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Stewart Hudson, Emily Hall Tremaine Foundation 
Climate change is a global problem of unprecedented scope and carbon finance will 
play a critical role in addressing it. 
In the mid 1980s, when I first started working on environmental policy issues, one 
would never have heard such a bold assertion. The prevailing belief in much of the 
environmental community was that private capital was usually the cause and rarely if 
ever the solution to environmental problems. And in the world of finance and 
investment, few individuals understood, or thought it was important enough to 
know, how markets influenced the environment and vice versa. 
As is made abundantly clear in Carbon Finance: Environmental Market Solutions to 
Climate Change, we are in a very different place today than we were 20 years ago. The 
environmental community is far more willing to add market-based mechanisms to 
its problem-solving tool box, and the financial world is far more savvy about 
environmental issues, including climate change. 
In the opening chapter of this publication, and in their own work on the history of 
financial innovation, Yale School of Management professors William M. Goetzmann 
and K. Geert Rouwenhorst document how financial instruments have, throughout 
history, co-evolved with changes in social purpose and concerns. Carbon finance might 
therefore be thought of as the latest example of this kind of social financial co-evolution. 
But first – what exactly do we mean when we use the term “carbon finance”? 
As the authors illustrate in this work, carbon finance has several different features. 
The first involves developing a market that trades in two new commodities – carbon 
allowances and their close cousins, carbon offsets. A second feature of carbon finance 
relates to investment. Whether venture capital, the relatively short-term financing of 
clean energy deals, or more traditional long-term investment in clean energy 
opportunities, investment is a critical element of carbon finance. Finally, carbon 
finance lends a new thematic focus to due diligence assessments of private firms. Said 
differently, carbon finance has a research element, one that will lead to a better 
understanding of how private firms have positioned themselves for success in a clean 
energy economy or, more troubling, how they have failed to do so. Assessments of 
carbon risk and reward, and the readiness of corporate firms to profit from the 
transition to a low carbon future, will in turn affect the trading and investment 
prospects inherent in what we mean by carbon finance. 
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One of the most agreed-upon conclusions about carbon finance is that carbon 
markets are closely tied to and significantly impacted by governmental policy on 
climate and energy. Notwithstanding the capacity for imperfection, a corollary to this 
conclusion is equally important – that government policies are necessary for carbon 
markets to develop, grow, and mature. 
The experts showcased in Carbon Finance: Environmental Market Solutions to 
Climate Change suggest some critical “do’s” and “don’ts” for governments, and 
provide some examples of inherent dangers in governmental policy-making that 
would be worthwhile to avoid. 
A first danger, of course, is that governments will fail to act in a timely enough 
manner. Failure to act in the face of such an overwhelming and disruptive threat as 
climate change allows for unregulated markets to develop. These unregulated 
markets might be well intentioned (or not), but without the proper regulatory 
framework there is no certainty as to how the markets will behave. Furthermore, 
when a regulatory regime is in place, the attractiveness of carbon markets and their 
ability to function effectively may have been dimmed by the manner in which 
unregulated markets could already have poisoned the well. 
A second danger is that governments will act alone, neglecting to make common 
cause with other jurisdictions that share their goals and are willing to work in 
mutually beneficial ways. An overly diverse array of regulatory regimes, especially one 
that involves a lot of “reinventing of wheels” prevents markets from scaling up and 
makes price discovery, when done across jurisdictions, more art than science. 
A third danger is that governmental action will not be ambitious enough to solve 
the problem at hand. This scenario, that weak-kneed policies become the best that 
politics can produce, will also lead to a fourth danger. 
The fourth danger is that if governments fail to adopt policies virile enough to 
fully address the climate problem, they will then do something that makes all market 
makers shudder – they will return again and again to tinker with the rules. 
Constant tinkering is, as the experts in this publication indicate, the bane of 
market creation. It makes prices utterly dependent on the shifting sands of domestic 
politics, rather than the more enduring fundamentals of how mature markets 
behave. Rather than unleashing the power of private capital, tinkering makes that 
capital more allegiant to political engagement than the dependable financial 
guideposts of risk and reward, profit and loss. 
These are some of the dangers of governmental involvement, necessary though it 
is to the growth of carbon finance. At the same time, there are a number of steps that 
governments can and should take to encourage the growth of these new markets. 
Governments can serve as objective third parties, available not only to establish 
rules that induce fairness among private firms, but also to govern markets as they 
evolve. In this particular case, carbon finance will be shaped by the continued 
discoveries of climate science and what it tells us about climate impacts on social 
welfare and the environment. Governments can be disseminators of scientific 
information, and serve to assess the validity and reliability of climate science. 
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Governments find it hard to pick winners and losers among private firms, but that 
doesn’t mean governments should shy away from setting policies that would ensure 
that winning, in a financial sense, is consistent with the desired social goal of reducing 
carbon pollution. Governmental policies can set up trading regimes (as in cap-and­
trade programs) that create a market and produce the desired environmental 
outcomes. Governments can create incentives so that state and local governments, as 
well as the federal government, adopt a cost effective portfolio of policies and programs 
necessary to the formation of carbon markets and the growth of carbon finance. 
Governments can reduce obstacles to investment in cleantech and, while this is 
certainly more controversial, there are instances where subsidies can and should 
encourage investment in new sources of energy like wind, solar, and the like. 
Governments can also support a new kind of due diligence – the reporting of climate 
risks and the extent to which firms are positioned for a transition to a low carbon 
economy. 
Finally, while governments should not tinker, they must certainly provide for 
oversight and regulation of carbon finance. It’s possible, as the current financial crisis 
has demonstrated, for governments to turn too blind an eye to financial innovation. 
Recognizing the limits to laissez-faire treatment of markets is not, at the same time, a 
reason to adopt a style of governing that is so over-involved it undermines the power that 
markets possess. The most effective strategy calls for a balance between policy 
intervention and an informed belief that markets can, if properly designed, achieve a 
commonly agreed upon social welfare objective (in this case reducing carbon pollution). 
Will it come to pass that carbon finance helps, rather than hinders, efforts to 
address climate change and other related issues? There is reason to be optimistic in 
this regard, as many of the experts in this publication point out. 
To begin at the beginning, we know from the opening chapter that financial 
innovation has always proven capable of evolving to suit the social and economic 
needs of society. No one should overstate the magic of the markets (keep in mind 
how King Leopold financed the colonization of the Belgian Congo), but it is 
important to know that markets can be properly structured to produce socially 
desirable outcomes. 
We also know that there is wide agreement on the necessary role of governments 
in supporting the growth of carbon markets and investment. We are not constrained 
by a futile choice between private capital OR public policy – in the case of carbon 
finance they are inextricably linked. 
To date, we also have evidence that these are robust markets. The European market 
is already well over $60 billion annually, and experts tell us that cleantech investment, 
worldwide, has doubled over the past year. Climate change is a global problem of 
unprecedented scope and carbon finance will play a critical role in addressing it. This 
publication, based on the extraordinary 2008 Carbon Finance Speaker Series hosted 
by the Center for Business and the Environment at Yale, tells us how best to do so. 




Bradford S. Gentry, Director, Center for Business and the Environment at Yale 
I write this Foreword for Carbon Finance: Environmental Market Solutions to Climate 
Change at a time when this 300-year old university is undergoing a “green 
renaissance.” Right across the street from my Prospect Street office, the new home of 
Yale’s School of Forestry & Environmental Studies is nearing completion. Kroon Hall 
will be one of the world’s greenest buildings, utilizing environmentally sound 
materials, leading-edge clean energy technologies, a rainwater harvesting system and 
more. As such, it embodies the values and ideals of the 100-year-old school while 
exemplifying a new vision of sustainability that is prompting innovation across the 
university. 
The Carbon Finance Speaker Series, from which this publication was developed, is 
a flagship project of the Center for Business and the Environment at Yale (CBEY). 
The series illustrates our belief that environmental markets can play a major, positive 
role in providing solutions to environmental issues, including climate change. This 
publication represents a major advance in our understanding of the interrelation­
ships among policy, markets, and technology in the climate arena. 
CBEY, the speaker series, and this publication are just a few of the initiatives that 
are part of Yale’s green renaissance. I am going to focus my remarks here on what Yale 
is doing, with the hope that what I describe will connect with, and perhaps even 
inspire, similar efforts in many other institutions here and abroad, including 
businesses, government agencies, and community organizations. We all have roles to 
play in developing the low carbon economy of the future and I speak simply from the 
perspective of my own institution. 
In the face of unprecedented growth and a major expansion of campus facilities, 
Yale has embarked on an applied experiment to reduce its carbon footprint. In 
October of 2005, through the leadership of President Levin, Dean Gus Speth of the 
School of Forestry & Environmental Studies, and the officers of the university, Yale 
committed to reducing its greenhouse gas emissions to 10 percent below 1990 levels 
by 2020 – a 43 percent reduction from 2005 levels,1 while at the same time planning 
for 15 percent growth of the university’s physical plant. President Levin’s vision for 
Yale leadership on climate change is clear. As he said in a 2007 address in 
Copenhagen, “Universities have an important role in the effort to curtail global 
warming . . . We aspire to leadership in all of these dimensions of sustainability, and 
1 
For an update on Yale’s 
progress to reduce green­
house gas emissions, go to 
www.yale.edu/sustainability 
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2 
Climate Lectures at the 
University of Copenhagen. 
President Levin’s remarks in 
Leading by Example: From 
Sustainable Campuses to a 
Sustainable World. (January 21, 
2007) 
3 
This event celebrated the 
100th year anniversary of 
President Roosevelt and 
Gifford Pinchot uniting the 
nation’s governors and 
launching the U.S. 
conservation movement. The 
Yale Conference of Governors 
on Climate Change brought 
together Dr. Rajendra Pachauri 
(Chairman of the Inter­
governmental Panel on 
Climate Change) and leading 
state governors including 
Arnold Schwarzenegger (CA), 
Jodi Rell (CT), Kathleen 
Sebelius (KS), and John 
Corzine (NJ) to release a 
declaration signed by 18 
governors that proposes a 





we hope to inculcate in our students a lasting consciousness of what it means to live 
on a planet with finite resources in full awareness of how human action today affects 
the future of both humanity and the natural environment.”2 
As part of this effort, the university has undertaken a variety of specific initiatives, 
including competitions for reducing energy use, the development of an experimental 
concept for the Yale Community Carbon Fund, the organization of the Yale Conference 
of Governors on Climate Change, 3 and the organization of an event on Carbon Finance 
– Clean Energy – Climate Change. These initiatives, and many more like them across 
campus, will help inspire and prepare students to become the leaders we need to 
address climate change far into the future. 
Preparing individuals to lead society at crucial junctures has long been Yale’s 
mission and one at which our institution excels. Fulfilling this mission is even more 
critical today, when the world is facing such complex environmental and economic 
challenges. We are helping to make progress. In a recent article entitled “Can Carbon 
Credits Slow Global Warming?”4, for example, Fast Company magazine highlights the 
role of Yale graduates who, as investors, analysts, and market makers, are among those 
leading the charge in the rapidly developing carbon markets. 
As we confront environmental problems such as global warming, uncertain energy 
supplies, water shortages, and diminishing biodiversity that are threatening global 
economic health and social stability, I wonder whether leading academic institutions 
can act even more quickly to make the necessary investments in research and 
education initiatives to advance sustainability. As Gifford Pinchot, Yale alumnus and 
founder of the Yale School of Forestry & Environmental Studies, once said, “The vast 
possibilities of our great future will become realities only if we make ourselves 
responsible for that future.” 
Individuals at Yale are increasingly taking responsibility for shaping a sustainable 
future. I can see this through my office window, as Kroon Hall takes shape. I can see 
it in the commitment the university has made to reduce substantially its emissions of 
greenhouse gasses. And I can see it in this publication, as well as in the words of the 
experts participating in CBEY’s Carbon Finance Speaker Series. 
Reflecting on these innovations, I can envision the impact Yale’s green renaissance 
may have on our students, faculty, staff and community. I can see Yale becoming a 
campus rich in social networks of students, faculty, and staff engaged in 
multidisciplinary environmental problem-solving. It will be a leader in using finance 
in combination with science and policy to accelerate the diffusion of environmentally 
beneficial technology. It will establish interdepartmental teams able to take a concept 
for an environmental solution and execute its value proposition. It will truly be 
training leaders for the sustainable future of tomorrow. 
Each of the institutions represented in this volume, and many others, are working 
hard to help build a sustainable future. It is our hope that the insights of the authors 
in this publication will help us move toward that future ever more rapidly. 




Bryan Garcia and Eric Roberts, Center for Business and the Environment at Yale 
Over the course of the 2007-2008 academic year, the Center for Business and the 
Environment at Yale, through the generous support of the Emily Hall Tremaine 
Foundation, organized a multi-part Carbon Finance Speaker Series in which the 
world’s leading practitioners in carbon markets and finance were invited to Yale to 
help us better understand the role of finance in accelerating solutions to 
environmental problems. This publication, Carbon Finance: Environmental Market 
Solutions to Climate Change, provides a compilation of presentations given during 
that series to bring their collective insights to a larger audience. 
While the chapters within this publication explicitly contain a lot of information 
and insight into carbon finance and environmental markets, they are also often rich 
in anecdotes and industry language that, beyond making for an enjoyable read, 
provide a valuable immersion into these fields. Whether novice or expert, as you read 
through these chapters, we hope that your understanding grows from the many 
perspectives represented. 
A lot has transpired over the period of time in which this speaker series took place 
– from ever-rising oil prices and an unprecedented U.S. presidential primary election, 
to the latest in original thinking on the economics of climate change by McKinsey & 
Company.1 Nonetheless, we made the dual decision as editors to not update such 
material in the earlier talks and to not structure our chapters according to the 
chronological time in which their corresponding presentations were originally 
delivered, which was driven primarily by the availability of speakers who are very 
much in demand. We believe the first point serves to maintain the contextual integrity 
of the speakers’ remarks, with the ancillary benefit of reminding us that the past year, 
like the carbon markets themselves, has been markedly dynamic. In regards to the 
second point, we structured the chapters by the nature of their content, in the interest 
of building the readers’ understanding of carbon finance and environmental markets 
in a logical way. This was always our intention and, in fact, after each of the talks, we 
would often discuss where it would be best placed relative to the other chapters. 
Sometime before the end of the series, we had organized this publication into five 
discrete parts, beginning with the role of financial innovation in society and ending 
with recommendations for the broader world, starting with our own university. We 
will use this introduction to give you a quick view of the content of the publication. 
1 
McKinsey and Vattenfall. The 
McKinsey Quarterly 2007 
Number 1. 
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Part I opens with a chapter called The History of Financial Innovation by Yale 
School of Management Finance Professors William Goetzmann and K. Geert 
Rouwenhorst. Professors Goetzmann and Rouwenhorst take a classical look at the 
“incredible ingenuity” that financial innovation has historically demonstrated for 
solving a wide range of societal problems, from dealing with large scale urbanization 
in Mesopotamia to addressing the illiquidity of international debt instruments in the 
18th and 19th centuries. In so doing, they provide context for the problem-solving role 
of finance in society and frame the reader’s understanding of finance as a tool to 
confront climate change. 
In the next chapter, Investing in Climate Change, Win Neuger, Chairman and CEO 
of AIG Investments, builds on the understanding developed in Chapter 1 by 
beginning to show how the climate issue can influence the investment strategy of a 
trillion dollar asset management company and insurer. Working from this vantage 
point, he emphasizes the need for all investors to keep climate change “top of mind” 
in their investment strategies so as to anticipate and to mitigate the risks that this 
game-changing problem poses, while also realizing the emerging opportunities for 
adding lasting value. 
Moving into Part II, we delve more deeply into the underlying regulations and 
market drivers that create the foundation for the emergence of a multi-billion dollar 
industry in carbon finance. This starts with Chapter 3, A Pot of Gold for Renewable 
Energy: Funding Renewable Energy with Carbon Finance, where Peter Sweatman, a 
Managing Director with Climate Change Capital, takes the reader through the 
“fundamentals of carbon finance.” Framing the value of carbon and renewable 
energy, he includes a review of carbon policy from 1988 to the present, an explanation 
of the value of carbon as a form of currency, and an overview of the Clean 
Development Mechanism. 
In Chapter 4, Abyd Karmali, Managing Director and Global Head of Carbon 
Emissions for Merrill Lynch, provides a detailed perspective on carbon markets, 
policy, finance, and technology in Investment Banks Jump On Board: Mining the 
Opportunities in Global Carbon Markets. Mr. Karmali’s prior experience in 
government and new-found passion for investment banking come to a unique 
crossroads as he discusses the role of regulation and carbon markets in realizing the 
goal of “getting the highest level of environmental emission reductions at the lowest 
possible cost to society overall.” 
Mark Fulton, Managing Director and Climate Change Strategist for Deutsche 
Bank, furthers the discussion from an asset management point of view in Chapter 5, 
Climate Change Investment Strategies: How a Universal Bank is Leading Investments in 
a Low Carbon Economy. Going through both mitigation and adaptation investments, 
he is clear about the focus of banks to make money first and reduce environmental 
impact second, while still emphasizing the abundance of win-win plays and the 
importance of increasing capital investment to enable environmental market 
solutions. Part II closes with Jon Anda, Executive-in-Residence at the Fuqua School 
of Business at Duke University and formerly President of the Environmental Markets 
Network at Environmental Defense Fund. In Chapter 6, Environmental Market 
yale school of forestry & environmental studies 
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Solutions for Global Warming, Mr. Anda makes the case that finance is fundamental to 
the creation and operation of any well-functioning environmental market. Perhaps 
more of a “501” talk than a “101,” his presentation expounds on some of the major 
themes presented during Part II at a level that we might expect our readers to be at 
this point in the publication. 
Having established a good foundation for understanding regulations and market 
drivers through these individuals’ presentations, we then transition to Part III, where  
market makers participate in moderated panel discussions to offer varying views and 
insights on climate change funding and investment, and on clean energy. In Chapter 7, 
Funding Solutions to Climate Change: A Philanthropy Panel, venture philanthropists 
Stewart Hudson (President of the Emily Hall Tremaine Foundation), Michael Northrop 
(Program Director of the Rockefeller Brothers Fund), and Ted Smith (Executive Director 
of the Henry P. Kendall Foundation), give an inside look at the funding strategies of three 
of the leading U.S. foundations. Although issuing the caveat that “if you’ve met one 
foundation, you’ve met one foundation,” they do reveal some of the common inner 
workings of the foundation world and deliver a candid and impassioned discussion that 
expresses a shared sense of urgency for the need to confront climate change. 
In Chapter 8, Investing in Climate Change: A Panel on Hedge Funds, environmental 
market and finance specialists Benjamin Block (Senior Analyst with Ardsley 
Partners), Andy Ertel (President and CEO of Evolution Markets), Paul Ezekiel 
(Managing Director and Global Head of Carbon Trading with Credit Suisse), and 
Martin Whittaker (Director at MissionPoint Capital), address issues surrounding the 
carbon markets, such as the need for regulatory certainty and increased market 
liquidity, with the hedge fund industry in mind. Beginning with an overview of the 
newly launched NYMEX green exchange, this conversation concludes with a question 
and answer session with an audience consisting mostly of hedge fund professionals. 
Chapter 9, Investing in Clean Energy and Climate Change: A Private Equity Panel, 
features private equity professionals Jeff Miller (Partner with the Tremont Group), 
Jeff Possick (Principal with MissionPoint Capital), and George Sorenson (Chairman 
of the FE Clean Energy Group), openly sharing their lessons learned and forward-
looking thoughts on clean energy and environmental market plays, including a good 
bit on energy efficiency. Given the diverse experiences of this panel, the scope of this 
chapter is somewhat large, but the messages are clear. 
The expert panel discussions of Part III conclude with a look at the future of 
technology and venture capital investing in Chapter 10, Investing in Cleantech: A 
Conversation Between a Venture Capitalist and an Entrepreneur. After an overview of 
the trends and essential components of cleantech venture capital derived from 
original research by Moderator Anastasia O’Rourke (PhD candidate at the Yale 
School of Forestry & Environmental Studies), Howard Berke (Senior Advisor to 
Good Energies and Executive Chairman and Co-Founder of Konarka Technologies) 
and Lise Dondy (President of the Connecticut Clean Energy Fund) engage in a 
dynamic conversation highlighting their career pathways to cleantech, the challenges 
of funding new technologies and bringing university and lab technologies to market, 
and the need for interdisciplinary skill sets in the cleantech sector. 
yale school of forestry & environmental studies 
Part IV aims to enrich the information, lessons, and ideas put forth during the first
three parts of the book by offering some additional, and unique, perspectives on
emerging issues and opportunities in carbon finance and environmental markets. In
Chapter 11, Insuring the Future in a Changing World: The Impact of Climate Change on
Insurance and Financial Products and Services, Ralph Mucerino, President of AIG
Global Marine & Energy, speaks to the critical link between the insurance industry
and climate change. Representing the largest commercial insurance company in the
world, Mr. Mucerino goes through the risks and opportunities presented by climate
change sector-by-sector. In Chapter 12, Winners and Losers in a Low Carbon Economy:
A Look at Innovest’s Carbon Beta, Mario López-Alcalá and Hiroshi Minami, Senior
Analysts with Innovest Strategic Value Advisors, take the reader into the world of
intangible asset valuation. Here, they consider and report on the impacts of carbon
regulation and carbon positioning on material corporate performance through
financial analysis techniques stemming from their proprietary Carbon Beta platform.
Part IV of the publication ends at the place where we intend to begin the next
Carbon Finance Speaker Series for the 2009 academic year – with a look at forest
carbon and forest markets. To confront climate change, both deforestation and land
management must be addressed. In Chapter 13, For the Love of Timber: A Different
Look at a Natural Resource, Andrew Aulisi, Director of the Markets and Enterprise
Program of the World Resources Institute, does this by embarking on a full value
chain analysis of the forest products sector. Without ignoring the uncertainties
surrounding the science of forest carbon and the rapidly evolving policies and market
dynamics, this chapter comprehensively highlights the complexities and
opportunities facing the forest products business.
The publication concludes with Part V, Chapter 14: From Understanding to Action –
Advancing Solutions to Climate Change on Campus, in our Communities, and Beyond,
our own contribution as editors of this volume. In this chapter, we aim to apply some
of the knowledge we gained from these leading practitioners over the course of the
past year. There are a myriad opportunities that can be pursued in order to advance
local and global solutions to climate change, and starting with our most immediate
spheres of influence, we hope to utilize Carbon Finance: Environmental Market
Solutions to Climate Change as a platform for Yale University to elevate its
commitment to promoting climate change solutions through its investments in
research and education on and off campus.
additional context and information
As will be quickly discerned, each chapter is prefaced by a page we call Editors’
Remarks. While our introduction here aims to provide some sense of the content and
context of each chapter as well as the connections between chapters, the Editors’
Remarks are designed to convey these notions in more detail, and may also be used as
a filter to help the non-continuous reader find a chapter best suited for his or her
particular interests.
As also noted in the Editors’ Remarks, additional resources to accompany all
chapters of Carbon Finance: Environmental Market Solutions to Climate Change can
carbon finance: environmental market solutions to climate change
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be found by following links through the Center for Business and the Environment at
Yale website or more directly through the following web address: http://www.
yale.edu/cbey/carbonfinance2008.
From this site, you can read additional articles related to each chapter, download
the original recordings for each presentation, obtain pdf versions of all chapters, and
order a bound copy of the entire publication (produced using a print-on-demand
system, printed on 100 percent recycled paper and with carbon emission offsets). To
date, the recorded versions of this speaker series have been some of the most
downloaded content at Yale University, and have had the good fortune of successfully
reaching a global audience. These additional educational resources are intended to
grow this momentum and to complement this publication by adding to everyone’s
understanding of the important role finance has in advancing solutions to
environmental problems. If you should desire information not found on this website,
or if you have questions or comments, we would be happy to receive them via email
at bryan.garcia@yale.edu or eric.roberts@yale.edu.
As a final comment on context, every chapter, with the exception of Chapter 2,
contains a question and answer session. These questions were in all cases generated
by the audience, which typically was directly affiliated with Yale University,
particularly the Yale School of Forestry & Environmental Studies and the Yale School
of Management, or the greater New Haven and Connecticut community. Chapters 2
and 8, however, come from presentations held in Greenwich, CT, and were delivered
to an audience mostly, though not exclusively, composed of hedge fund practitioners.
Finally, it is our hope that Carbon Finance: Environmental Market Solutions to
Climate Change will serve in a number of capacities – to educate students, faculty,
policy-makers, NGOs, market markers, entrepreneurs, investors, and business
professionals across the board about the important role the finance sector plays in
advancing environmental market solutions to climate change. For example, we hope
that these remarks by leading practitioners will become a part of syllabi for university
coursework on environmental markets, background information for policy-makers
and philanthropic and non-profit organizations considering market-based
approaches to environmental problem solving, and as a primer for institutional
investors, including endowment managers and pension funds that are in the process
of developing portfolio strategies on mitigation and adaptation solutions to climate
change. Lastly, we hope that Carbon Finance: Environmental Market Solutions to
Climate Change will become a resource for you to support your personal actions to
combat climate change and realize the many opportunities that climate change
investing presents.
introduction
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Carbon Finance: A Definition
Bryan Garcia and Eric Roberts
Center for Business and the Environment at Yale
What is carbon finance? Since this is a question we received, in one form or another,
so frequently over the past year, it seemed appropriate to address it upfront.
Surprisingly, there are a lot of answers to this question, and although we haven’t
found inconsistency among these answers, we also haven’t found precise uniformity.
This brief treatment here is not intended to establish this uniformity, but rather
just to give a sense as to the scope, as well as content, of the possible answers. Indeed,
we believe that pinning down the definition of carbon finance at this point in time
fails to recognize how much the term stands to evolve over the coming years. Also,
because of the many voices contained within this publication, we do not wish to
retrospectively coin a phrase that might disagree, albeit in subtle shades, with the way
the phrase was originally wielded during the Carbon Finance Speaker Series over the
past year. We do point out the diversity of usage, but we do not try to second-guess
it. As a final point, we acknowledge that there have already been some excellent
working definitions supplied from other sources. We note a few of these, but our list
is not designed to be complete.
First, in the spirit of the carbon markets themselves, we start with the results from
a diverse and collaborative effort. According to Wikipedia1:
Carbon finance is a new branch of environmental finance. Carbon finance
explores the financial implications of living in a carbon-constrained world, a
world in which emissions of carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gases (GHG)
carry a price. Financial risks and opportunities impact corporate balance sheets,
and market-based instruments are capable of transferring environmental risk
and achieving environmental objectives. Issues regarding climate change and
GHG emissions must be addressed as part of strategic management decision-
making.
The general term is applied to investments in GHG emission reduction projects
and the creation (origination) of financial instruments that are tradeable on the
carbon market.
The World Bank Carbon Finance Unit2 gives a less broad and more traditional and
transaction-based definition:
carbon finance: environmental market solutions to climate change
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Carbon Finance: The Financial
Implications of Climate
Change, Wiley Finance, ISBN:
978-0-471-79467-7, April 2007.
Carbon finance is the general term applied to resources provided to a project to
purchase greenhouse gas (GHG) emission reductions (“carbon” for short).
Carbon Finance: Resources provided to projects generating (or expected to
generate) greenhouse gas (or carbon) emission reductions in the form of the
purchase of such emission reductions.
In a definition that spans the essence of the previous two, Sonia Labatt and
Rodney R. White, in their book on carbon finance3, submit the following:
Carbon finance explores the financial implications of living in a carbon-
constrained world – a world in which emissions of carbon dioxide and other
greenhouse gases carry a price. Thus, carbon finance:
 Represents one specific dimension of environmental finance.
 Explores the financial risks and opportunities associated with a carbon-
constrained society.
 Anticipates the availability and use of market-based instruments that are capable
of transferring environmental risk and achieving environmental objectives.
Within this publication, we also have a collection of definitions and usages. A few
examples:
In the Preface, Stewart Hudson approaches this topic directly:
As the authors illustrate in this work, carbon finance has several different
features. The first involves developing a market that trades in two new
commodities – carbon allowances and their close cousins, carbon offsets. A
second feature of carbon finance relates to investment. Whether venture capital,
the relatively short-term financing of clean energy deals, or more traditional
long-term investment in clean energy opportunities, investment is a critical
element of carbon finance. Finally, carbon finance lends a new thematic focus to
due diligence assessments of private firms. Said differently, carbon finance has a
research element, one that will lead to a better understanding of how private
firms have positioned themselves for success in a clean energy economy, or more
troubling, how they have failed to do so. Assessments of carbon risk and reward,
and the readiness of corporate firms to profit from the transition to a low carbon
future, will in turn affect the trading and investment prospects inherent in what
we mean by carbon finance.
In Chapter 1, The History of Financial Innovation, Professors William Goetzmann
and K. Geert Rouwenhurst use the term carbon finance both in the transactional
sense and in alignment with Mr. Hudson’s first feature, i.e. developing a market that
trades in two new commodities. In addition, they utilize it more generally to indicate
a financial approach to solving environmental, specifically climate change, problems:
“One of the interesting things about carbon finance is that it is a proposal for letting the
invisible hand solve some of the problems that one might otherwise consider regulatory
issues to be addressed by a central planner.”
Within our publication, the most thorough treatment of the term carbon finance
comes from Peter Sweatman in Chapter 3, A Pot of Gold for Renewable Energy:
Funding Renewable Energy with Carbon Finance. Clearly by the title, we can see the
term pointing to something akin to the World Bank Carbon Finance Unit’s
definition. But more broadly, he also applies it to the wider field of carbon
investment. The carbon finance team within Climate Change Capital, for instance,
manages capital dedicated directly to carbon mitigation projects as well as some of the
entities which provide the services or technologies that go into these projects. Within this
scope, there is also a trading component: [the team] trades the carbon credits that come
out of the projects to provide financial returns.
Finally, we point to one more example within this book. In Chapter 13, For the Love
of Timber: A Different Look at a Natural Resource, Andrew Aulisi employs the term to
specifically mean carbon pricing, or transactions associated with CO2 credits. He
remarks, for instance, that carbon pricing or carbon finance is really just one facet of a
much more complex issue.
Whether carbon finance is in fact a narrow or broad term, a simple revenue stream
or a complex instrument, a transactional or a general approach to solving
environmental problems and climate change, or some combination of all of these, we
hope that the many chapters within this book, above all, serve to illustrate that
finance, in general, can be an important tool to include in the climate change solution
set going forward.
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Chapter 1
The History of Financial Innovation
Professor William Goetzmann and Professor K. Geert Rouwenhorst
Yale School of Management
editors’ remarks
This was the opening talk in the speaker series, chosen to frame the subsequent
year-long discussion about the role of finance in helping to solve the climate issue.
Professors William Goetzmann and K. Geert Rouwenhorst skillfully construct this
framework, taking us through several historical examples of financial innovation
and putting finance and its ability to solve problems in context. As Professor
Goetzmann states,“it seem[s] clear that in order to make this experiment in carbon
finance work, it would be useful to understand the foundations of financial
innovation.” Indeed, watching finance emerge as a tool to solve problems
associated with the large scale urbanization of Mesopotamia or the illiquidity of
international debt instruments in the 18th and 19th centuries, one readily gains the
valuable perspective that finance “is something that was invented and elaborated
on over time” as a powerful means to solving problems of a broad nature.
Professor Goetzmann begins the talk by illustrating, through a big picture lens,
the essence of finance and financial innovation, highlighting the relevancy of
certain historical developments and lessons to the burgeoning carbon markets.
Picking up about midway, Professor Rouwenhorst presents some interesting
examples that serve to demonstrate the “incredible ingenuity” of financial
technology, corroborating Professor Goetzmann’s claim that “financial markets
have incredible potential for implementing change . . . [and] are at least worth a
gamble in terms of being a tool that we might be able use to solve environmental
problems.” After an insightful conclusion, the presentation ends with a question
and answer session mostly concentrated on the general structure of carbon
markets.
The foundation built by this opening talk was one that we enjoyed so much that
a signed copy of the book upon which much of its material is based became a
standard token of appreciation to all of the presenters that followed.*
* To gain further context, read
related articles, order a bound
copy of this publication, or
download pdfs of the
publication or the recorded
version of this presentation,
please visit: www.yale.edu/
cbey/carbonfinance2008  
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Oxford University Press, 2005
William Goetzmann
Thank you for inviting us to be the opening speakers in this really innovative series.
As you can see from the title of our talk, it is not directly focused on carbon finance,
and we were a little taken aback that our topic was of interest to this group. But as we
got interested in looking at these connections, it seemed clear that in order to make
this experiment in carbon finance work, it would be useful to understand the
foundations of financial innovation – how innovation takes place, what kinds of
instruments might fail, and so forth. The lesson for us in many regards comes from
experience and the history of financial innovation over time. So today you will hear
about financial history and, though we will not explicitly make this link for you, you
can think how this history relates to carbon markets.
I will begin the presentation by speaking about some general topics in finance and
some historical episodes in financial innovation. Professor Rouwenhorst will follow
with some really fascinating additional examples from the golden age of finance that
can also be found in our book1. A lot of the information we’re going to talk about today
comes from this book, which was a great experience for us in terms of learning about
financial history – most of the topics you can find in the introductory chapter and in
later chapters as well. We’ll conclude the presentation with some questions and answers.
why finance?
Finance is really a technology about the future. It is not an ideology, but rather a set
of tools that are increasingly being used to solve problems. It’s a peculiar technology
in that it is not a machine that performs things in the present tense, but is a way of
passing value back and forth between the future and the present. The essence of
finance is a time machine – you put some money in a box today, you turn the crank,
and it appears at some time and place in the distant future. We call that a loan, but it
is a strange slight of hand. It is something that was invented and elaborated on over
time and it is endlessly fascinating in terms of financial engineering and technology.
The thing that makes this particularly interesting with regards to carbon finance is
that a lot of what we are trying to do is to change the future. Given the status quo of
the present, we are looking for a technology to affect future environmental outcomes.
Finance is first a way of passing economic value through time, but maybe it is also a
way of passing environmental value and characteristics through time.
Driven by the fact that there are financial markets, finance is also a mechanism for
allocation; free capital markets are classic mechanisms for efficient allocation of
capital. One of the interesting things about carbon finance is that it is a proposal for
letting the invisible hand solve some of the problems that one might otherwise
consider regulatory issues to be addressed by a central planner. This is one of the
most important issues that connects finance with the topic of carbon finance. It is a
thing that will subtly and, I hope, inevitably enlist a broader community of interested
people in the problem at hand. It’s a way, in some sense, of slowly seducing an ever
increasing circle of agents into solving the problem together. And it does this by
creating economic incentives as well as philanthropic incentives.
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One of the interesting things about carbon finance is that it is a proposal for
letting the invisible hand solve some of the problems that one might
otherwise consider regulatory issues to be addressed by a central planner.
If carbon markets work, if the financial technology applied to environmental
problems works, it will enlist an unusual and eclectic community of economic
players, from hedge funds to savers to speculators and so on, into thinking about
forecasting and estimating the effect of environmental carbon. That will be a good
thing. The question is, what mechanisms will help us achieve that?
why financial history?
Financial markets have incredible potential for implementing change. They have been
extraordinary catalysts at certain points in history. As a result, they are at least worth
a gamble in terms of being a tool that we might be able use to solve environmental
problems.
What you will see is that crises, particularly warfare, have been the catalyst for
these transformative innovations. And intermediaries, although they may seem like
pesky problems at times of financial crisis, play a very important role in getting the
prices right on the things that we would like to be traded and liquid in this market.
Finally, once you get markets started, they have this capability of stimulating and
harnessing human ingenuity. If you think about the collective brainpower of all the
students passing through Yale, and you push that back two hundred years, you had an
immense number of people focusing on Bible studies and Greek philosophy. And
now we have an immense number of people focusing on (among other things) what
Goldman Sachs does and how to price derivative securities on Wall Street. I am being
a little facetious here, but there are ways that the markets have transformed what
really smart people are interested in spending their time thinking about and doing. If
you create a viable market, such as a carbon market, it has the potential of getting
some bright, creative people involved in solving these problems.
. . . there are ways that the markets have transformed what really smart
people are interested in spending their time thinking about and doing. If
you create a viable market, such as a carbon market, it has the potential of
getting some bright, creative people involved in solving these problems.
a very brief lesson in what i think finance is
Finance has three key features. The first one is time. You can think about it as
investing today and reaping the rewards tomorrow, or borrowing money from the
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future to invest it today. Some people need to be savers, while others need the capital
to build businesses. Financial markets and financial contracts and securities are just
mechanisms for making that happen. Think about a bond – it’s a time machine that
passes money into the future for the saver. For the borrower, it’s a way of promising
what you do not have yet, something that you expect to get in the future in return for
something you receive today. Stocks are a little bit like this – you have a stream of
dividends that are going to stretch out into the future, but you pay your money in
order to get those dividends today. The value of the stock is the present value of that
future stream of dividends. Presumably because this future stream goes on forever, it
is a discounted value. There is a time value to that stream. A lot of finance has to do
with determining the appropriate discount for that time dimension.
Futures contracts are pre-agreed compensation for the delivery of future
commodities. With carbon futures, for example, you have a contract that allows the
owner to expend so much pollutant at some time in the future for an agreed-upon
price today. We often think about these things as financial contracts – stocks and
bonds – but there are lots of ways for these inter-temporal transfers to happen. It
used to be that the family was a mechanism for smoothing income through time or
creating delivery of future value through present investment. Other institutions, such
as banks or pension funds, the government or non-profits, can all be thought of as
financial agents. It is not the institution that is as important as the basic function –
the need for people to plan for their future retirement or the need for you to shift
income that you have today into the future, for example. Or, for instance, if you want
to buy a house, you can borrow the money today and offset it with future
compensation.
The second dimension that is really important is chance. You have the future, and
between you and the future is a veil of uncertainty. The future is inherently hard to
predict. That veil of uncertainty creates interesting potential for financial technology.
A lot of finance has to do with rating contracts depending on some outcome.
Insurance contracts are a classic case. With life insurance, your beneficiaries only get
paid when you die. With fire insurance, you only get paid when your house burns
down. These things are called derivative securities and are ways of insuring against
certain kinds of outcomes. There are institutions, such as insurance companies, that
make that happen. There are also traded securities, such as options, which are
securities that trade in a market, that allow you to hedge yourself against uncertain
outcomes such as a drop in the stock market, for example.
When one thinks about how these things might relate to carbon markets, one of
the problems one faces is what happens if these securities are suddenly worthless – if
some erroneous calculation was made about a cap on emissions and suddenly the
value of such securities expires. That is a disaster for investors who hold these things,
and there may be ways of insuring or protecting against that kind of outcome
through options or intermediaries that can take on that risk.
That kind of dealing with risk, parceling the risk out to someone willing to take
that risk, is called a structured product in modern terms – chopping up the risk and
selling it to the person or group that is best prepared to take it on. The current crisis
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that we’re in with mortgages suggests that it is not always clear that people
understand how much risk they are taking on. But nevertheless, there is a technology
for allocating that risk to those with the best expectation about it.
The third basic financial tool that I’d like to talk about is simply markets. Markets
don’t make finance, but they make finance better. They provide liquidity, but in some
sense they also provide democratic access to these ways of moving money through
time with different degrees of risk. This access goes beyond simply a notion of
fairness and level playing field, to the process of comparison shopping – the ability
to look at different prices for the same kinds of things and the ability to sell them to
the highest bidder. This process has a certain magic to it. The prices that emerge from
this process actually begin to incorporate available information. They aggregate
knowledge. They create a market consensus, a market expectation. And that
expectation is really an interesting thing. It’s an expectation about the future. If one
is thinking about trying to affect future outcomes, it is really useful to understand
what most people think about them, particularly when we’re imagining
environmental outcomes. If you had futures instruments that predicted emissions
out 10, 15 or 20 years, for example, you could compare these predictions with the
current state of scientific knowledge. So markets play an important role and
potentially a really important role.
Markets don’t make finance, but they make finance better. They provide
liquidity, but in some sense they also provide democratic access to these
ways of moving money through time with different degrees of risk. This
access goes beyond simply a notion of fairness and level playing field, to the
process of comparison shopping – the ability to look at different prices for
the same kinds of things and the ability to sell them to the highest bidder.
This process has a certain magic to it.
Finally, these are the ways that you are going to enlist larger and larger groups of
players. You need a market that is going to bring in lots of people, and you need a
broad market if you are going to bring in all these different players.
back to financial history
Origins in Mesopotamia
It was difficult to figure out which examples from our book to talk about, but I picked
three. The first example I want to talk about is really the origins of finance, which
began basically in Mesopotamia, in cities. Before urbanization in Mesopotamia, there
wasn’t writing and it is unlikely there was any serious form of finance. But very
shortly, with the emergence of large scale cities, there also emerged accounting
technology, financial technology, and recording technology. It is no accident that they
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occurred together. They solved two basic problems: reciprocity and competition for
land.
The problem of large scale urbanization was the problem of how to keep account
of people’s obligations to each other in a world where people were anonymous. If
there are a couple of people who are neighbors and who know each other well, they
can keep a mental account of who owes how many days to whom for what kind of
favor. Once there is a large community, that capability is no longer there. There is a
need for systems to record who has fulfilled their obligations and who hasn’t. Very
quickly these early Mesopotamian cities, around 3000 BCE or so, developed tools for
recording those obligations and making future promises for delivery of goods and
services. This is the reciprocity part.
The other thing that developed were contracts and property rights about land,
because when you live in the city there is, almost by definition, a huge demand for
space. One cannot just move a little further away so as not to bump up against one’s
neighbor. Very quickly people started to parcel out tiny bits of land and charge high
prices for them and have lawsuits that stretched on for generations about spaces the
size of a movie screen.
Out of those problems, finance emerged to solve both of them. Loans were
developed to take care of the issue of reciprocity, and things like mortgages and land
property rights developed to take care of the problems of land ownership and
competition for land. For almost every instrument we have today, if you look hard
enough at the cuneiform tablets, you can find some example of it. Let’s take a look at
one of them.
Figure 1 Cuneiform tables
For almost every instrument
we have today, if you look
hard enough at the cuneiform
tablets, you can find some
example of it.
Figure 1 is a tablet that I believe is
in the Yale collection. Yale has one of the greatest collections of cuneiform tablets, at
least among universities in the world. It was a gift of J.P. Morgan, who endowed the
Yale Babylonian collection. I thought this was a useful one to show because, although
it’s not a delivery for carbon, it’s a promise to deliver wooden objects – it’s as close as
I could get to what we would like to talk about. It’s just a contract for future delivery,
a futures contract, and it involves wooden objects and silver. It is a transaction that
introduces the dimension of time. What might have been a friendly promise between
two friends has now been formalized in a contract.
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It’s just a contract for future delivery, a futures contract, and it involves
wooden objects and silver. It is a transaction that introduces the dimension
of time. What might have been a friendly promise between two friends has
now been formalized in a contract.
Paper money and traveler’s checks in China
Let me skip on to China. I picked an example from China that is pretty
straightforward. One of China’s great challenges was a fight with the barbarians to the
West, and in the Song Dynasty, two amazing inventions took place. One was the
invention of paper money which provided a way to move value very quickly and very
cheaply through time and space and also a way to produce a lot more money in a
hurry when you needed to pay. Figure 2 shows a piece of paper money, again from the
Yale collection. This is from the Ming Dynasty. For those of you who read Chinese,
it's a Great Ming universally circulating treasury note.
Figure 2 Chinese paper money from the Ming Dynasty
Figure 3 is the other invention: a traveler’s check
from the Song Dynasty, 1208 ACE. I think it’s really
interesting, first of all because it has this little
symbol that looks like a flying horse suggesting
that money moves quickly through time. Also, just
like a traveler’s check, it requires the year, month,
and day to be filled in and then stamped by the
user to verify the expense. So, it is not just Western
finance that is contributing to this tradition of
innovation, it is also Eastern finance.
Deposit banks, checks, and the first bond market
in Venice
I’d like to provide one more example. This moves
up into the European medieval period, but not
too far distant in time, actually about the same
time as that piece of paper money. Marco Polo
went to China and wrote an elaborate description of paper money – about how
amazing it is that people peel off the bark of trees, mash it up, print this thing on it
and then spend it like cash. When he came back to Venice, where he lived, he could
do something equally amazing. Marco Polo could walk across the Rialto bridge from
his house, go down to the Rialto market and deposit some money and write a check
from that account to pay somebody else. The Venetians invented deposit banks and
brought this whole idea of writing checks to the rest of Europe.
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Figure 3 Traveler’s check from the Song Dynasty
Figure 4 is a picture taken of a little statue
looking at the church in the Rialto market. The
statue is described as a figure showing the effect of
not paying your debt obligations.
This was also the first bond market in the
world. Venice’s true innovation came when it was
mired in a great war with Byzantium. At one
point, it ran out of money, and then solved that
problem by issuing debt. It forced all of its citizens
to take on debt, and promised to pay them back,
and to pay them an interest rate until such time.
It raised a fleet, the fleet sailed off, the fleet had a
disaster, came back, the doge was killed because of
this disaster and they couldn’t pay the money
back. Instead, they had to keep limping along
paying interest. That idea of limping along and
paying interest and not paying the principal back
– that became the first municipal bond. That was
the first bond ever invented, and from that point
on, debt finance took off – like a crazy financial
innovation – all across Europe.
Figure 4 Statue showing the effect of not paying your debt obligations
Figure 5 is a Florentine bond from 1627 where
these things became traded instruments. This one
pays 4.5% interest. The real lesson for me is that
this was an innovation born from extreme
adversity and the amazing thing is that these forced
loans, instead of being a pain, became something
that people really wanted. Europeans decided that
it was a great tool for passing money from the
present into the future. So bonds created a broad
investor class all across Europe. Bond markets over
the next several hundred years emerged in Europe
like they emerged no place else.
I am now going to turn this over to my colleague
Professor Geert Rouwenhorst because I’d actually
like to hear him tell the story of this bond.
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The real lesson for me is that this was an innovation born from extreme
adversity and the amazing thing is that these forced loans, instead of being
a pain, became something that people really wanted. Europeans decided
that it was a great tool for passing money from the present into the future.
So it created a broad investor class all across Europe.
Figure 5 Florentine bond
K. Geert Rouwenhorst
17th and 18th Century Holland: A remarkable time for finance 
Thank you. Figure 6 is a remarkable security from the Yale collection – a perpetual
bond. It is one of the oldest bonds in the world that has continued to pay interest
until today. In fact I personally collected the interest on behalf of Yale in 2003, and will
describe some of the details of the security. It was issued in The Netherlands in 1648
by what is called a water board. As you all know, Holland is a country with many
waterways and dykes, and the maintenance of these systems has resulted in an
unusual form of government organization, because floodplains of rivers don’t
necessarily coincide with state boundaries. More than 800 years ago, separate
administrative organizations were set up to oversee the dykes. Those who were
protected by a dyke had to contribute to its upkeep. People were taxed based on their
proximity to the dyke and could be drafted to conduct repairs by participating in
what was called the dyke army. The cost of these repairs was covered by the taxes
levied by the water boards. In the event of a sequence of breaches, a water board
might not have sufficient tax receipts, in which case it was allowed to issue bonds. The
security in Figure 6 is an example of such bonds that were issued.
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Figure 6 Dutch “water board” from 1648
Those who were protected by a dyke had to contribute to its upkeep. People
were taxed based on their proximity to the dyke and could be drafted to
conduct repairs by participating in what was called the dyke army. The cost
of these repairs was covered by the taxes levied by the water boards.
Because water boards did not go to war and had the power of taxation, they were
long-lived organizations. Combine this with the custom at that time to issue
perpetual bonds, and you have the explanation for why these securities are among
the oldest in existence. The face value of the bond in Figure 6 is for 1,000 guilders, and
you can see that the interest payments were recorded on the document. When I
mention that the bond did not default, I was actually not quite precise — at some
point the water board cut the interest rate on the bond in half from 5 to 2.5 per cent
per annum. It has continued to pay interest for over 350 years, and it currently resides
in the Beinecke Rare Book & Manuscript Library at Yale.
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There is an interesting story about storing the bond in the Beinecke Library
because libraries typically only accept “dead” manuscripts and this bond was clearly
a live security. So what to do? You can see this caused great consternation in the
university. It was eventually decided that the library would store the original vellum
document, but not the allonge, which is the piece of paper that was added to the bond
to record additional interest payments after space on the vellum document had run
out. So the dead portion would go to Beinecke and the live portion would be held at
the International Center of Finance at the Yale School of Management. That was the
compromise.
The 17th and 18th centuries in The Netherlands were a remarkable time for finance.
Many of the financial products or instruments that we see today emerged during a
relatively short period. In particular, merchants and bankers developed what we
would today call securitization. Mutual funds and various other forms of structured
finance that still exist today emerged in the 17th and 18th centuries in Holland. I’d like
to take you through some of these examples. Some have survived until today, but
others have not, as we will see. Financial innovation is about trial and error and not
every innovation that initially takes off turns out to be a good idea.
The 17th and 18th centuries in The Netherlands were a remarkable time for
finance. Many of the financial products or instruments that we see today
emerged during a relatively short period. In particular, merchants and
bankers developed what we would today call securitization. Mutual funds
and various other forms of structured finance that still exist today emerged
in the 17th and 18th centuries in Holland.
The 17th century in Holland was unusual because it marks the origins of financial
markets in the sense that stocks and bonds were traded at a central, physical location.
Two examples from that early period are a share in the Dutch East India Company
and a bond which is held in the Beinecke library. Only three of the shares have
survived and, unfortunately, Yale doesn’t own one.
Interestingly, though, the manner in which share ownership was transferred gave
rise to the financial innovation of a forward market in shares. Formally shares would
change hands only after the transfer was recorded in the registers held by the
company. The company only opened its books once a month, but people wanted to
trade every day. As a consequence investors would agree to buy or sell shares with the
final delivery at a future time when the company would open its books. So as a
natural by-product of stock trading, a forward market and options market emerged
very quickly to facilitate trading. The technique of forward settlement was not new,
as this had been used for centuries in agricultural commodities markets. The
application, however, was new.
I mentioned that in the 18th century bankers learned how to securitize and pool
risks. Let me show you one form of securitization that eventually led to the
development of a mutual fund industry in the Netherlands. One of the predecessors
of mutual funds are tontines. If you “google” the word tontine, you’ll see a long list of
references to crime novels. To understand what a tontine is, I should first tell you how
governments in the 18th century would borrow. Governments would mostly borrow
in the form of annuities: investors would lend the government say $100 and in return
the government would pay investors an interest rate for the remainder of the life of
the nominee; the principal was never returned.
A tontine is an annuity to a group. Each member of a group would invest one
hundred dollars, and the interest on the entire capital would to be divided among the
surviving members of the group. As members would eventually decease from a
group, the payout to the remaining people would go up. So now you understand why
this becomes a topic for crime novels – as the number of participants in a tontine
dwindles and they learn about each other’s whereabouts, it wouldn’t exactly provide
the right incentive from a social point of view. This is one of the reasons why tontines
were ultimately outlawed.
An interesting development occurred when individuals organized private tontines.
These tontines resembled a form of a private pension fund. Investors would pool
their money and collectively buy a number of shares of stock, never touch their
invested capital, but divide the dividends from the portfolio amongst the surviving
members of the group. As the group became small, there would be a liquidation rule
to split up the fund and divide the shares to avoid the issues mentioned before.
Figure 7 18th century tontine 
Figure 7 is an example of a tontine
that was issued by an orphanage. It is
unusual because the tontine was
embedded in a giant lottery. In the
18th century Netherlands, many
securities embedded lotteries. It was
recognized that investors were
attracted by long shot lotteries. This
security starts out like a bond and,
after all the securities were sold to the
investors, a lottery would be held
where some investors would be
cashed out by receiving large prizes
while most would get smaller prizes.
If you were one of the remaining
investors when only small prizes were
left then, instead of getting a cash
prize, you would receive partici-
pations in the tontine. According to
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your age, you would be put into a group that would start receiving interest until all
members of that cohort had died. Investors and nominees could be different persons.
For example, I could participate in this tontine, but make Professor Will Goetzmann
the nominee. Payments would then be based on his life and I would collect my
dividend as long as Will survived. There would have been an annual coupon (bonds
had actual coupons – this is where the word coupon-clipping comes from) that one
would need hand over in lieu of the  interest payment. However, as this was a tontine,
I would only get my interest if Will was still alive. The back of these coupons had to
be signed either by a Notary Public or someone from the Ministry, who would
confirm “I, the undersigned, declare that I know so-and so and know him or her to
be alive.” It had to be signed and this was the official auditing procedure for this
tontine.
Financial innovation is about trial and error and not every innovation that
initially takes off turns out to be a good idea.
A true securitization that happened during the 18th century is related to the dark
side of European capitalism, closely tied to the slave trade. The slave trade is closely
tied to the development of what we call “mortgage-backed securities” today. Dutch
merchant bankers in the 18th century were truly merchants and bankers at the same
time. Situated in Amsterdam they would send ships to Africa, where slaves would be
picked up to be brought to the West Indies to work on plantations. The plantation
owners would then ship their goods back to Western Europe. The way these merchant
bankers tied up these plantation owners was to lend them money in the form of
mortgages, and in return, plantation owners would be required to send their goods
to Amsterdam to be sold by the merchant banker. Rather than put up his own money
to finance these mortgages, the merchant banker would actually issue securities in the
capital market to raise the money to make these mortgages and then use the proceeds
from the sale of the goods to pay off the bondholders. This was a true securitization
because the underlying asset was the mortgages that became the backing for bonds
which were freely tradable in the Amsterdam market.
The reason we know about the details of these arrangements is because, when you
bought a bond or a stock at that time, your bond certificate was a numbered version
of a prospectus that described in great detail how the security worked – how people
got paid and what their rights were. For example, we can read that property owners
in those days were able to mortgage not just their house or land, but also their slaves
and animals. It was a very different time than today.
Figure 8 is one of these mortgage-backed securities that I described to you; this one
being from 1768.
Figure 8 Mortgage-backed security from 1768
Figure 9  is a share in the first mutual
fund that was developed in Holland in
1774, I believe. After financiers figured
out that one could repackage mortgages
and turn them into securities, it was a
small step to just buy securities and
repackage them into other securities.
That was essentially how closed-end
mutual funds worked. This is a copy of a
share certificate in a fund named “Unity
Creates Strength,” which was the maxim
of the Dutch Republic at that time.
Looking at the first page of the
certificate, you can see what that mutual
fund invested in – a sequence of
international bonds issued by various
European countries, as well as the
plantation loans I described earlier. These
mortgage-backed securities were also
part of the portfolio of this mutual fund.
Figure 9 Share in a mutual fund from ~ 1774
There are many interesting things
about this mutual fund. It was basically
designed to exist for about 25 years, and it
also had an imbedded lottery to make it
attractive to small investors. In modern
times, securities and lottery tickets are
sold in completely separate markets. In
the 18th century, people thought of
securities and lotteries in very similar
ways; if you look at 18th century
investment portfolios, you can see lottery
tickets held side-by-side with securities.
Financial engineers of the 18th century
understood that investors like risks that
have small chances of very large payouts.
The way this was implemented in the
mutual fund was by investing the capital
in bonds that earned 5 percent interest per
year, and only promising a dividend of 4
percent to shareholders. The difference of
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1 percent was held behind to build up a capital reserve inside of the fund. At the end
of every year, the fund managers would hold a lottery and one shareholder would win
the pot and receive his initial investment back plus the prize. This would all be done
in a way that would keep the fund portfolio intact. In the subsequent years, this would
leave the same investment income to be divided among fewer shareholders: this
meant the fund manager could hold a larger lottery. So there was an escalating lottery
embedded in the mutual fund.
This leads to the question: why was this mutual fund set up this way? Surprisingly,
the whole notion of diversification was well understood at that time. For example, in
the prospectus of a similar fund of 1776, we find written that it is prudent to spread
your money, as much as possible, over good and solid securities. Since everything is
uncertain and subject to fluctuation, you should not put all your money into a single
security. The prospectus further pointed out that for small investors, it was difficult
to buy a variety of bonds (one had to be wealthy to be able to buy enough bonds at a
face value of 1000 guilders to be diversified). Here is where the attraction of the fund
came in, because for 525 guilders you could participate in this fund and achieve
diversification with a relatively small amount of capital.
The prospectus mentioned that if you were a pessimist and thought that all
securities in the fund could cease to pay off at the same time, then you should never
have invested your money. 18th century investors seem to have understood the notion
of uncorrelated risks as well.
The Dutch set up a large number of mutual funds at the end of the 18th century. I
want to briefly talk about one more that would invest in stocks that, based on a
sufficient decline in price, merited speculation. This is the earliest reference to what
we today would call “value investing” – trying to buy securities at a discount relative
to their “intrinsic values.” Another interesting aspect of this fund is that investors
seemed to understand the perils of delegated money management. Since the fund is
going to buy securities on another’s behalf, what guarantees can be given that the
money manager is not going to run off with the money? The share certificate stated
that all the stock certificates of the fund would be placed in iron chests with three
different working keys, one of which belonged to the notary public and the others in
the possession of the directors of the fund. Financiers understood well that if you
want to take investor’s money and manage it, you should prevent stealing.
Revolutionary bonds from the United States
Let’s take a sidestep to what happened at that point in time in the United States. The
United States was at war with England, trying to win independence. Benjamin
Franklin was sent to Europe to negotiate loans on behalf of the United States in order
to finance the American Revolution.
Figure 10 shows the signature of Benjamin Franklin on one of those loans that he
negotiated in France. It is an interesting security that unfortunately is not in Yale’s
possession. I am only showing half of the loan document. The entire loan agreement
consists of two identical “twin” copies with a marbled middle between them. The two
bonds would be cut apart, one being given to the borrower and the other to the
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lender. The bonds would be unique because of the marbling boarder, which would
prevent counterfeit of the contract. Benjamin Franklin actually developed this
technology and printed these bonds himself – he was a remarkable man.
Figure 10 Franklin bond
At the time of Franklin’s loans, inflation
ran high in the United States, partially
because of the war. States were printing paper
money with which you could supposedly later
pay your taxes, but there was too much of it
printed and it was issued by a variety of states
and by the colonial Congress. The public
became very reluctant to accept paper in lieu
of transactions, and over time it became
increasingly more difficult to pay interest with
other forms of paper. The U.S. government
decided to make interest payments through
hard currency raised by the loans of Benjamin
Franklin in Paris. The only problem was that
the hard currency was in Paris where the loans
were negotiated. So what happened? 
When you got your interest payment, you got something which is called a bill of
exchange. The bill of exchange in Figure 11 indicates that at 30 days sight of this bill,
1st, 2nd, and 4th not paid (I’ll explain this in a minute), one would be paid $24 or the
equivalent in Livres Tournois for interest borrowed by the United States payable in
Paris. But if you were not a frequent visitor to Paris, how would you ever collect your
interest? From here, active securities markets came into play. People started to trade
these bills of exchange with merchants who traveled to Paris.
Figure 11 Bill of exchange from 1779
One had to show this bill
of exchange in Paris in order
to collect the interest
payment and there was risk
– risk of piracy, risk that
your ship would sink, etc. –
which explains why these
bills were issued with four
copies. If the first bill was
lost, one could cut off the
second copy and send it to Paris. The first copy to make it to Paris would be paid,
invalidating the others. That’s why this document states “This is the 3rd bill of four,
the 1st, 2nd, and 4th not paid.” It’s an interesting security from the United States.
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Figure 12 Massachusetts Bay bond 1780
It was also during the revolutionary war that the first commodities bonds were
created in the U.S., and very much like today, inflation was the motive. The bond in
Figure 12 was issued by the State of Massachusetts Bay to pay a soldier – it was a deferred
payment to a soldier. Apparently people thought about various ways to try to protect the
value of these payments against inflation. One of the ways was to make them payable in
hard currency in Paris, but another way was to explicitly link them to prices. This is a
commodities bond where the final repayment is linked to a price index, or commodities
acting as a price index – consisting of corn, beef, sheep’s wool, and sole leather – to
determine the repayment. This is the oldest commodities bond of which we know.
Russian debt and liquidity
Let me step a bit forward. The same bankers who figured out how to repackage
securities in the form of mutual funds also helped to securitize the debt of Russia. The
way the Russian government borrowed at that time was through inscriptions in the
Book of Public Debt of Russia. Basically, the government acted like a savings bank. The
lender showed up, was inscribed in the register of lenders, lent the money, and then
returned to St. Petersburg every year to collect interest. The lender would be issued a
certificate that would be stamped every time the interest was collected. It was not very
practical for international investors to lend to the Russian government in this manner.
Investment bankers in Amsterdam helped out and bought these loan certificates in
their own name, placed them in a safe and then issued bonds that were backed by the
original certificates. These bonds were structured as “bearer certificates,” meaning
they were freely traded in the Dutch capital market and were not linked to the identity
of holder. Any person who presented the coupon (the bearer of the coupon) would
be paid the interest. Again, this is an example of creating a liquid market out of
something that was inherently illiquid.
This was initially a technology that was applied to Russian debt, but subsequently
in the 19th century became very popular for cross-listing U.S. railroad stocks in
Europe. Like the early Russian debt, U.S. stocks were not traded in bearer form but
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were transformed into bearer securities by Amsterdam bankers using the same
mechanism that we would today call a depository receipt.
French annuities and Swiss investment bankers
When the French government started to issue annuities in the 18th century, statistics
were not so well developed. Calculating life expectancies was complicated and
certainly there was no good data to figure out what people’s life expectancies were. As
a result, there was confusion about the terms that should be offered on these
annuities. The French government, for a long time, issued annuities on the same
terms to the young as to the old. If your life expectancy is shorter, I should give you a
much higher interest rate than to the young. But the government did not initially
distinguish. It will come as no surprise that old men would show up at city hall to buy
annuities on the lives of their grandchildren. However, there was still a chance that a
child would die young, and what seemed to be a great investment initially, would
potentially not pay off.
Figure 13 Dutch share of a Swiss annuity
Enter the Swiss investment
bankers, who would buy annuities
in the names of young girls, pool
them in a fund, and then sell
shares in the fund to the public.
The risk of any girl dying young
would be diversified away and one
could lock in the mispricing by
the French government.
Figure 13 is a share of a Dutch
version of one of these funds –
you can see the names of all of
the Dutch girls under which
these annuities were bought. If
you examine the names, you will
discover that many of them
belong to the same families or to
the same social register of
Amsterdam at that time. This
was a way to diversify against the
risk of early death. One might
ask “Why young girls?” To begin,
all these girls had survived small
pox, which was a major threat in
early life to life expectancy. My
further interpretation is that choosing girls instead of boys was a tradeoff of the risk
of childbirth to the risk of going to war.
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Let me wrap up by showing you one more recent example and then I’ll ask Will to
conclude.
German war bonds
Figure 14 is a much more recent example of an interesting contingent claim. It is a
bond issued by Germany in 1930, at the time between World War I and World War II.
If you remember, when Germany came out of WWI, it was charged to make
reparation payments to other European countries, which ultimately led to an
unraveling of finances in Germany and to hyper-inflation in 1923. To put Germany
back on the gold standard, a commission was formed led by two Americans, Dawes
and Young, that put Germany on the gold standard and gave it access to international
capital markets again. Figure 14 is one of the bonds that Germany issued in the United
States. Germany ultimately defaulted on these bonds during WWII.
Figure 14 German war bond
After WWII, when West-Germany wanted to go back to capital markets and
wanted to borrow, investors held up the old bonds and demanded repayment on the
old bonds. West-Germany claimed that the old bonds were actually obligations of
Germany which did not exist anymore as such. This became a political issue which
ultimately came to a resolution in 1953 at a conference in London where West-
Germany agreed to honor these pre-war debts in the case that East and West Germany
were ever reunified. One thought that was a distant promise. But West-Germany
issued rights certificates that could be exchanged for bonds to compensate previous
bondholders for past losses in the event of reunification – a claim that was contingent
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on a political event. These certificates were issued in 1960 and infrequently traded on
the French stock exchange for about 30 years to end up in the money in the 1990s.




It is a challenge to wrap up all of that. Those are really interesting stories, and the take
away is that incredible ingenuity went into the development of financial technology.
How each one of these innovations led to insights that led to another innovation, and
the accretion of this technology is the really fascinating lesson.
The big picture that we want to draw from this is that finance began in urban
societies solving certain basic problems. These financial tools were not an add-on,
they were integral to the development of urban life. All throughout our examples, you
saw that war created challenges and problems, and that in turn led to innovative
financial solutions, which, of course, is kind of sad. But in the wake of these crises,
we’ve been given tools that we hope we can use for other things as well.
The biggest innovation in my mind is the creation of a whole class of people who
learned that you could finance the future, invest in the future, create your own
economic future through the use of these financial instruments – the annuities,
perpetuities, loans, stock shares, and so on. These became the instruments by which
we’ve been able to shape our own financial lives. It peels us away from having to
depend upon family and government, giving us real independence.
That, I think, is enough to convince people that, when we face a huge problem like
the environment, maybe these financial tools can be adapted, borrowed from other
examples, and made to fit some of the interesting risks and long-term expected costs
that the environmental crisis challenges us with.
K. Geert Rouwenhorst: With that we’re happy to take any questions.
William Goetzmann: Yes, thank you very much.
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Question and Answer Session
QUESTION 1: Carbon markets
Outside of the context of war, in terms of the environment, we’re looking towards finance
to help avert a potential crisis. Your examples show how problems beget solutions and I
wonder, in your perspective, what technologies you are looking at in addition to the
carbon markets.
William Goetzmann: Well, I am just recently interested in the carbon market itself
and the different models that people are trying – the caps, sale of permits, and so
forth. I think there is extraordinary potential and what we are going to see is that a
few different models are going to be tried until one of them works. One thing that
really worries me a bit is the possibility of a market emerging and then collapsing and
disappearing. I am hopeful that some gentle experimentation without complete
commitment to one particular model will allow us to learn. So I think that it’s going
to take some time and it’s going to take a lot of pushing by different groups to create
an environment where we could experiment for a while and then hopefully
something will work. I think that a market alone is something that’s worth exploring
seriously.
K. Geert Rouwenhorst: I’ve seen people who are interested in commodities markets
being interested in trading futures on the emissions rights in Europe. I see that it’s on
the radar of the larger investment banks. The market is small at this point, and needs
to build investor interest into that market. Setting up futures markets is a complicated
issue – we see many futures fail before we see one survive. I agree with Will that doing
a little experimentation and seeing where we can create things that have a natural
demand on the long and short side is important in order to create a market and
facilitate trading, allowing price discovery and efficient allocation of these pollution
rights.
William Goetzmann: Briefly to follow-up on that, I think the idea of creating
mutual funds where people have interests in buying rights and even letting them
expire is an interesting one.
I agree that doing a little experimentation and seeing where we can create
things that have a natural demand on the long and short side is important
in order to create a market and facilitate trading, allowing price discovery
and efficient allocation of these pollution rights.
QUESTION 2: Internalizing externalities
I often hear the argument that the market will solve the problem – just let the market
work, don’t interfere at all – or, similarly, that technology will solve the problem. My
limited understanding of economics is that when there are externalities such as CO2, the
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market doesn’t solve the problem unless there’s a price on that externality. Maybe you can
share your point of view on that argument and whether you believe the market will solve
the problem once it can interpret this externality through a price signal but not until then.
K. Geert Rouwenhorst: I think that’s right, in that when producers produce goods,
the price does not include the potential harm that is done to the environment.
Internalizing that externality is important because when you think about how you are
going to distribute these rights to pollute, you have to do it in a way that makes firms
internalize these costs. So, for example, just issuing emissions rights to firms seems
not to be such a logical solution as they will receive the rights for free. It is really the
firms that should be bearing those costs. It seems that schemes where these rights will
be auctioned off, where firms have to directly pay for these rights, is a much better
mechanism. But even in designing these mechanisms, we have to think about doing
it in a way so there will be efficient market allocation of these rights to pollute. I think
the market can potentially solve those problems.
William Goetzmann: I have just a one word answer, which is “Russia.” If you think
of the privatization that Russia went through, the argument was “Hey, let’s privatize
the market, we’ll solve things.” What was discovered was that if you create a half-
baked market without thinking through property rights and creating an institutional
fabric for this to take place, then, the forces of the market not working could lead you
grossly astray.
QUESTION 3: Durability of environmental markets
I wanted to ask a question about environmental markets in general. The rise of such
markets, such as the carbon markets or the SOx and NOx markets, strikes me as some of
the first markets created almost entirely by government fiat. We’re saying these need to be
traded, and this trading mechanism sort of arises around that which wouldn’t otherwise
exist. So, for example, with the acid rain pollutants, the market was created by the Clean
Air Act. A multinational protocol like the Kyoto Protocol would have to arise to put some
sort of price on carbon. Is this kind of market durable in the long-term in your opinion,
and wouldn’t the rise of large-scale players inevitably shape the policy decisions that
would ultimately affect the prices of the commodities being traded? 
K. Geert Rouwenhorst: I agree, as I said earlier, that you can create the markets, but
markets don’t necessarily make people trade. In order for there to be trade, for a
mechanism to survive, I think both parties, on the demand side and supply side, must
have an incentive to trade. Having caps in place, enforcing those caps, and monitoring
the pollution I think would provide an incentive to trade these rights.
Specifically what I’m asking is whether these markets are durable given that the value
of these commodities is being created solely by a regulatory structure – they don’t have
any intrinsic value, such as a bushel of corn.
William Goetzmann: Yes, I understand that argument, but let me give you a
counter-example: tax obligations. They are purely created by government and yet
they’re a fundamental part of economic life. The only way they would go away is by
the government saying that you don’t have to pay taxes. One of the things that worries
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me about this particular case, and I think it’s related to what you’re proposing, is the
pre-commitment by the government to maintain a cap, when, for example, stresses
and strains might cause the government to raise the cap and eliminate value. That’s
where it might lack some bite. If it always depends on government commitment, then
it’s hard to maintain.
One of the things that worries me about this particular case is the pre-
commitment by the government to maintain a cap, when, for example,
stresses and strains might cause the government to raise the cap and
eliminate value. That’s where it might lack some bite. If it always depends
on government commitment, then it’s hard to maintain.
QUESTION 4: 18th century French annuities 
A quick comment on the previous question: there is a market somewhat like that – the
market for the radio waves and satellites which are actually now primarily privatized. But
I had a question of my own: If I were that Swiss banker and I were picking the young
children to put the annuities on (I wonder if you know the history of these people), I would
have picked little boys that were going to the seminary (very unlikely to go to war) or little
girls who were already in the nunneries (very unlikely to bear children). Do we have any
notion of who was picked? Were they clever enough to pick those kinds of people?
K. Geert Rouwenhorst: On the Dutch security I did look at the names and, at some
point, try to do some amateur genealogy on them. It does seem that the names of
these girls are actually connected to some of the wealthy families of Amsterdam at the
time. Of course, on the other hand, one didn’t want the children to grow up and run
off, making it difficult to monitor whether they’re alive or not. One would have
wanted to keep an eye on them in a way, and one of the ways to do that is to put in
the names of your own kids or the kids of your friends.
William Goetzmann: One really shocking thing is that this was the primary means
by which France financed itself through the late 1600s and early 1700s. So every time
they sold a bond it was mispriced. You would think that in the long-term they were
just digging themselves deeper and deeper into a financial pit. You might think that
this was one of the factors that contributed to the French Revolution – the financial
crisis due just to mispricing this security.
K. Geert Rouwenhorst: At the time, the French government tried to hire statistics
professors as consultants to try to help solve this problem of life expectancy.
DeMoivre, for example, was one of the consultants to the French government, though
I think it was just a little too late.
QUESTION 5: Reducing the risk of climate change through diversification
A lot of the time when you talk about diversification within a big portfolio of assets,
you’re talking about idiosyncratic risk that you can diversify out. But the problem with
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climate change risk is that it is often very systemic, affecting lots of different parts of your
portfolio and it's very hard to diversify away. From the perspective of a large pension fund
or large institutional investor, how should they approach this big risk they are facing?
K. Geert Rouwenhorst: Part of it could indeed be systematic risk. I am not an
expert on climate change, but from the talks I’ve attended my understanding is that
there are going to be winners and losers when the climate changes. I think it was a few
years ago that I attended the lunch seminar here at the Yale School of Management
and someone said that the Northeast of the U.S. is going to be relatively well-off in
this situation. So I think that means that part of the risk is going to be diversifiable.
The rest I think will indeed be part of a global risk factor that we can’t dodge.
William Goetzmann: The basic intuition of diversification is that yes, as you start
to diversify, you keep reducing risk down. But at a certain point you hit a floor. You
hit that systematic floor where, if the climate is going this way, there’s no way to make
that problem go away. At that point you say either it’s fairly priced and I’m willing to
hold that, or you cut up that part of the risk and sell it to the people who are willing
to pay the right price for it. Diversification does not solve the fundamental problem.
QUESTION 6: Regulating a global carbon market
Within the context of a global carbon market, who do you anticipate would run it and
make sure that it was free of corruption and working well? Who would create and enforce
the rules? How do you think you could find a group of people to do that with the
necessary clout on a global issue like this? 
William Goetzmann: Look at the situation of the world stock market. We don’t
have one big world stock market where somebody is in charge and we trust them. We
have a lot of stock markets that are regulated in different ways and we have different
levels of quality of regulation, different levels of verification, different auditing
standards, and what have you. That is actually a pretty robust structure. I think that
we’re probably going to end up borrowing that model. If this is going to work, it is
probably not going to rely on a universal regulator, although coordination at some
level like the Kyoto accord level can create standards that are enforceable. That may
be the level of international coordination that is required.
QUESTION 7: Government investment to mitigate public risk of climate change
A lot of talk about carbon finance focuses on the private risk associated with carbon – so
it’s corporate risk associated with regulatory risks, reputational risks, legal risks, label and
branding risks, etc. – yet a lot of the risk of climate change is a public risk. Who is going
to take care of people who lose their homes? Obviously there are currently insurance tools
for that, but it is not that difficult to imagine a future situation where such tools are
inadequate or increasingly inaccessible. Putting aside a potential conflict of interest
between making the rules as a regulator and investing in the market, should governments
be investors in the carbon market at all in terms of using it to mitigate the public risk of
climate change?
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William Goetzmann: Here’s a thought experiment: say that this proposed
Northeast States memorandum of understanding were to happen, and all of a sudden
it created securities that could be purchased. Let’s say a state came in and just
purchased them all. I’m not sure this is feasible, but it’s a thought experiment. Should
the government be allowed to speculate in these things? Maybe not the government
that is regulating them or creating them, but this type of situation creates really
interesting problems. I don’t see an immediate answer, but it’s an interesting problem
where you have government competition. I think that could create a train wreck.
K. Geert Rouwenhorst: It seems especially difficult to me how to set these quotas
across countries in ways that seems to be, I wouldn’t say fair and equitable, but
acceptable to all parties involved. The most important role that I could see a
government play is choosing the right amount of pollution rights that should be
traded. That problem by itself seems incredibly complex to me and so making good
decisions on that end seems to be of first-order importance.
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Investing in Climate Change
Win Neuger, AIG Investments
editors’ remarks
This is the first segment of a larger presentation that we sponsored in Greenwich,
Connecticut, in conjunction with the Connecticut Hedge Fund Association, Clean
Air-Cool Planet, and the Connecticut Departments of Environmental Protection,
Insurance, and Treasury. The main audience for this event was hedge fund
practitioners, and Win Neuger’s talk was designed to provide an overview that
highlights climate change fundamentals and the importance of incorporating
climate change exposures into investment decisions. As chairman of the AIG
Investment Group, Mr. Neuger has strategic knowledge of managing such risks and
opportunities through an experienced macro-lens, giving authenticity to his main
thesis: “Whether we are investing in stocks, bonds or commodities, climate change
is important to everything that we do and everything in which we invest. You have
to keep it top of mind as you are making those investment decisions, because if you
don’t, it will catch up to you in the end. But if you do, not only will you mitigate
your risks, but you will also find opportunities for adding lasting value.”
After setting the context, Mr. Neuger begins with a basic review of climate
change consequences, reminding us of the economy-wide nature of the issue. He
then discusses various levels of response to the problem, touching on the
importance of regulation and the emerging demand for green buildings. In the
final section he goes through several investment opportunities, with particular
attention to cleantech and equity issues in emerging economies and the carbon
markets. Other areas he notes to be interesting from an investment standpoint are
utilities and energy infrastructure, alternative energy, and water: “The increase or
the continued need for clean and affordable water is extremely important, and,
coupled with climate change, it becomes a greater issue.”
The second segment of this presentation, Investing in Climate Change: A Panel on
Hedge Funds, can be found in Chapter 8 of this publication.* 
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introduction
Climate and its impact on investments is an idea whose “time has come.” Climate
change has now moved out of the realm of socially responsible investing (SRI) and
into the mainstream. Every investor should think about the issues – both the risks
and the return opportunities – that climate change presents. If they fail to do so, they
are not only foregoing tremendous opportunities, they are assuming risks they are
not getting paid to undertake.
Clearly, climate change is a global issue with consequences for society, for business,
and for governments. AIG is a long-term institutional investor, and therefore we need
to look at the risks and opportunities associated with climate change and their
impact on our investments, as well as those of our non-AIG asset management
clients.
Climate change is beginning to be addressed through emerging regulations.
Cleantech and the trading of carbon in carbon markets are two clearly emerging
investment opportunity areas that will change and evolve as regulations develop.
However, addressing such investment opportunities requires sophisticated analysis of
technologies, an understanding of the markets, and certainty about the impact of
regulations.
Climate and its impact on investments is an idea whose “time has come.”
Climate change has now moved out of the realm of socially responsible
investing (SRI) and into the mainstream. Every investor should think about
the issues – both the risks and the return opportunities – that climate
change presents. If they fail to do so, they are not only foregoing
tremendous opportunities, they are assuming risks they are not getting
paid to undertake.
Financial instruments are being developed to take advantage of climate change
opportunities, and we see hedge funds increasingly participating in these
deployments. These hedge fund investment opportunities span across sectors, which
include utilities, energy infrastructure, commodities, carbon trading, and a host of
other areas. In addition to hedge funds, investment opportunities are also available
in project finance, in real estate, and in mainstream, day-to-day stocks and bonds.
At AIG Investments, we are actively seeking investment opportunities associated
with climate change. I will highlight a couple of those as I go forward, including our
investments in carbon mitigation projects in private equity, project finance
investments in renewable energy, and investments associated with catastrophe bonds.
For this discussion, I will review some of the consequences of climate change and
the regulatory response, and then focus primarily on the opportunities associated
with climate change, specifically cleantech and carbon trading.
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climate change consequences
The flip side of the opportunities, of course, is the risk side. Investors who are not
paying attention to their exposure are not getting paid for the risks they are taking.
Some risks are pretty obvious. If you invest in a heavy-carbon emitter, for example,
and new regulation around greenhouse gases is passed, then that company’s growth
prospects may be affected negatively. If you are not taking regulation into
consideration when you make an investment, you had better hope that there are no
changes, and that whoever you are going to sell that investment to is not going to care
about what the future changes will be, but that is highly unlikely.
Figure 1 Global surface-warming scenarios
Sources: Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC); U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)
What is the overall landscape of climate change? Unfortunately, nobody has exact
certainty regarding climate change, and the scientists will tell you candidly they do
not know exactly what is going to happen. With a reasonable degree of predictability,
however, they think they know what will transpire if greenhouse gas emissions
continue to increase unabated. Figure 1 illustrates the outcomes of various emission
scenarios.
Some people might want to argue against it, but most scientists are clear in the fact
that humans contribute significantly to the growth of carbon emissions and that the
growth of CO2 has a significant impact on the climate warming up. In terms of
regulation, those two factors – and what occurs from this point forward – are very
important.
A variety of phenomena occurs because of increased levels of greenhouse gases in
the atmosphere – not only does the global surface temperature of the earth increase,
but there are also other types of impact. Precipitation patterns may change, and we
may experience more extremes in weather patterns, both droughts and floods. There
are also potential changes in agriculture and food systems, in addition to ecosystem
impacts in general. These are huge follow-on effects that for AIG, as a major
insurance company, may have significance.
Additionally, if global warming is causing an increased severity of storm activity,
clearly that has an impact on property insurance in coastal areas. An increase in
droughts causes a significant increase in fires in places that might be significantly
populated. All those things have to be factored in for us as an insurance company.
Clearly, climate change affects our business, and I think we can argue that for most
businesses, in one way or another, climate change has some degree of impact. It
clearly has a direct impact on energy, agriculture, water, and, as I said, insurance.
Clearly, climate change affects our business, and I think we can argue that
for most businesses, in one way or another, climate change has some
degree of impact.
The economic impact and the risk of inaction are significant. The Stern Review1
cited the economic risk of inaction on climate as between 5 percent and 20 percent
of global GDP, far outstripping the cost of mitigation. In Davos2, the Prime Minister
of Japan spent his entire speech talking about the upcoming G8 conference that Japan
is chairing. The bulk of what he talked about in terms of that G8 conference was
climate change and Japan’s commitment to reduce its own carbon emissions. He was
putting out a call to the rest of the G8 to follow that lead.
Addressing climate change will require a significant shift in the global economy:
how we generate energy; how we produce goods; how we travel; and how we think
about all of these situations. As society, governments, and business begin to address
climate change, investors need to understand how the economic environment will
change and what the impact of these changes will be on our investments.
As I said, AIG Investments is very much a long-term investor, and we need to think
about those long-term changes as an important issue that needs to be considered. Yet
I would argue that whether you are a long-term or a short-term investor, these are
real issues that have a real impact on stocks. I will use one quick example that is
outside of the climate area, but that demonstrates the importance of the impact that
social issues have on stocks.
Addressing climate change will require a significant shift in the global
economy: how we generate energy; how we produce goods; how we travel;
and how we think about all of these situations.
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I am sure many of you followed the events related to product quality over the latter
part of 2007. If you looked at the share price of public companies that were exposed
to lead paint in their products, you would have seen the impact immediately. If a
company is not paying attention to social issues, the resulting negatives can severely
impact that organization.
As one example on the environmental front, Texas Utilities (TXU) announced
plans for 11 new coal-fired power plants last year. The equity market then started to
become concerned about these new coal-fired plants — what the impact would be on
carbon emissions and what the potential cost to the company would be if the U.S.
passed a carbon tax. As a result, the stock performed very poorly. Private equity
investors, recognizing an opportunity, came in and worked with non-governmental
organizations (NGOs) to cut those 11 plants to three, significantly reducing the
carbon emissions. Because of these changes, they were able to get the support of those
NGOs, as well as state regulators. There is evidence that ignoring the issue of climate
change results in a clear cost, even if it occurs in the short term.
responses to climate change
Regulatory responses have varied in addressing the climate change issue. Because
society is becoming more and more aware of the risks associated with the topic, there
is increasing movement towards regulation. In terms of global regulation, the Kyoto
Protocol has been the most noteworthy so far. While the U.S. has been one of the very
few non-signatories to the Kyoto Protocol, I think it is also interesting that, despite
this lack of federal government leadership, we have seen individual states begin to act.
Furthermore, corporations in the U.S. are increasingly taking stands on reducing
their carbon footprint. We have seen efforts like the Carbon Disclosure Project
(CDP),3 where investors are requesting companies to report their carbon emissions.
Investors who are CDP signatories are basically saying that they need to know a
company’s carbon footprint because ultimately it may present a problem. A large
carbon-emitting company, for example, may be forced to reduce its carbon footprint,
and the investors need to know what its exposure is so they can invest accordingly.
In terms of real estate, there is clearly an opportunity in green building, even
though higher rents for green buildings are not necessarily attainable today. Our real
estate team, AIG Global Real Estate, finds that the ability to lease up green buildings
is significantly higher than for non-green buildings. Our green buildings lease up
quickly, and do so for a couple of reasons. First, there is a correlation, of course,
between energy costs and carbon emissions. If you own a green building, not only are
you reducing your carbon footprint, but you are also reducing your energy costs.
Second, as corporations are trying to reduce their carbon footprints, they are inclined
to want to move into a green building. And third, interestingly, corporations are
finding that their employees really care. Employee morale is better, and employees
appreciate the fact that their employer has chosen to be in a green environment and
that they are now working in a green building. So we are seeing that our green
developments are in tremendous demand by corporations, and I think those changes
are going to be on-going.
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Beyond the states and beyond the corporations, there may be a need for some
uniform federal regulation around climate, and I do not usually find myself calling
for regulation. I gave a speech about a year ago where I talked about the fact that, as
investors, we had to be prepared for a carbon tax of one form or another. Whether it
is a tax or any other methodology, there could be a cost if you are a carbon emitter.
There was a headline in one of the trade presses that said that I had called for new
taxation, which I hadn’t, and I am not doing that today. But what I am saying, and
what we at AIG are saying, is that we think that a regulatory framework around
carbon emissions is important.
It is important for several reasons. First, because this is a long-term issue, it is
difficult for a corporation to take a stand that it is really concerned about the state of
the world 50 years from now and voluntarily reduce emissions. That is happening to
some extent, but it is challenging because by taking this long-term view, it would be
putting itself on a non-level playing field. On the other hand, it is obvious that if
society does not take climate change seriously today, 20 or 30 years from now it could
be too late. Therefore, the only way to address this is with a regulatory solution.
Second, it is important to know what the rules and regulations are going to be. It
is inevitable that we will have some kind of regulation around carbon. Whether it is
this year, next year, or 2012, it is going to happen. From an investor’s point of view,
the sooner we know what the rules are, the better. It is the uncertainty around those
rules that makes it hard to make decisions. It is difficult to build a plant that has a 20-,
30-, or 50-year life if you do not know what the rules are.
It is difficult for a corporation to take a stand that it is really concerned
about the state of the world 50 years from now and voluntarily reduce
emissions. That is happening to some extent, but it is challenging because
by taking this long-term view, it would be putting itself on a non-level
playing field. On the other hand, it is obvious that if society does not take
climate change seriously today, 20 or 30 years from now it could be too late.
Therefore, the only way to address this is with a regulatory solution.
We think it is important that the U.S. have clear rules, and AIG is a supporter of
the U.S. Climate Action Partnership (USCAP),4 which is a group of six non-
governmental organizations and currently 26 corporations. USCAP continues to
grow, in terms of people who support it and are basically calling for a mandatory cap-
and-trade policy in the U.S.
climate change related investment opportunities
In Figure 2, we see the growth of carbon emissions, depicted by the solid line. People
have been talking about this process called “The Wedge Theory” that was developed
by Professors Stephen Pacala and Robert Socolow at Princeton University. The Wedge
Theory indicates that there are certain measures that we can take now that can have
a significant impact on future carbon emissions from 2030 to 2050. But that wedge
suggests that the sooner we implement action, the more impact it has in the later
years, and therein lies its importance.
Figure 2 Investment opportunities – stabilization triangle and wedges
Source: Pacala, S and Socolow, R, “Stabilization Wedges: Solving the Climate Problems for the Next 50 Years with
Current Technologies,” Science August 13, 2004.
Of course, there is no silver bullet. It would be great if there was, but I am willing
to bet that nobody’s going to sit up on this next panel5 and claim that he has the one
answer. Instead, there are a whole host of things that have to happen in order for us
to drive these emission reducing wedges.
Fortunately, there is a great deal we can do. Energy efficiency is important and
significant. This includes turning off the lights, encouraging people to think about
turning off their machines at night, and similar actions. Renewable energy, such as the
commitment by the state of Connecticut via the Connecticut Renewable Portfolio
Standards (CT RPS) to obtain 20 percent of its energy through the renewables and clean
technology, and a variety of initiatives around carbon capture and storage and shifting
fuel sources are also positive signs. Forests and agriculture are good at soaking up carbon,
so investing in forestry and planting trees is also a solid step in the right direction.
One solution that I personally think is maybe the toughest to work through, and
one that if anybody has any great insights on I would like to hear, is nuclear. Nuclear
is one source of energy today that could be produced in significant quantities with
relatively low GHG emissions. However, for those of you who are old enough to
remember the 1960s and 1970s, you probably remember the tremendous
controversies around nuclear energy in the U.S. The country has not built any nuclear
plants in the last couple of decades, and it remains unclear if this solution will play a
role in addressing climate change.
Each of these solutions and technologies can have a significant impact on reducing
carbon emissions over the next several decades, and the bottom line is that addressing
carbon emissions requires a combination of solutions and a concerted effort that
starts today.
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In terms of analyzing investment opportunities, we think there are a lot of
different and interesting areas of opportunity in technologies that are currently
available. All of them – solar, wind, biofuels, energy efficiency, waste, recycling, and
water technology – have a significant impact on reducing carbon emissions over
time, and they are all considerable areas of interest for investors.
Cleantech opportunities and equity issues
While the focus on cleantech opportunities has primarily been in the U.S. and
Europe, this is getting increasing attention around the world. There is significant
growth in cleantech investments in China and India. In China, one of the key tenets
of the 11th Five-Year Plan, which is the mid-range plan that the Chinese government
currently is operating under on a day-to-day basis, is the environment. Those of you
who have been to Shanghai, Beijing, or some of the other large Chinese cities, know
that the environment has increasingly become a real concern for the country.
The tremendous growth in China has led to a significant degree of environmental
degradation, particularly in the air quality of large cities. The Chinese government
recognizes that they need to address that for a variety of reasons, not the least of
which is that the quality of life in those cities is starting to deteriorate; people have
difficulty breathing and are becoming ill with pulmonary diseases. We are seeing
China begin to address these problems, and we are also seeing India begin to address
them in a serious way.
One of the issues that those countries have with the U.S. is, in a sense, our insistence
that there will be a level playing field in terms of carbon reduction – for both them and
us. The U.S. does not want to cut its emissions until China and India do so. But the
objection is that the carbon emissions per capita in India and China are a fraction of
what they are in the U.S. and Europe. These countries are also in an economic growth
phase, and, while they insist they treat this topic seriously, they also say that it is not
realistic to stop or reduce carbon emissions at current levels and still maintain growth.
I hope that the West is cognizant of this challenge, but at the same time I hope that
China and India use the opportunity to leapfrog ahead in terms of technology. This
is clearly what has happened in telephony. Around the world, especially in emerging
markets, telephony has leapfrogged over the West. Cell phones in many parts of the
world are a generation ahead of where they are in the U.S. because there wasn’t the
old technology holding them back. Many people do not even have landlines in those
countries. I was in Estonia five or six years ago, and there you could pay your taxicab
bill with your cell phone.
I hope that China and India use the opportunity to leapfrog ahead in terms of
technology. This is clearly what has happened in telephony. Around the world,
especially in emerging markets, telephony has leapfrogged over the West. Cell
phones in many parts of the world are a generation ahead of where they are
in the U.S. because there wasn’t the old technology holding them back.
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The same principles could apply in terms of power generation and in terms of
cleantech. There is an opportunity because developing countries do not have the
embedded infrastructure of the U.S. slowing their ability to outperform the West. I
hope that we see this happen, and I think there is a commitment on the part of China
and India to contribute towards this growth.
Carbon market opportunities
The other major area in terms of climate-change-related investment opportunities is
the trading of carbon credits. Most of the carbon credit trading is taking place in
Europe, because the EU, as a signatory to the Kyoto Protocol, has put in place a cap-
and-trade system. The volume of carbon credits has increased significantly, and the
opportunity to trade those credits has also increased dramatically (see Figure 3).
Figure 3 Carbon finance – volume (MtCO2e) and value (Millions of $US) of carbon credits (2005 to 2007)
* Estimated
Source: 2006 & 2007 data: World Bank, State and Trends of the Carbon Market (2007) 2008 data: Wall Street
Journal, “Hot Carbon Market Signals New Interest,” January 18, 2008
As you can see, the growth in carbon credits has been just under 100 percent
annually. I do not know how long that will continue, but it is a good pace for a while
and it has only just begun. As those markets become more liquid, the opportunities
become more significant.
Given the emerging opportunities in the carbon markets and in cleantech, the
financial markets have finally begun to recognize these opportunities. New financial
instruments have been developed to take advantage of emerging investment areas
that are becoming more of a focus.
One area that has experienced growth has been energy and environmental hedge
funds. One source says that there are now over 500 hedge funds that specialize in the
environment and energy, and I would expect that number to grow. These funds tend
to be dominated by long/short equity funds and commodity funds.
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Chicago Climate Exchange, UK ETS, CDM and JI
Given the growth of these funds, where might one look for the best opportunities?
Although there are many areas, and some are pretty obvious, let’s run through some
that we at AIG Investments think are particularly important.
One area to consider is utilities and energy infrastructure. Developing technolo-
gies or engineering that might reduce carbon emissions from plants or that might
provide new ways to generate electricity represents an important way to participate.
A second area, and one that I mentioned before, is alternative energy and cleantech.
Each clean technology has unique characteristics and unique risks. To some extent,
cleantech has become the biotech opportunity of the venture capital funds over the
last few years and a huge amount of money is flowing in this direction.
I suspect that much like what happened in biotech the last time around, there will
be many people who lose a lot of money in cleantech, but that does not mean that
there will not be people who make a significant amount of money by identifying
those areas of opportunity. Clearly, technological sophistication and the ability to
commercialize these products are going to be essential.
Each clean technology has unique characteristics and unique risks. To some
extent, cleantech has become the biotech opportunity of the venture
capital funds over the last few years and a huge amount of money is
flowing in this direction.
Another notable area is water. Climate change has a really profound impact on the
availability of this essential resource. While in 2007 climate change was one of the
most prevalent topics at Davos, water, other than sovereign wealth funds, may have
been the second most prevalent in 2008. There was a lot of attention given to water
at Davos, with at least six or eight different sessions that dealt with water in one form
or another. The increase or the continued need for clean and affordable water is
extremely important, and, coupled with climate change, it becomes a greater issue.
Interestingly, there are many diverse investment opportunities focused on water
around the world. In London, for example, it is estimated that nearly half of the water
that goes through the area’s water system leaks away, and is simply lost.
I had an interesting conversation with someone from the Philippines who has a
water concession from the local government. They are now delivering water to half of
the Manila population and have significantly reduced the loss of water by bringing in
new pipes and completely revamping the infrastructure. They have been able to provide
clean water to over a million people who did not previously have access to clean water,
and they have been able to price it in a way that is affordable for the poor people of
Manila. This is an example of where the private sector has come in and significantly
changed the quality of water and, ultimately, the quality of life for people in a country.
If we look at climate change and how people are addressing it, we also have to
think about some of the unintended consequences. I look at some of the biofuels and
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their impact on food and water as two things that people have not necessarily taken
into consideration before. There is a tremendous amount of farm production moving
into production of energy instead of the production of food, thereby taking a
tremendous amount of water which is already in short supply. There are people who
are saying that water is the new oil in terms of scarcity, and the use of biofuels is
actually exacerbating that problem.
We are looking at all these investment opportunities, have exposure to managers
in nearly all of those areas, and continue to look and search for opportunities. We see
opportunities not only in hedge fund investing, but also across all of the asset classes,
and there are clearly opportunities in private equity. For example, our private equity
team invested in a U.K.-based company called Sindicatum Carbon Capital, a financier
and developer of greenhouse-gas-abatement projects. We have also been an investor
in a variety of renewable energies, and we have a fixed income fund that is focused on
renewable energy.
As I said at the outset, thinking about climate change and carbon emissions and
investing around that is not simply in the domain of socially responsible investors – it
has to be considered mainstream now, and, as investors, it is an important component
of risk assessment. Whether we are investing in stocks, bonds or commodities, climate
change is important to everything that we do and everything in which we invest. You
have to keep it top of mind as you are making those investment decisions, because if
you don’t, it will catch up to you in the end. But if you do, not only will you mitigate
your risks, but you will also find opportunities for adding lasting value.
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A Pot of Gold for Renewable Energy?
Funding Renewable Energy with
Carbon Finance
Peter Sweatman, Climate Change Capital
editors’ remarks
Peter Sweatman is one of the environmental market makers of our speaker series and
his presentation draws on this perspective. The material here, however, is not
exclusively at the expert level and intentionally discusses many of the core components
of carbon finance without assuming extensive prior knowledge.
The largest section of the chapter, “Fundamentals of Carbon Finance,” covers such
topics as: the value of carbon; the scale, timing, and economics of the climate issue; the
progression of carbon policies; the basics of cap-and-trade systems; the different
carbon markets; and the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM). A following section
looks at the link between carbon and renewable energy, particularly how regulation
and the CDM market are driving across-the-board improvements through competition
and, especially, through financing: “The availability of capital has enabled firms to
invent things that have created cost reductions where we didn’t anticipate them or in
areas where scientific laboratories do not tend to look.” After briefly reviewing the
voluntary markets and summarizing three examples of on-going mitigation projects,
the chapter closes with questions about biomass, energy efficiency, forestry, cleantech,
private equity, and transportation.
While one intention of this chapter is to “frame the value in renewable energy and
carbon” by leading us through a relevant body of work, it also succeeds in providing insight
into the evolution of this value. In Chapter 5, Mark Fulton, looking forward, observes that
we’re still waiting for the markets to “really take carbon on board” and see “the Fed funds
rate, the U.S. Euro rate, the treasury bond rate, the oil price, and, beside them, the carbon
price.” In this chapter, Mr. Sweatman reminds us, in looking back, that carbon has come a
long way in a short time and has already achieved remarkable market integration: “It is
great that carbon has a freely traded price and that there are probably now thousands of
market participants that look at it everyday. The feeds go into all the typical financial
systems and models, and can be easily drawn into the spreadsheets around the world that
are projecting the price of energy and the price of project finance debt.”*
carbon finance: environmental market solutions to climate change
yale school of forestry & environmental studies
60
introduction
Thank you very much. This afternoon I’d like to take you through some work that I
hope helps frame the value in renewable energy and carbon. One of the things that is
happening on the international level at the moment is that, for the first time, the
financial markets and the capital markets are beginning to get to grips with
environmental factors. Policy makers are increasingly listening to the scientific
community which is providing increasingly certain analysis about the way in which
the climate is changing as a result of greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions globally. The
response has been a government move towards a fuller environmental pricing policy
via policy action in the sectors of high energy or high greenhouse gas emissions
intensity.
I will describe the organization that I work for, and then the challenges for some
of those policies that are dictating the value framework – which, of course, generate
the pot of gold for those who act. We can then discuss the markets themselves, the
carbon markets, and the markets for renewable energy using mostly European case
studies as these are the ones with which I am most familiar. I will also present some
case studies, which are real projects, in order to illustrate some of the things that we
will have hopefully covered during the time prior.
I should mention that I am particularly happy to come to Yale. It is the first time
I’ve visited your university, but exactly two years ago, in November of 2005, one of the
first presentations that I gave in Madrid on the economics of climate change was at
the invitation of the Yale Alumni Association. For what it’s worth, Yale has always
been a leading light on climate change in my mind and I remain an avid reader and
fan of Dean Gus Speth and his writing on the subject. Thanks for having me here.
background
To give you an idea of how I came here, I am an engineer who worked for an
investment bank, who then became what’s been recently labeled a “social
entrepreneur.” Although I didn’t call myself a social entrepreneur at the time, the title
seems to fit what I was up to during the five years between ending at JP Morgan and
starting at Climate Change Capital (CCC). The relevant piece for this afternoon is
that I spent 10 years getting to grips with financing and how the traditional corporate
finance and capital markets world works. I spent five years attempting to provide
channels that would increase the efficiency and amount of financing for social
projects, and now I have spent 3.5 years effectively at the intersection of the
environment and the financial markets at Climate Change Capital.
Climate Change Capital is a fairly unique organization. Everyone thinks their
organization is unique, of course, but in this instance it is 125 people who are in an
alternative investment manager and advisor specializing in the opportunities that are
generated by the global transition to a low carbon economy, principally the markets
of clean power, clean technology, clean fuels and carbon. CCC has the “look and feel”
of traditional advisor/fund manager, but with the focus and intent to be drivers of
investment and change in climate change and environmental markets.
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CCC’s main activity is investment management, which I will describe in a little
more detail. Presently, CCC has on the order of $1.5 billion of funds under
management in a variety of project equity, clean technology or private equity and
carbon funds – which are our principal vehicle for investments in Clean
Development Mechanism (CDM) projects.
While we are a “niche player,” often times if you compare the sheer volume of
resources that we can deploy into these sectors, it is significantly larger than the
volume of resources that some of the larger banks deploy into the same sectors. We
are purely focused on those sectors as that is all we do. We tend to serve four types of
clients: energy sector clients, financial institution clients, solution providers, and
government related clients.
CCC’s Carbon Finance Team manages one of the largest pools of private capital
dedicated to “carbon investments” in the world – around $1 billion under
management. This fund invests in CDM or Joint Implementation (JI) projects as well
as some of the entities which provide the services or technologies that go into these
projects. It subsequently trades the carbon credits that come out of the projects to
provide financial returns to private equity style investors, mainly pension funds.
Our Clean Private Equity Fund looks for investments typically between 5 and 20
million euros in “cleantech” companies that need development capital to grow to the
next stage of their life – a classic example would be taking one factory that is
producing one set of products for one market into five factories that are producing
five products for a global market (obviously within the low carbon space).
Our very first funds were structured as Venture Capital Trusts (VCT), which are UK-
specific structures designed to make investing in renewable energy, and other venture
capital style investments, tax efficient for high rate UK taxpayers. The main operations
of our Ventus VCT funds are to find and invest in wind projects within the UK.
Carbon Funds invest in a new asset class which has been created by the Kyoto
Protocol and other GHG cap-and-trade schemes in order to share the burden of
investment in GHG reductions across sectors and between countries. Among other
things, carbon funds provide capital through a contract, becoming the off-taker of
carbon credits from a project and helping to create carbon credits through often
uncertain registration and analytical processes. Those carbon credits have a value,
which I’ll explain once we have seen the policy framework. Carbon Funds are a pool
of available credit, which among other things, are helping to fund GHG reductions
and renewable energy in developing countries.
Carbon Funds are a pool of available credit, which among other things, are
helping to fund GHG reductions and renewable energy in developing
countries.
fundamentals of carbon finance
Value of carbon
You may know this, but I think one of the purposes of going through the policy
framework that exists is to ensure that everybody’s on the same page and understands
why carbon credits have a value. In essence, things that were previously “free” (i.e.
emitting CO2 and other gases that create global warming) are currently becoming no
longer free. This is being driven by policy rules and regulations. Those regulations are
driving investment and those investments, we hope, are saving the planet.
Figure 1 Change is driven by economic incentives and smart regulation
The problem of climate change is a problem of HUGE scale, and this is the main
reason why I moved from the NGO (non-governmental organization) sector back
into the private sector – I feel quite strongly that one of the few tools at our disposal
to help tackle the enormity of climate change is the global financial market. The sheer
volume and speed by which I feel humankind has to move is something akin to the
daily turnover of FX markets rather than average annual fundraising of my NGO. I
figured that if one could direct just a small part of that huge gushing flow of capital
at the problem of climate change then we might have a chance of avoiding many of
the impacts that humanity would prefer to do without. The joke about Figure 1 is that
there’s one guy who is chasing the carrot on the stick and there’s a bunch of other
people discussing things. I believe that economic incentives combined with smart
regulation will certainly incentivize and drive change.
Timing and scale
In my mind the best work which illustrates the problems of size and scale is the
framework produced by Professors Socolow and Pacala of Princeton. Effectively, the
stabilization wedge theory1 is a useful framework to understand the roadmap that is
necessary for us to move onto a level playing field (stability) when it comes to global
carbon emissions. Figure 2 shows that in the 50 years between 2004 and 2054, if we
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want to just maintain the same level of carbon emissions globally, which is the big
blue rectangle, we would have to do seven things to reduce greenhouse gas emissions
through seven “wedges” below a “business as usual pathway.”
I feel quite strongly that one of the few tools at our disposal to help tackle
the enormity of climate change is the global financial market. The sheer
volume and speed by which I feel humankind has to move is something
akin to the daily turnover of FX markets rather than average annual
fundraising of my NGO. I figured that if one could direct just a small part of
that huge gushing flow of capital at the problem of climate change then we
might have a chance of avoiding many of the impacts that humanity would
prefer to do without.
Figure 2 Stabilization Wedge Theory by Pacala and Socolow
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Using technologies available today, Socolow and Pacala came up with 15 potential
wedges, each of which could reduce 1 GT (gigaton) of carbon dioxide (CO2e)
equivalent emissions during that 50 year period.
The 15 Socolow-Pacala strategies are:
 drive more efficient vehicles;
 reduce the number of vehicles on the road;
 produce more efficient building stock;
 make the base load of coal power plants two times more efficient;
 switch from coal to gas in base load power production;
 capture CO2 at base load power plants and store it;
 capture CO2 at hydrogen producing power plants and store it;
 capture CO2 at coal to syn-gas fuel plants;
 use nuclear power instead of coal;
 use wind power instead of coal;
 use photovoltaic power instead of coal;
 use wind produced hydrogen in fuel-cell cars instead of gasoline;
 use biomass fuels instead of fossil fuels;
 reduce deforestation and afforest areas that are currently denuded of forest;
 change agricultural methods from intensive to “conservation tillage.”
These are the 15 strategies, and Socolow and Pacala ask us to select seven of these
to achieve their stabilization outcome.
The following examples illustrate the scale of the solution set. If you were to
choose increased efficiency of vehicles, for example, you would have to double the
efficiency of 2 billion cars over the next 50 years. If you wished to create a gigaton of
carbon savings from the use of nuclear, you’d have to replace every aging nuclear
power plant with a new nuclear plant and for every one nuclear plant you’d have to
build another one, globally. If you wanted to do something about the efficiency of
coal, you’d have to double the efficiency of every coal power station currently
operating. This is a significant challenge, but then again, we have come a very long
way in 50 years.
For people who ask if the renewable energy bubble is about to deflate, I make the
point that we currently have about 60,000 MW (Megawatts) in the world of
operational wind farms and what we need is 2,000,000 MW. We’re about 3 percent of
the way there. If anybody’s thinking about renewable energy as an attractive option
to look at, career wise or any wise, the change has only just begun. We’ve got to reach
700 times today’s coverage of solar panels to create one of Socolow’s wedges. The list
goes on: 100 times the amount of ethanol used in Brazil for global cars or 3,500 times
the Sleipner CO2 Storage project, which is a Norwegian pilot to store CO2 in specific
geological structures underneath the sea as a method of sequestration.
Carbon policy
So what has the world done about this? Well, at the scientific and consensus building
levels, much more than folks think. Imagine the world thinking about how to solve
such a large and complex problem. Nearly twenty years ago, in 1988, the
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) was created as a vehicle to inform
the world’s political leaders and thinkers about climate change. Through a number of
reports, all of which pointed to increasingly solid, similar, and proven facts, it has
progressed scientific consensus. Figure 3 highlights the chain of these reports over the
last 20 years: 1990, human activity seems to be causing global warming; 1996, stronger
evidence that human activity is causing global warming, and so on. Over time, the
probabilities have become more certain, and the reports have gotten deeper and more
detailed. The top section of the timeline shows the movement of scientific thought
over the last 20 years, while the bottom section of the timeline shows the key policy
events that were locking in the kind of umbrella framework that has created the
carbon markets in Europe, like the European Trading Scheme (or ETS).
In 1992, the critical and seminal United Nations Framework Convention on Climate
Change (UNFCCC) created the umbrella framework, now signed by 192 countries,
which set a strategic direction. In other words, reducing greenhouse gases is good and
we all should do it. This is the largest global consensus framework ever ratified.
Underneath the UNFCCC, a protocol was required to “put teeth into the grand
statements within the framework” and provide specific targets for countries and
mechanisms through which the broad statements of the UNFCCC would be turned
into actions. Once the Kyoto Protocol was ratified in 2005, the individual
governments then implemented their targets from the Kyoto Protocol into local laws
in order to guide the economic choices of the markets and market players.
Figure 3 is a policy map of how we came to where we are today. I happen to think
that is important because I often ask the question, and sometimes wonder, if there
would have been a different way of doing it. Aside from “faster,” it’s hard to imagine
a substantially different process that could “solve a global issue” while allowing
international consensus around the solution of a global problem to be transcribed
into local law and hence into the actions of local economic actors.
The Kyoto Protocol is a very interesting, forward-thinking, and challenging
agreement. I’d like to draw on three fundamental concepts which I think are some of
the important concepts written into it. First, it gave specific country targets, measurable
emissions caps. In other words, Annex 1 governments who had been submitting data to
report their greenhouse gas emissions have to reach reductions targets against a 1990
“baseline” or starting point. The 15 major economies of Europe, for example, are
required to reach a collective level that is 8 percent below the 1990 baseline; Canada has
to reach 6 percent below, Croatia 5 percent below, Spain (where I live) 15 percent above,
Norway 11 percent above, and the U.S. – if it had ratified – would have had to reach 7
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percent below 1990 levels. Enshrined in the Kyoto Protocol were the specific targets for
each country for its expected GHG emissions during the years 2008 to 2012.
The Kyoto Protocol also introduced two flexibility mechanisms which, in my
opinion, are critical, innovative, and the reason why there’s so much interest at the
moment in terms of carbon investment and trading. The so-called “Flex Mex” allows
governments – and governments allow economic actors – to interchange and to
trade their carbon credits among each other. It also established a “steam valve” called
the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM), which ties together both efficiency, in
terms of marginal abatement cost, and the issue of responsibility and equity. In
essence, a lot of the carbon emissions already in the system have come from the
developed world and a lot of the new infrastructure that could create GHGs will be
built in the developing world as they converge to us in terms of their standards of life.
There has to be a mechanism through which investments can be made by historic
emitters to help that new infrastructure become less carbon intense.
China, for example, is completing the construction of one new coal fired power plant
per week (roughly 52 a year), and 52 new coal power stations of roughly 500 MW in size
creates, broadly speaking, the same GHG output as the entire electricity generating base
of the UK. If we can’t somehow provide additional funds to help make China migrate
into a cleaner energy production base, which of course is likely to be more expensive
(and the CDM is a mechanism to help share the costs of that), then no matter what we
do in the developed world, we may have an issue which locks in a plant lifetime (i.e. 40
to 50 years) of GHG emissions due to new “dirty” infrastructure in developing countries.
[The Kyoto Protocol] also established a “steam valve” called the Clean
Development Mechanism (CDM), which ties together both efficiency, in
terms of marginal abatement cost, and the issue of responsibility and
equity. In essence, a lot of the carbon emissions already in the system have
come from the developed world and a lot of the new infrastructure that
could create GHGs will be built in the developing world as they converge to
us in terms of their standards of life. There has to be a mechanism through
which investments can be made by historic emitters to help that new
infrastructure become less carbon intense.
Cap and trade
While this seems “simple,” I am often surprised by the kind of folks for whom “cap-
and-trade” schemes do not mean much. Recently, one of my close friends who runs
a hedge fund in San Francisco and had spent a career in investment banks and private
equity, thanked me for explaining this to him because he had never really understood
what it was and why carbon had a value.
In the European Emission Trading Scheme (ETS), you have 11,500 companies for
which we have historic carbon data. They’ve been reporting how much GHG
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emissions they emit, and their reports are independently verified. To date, we’ve
probably got four years of data on these installations; countries know how much
these installations expect to emit.
Governments then negotiate individual allocation plans and allocate each
company an amount of credits for every year. In Phase 1 of the ETS, the amount of
credits in many cases was just slightly short of the amount of credits each respective
company needed. In some cases, like producers of energy from biomass or from
cogeneration, this allocation was sometimes slightly higher in anticipation of
increased production going forward. Governments created “a short,” a need for
carbon credits. Entities that, for whatever reason, emit less in a given year, can take
the amount of credits that they don’t need (as a result of emitting less) and sell them
to a company who is going to emit more. A game of musical chairs is an easy analogy
– the government controls the number of chairs around the table, and all the
companies rush around trying to sit on a chair (their allocation) by buying a chair
from somebody else (trading), by creating a chair (CDM), or by exempting
themselves for the need of a chair (i.e. just emit less by making an investment in new
technology or reduced production). Clearly, the overall number of chairs (emissions)
has to keep going down to “make the game work” and this is the lever controlled by
government policy.
Effectively, the market has a limited supply of credits. Suppose, for example, that
you are a European electricity producer who owns two plants – one gas power plant
and one coal power plant. If you have capacity to produce marginal electricity from
both plants, and if you want to create a carbon credit, then you’d generate the next
MWh (Megawatt hour) of electricity from your gas plant, which is half as carbon
intensive as the coal plant. You’re all smart enough to figure out there’s a mathematical
calculation here – if you knew the coal price, the gas price, some conversion
efficiencies, and the electricity price, then you could figure out a theoretical price for
the carbon credit created. That would be one way of creating a carbon credit. Another
way of creating a carbon credit is through CDM, which brings a cheaper credit into
the market from GHG reduction projects in the developing world.
The reason this is an efficient system, in the opinion of European regulators at
least, is that the cost of a ton of CO2e abatement is different in different industries,
and in fact, it’s only the plant operator who probably knows the true marginal cost of
the reduction in his own plant. In the cement industry, for example, to create a ton of
clinker cement using today’s technology, almost by chemical definition, one has to
produce around three-quarters of a ton of CO2. To reduce the CO2 that the cement
factory produces is potentially very expensive compared to increasing the efficiency
of, let’s say, a very old coal boiler at an electricity generating plant through process
improvement. Therefore, by definition, there are companies that will find it cheaper
to invest per ton of CO2 in reducing their own emissions than will others. The low
hanging fruit, or cheapest emissions reductions, are done first, and in a world where
capturing methane from agriculture, for example, comes more cheaply than GHG
retrofits to power stations, offsets are a low cost alternative. The costs of compliance
to the regulated sector in the EU are, as a result, the lowest marginal costs that can be
achieved by those 11,500 companies for abatement multiplied by the short created.
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Therefore, by definition, there are companies that will find it cheaper to
invest per ton of CO2 in reducing their own emissions than will others. The
low hanging fruit, or cheapest emissions reductions, are done first, and in a
world where capturing methane from agriculture, for example, comes more
cheaply than GHG retrofits to power stations, offsets are also a low cost
alternative. The costs of compliance to the regulated sector in the EU are, as
a result, the lowest marginal costs that can be achieved by those 11,500
companies for abatement multiplied by the short created.
Economics of climate change
The Stern Review2 is an excellent report written by the economist Lord Nicholas Stern,
former World Bank Chief Economist, as commissioned by the British government.
The purpose of the Stern Review is to think from an economist’s perspective about
climate change and to try to analyze, in economic terms that people can understand,
what the cost-benefit equation might look like for climate change mitigation. For the
purposes of this report, that meant keeping the total concentration of CO2 emissions
in the atmosphere underneath scientifically specified thresholds.
One of the key conclusions of this report, which is very long and detailed (and a
worthy read), is that the resource costs required to avoid many of the worst impacts
of climate change, with their various ranges of probabilities, is around 1 percent of
global GDP (Gross Domestic Product) over the next 50 years until 2050. That
amount, however, would not only be a cost, but would also create opportunities, add
to global competitiveness, and likely have other tangential benefits. This investment
would, in Stern’s baseline climate view with certain probability curves around it,
avoid an expected cost of minus 5 percent of consumption by mitigating climate
change market impacts and risk of catastrophe.
Again, this is a fairly detailed piece of work which makes interesting reading. There
are a number of classic discussion points around the assumptions that went behind
the Stern Review that we could discuss. But for simple purposes, I think the point that
the Stern Review was trying to make was that if we invest now, while the time frames
are long, we are going to have a return on our investment in terms of avoided costs,
almost like taking out an insurance policy. And those avoided costs could be pretty
significant—factors of between 5 and 20 times the required investment, depending
upon the future climate scenarios and other complexities.
Carbon markets and currencies
Figure 4 shows that there is not one carbon market, but many carbon markets. In fact,
whilst there are fewer carbon markets than there are currencies in the world, one can
think about them, in a sense, as carbon currencies. The big orange circle is a carbon
currency whose total capital stock is 57 billion tons of CO2 – the amount of carbon
emissions covered by the Kyoto Protocol in 36 Annex B countries who have ratified
2 
Stern Review on the
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the Protocol and are under obligations to meet targets. Within that, this market has a
credit called an AAU (Assigned Amount Unit) held in a government account or
register; European countries have 26.2 billion of these AAU “carbon units”.
Figure 4 The many carbon markets – driven by 2008 to 2012 Kyoto compliance
Underneath that, in Europe, sits the regulated market called ETS which we have
discussed. The ETS is made up of 11,500 emitter installations that are collectively
allocated 10.4 billion EUAs (European Union Allowances), which is the “carbon
currency” which trades on screens on Reuters and Bloomberg and has liquidity in the
five main power and carbon trading exchanges in Europe. These allowances are the
ones most frequently quoted on the forward market between 20 and 24 euros per ton
of CO2. There is a 10.4 billion capital stock of EUAs (each representing a ton of CO2
emission) sitting in the European registries.
The reason for the green circle called “EU: Other Policies” is that the ETS is not the
whole EU emissions story – only around 55 percent of the total emissions in Europe
are covered by those 11,500 plants. The other 45 percent of GHG emissions come
mainly from transport and heating. There are other European policies directed at the
transport sectors, energy efficiency sectors, and fuel efficiency sectors which are
dealing with the expected emissions reductions from these “non regulated” sectors.
The Kyoto Protocol’s flexible mechanisms support or add to all this. The capital
stock of credits coming in from the flexibility mechanisms are estimated to be
between 1.5 and 2 billion tons. This means that the CDM/JI markets are about 20
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The dotted line going off to the RGGI (Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative)
market, which is the first organized market being created in the U.S., shows the only
possible link from a global or EU carbon currency to a U.S. carbon credit. Effectively,
there is no established flow of Kyoto credits into the RGGI system today, but there
could be if the price of the RGGI carbon units were to go above 10 USD (U.S. dollars).
These are the mainstream carbon markets which currently exist. There is another one
not on here known as the “voluntary carbon markets,” which I will come to in a minute.
Clean Development Mechanism
From an investment perspective, the most important thing for CCC’s Carbon funds
presently is the Clean Development Mechanism. The Clean Development
Mechanism, as I mentioned, is an expected capital stock of around 1.5 to 2 billion
Certified Emission Reduction credits (CERs) coming from around 1,600 projects.
These projects are based in the countries seen in Figure 5. By number, 35 percent of
the projects are in India, 14 percent in China, 13 percent in Brazil, 11 percent in
Mexico, etc.
The period prior to Kyoto ratification, saw really explosive growth in this market
once people were pretty sure that Kyoto was going to be ratified. There was initially a
very strong growth of industrial gas projects (i.e. the HFC-23 and N20 reduction
projects). These projects were the low hanging fruit of the CDM as these gases have
particularly high impacts on global warming compared to CO2 — some hundreds or
tens of thousands of times the warming impact of one CO2 molecule. Unsurprisingly,
and driven by economics, the cheapest abatement projects happened first and then a
raft of broader based methodologies and projects quickly followed.
Renewable energy is the second largest asset class of the carbon markets, and may
well grow to be the largest as most of the industrial gas projects are now finished. The
third largest category is methane reduction from cement plants, coal mines (coal
mine methane), and waste treatment processes and storage. After that is energy
efficiency, fuel switching, and, sad to say in the present company of the Yale School of
Forestry & Environmental Studies, afforestation/reforestation, which is tiny; however,
we expect it in the post-2012 environment to grow significantly faster with
(hopefully) U.S. support.
There have been estimates made by the World Bank that the amount of capital
currently committed to CDM and flowing through to these 1,600 projects, is about $12
billon. But I suspect that the capital ready for investment in CDM at the moment is
probably closer to $20 billion, mainly adding the balance sheets of large energy
companies that may be investing in these markets, which are more difficult to accurately
measure. There is some very serious capital being invested through this mechanism.
At a different level, another size indicator is that in the first half of 2007, 16 billion
euros worth of carbon credits traded across the European exchanges. This provides a
sense of the current liquidity in Europe for carbon credits, and it’s an important
figure to bear in mind when comparing and contrasting the liquidity and volumes
circulating in the regulated markets with those in the voluntary markets.
carbon finance: environmental market solutions to climate change
yale school of forestry & environmental studies
72
Figure 5 CDM project locations, by number
The Clean Development Mechanism, as I mentioned, is an expected capital
stock of around 1.5 to 2 billion Certified Emission Reduction credits (CERs)
coming from around 1,600 projects . . . There have been estimates made by
the World Bank that the amount of capital currently committed to CDM,
and flowing through to these 1,600 projects is about $12 billion. But I
suspect that the capital ready for investment in CDM at the moment is
probably closer to $20 billion . . . There is some very serious capital being
invested through this mechanism.
Carbon prices
How does the European carbon price, that 20 euro amount per ton, come about? Well,
there are the fundamentals of the market such as the actual emissions coming out of the
plants and the allowances or credit stocks that were made available to the companies at
the beginning of each crediting period. The gap which creates the short (supply and
demand of the credits) can be estimated. Then, in terms of system design, the new
credits that are going to be created through imports from CDM can also be estimated.
In the European trading system, we are coming to the end of the first period on
December 31st 2007. The second period begins on January 1st 2008, which coincides
with Kyoto, and lasts until December 31st 2012. The third phase of the European
trading system will begin in 2013 and end in 2020 most likely. One of the key
questions we are considering is: If you have a credit at the end of those periods, can
you keep it and use it in the next one? That is, if you have a credit in your account on
December 31st 2012, can you keep it and use on January 1st 2013? “Banking” obviously
has an impact on the value, or expectation of value, of the credits.
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Actor behavior also impacts short-term pricing. How frequently or fluidly do the
participants actually trade? There are clusters of highly intensive industries and some
financial players that trade on a very frequent basis. But there are a lot of smaller
industrial players that maybe only have a single person finance team or controller
who’s not a trader, and whose job is not to regularly buy and sell carbon certificates or
even have a view on the carbon price. These plants often follow a compliance strategy,
meaning that they figure out how many credits they need, trade once a year, get the
balance right, and then move to the next year; many participants behave like this.
Figure 6 shows the European carbon price history over the beginning of this
market. At the start (pre-EUETS phase), liquidity was low, yet the market traded on
a forward basis based around a “politically acceptable expectation” of future carbon
prices. Few counterparties, however, really operated in a meaningful way. When the
markets began in earnest and when there was liquidity in the markets, most of the
major traders, the human beings who do the trading in this market, tended to also
trade power. Around 50 percent of emissions credits are held by electricity generating
firms and the people who trade CO2 also trade electricity or sit in the same room as
those people.
With that in mind, look at the price evolution in Figure 6. The green line is the Phase
I price, and the orange line is the Phase II price. That blue line, which moves in a very
similar way to the price of carbon, is the implied cost of switching between coal and gas.
Figure 6 Liquid markets: A clearinghouse for GHG liabilities and a clear “market” feedback to regulators
There is a high relative correlation between the short-term upward and downward
moves of the implied coal-gas switch spread and the EUA price, but these prices are
not a direct mathematical formula of each other. Factors which affect the EUA price
which do not impact the implied fuel switch are allocations, actual emissions,
imports via CDM and JI, and eventually, the future of the post-2012 discussions. The
EUA price has been consistently lower than the actual cost of the marginal switch
from coal to gas, notwithstanding this high tracking correlation for certain periods of
the past during which the other, EUA-only, factors were more or less stable.
There is a high relative correlation between the short-term upward and
downward moves of the implied coal-gas switch spread and the EUA price,
but these prices are not a direct mathematical formula of each other.
Factors which affect the EUA price which do not impact the implied fuel
switch are allocations, actual emissions, imports via CDM and JI, and
eventually, the future of the post-2012 discussions. The EUA price has been
consistently lower than the actual cost of the marginal switch from coal to
gas, notwithstanding this high tracking correlation for certain periods of
the past during which the other, EUA-only, factors were more or less stable.
Another interesting phenomenon reflected in Figure 6 is what happened around
May of 2006, when the first real emissions data was announced. Prior to May 2006,
the market was based on historically estimated data that had been calculated and
back-checked by verifiers and by the firms that were participating in the markets, and
the allocations were given on the basis of those estimates. It came to pass that those
estimates were over-estimates and when the real data from 2005 was released, with all
the individual stations shown, it appeared to everybody at that time that the market
itself was “long” for Phase I.
What was incredibly interesting was that theoretically, when the data was released,
the carbon price should have gone straight to zero, stayed at zero, and flat lined all the
way along. In reality, the price stayed around 15 euros for a significant period of
months and then gradually went down to zero. I suspect that one reason for that was
that a number of the shorts were held in the large liquid trading institutions that were
very frequent market participants, while the longs were actually distributed among
the small plants that were just doing compliance trading. Those carbon credits were
tightly held and were not coming out into the market. So even though theoretically
the value of carbon at that point was zero, as predicted by increasingly large numbers
of market participants at the time, including CCC, the individuals who were holding
onto the credits that wouldn’t have any value come the end of the year just were not
selling them immediately because they were not frequent traders. So the Phase 1 EUA
price was supported for a bit but is now effectively zero.
While the “price crash” exposed the difficulties of estimating historic emissions,
and the weakness of allocations based upon these, in the longer term it could be seen
as good news because Phase 1 was a “pre-Kyoto trial” and key lessons were learned.
The new allocations for Phase II, a longer and more important phase, were based on
correct data and the banking of credits from phase II into phase III should also
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3
20% of all energy use should
come from renewable sources
with a 20% energy efficiency
goal by the year 2020. Energy
being used in establishments
across Europe will be 20%
more efficient, or use 20% less
energy obtained through
other measures.
prevent a “crash to zero.” I do not anticipate that the Phase II carbon price will suffer
the same excitement when the real emissions data are released in the future . . . and,
in fact, it didn’t in May 2007 when 2006 data was released.
The title of this figure, “Liquid markets: A Clearinghouse for GHG Liabilities and
a Clear ‘Market’ Feedback to tegulators,” reflects that we very much like the fact that
there is a clear and transparent price of carbon and that this provides direct, clear, and
dynamic feedback to regulators regarding the impact of their policies; it also begins
to force the “markets” to price in the environmental impacts of their actions (the
famous “imperfection” cited by the Stern review). It is great that carbon has a freely
traded price and that there are probably now thousands of market participants that
look at it everyday. The feeds go into all the typical financial systems and models, and
can be easily drawn into the spreadsheets around the world that are projecting the
price of energy and the price of project finance debt, etc. That has all been a pretty
positive development with respect to the environment and the efficiency of
regulation in my opinion. However, there is a huge amount of work still to be done.
renewable energy
Carbon and renewable energy
Earlier this year, European policy highlighted where the carbon markets and the
renewable energy markets are blending. Europe drafted an energy package and laid
down the formulas for what we call “20-20-20,” which is a 20% reduction in emissions
for the European countries by the year 2020 simultaneously with a 20% renewable
energy target by the year 2020.3 Over and above, and to demonstrate its leadership
and to serve as a “gauntlet” to encourage broad participation in the post-Kyoto low
carbon world, Europe effectively announced that if the world participates in this
particular quest, it would raise its GHG reduction target to 30 percent.
In addition, the reason why Figure 7 has overlapping circles is that the success in
any one of these three 20-20-20 goals affects the challenge in meeting the other two
targets. If you end up, for example, producing 30 percent of electricity from
renewable sources, you will have therefore turned off a bunch of power stations that
would have otherwise been emitting CO2 and do better in your emissions target. If
you increase your energy efficiency and don’t build any more power stations and turn
off the highly carbon intensive ones, you will be proportionally improving your
renewable energy performance. So there are clearly a number of ways in which these
different targets converge on the same target.
Another interesting link between carbon and renewable energies is that, because of
the growth in the CDM market and the growth in the U.S. demand for wind power,
there are unseen bottlenecks occurring across the board in Europe in terms of the
projects being invested in. Using traditional markets analysis, one wouldn’t expect the
short that now exists in terms of wind turbines, for example. One of the reasons a
number of the renewable energy producers have been buying turbine manufacturers
is to guarantee their supply of turbines. The global demand for turbines is such that
the main manufacturers of wind turbines, who have been producing the main
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turbine supply, are pretty much sold out for potentially years unless you’ve got huge
buying power. As you’ll see, that has been compounded by the development of wind
farms through the CDM mechanism.
Another interesting link between carbon and renewable energies is that,
because of the growth in the CDM market and the growth in the U.S.
demand for wind power, there are unseen bottlenecks occurring across the
board in Europe in terms of the projects being invested in. Using traditional
markets analysis, one wouldn’t expect the short that now exists in terms of
wind turbines, for example.
Figure 7 EU 2020 targets affecting energy
Cost reductions
There’s an enormous amount of learning going on, and we have been aiding
technology transfer through CDM already. CCC has been using European and U.S.
technologies in the development of our CDM projects, and recent months have seen
Indian firms buying German manufacturers of wind turbines and Chinese PV panel
manufacturers becoming some of the most price competitive suppliers of the
photovoltaic panel markets in Southern Europe. These market dynamics have been
woken up to some extent by the European renewables policies and to some extent by
the CDM markets. The good news from an environmental perspective is that they’re
rushing us down the technology curve. PV project costs have come down by a factor
of 10 over the last 30 years and, although they may not necessarily come down by
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concentration, dual axis tracking systems, thin film, and other enhancements, there is
still a good scope for cost reduction. The availability of capital has enabled firms to
invent things that have created cost reductions where we didn’t anticipate them or in
areas where scientific laboratories do not tend to look.
There’s an enormous amount of learning going on, and we have been
aiding technology transfer through CDM already. CCC has been using
European and U.S. technologies in the development of our CDM projects,
and recent months have seen Indian firms buying German manufacturers
of wind turbines and Chinese PV panel manufacturers becoming some of
the most price competitive suppliers of the photovoltaic panel markets in
Southern Europe. These market dynamics have been woken up to some
extent by the European renewables policies and to some extent by the CDM
markets. The good news from an environmental perspective is that they’re
rushing us down the technology curve.
Financing
The availability of financing is improving. In various EU markets, depending upon
the support regime, one can get 70-90 percent debt financing on solar plants. The
reason is twofold. First, besides a flat piece of land and some construction work, these
projects involve systems and panels that have guarantees from their manufacturers
for their working lives (30 plus years for the panels). Second, there is a feed-in tariff
from the government which looks like a government bond for the majority of the
revenues, assuming the plant is connected and working.
As financiers get more comfortable with renewable energy and get more
comfortable with the tariff regimes that are in place, the degree of aggression with
respect to the provision of finance and the degree of financing alternatives themselves
create efficiencies.
As financiers get more comfortable with renewable energy and get more
comfortable with the tariff regimes that are in place, the degree of
aggression with respect to the provision of finance and the degree of
financing alternatives themselves create efficiencies.
This is highly beneficial to the developing U.S. markets. Much of the U.S.
renewable energy industry is foreign-owned at this point in time and clearly these
techniques are flowing into this market as we speak.
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voluntary markets
The voluntary markets are an important source of activity, preparing the way for
carbon emissions reductions. I will use the term voluntary markets here to describe
any markets that are not regulated with firm and fixed emission levels or targets,
including any GHG emitting activity of an unregulated firm or one which does not
have to comply in one of the previously described carbon markets. By many market
volume trading estimates, the amount of voluntary carbon reduction certificates
traded in voluntary markets is around a factor of 100 less than what was traded in the
regulated markets last year. So while the voluntary markets are clearly important and
help spur innovation, specific emissions caps and trading regulated allowances are
showing themselves to be the more appropriate tools in terms of delivering the scale
of changes required within a limited timeframe.
example projects
I’m going to end by talking a little about a few of the projects that CCC and its funds
have been working on.
The first is a wind farm called Shuanglio, in the Jilin Province of China. It’s a 49.3
MW grid-connected wind farm. It uses European technologies, is developed on land
unfit for cultivation, has local sustainability benefits, is generating the equivalent
amount of electricity as 37,000 tons of coal per annum, and is clearly reducing all
kinds of other gases which a traditional power station would have emitted (which is
also key in China, where air quality issues around the major cities are a very serious
problem). The project saves 190.8 metric tons of CO2 per annum as compared to the
traditional (GHG intensive) baseline in China for electricity generation.
The second is a new landfill in the fastest growing city in China, called Shenzhen
City. The landfill is taking in on the order of 3,000 tons of municipal solid waste per
day. When I’m in Spain giving this presentation, I describe this quantity as roughly
half of all the daily waste from Barcelona, which is Spain’s second largest city. This
project also uses European technology, and takes the methane that comes out of the
decay of the organic waste in the landfill, puts it into pipes, and uses it to generate
automobile fuel or energy. In some cases the gas is just flared to convert the methane
into CO2 – since methane is over 21 times more potent, in terms of global warming
potential, than CO2 in the atmosphere, we get about 20 carbon credits for burning a
ton of methane and turning it into CO2.
Having visited a number of landfills, it is clear that the methane seeping out of the
ground is noxious as well as potentially hazardous. So the impact on the local
environment, on the energy equation, and on the revenue equation is a positive result
of these landfill projects.
Finally, let’s look at the Zhejiang Juhua project which is enormous in terms of its
CO2 equivalent emissions reductions – 29.5 million tons of CO2-equivalent avoided
from the destruction of HFC-23 over 6 years. HFC-23 is a peculiar gas. It is a
byproduct of the production of HFC-22. HFC-22 is required as a replacement for
CFCs (Chlorofluorocarbons), which are the chemicals that were opening the hole in
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the earth’s ozone layer. Thanks to the effectiveness of the Montreal Protocol, CFCs
were eliminated with “harmless” HFC-22s, only to discover that their “cousin 23” is
now warming the atmosphere. However, the good news is that the process to remove
HFC-23 from the atmosphere is fast and easy to install. Most of the point source HFC-
23 emissions are attended as a result of the Kyoto protocol coming into force in 2005.
If there are any questions, I’ll be happy to take them.
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Question and Answer Session
QUESTION 1: Portfolio diversification
How do you diversify your portfolio?
We deploy resources into many geographies and technologies and attempt to have
projects that fit into all of these categories. There is a focus in China as a result of that
economy’s size, broad industrial base, and stage of development. Also, CCC had just
completed the fundraising for its first carbon fund when China began to develop
quickly in terms of being a CDM project hub.
Having said this, we’ve signed agreements and are developing a number of
different projects across the world and we have teams active in all of the key CDM
regions, and additionally in the USA for VERs. In terms of the project type, or the
project asset class, we have good coverage across renewable power, biomass, methane
recovery, energy efficiency, and industrial gases.
QUESTION 2: Biomass projects
I saw during the summer that the UNFCCC started the consultation process for biomass
cultivation. I wonder how Climate Change Capital has studied the possibility of
incorporating that into their portfolio.
CCC has explored, transacted in, and is very supportive of biomass. If you compare
biomass to other renewable energy projects in terms of an economic project to develop
in a European context, the biomass plant tends to have the additional benefits of
creating more jobs (regional or rural employment), of potentially creating heat and
distributed generation, and of potentially reducing the transmission costs of delivering
the electricity out to the more remote regional areas where biomass can be produced.
There is a lot of investment needed in the biomass supply chain – fuel crops,
transportation, pellet manufacturing, new energy production processes, and the
reuse of traditional waste streams. Comparing biomass to wind, for example, the level
of investment in biomass technology is far below the level of investment in wind.
There is a long way to go in terms of efficiencies in the biomass processes.
Biomass also has its share of “issues”. Among these are its relatively low energy-
weight density and hence, its inefficiency, compared to other forms of fuel, if
transported over large distances. This may have a leakage or damaging impact on the
overall CO2 balance for biomass plants fired with non-local inputs. Careful planning
over the sources and uses of biomass will lead to a more efficient system, and this
process has only just begun.
QUESTION 3: Energy efficiency projects
I have a question with respect to energy efficiency projects. I understand that most of the
projects seem to be geared either towards renewable energy or new construction on the
demand side. I understand that the reason for that is because it is easier to put an
investment package together when you have a discrete project like that. In terms of large
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scale energy efficiency projects in places like cities where you obviously have a lot more
players—what is the interest in that, what are the challenges in that? Everyone talks
about the low hanging fruit, but energy efficiency may not be because of the challenges of
the investment.
It’s exactly the right question, and the question that’s currently being debated. How
can we “projectize” a multiple source investment where the significant savings are
produced from many small actions as opposed to one major one? One project that
comes to the top of my mind is the Mexican government’s promotion of energy
efficiency measures across all of their government buildings in the country. In that
instance, it looks more like a discrete project because there is one counterparty (the
government). You can audit all of the buildings before the investment takes place, and
audit them again after the investment to see the differential in terms of energy usage
and greenhouse gas characteristics. Such projects are quite complex and time
consuming for the private sector, yet are being caught in the discussions of
“programmatic CDM”.
Remember that there is a huge carbon market that exists intra-government that
doesn’t currently involve the private sector. This is likely to be an area of policy focus
in the 2008-2012 Kyoto process and in the design of the post-Kyoto era.
QUESTION 4: Forestry projects 
You said by 2012 there would be more projects coming in afforestation and reforestation.
What are the issues and challenges in those projects?
Not being a forestry expert and knowing how much knowledge there is resident in
these walls, I tread nervously here. First, and for the record, forestry is an asset class
that most of the people inside of my company would like to do more of. Forestry is
highly engaging for human beings and forestry projects are highly charismatic. I’ve
looked at forestry projects in Brazil related to the sustainable production of charcoal
for the production of pig-iron, which show all kinds of strong local developmental
benefits and health benefits in addition to the afforestation or reforestation that
would take place.
Financial markets tend to treat harshly the uncertainties that the scientific
community naturally has. And forestry assets are complex. The differences in terms of
where the forests are planted (Northern Hemisphere, Southern Hemisphere) and the
related issues about UV (ultraviolet) absorbency, the time period for which forests
need to stand, reflectivity, and the soil release of CO2 have not made it easy, shall we
say, to get forestry projects approved through the current process that exists for CDM.
The CDM mechanism, which is marketed as a one-size-fits-all mechanism at the
moment, is straining to cope with all of the scientific and process related issues in
over 50 “asset classes”. I guess I’ve used a lot of words to say it’s a complex matter, but
things are moving, albeit slowly.
I think that forestry, especially avoided deforestation, will be a necessary
component of the future solution, but we need to find a robust framework in which
to channel capital. Whether the capital is purely private sector capital, a blend of
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private and public capital, or domestic capital for domestic projects and other types
of capital for international projects, I’m not really sure. I think that the focus on
forestry assets will go up. In fact, the main conclusion is that the convergence of
finance markets with environmental markets is a great thing for people who are
possessed of both skill sets.
QUESTION 5: Cleantech and private equity funds   
Morgan Stanley recently initiated coverage of cleantech. Can you speak a little bit about
how you see that affecting your business? Can you also talk about the time frame and
expected rate of return for your PE/VC (Private Equity / Venture Capital) investments?
CCC’s PE fund is called Climate Change Capital Private Equity (CPE) and is a 200
million euro private equity fund targeted at what you might call “later stage clean
tech”. In other words, it’s not venture capital money, it’s looking to invest amounts of
upwards of 5 million euros. The demand for capital in a second or third stage of
financing is, to us at least, one of the most interesting areas to be involved in with
cleantech today.
A lot of companies are going to need more capital, a lot of those company’s values
are going to go up and, as I said, it is uncharted territory in many areas. All kinds of
sectors are in need of capital as technologies emerge from laboratories or small firms
and enter mass production: solar, biomass, micro generation, energy efficiencies etc.
The second part of the question is timeframe. Clean PE funds, like traditional
ones, have a fixed investment period and then a divestment phase. These periods for
“clean funds” are similar to those for normal PE funds.
QUESTION 6: Transportation 
Although transportation is a big contributor to greenhouse gases, it represents such a small
percentage of the advancement in GHG reductions. There are two things that come into
play in the future and I don’t know if they are factored in already. Number one is the
escalating price of fossil fuels and number two is the increased use of automobiles in China
and India. Do they offset or will the price really bring down the whole carbon footprint?
The cab drivers in Madrid say increasing oil prices don’t affect them at all – before
the price went up they put 20 euros of petrol in their cars and they still put 20 euros
of petrol in their cars. The point is that it appears at the moment that the customer
demand function for use of transportation versus price of petrol is relatively
inflexible. I happen to think that we’re going to go through price barriers where that’s
not going to be the case. There was a 25 cent per gallon increase in the last three weeks
in the U.S. I don’t live here and haven’t studied reports specifically about this country,
but I suspect in Europe where I live, if that kind of increase were to occur, people
would stop to think twice or three times about the use of vehicles.
It is very difficult in a free world context to think about the use of transportation
and the kind of policy measures that will require reduced car usage. One of the things
that I always scratch my head at is that friends of mine in L.A. (Los Angeles) complain
about traffic all day long. In fact, we all complain about traffic all day long. It would
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be great and would improve our quality of life if somehow we could cure traffic
problems in all the major cities of the world. In London, for example, the government
imposed a congestion charge if you want bring your car into the center of the city
between particular hours of the day. This mechanism had a major impact on traffic,
raised revenues, and caused an improvement in air quality in the city.
If you talk to experts, they will tell you their vision of transport for the future, and
it’s a mix of hydrogen fuel cells, plug-in electric cars, and so on. All I know is that it
doesn’t seem to me to be the smartest way to go around town, as a single-bodied
human being, in a huge car that’s spaced for six people and a couple of dogs, and then
to be sitting in traffic most of the time . . . there is something that just doesn’t work
about that. Perhaps the solution needs to be a little more radical, perhaps it involves
vehicles that become increasingly like energy storage mechanisms. This is food for
thought during the next 50 years of development.
Thank you.
Investment Banks Jump On Board:
Mining the Opportunities in Global Carbon Markets
Mr. Karmali has worked for 17 years on climate change and the carbon markets. He is 
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Investment Banks Jump On Board:
Mining the Opportunities in Global
Carbon Markets
Abyd Karmali, Merrill Lynch
editors’ remarks
Abyd Karmali came to our carbon finance lecture series in the middle of a whirlwind
international tour. He arrived in New Haven on little sleep but nonetheless, proceeded
to deliver not only a lucid and poignant talk, but also one that was witty and endearing
to our audience. His broad expertise comes through as he covers a wide scope of
material including carbon markets, policy, finance, technology, and business
opportunities in the carbon space through the perspective of an investment bank.
Claiming that the carbon markets are “well suited to someone like myself, who is not
a master of anything, but wants to have a finger in many different pies,” Mr. Karmali’s
chapter exhibits remarkable depth and comprehensiveness. Because of this, it contains
many micro and macro connections to the other chapters, particularly those within Part
III of this book. Like Peter Sweatman, for instance, Mr. Karmali offers particularly keen
insights into many aspects of the carbon markets and like Jon Anda, he explores
normative issues from a practitioner’s viewpoint, such as what effective carbon policy
should be. Having recently joined Merrill Lynch at the time of this presentation, Mr.
Karmali also explains how he came to the investment bank, how they view the climate
issue, and what activities they have been and plan to be engaged in with regards to
climate change and the existing and potential carbon markets. These talking points
offer clarity into the financial services sector as a whole, and are accented with
examples and illustrations.
Striking a fine balance between describing what was, is, and should be, this carbon
markets discussion covers many of the bases that will be needed to achieve the
ultimate goal of any regulation, namely “getting the highest level of environmental
emission reductions at the lowest possible cost to society overall.”* 
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opening remarks
Thanks very much for the kind introduction. It’s a great pleasure to be here. I have a
confession to make. My first boss was a graduate of the joint program at the School
of Forestry & Environmental Studies and School of Management at Yale, so that filled
me with intimidation when I was asked to come speak at this institution. The second
thing that filled me with intimidation is that I met with Jon Anda1 earlier today and,
trained in the art of due diligence, asked him how it went at Yale, what the audience
was like, etc., and he told me it was one of the toughest audiences he had ever had.
I’m not sure if he was trying to wind me up or if that was a genuine reflection, but I
think he very much enjoyed being with you and I hope that it will be the same for me
too. Of course, the third reason I am intimidated is that it is Halloween and I’m sure
you are going to be bringing tricks instead of treats.
I am going to give a three-part presentation. First, I’m going to spend a bit of time
setting the context, talking about why Merrill Lynch believes that climate change is in
fact a mega-trend for investment. Second, I’m going to dig a bit deeper and explore
some of the risks and opportunities that are now apparent because of the emergence
of the carbon market and where that market may evolve. Third, I’m going to get into
some specifics at the grassroots level within Merrill – how we’re organizing ourselves
to address the opportunities and watch out for those risks.
context
This graphic is my miniature version of An Inconvenient Truth, but don’t worry, I
didn’t bring a cherry picker to help me with that escalating temperature going off the
scale (see Figure 1).
Figure 1 Changes in Temperature, Sea Level and Northern Hemisphere snow cover
2
I’ve tried to put everything on one slide and it’s principally to establish that at an
investment bank like Merrill Lynch, we don’t claim to be atmospheric scientists. We
appreciate that there is a lot of expertise outside of the bank that we have to take as a
given. Our starting point is that the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change
(IPCC) is widely acknowledged as the leading expertise in this area, and that is
essentially where we take our lead. When you have three leading indicators such as you
see here from IPCC’s Working Group I – temperature, sea level rise, and decreasing
snow cover — I think we’re all good at reading graphs and know what this means. Of
course the other part of Working Group I is looking at projections, and the colors in
Figure 2 say more than I possibly could about where the projections could lead us.
Figure 2 Projections of surface temperatures
3
In terms of IPCC’s Working Group II, this is where it begins to get tricky, because you
have different kinds of projected global impacts (see Table 1). When you break it
down, as Working Group II has very discretely, into water, ecosystems, food, coasts,
and health, and you think about the kinds of businesses and clients Merrill Lynch has,
you realize that there is an awful lot of potential impact and opportunity in each of
the different areas in which the bank operates. Just to throw out some obvious ones,
the kinds of impacts that we’ll see in the food system affect Merrill Lynch in many
ways, whether it’s taking positions in the commodities markets, helping companies
active in the soft commodities business hedge their kinds of risks, or advising clients
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who are actually in manufacturing or elsewhere in the food chain – whether they be
beverage producers or some of the large conglomerates. When you go through that
exercise for each and every one of these impact categories, it begins to look quite
daunting.
Table 1 Examples of projected global impacts – global mean annual temperature change relative to
1980-1999 (°C) 
4
Working Group III is where I think we see the potential upside (see Figure 3). This is,
of course, the part of the IPCC that looks for the emission-reducing opportunities.
The lens we use to look at this information is the cost per ton of reducing emissions
in each of the different sectors, ranging from energy to waste management, and what
that implies about the short-term, medium-term, and long-term opportunities in
each of these sectors.
Figure 3 Emission reduction opportunities
5
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The challenges get more and more intense because you’re talking about
opportunities in each of these sectors which have, from a financial markets
perspective, different capital requirement profiles. You are talking about different
risks of technology performance and about technologies that are at different stages of
development, so there is not going to be a “one-size-fits-all” type of solution. This
means that, as a bank, we have to have different kinds of vehicles ready to address the
opportunities that fit into different kinds of buckets.
The challenges get more and more intense because you’re talking about
opportunities in each of these sectors which have, from a financial markets
perspective, different capital requirement profiles. You are talking about
different risks of technology performance and about technologies that are
at different stages of development, so there is not going to be a “one-size-
fits-all” type of solution.
The other message that I would take away from Figure 3, which I know that Merrill
Lynch’s management certainly has taken on board, is that if we are to achieve the
targets the policy makers are coalescing around – let’s just say arbitrarily 550 ppm (of
course we know that that is unfortunately a moving target; it seems the desire is to
make that even tougher to avoid some of the adverse impacts I showed in the
previous figures) – when you work that backwards to an aggregated marginal
abatement cost curve across each of these different sectors, it does not look that bad.
Of course, that is the key message of the Stern Review6 and it is also a message that
was borne out by the work that McKinsey & Company has done for Vattenfall that
was released earlier this year.7 The message is that, if your policies are executed in an
effective way, you probably don’t need to get above $50 a ton to achieve the emission
reduction target. I think this is a very positive message and one which suggests that
we can move forward with a bit more confidence that all is not lost.
The message is that, if your policies are executed in an effective way, you
probably don’t need to get above $50 a ton to achieve the emission
reduction target. I think this is a very positive message and one which
suggests that we can move forward with a bit more confidence that all is
not lost.
carbon markets
Policy makers have clearly realized that we do need to put into place mechanisms to
capture some of the financial opportunities I just discussed; certainly at Merrill Lynch
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World Bank and IETA data
(2007)
we’re very supportive of the fact that the carbon market is the preferred policy option
to try to capture those opportunities. I am happy, in the question and answer session
after this presentation, to talk about the merits of different kinds of policy
mechanisms. It is probably not surprising to you that someone from Wall Street or
the City of London is not going to stand up here and advocate taxing, but I am happy
to talk about the trade-offs as we see it between those different instruments. I will say
one thing – one of the advantages of trading over taxing is that you provide an
additional motivation in a trading scheme for companies to over-abate because,
under a tax, you certainly don’t have that incentive for companies to do better than
the level at which the tax is set.
The first point here is that policy makers have identified trading as the most
economically efficient approach. I can say, hand on heart, that some policymakers
have identified other instruments as more economically efficient. I know in the halls
of academia there is also a strong preference that seems to have come back, perhaps
in the last six months, for taxes over trading. But certainly what the policymakers and
the politicians have realized is that it’s the most politically expedient approach to have
cap-and-trade schemes and other market-based mechanisms to try to provide CO2
with a price. I am going to talk about the evidence for what we’ve seen, based on three
years of the carbon markets.
The mandatory carbon market is obviously by far the largest segment of the
market (see Table 2). It’s largely driven by the mechanisms in the Kyoto Protocol,
whether it’s international emissions trading, the Clean Development Mechanism
(CDM), or Joint-Implementation (JI), the last two of which, as you know, are
project-based mechanisms.
Table 2 Growth of the global carbon markets
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2004 2005                         2006
MTCO2e MUS$ MTCO2e MUS$ MTCO2e MUS$
Allowance Markets
Mandatory
EU ETS 8.5 N/A 321 7,908 1,101 24,357
New South Wales 5 N/A 6 59 20 225
UK ETS 0.5 N/A <1 1 - -
Mandatory Total 14 N/A 327 7,968 1,121 24,582
Voluntary (CCX) 2.2 N/A 1 3 10 38
Allowance Markets Total 16.3 N/A 328 7,971 1,131 24,620
Project-Based Transactions
Compliance
CDM 97 485 351 2,638 475 5,257
JI 9.1 54 11 68 16 141
Other 1 4.4 20 187 17 79
Compliance Total 107 544 382 2,894 508 5,477
Voluntary 2.9 5.6 6 44 10+ 100
Project-Based 
Total 110 549 388 2,937 518 5,577
This shows data about the market segmentation. It is quite remarkable. You have a
market that has evolved from essentially zero about three or four years ago to a
number that if you add up the allowance market with the project offsets market, was
roughly $31 billion a year. That is phenomenal growth and it suggests why investment
banks like Merrill Lynch have begun, in the last 12 months or so, to look at this as a
significant opportunity – initially with a commodity focus, because carbon is now a
commodity.
You have a market that has evolved from essentially zero about three or
four years ago to a number that, if you add up the allowance market with
the project offsets market, is roughly $31 billion a year. That is phenomenal
growth.
Here is my slide on the EU Emissions Trading Scheme (see Figure 4). The key
message here, which I think has been lost in some of the coverage, particularly in the
U.S., is that it wasn’t just about over-allocation. There were significant levels of
emission reduction in the first phase of the Emissions Trading Scheme that ran from
2005 through 2007.
Figure 4 EU ETS results for 2005 – emission reductions, not just over-allocation
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Where do I get my data from to say that there has been some emission reduction?
Well, previously I would say that I could anecdotally provide data points from work
that I was doing with companies X, Y, and Z (or in sectors X, Y, and Z to preserve
confidentiality). But now there have been some proper studies conducted. The
Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) and the International Energy Agency
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(IEA) have come out with some definitive work in this area that talks about
reductions on the order of about 100 million tons per year from the price of CO2.
10
The key message here, which I think has been lost in some of the coverage,
particularly in the U.S., is that it wasn’t just about over-allocation. There
were significant levels of emission reduction in the first phase of the
Emissions Trading Scheme that ran from 2005 through 2007.
This isn’t bad, considering that it was a pilot scheme. The European Commission
knew full well that they would have to have a gentle start to the scheme to get certain
segments of industry on board and, in fact, certain countries on board. I saw the
political game being played out. It was very clear that the EU member states were
basically being “good cop” and the European Commission was being “bad cop.” A few
countries were playing tough as well and the UK did a very credible job, I would say,
in their national allocation plan. But it was very easy for a country to say that it is
“industry X” or “Brussels” that is making us do this. I am sure you are familiar with
that here in the U.S. – blame it on Washington or some similar type of approach. The
reality is that it was a bargain that worked because it got industry on board, and it got
each of the member states on board. What some people may not appreciate is that
there is a technical reason why the price has collapsed in this first phase, which you
can see in the next figure (see Figure 5).
Figure 5    EU ETS has created a price for CO2 – contract forward prices for EU allowances (€/mt)
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The price for 2007 vintages uses the left hand scale, and the price for December
2008 allowances, which is around 22 Euros a ton, uses the right hand scale. The point
is that, because we’re talking about an emissions trading scheme that is subsidiary to
the Kyoto Protocol, and because the Kyoto Protocol’s budget periods are between
2008 and 2012, countries couldn’t risk banking forward allowances from 2007 into
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2008. There is a wall that exists between the two phases. In any other system, going
forward one would assume that there would be a sufficient level of banking to prevent
this price collapse. That, for example, is a feature of the second phase of the EU
Emissions Trading Scheme, where there will be banking from the second phase into
the post-2012 phase (whether it’s a 5 year or 10 year phase). I was very happy to see that
the Lieberman-Warner bill here in the U.S. also includes a certain level of banking that
obviously is going to provide that price support as well. I’m not going to stand here
and say that the EU Emissions Trading Scheme was perfect, but I think that it has been
damaged beyond fairness in some of the analyst reports in some of the media.
Now let’s look on the positive side. Is the Emissions Trading Scheme responding to
fundamentals? I can tell you from where I sit (literally from where I sit since the
traders sit just a few rows down from me) that yes, it is responding to fundamentals.
There are a variety of different variables that will cause the price of allowances to be
one way or another. Obviously the stringency of the national allocation plans is one
– if the stringency is low, that would tend to lead to a lower than otherwise EU
allowance price. If the spread between gas and coal prices, where the power sector is
the largest recipient of the allowances, is low, then that means there is going to be a
dampening effect on price. If there is a high level of output coming from carbon-free
sources then, obviously, that is going to dampen the price.
Is the Emissions Trading Scheme responding to fundamentals? I can tell you
from where I sit (literally from where I sit since the traders sit just a few
rows down from me) that yes, it is responding to fundamentals.
You can go through all of these different variables and say, depending upon your
point of view on each of these variables, what is going to affect your overall view on
where the prices are going to be. I think that is important because good markets,
efficient markets, do respond and should respond to fundamentals. That is what gives
you a certain level of liquidity during any given trading period. This is now a market
where we see roughly five million allowances being traded in a typical week. That is a
good level of maturity and it’s come a long way in just three years. I should say that
most of that trading activity, almost all of it, is now in the forward market for Phase
2, as there is nothing going on in Phase 1 anymore.
Project offsets market
Let me now talk about the project offsets market, otherwise known as carbon credits.
You saw in Table 2 that the project offsets market is roughly $5.5 billion out of about
$31 billion. This is another piece of the positive story about the cap-and-trade
schemes that again is a huge advantage over a tax mechanism. Let’s think about what
that $5.5 billion represents. It doesn’t just represent the value of the carbon credits
coming from developing countries; it also represents engagement by private entities
and governments in developing countries creating emission reductions for which
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they have no national targets. That is a small but growing level of engagement, and
very important given that we know that it is absolutely crucial to get developing
countries onboard with targets over the longer term. There has been awareness about
the “wins” (i.e. the benefits) that come along with some of these projects – a degree
of technology transfer and a degree of contribution to community and social benefits
– but it’s not true for all of these projects. I’m not going to say that reducing high
global warming potential gases such as HFCs in the production of HCFC-22, for
example, is giving additional sustainability benefits. But it’s low hanging fruit that
needs to be picked off and if the market is set up in such a way that those projects are
eligible, then it is probably not surprising that the markets are going to look for those
types of opportunities first.
This is another piece of the positive story about the cap-and-trade schemes
that again is a huge advantage over a tax mechanism. Let’s think about
what that $5.5 billion represents. It doesn’t just represent the value of the
carbon credits coming from developing countries; it also represents
engagement by private entities and governments in developing countries
creating emission reductions for which they have no national targets. That
is a small but growing level of engagement, and very important given that
we know that it is absolutely crucial to get developing countries onboard
with targets over the longer term.
Why are these projects challenging? Because the UN process that is in place is
ensuring a high level of environmental integrity and I think that is a good thing. The
last thing we need is a market which is tarred by, as we say, “dodgy” projects. The
challenge, however, is that the projects rely upon a baseline scenario and a project
scenario, and this baseline scenario is a counterfactual hypothetical. I would say it is
partly an art and partly science to come up with the calculation of what lies in the
middle of these two scenarios. This is why it has been challenging and continues to
be a massive source of learning and innovation, which is very important, because we
need to extract all the lessons and knowledge we can from these processes if we are
going to capture emission-reducing projects through the carbon markets.
Why are these projects challenging? Because the UN process that is in place
is ensuring a high level of environmental integrity and I think that is a good
thing. The last thing we need is a market which is tarred by, as we say,
“dodgy” projects.
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As an aside, I was very happy to see in the tabled version of the Lieberman-Warner
bill that 30 percent of the total size of the market in 2012 in the U.S. could be filled
with project-based offsets. I think that is a very positive thing because it again shows
that the price will generate all kinds of incentives to find the low hanging fruit and
deliver reductions.
Figure 6 shows the story of the Kyoto carbon credit projects market. This
particular chart reflects the cumulative issued Certified Emission Reductions (CERs)
– 83 million tons is the number of credits that have actually been issued by the UN
body controlling this process. The number of projects approved and the total pipeline
of emissions reductions that will come from those projects is much bigger than this
number of 83 million tons. In fact, the UN itself keeps track of this and expects
roughly 450 million tons per year to be generated in each of those five Kyoto budget
years. That is going to make a massive contribution to reducing emissions.
Figure 6 Kyoto carbon credit project markets
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This also creates an opportunity for an organization like Merrill Lynch and other
investment banks because the carbon projects have different risk/reward profiles (see
Figure 7). Any time we see different risk/reward profiles, those of us in the banking
community sense an opportunity. We have counterparties in the carbon credit
business who are more conservative in their acceptance of risk than others, so there
is a role for us to play in helping companies involved in these carbon credit projects
to hedge some of the different types of risks that could arise – from the very early
stage of identifying a project all the way through to delivering those carbon credits,
whether it’s six months or one year down the road.
You have to remember that there are lots of new organizations involved in the
carbon credit project business and not all of them have the scale of a Bechtel
Corporation. Quite frankly, you see a lot of project management failures going on in
the early stages of this market and there are important learnings to come from that.
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As of September of 2007,
cumulative issued CER total
of 83 MTCO2
Figure 7 Different risk-reward profiles for carbon credit projects
We see technology under-performance in some sectors. There are some project
types where the amount of carbon credits that have been generated compared to what
it originally said on the tin, so to speak, is on the order of 25 to 35 percent. That is
causing problems for individuals who may be carrying the risk associated with those
carbon credit projects.
Voluntary markets
It might be worth saying a little bit about the voluntary markets. Recalling Table 2
again, the voluntary strand is almost immaterial at present at roughly $100 million out
of the $31 billion, but I think it’s important because it’s bringing to market a bunch of
companies, sectors, and even individuals who otherwise would not be taking action to
reduce emissions. It is also, at least according to several projections, likely to be a sector
experiencing rapid growth. Of course, it’s easy to have a nice “hockey stick” when you
are growing from $100 million in the first couple of years. But in all seriousness, this
could be on the order of about, let’s say, a $1 billion market by about 2010 or 2012 and
there have been many organizations that have been quick to seize that opportunity.
One of the companies in the U.S. that sticks out, for example, is a company like
TerraPass. I’ve noticed that when you buy your flights on Expedia, you have the option
to immediately offset your emissions with TerraPass. This is attracting a different
segment of the market, and in the U.S. there is the possibility that the companies that
are going to have caps, let’s say four or five years down the road, may wish to
experiment in this pre-compliance market, if you like, by buying and selling voluntary
credits so they can come to grips with the process of delivering different carbon credits.
One of the reasons organizations are participating in the voluntary markets is
reputation. When I was a consultant with ICF International we used to work with
many large companies, not all of which had compliance obligations. News
Corporation is one that, I guess not surprisingly, has gotten lots of media publicity
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from their efforts to go carbon neutral. It’s about reputation, but it’s also about
business opportunity for them. They see an opportunity to introduce climate change
considerations into their different business areas. It’s also about gaining experience
with the carbon credit market, because that’s potentially a business they may wish to
be involved in themselves. And of course it’s also about principles and
competitiveness. In some sectors there is a real case of the bar being raised and it is
absolutely crucial for you to have a progressive stance if you are going to continue
attracting your customer base.
The voluntary strand is almost immaterial at present at roughly $100
million out of the $31 billion, but I think it’s important because it’s bringing
to market a bunch of companies, sectors, and even individuals who
otherwise would not be taking action to reduce emissions. It is also, at least
according to several projections, likely to be a sector experiencing rapid
growth. Of course, it’s easy to have a nice “hockey stick” when you are
growing from $100 million in the first couple of years. But in all seriousness,
this could be on the order of about, let’s say, a $1 billion market by about
2010 or 2012 and there have been many organizations that have been quick
to seize that opportunity.
What’s interesting about the project offset market is that you see projects at every
stage of the value chain – upstream projects, projects based in operations, and
projects based in downstream. I think offsets are a very interesting piece of the whole
carbon market because there is absolute carte blanche for innovation and
experimentation. It also presents some risk. If I put my Merrill hat on again, I would
say that it creates some anxiety because the voluntary market is the Achilles heel of
the overall carbon market because it is not regulated. If you have organizations or
individuals doing transactions where the carbon is of very low environmental
integrity, it tends to tar the whole market with the same brush. I get the sense that
some of that is emerging here in the U.S. There has been a spate of articles about the
credit unworthiness of some of these deals. In Europe, the Financial Times had a
whole series of articles earlier this year exposing what they called “carbon cowboys.”
My sense is that it is isolated, but a few bad apples can spoil the bunch and that is why
Merrill Lynch is going to be involved in the voluntary carbon markets. I can’t say too
much about what we are going to be doing, but certainly we will be involved in the
supply side as well as looking for ways to distribute high quality carbon credits
through our various investment channels.
We’re talking about an unregulated market here, and because there have been
some challenges with projects that have come to light with very low standards of
environmental integrity, people have, fortunately, now seized the opportunity to put
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in some voluntary standards. I think that has raised the bar, but it has also created
confusion. There are too many standards, and this means that when you are buying a
carbon credit, you need to make a decision as to whether it’s non-standard or a Gold
Standard VER (Verified Emissions Reduction) or VCS (Voluntary Carbon Standard)
or VOS (Voluntary Offset Standard). People are struggling to figure out what the
difference is between these various standards. I think we’ll see another shift, a shift
towards a consolidation of these various standards. My sense is, again referring to
what’s happening here in the U.S. with Lieberman-Warner and the fact that there is a
provision for credit for early action (which I think is going to be roughly 4 percent of
the total size of the market by 2012), we could see a flight to higher quality voluntary
credits because the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) has been given the
responsibility to make the determination on what is eligible and I would expect they
would choose only high quality offset credits. It will shake itself out.
Figure 8 Offset prices in the voluntary carbon markets
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Figure 8 is a quick picture of the pricing in the voluntary market. There are the
actual commodity costs and the transaction costs, but the prices are all over the map.
This means that, in effect, voluntary carbon is not a commodity in the same way that
an EU allowance or a CER from a CDM has become a commodity. This also makes it
challenging, because how do you do a mark-to-market on a product that is not a true
commodity? 
Where are the markets going?
I think we’re entering a crucial phase where the negotiations at the United Nations
Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) level will hopefully end up
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with a new treaty. Maybe it will be called “Kyoto II” or the “Copenhagen Protocol” –
who knows what the name will be – but it will at least set a very clear emission
reduction target for a set of countries to achieve over a certain time frame. My sense
is that the market mechanisms will be retained within that framework (both the
emissions trading as well as the project-based emission reductions). I think that is
nearly a given. In the Kyoto zone, if you like, principally as the EU Emissions Trading
Scheme is entering its next new phase in 2008, there is a very robust forward market
for allowances and the Kyoto carbon credit market is also experiencing rapid growth
– 83 million tons issued so far, but that is going to reach around 450 million tons
issued by next year.
For the United States, I’ve been referring liberally to Lieberman-Warner during
this presentation because it really is the topic of the day. I was in Washington just a
few weeks ago before the tabling of the bill and I am aware that there’s already been
a mark-up on whichever committee is looking over this bill, so things are moving
extremely fast. The schedule the Senators desired is very aggressive. I don’t know if it
is reachable or not, but the key thing is, when will the U.S. cap-and-trade system come
to be? We’re probably talking about 2012 at the very earliest because of the time it
takes to go from enactment of a major piece of legislation to actual regulations that
will decide all of the rules for all of the covered entities. I am not going to
underestimate the political fighting that needs to take place over the next couple of
years to achieve that as well. My sense is, however, that it is going to overtake a lot of
the regional initiatives which have been developing – the Regional Greenhouse Gas
Initiative (RGGI) here in the Northeast and possibly even the California and West
Coast initiatives. This is not to denigrate the work of the individuals involved in those
regional initiatives. They have been fundamental to getting the federal process to
where it is today. But there is a practical reality to be considered. If you are a covered
entity, let’s say a public utility in Connecticut, would you really want to be covered at
the state level as well as by a national level scheme? The precedent I could draw on,
realizing of course that we’re talking about a different continent, is that the UK
Emissions Trading Scheme, the core of which was piloted back in 2002-2003,
eventually went by the side and the EU Emissions Trading Scheme took precedence.
We’ve got some other countries proposing domestic emissions trading schemes –
Australia being principal among them. I’ve talked about the fact that the voluntary
piece of the offset market will shift towards high quality with a view to being almost
pre-compliance starting in 2012 here in the U.S. The interesting question is how you
get the different segments of the market to potentially coalesce and create a global
liquid market that is as large as possible, allowing the overall cost of compliance for
all the covered entities of that market to be as low as possible. After all, that is what
we should be trying to achieve — getting the highest level of environmental emission
reductions at the lowest possible cost to society overall. I think the sense is that it’s the
project offsets that will be the interconnectors between the various markets – which
is the reason I said I was very happy to see a 15 percent provision in the Lieberman-
Warner bill for international offsets (offsets coming from outside the U.S.).
Interestingly, I was having a chat with somebody today and he was saying that you
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must be very careful with that 15 percent in the bill because, in fact, it may be that the
drafters of the bill want to see carbon allowances coming from countries with caps as
opposed to the Clean Development Mechanism where the carbon credits are coming
from developing countries without caps. This is still to be clarified. In my view, it
would be a disaster if that language did not include carbon credits coming from
developing countries, because then, essentially what we would have is fortress
America and fortress Kyoto.
The interesting question is how you get the different segments of the
market to potentially coalesce and create a global liquid market that is as
large as possible, allowing the overall cost of compliance for all the covered
entities of that market to be as low as possible. After all, that is what we
should be trying to achieve – getting the highest level of environmental
emission reductions at the lowest possible cost to society overall.
When do those two systems merge and when do the regulated entities in each of
those different systems have a chance to take advantage of the more diverse
opportunities for emissions reductions that exist more broadly? As you know from
marginal abatement cost theory, the wider you draw the circle, in theory, the lower
the overall cost for everybody. That’s something that Merrill Lynch will be engaged in
and I’m sure others with a financial bent will also be looking to influence the way that
shakes out.
financial services and climate change
This leads me to what Merrill Lynch is doing on climate change. The first thing to say
is, as was perhaps mentioned at the outset, I’ve only been at Merrill Lynch for six
weeks. It’s taken me about a day (since I didn’t have a choice) to figure out exactly
what Merrill Lynch is doing on climate change. I went through a very rigorous
interview schedule, as I’m sure the students in the room will know about, and since I
was coming from outside the banking sector, I did my own due diligence. I met with
senior individuals in London, Houston, and New York and had a conference call with
a couple of people in Singapore. What I took away was that it would be very
comfortable for me to make a transition from someone who’d been a consultant,
someone who’d even worked with the UN previously, to a company like Merrill Lynch
because they, we (I should now say), really do “get it.” The intention is to embed
carbon considerations into each part of the bank and to recognize that there are going
to be significant changes affecting the kinds of investments Merrill Lynch is involved
in across the whole bank. You can’t put your head in the sand and say this stuff is not
happening and continue business as usual. It just doesn’t fly. You have to think about
the different roles Merrill Lynch has. It’s a provider of capital, an investor, an
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employer, a recruiter of talent, a wealth manager for clients, a provider of guidance to
institutional clients, a trader and a market maker, and it has its own facilities with
offices in 38 countries, so it has its own environmental stewardship to worry about.
What we’re doing is trying to align the climate change strategy along four
dimensions. These are the vision for where the bank is going, the governance for how
we manage this issue within the bank (which is not easy), the aforementioned
environmental stewardship (how we “walk the walk”), and the business risks and
opportunities, which is where I am mostly focusing my efforts. Let me touch on each
of these four elements.
In terms of a vision, the senior individuals I met with in the interview process gave
me a very clear sense that Merrill Lynch would like to be seen as an investment bank
that is greener than your typical comparable institution. I say that, recognizing that
we’re talking about a long-term mega-shift over time. We’re not suddenly going to
change some of the businesses that we’re involved in, because society doesn’t change
overnight – it goes through incremental transitions. Of course, sometimes public
policy changes in radical, quantum steps. A few good examples are dolphin-friendly
tuna and unleaded gasoline. If you happen to be involved in the tuna business, for
example, that is a quantum shift to your business or if you’re involved in the gasoline
business, that’s also a radical shift. But we have to make sure that we bring our clients
along with us. We have to make sure that we are not taking on unnecessary risks and
that we have a transition plan for those kinds of opportunities.
In terms of the framework that has just been outlined, shortly after I joined the
firm (in fact just two weeks later) I was in New York for the unveiling of our new
environmental sustainability framework, rolled out by Greg Fleming, the president of
the bank. He’s made it abundantly apparent that this is a framework that needs to be
embedded in the different parts of the bank, and for me personally, it’s made my life
very easy. Since I’ve joined the bank, I’ve been seeing a lot of engagement from
bankers, financial advisors, and from different parts of the bank that now wish to put
in place some of the actions that fall out of that environmental sustainability
framework.
On the stewardship side, we’ve taken on our own emission reduction target. There
is an environmental sustainability steering group which has been set up across the
firm with a view to managing our own internal operations as well as looking for new
business opportunities. I’m lucky enough to be a representative on the working group
that reports up to that steering committee. The challenge is where we identify new
types of business risks, where we identify new kinds of business opportunities, and
how we can exploit them before our peer companies do. What are we doing? It all
links back to the carbon market. The carbon market, three years old, has already
enabled the development of what I can call next generation financial products.
The way we think about the world is that we have different classes of assets,
different activities, and there are opportunities within each of these classes of assets
to design, innovate, and offer products to our different types of clients. In the equity
area, for example, we have a research team that is, I would say, top notch. Just within
the past year, they have come out with several groundbreaking pieces of research in
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areas such as biofuels, energy efficiency and renewables to coincide with the launch,
just about a month ago, of Carbon Disclosure Project Report 200714 for which Merrill
Lynch was the key sponsor. We launched a report on carbon leaders and carbon
laggards and on the back of that created a new carbon leaders index. That then
presents another investment opportunity for our individual client base.
As the options market has evolved in the carbon market, there’s an opportunity to
begin to do structured emissions products. This means looking at the opportunity to
develop products based on an underlying asset, say the EU allowance or secondary
CERs, together with the use of put and call options, to come up with a product that
offers a sound investment opportunity for a certain type of client. Of course we have
to consider their overall investment portfolio and make sure the risk-reward profile
is appropriate for that particular client, but that’s all part of the basic level of
engagement that Merrill Lynch has with its clients. One of the interesting things
about structured emissions products is that it does give you a chance to have a
tailored solution for a certain type of client. Everyone’s going to have a certain risk-
reward profile, which will suggest different types of options. Maybe I can explain a bit
more about that because I know that would be of interest to those of you with an
interest in the finance area.
The challenge is where we identify new types of business risks, where we
identify new kinds of business opportunities, and how we can exploit them
before our peer companies do. What are we doing? It all links back to the
carbon market. The carbon market, three years old, has already enabled the
development of what I can call next generation financial products.
Financial instruments and opportunities
If your point of view is that the EU allowance market is going to be long on price
volatility over the next year, we can create a structured product note that basically says
we’re going to give you some protection on the down side by selling a call option that
is deeply out of the money. You get some return out front generated from the sale of
the premium and we give you a long position on the underlying that would allow you
to take advantage of what we would expect to be a bullish market in, let’s say, EU
allowances. If you were concerned about price volatility and you wanted to take a
short position on volatility, then we could construct a short straddle. We would
basically sell a call and a put option at the same strike price and bound the range of
prices where you would achieve an upside.
So there are different things we could do as the options market evolves. There are
certain clients for whom other kinds of opportunities have arisen, companies, for
example, that have exposure to temperature or precipitation changes. We see
essentially what we call an inter-market spread opportunity. An inter-market spread
is where you take a position in two similar but slightly different contracts. In this case
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you would take a position on an EU allowance future, which you might buy, and you
would simultaneously sell a similar position in, let’s say, UK gas. Thinking back to the
different variables affecting the price of EU allowances (see Table 3), one of them was
fuel prices. If you’re long or short on UK gas, you can hedge some of that risk by
taking a contrary position in the price of EU allowances.
Table 3 EUA prices are responding to fundamentals
Stringency of National Allocation Plans low high
Relative price of gas and coal low high
Hydro, nuclear and renewable plant output high low
Degree of competition for carbon credits from 
governments and non-EU low high
High electricity demand low high
EC Linking Directive allows high level of carbon 
credit imports high low
Resulting impact on EUA Price low high
There are also some interesting opportunities purely for what we call arbitrage.
Namely, we don’t think the future price of EU allowances, that is 2012, reflects the cost
of carry. So thinking about arbitrage opportunities, your future price should be your
current price plus your cost of carry. If we don’t think it reflects the cost of carry, we’ll
either go cash and carry, as they say, or reverse cash and carry. To give you a sense of
the numbers, right now the basis between 2008 and 2012 allowances is roughly 2.5
Euros and we think it should be closer to about 5 Euros. So there is an arbitrage
opportunity right there. The challenge, of course, is that Merrill Lynch is not long on
EU allowances. We’re not one of the natural holders of these allowances. We’re not a
utility in Europe. As an advisor, you have to convince a conservative German utility
that this is a trade they should be doing. They have their own reasons and risk
parameters within which they have to deal and it’s not always an easy proposition
even though you’re pointing to money on the table.
Downside risks
I talked a lot about opportunities, but if you remember from the IPCC Working
Group figures, there are also downside risks. It is foolish for me to stand up here and
say that Merrill Lynch is only going about designing new instruments for investors to
take advantage of the upside that may come about because of carbon policy, carbon
markets, changes in some elements, or new technology opportunities. There are real
examples, with which I’ve been personally involved, of specific companies in different
sectors where the physical effects of climate change are having an impact now, or are
material to company decision-making processes where they see a potential need to
factor in those changes in investment planning. For a particular North American
forest products company, for example (I have to shield the names of the companies),
in terms of their land acquisition strategy, the challenge is that they already see a
departure from historical growth rates due to water availability and other factors and
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this is affecting their mergers and acquisitions (M&A) approach. As another example,
let’s take an Asian consumer products and transport conglomerate, a very large
company based in Asia, that is keen to expand its beverage operations. One of the key
issues in that particular country in Asia is that there is a concern, given the water
scarcity that is arising and will continue to arise, about the reduced availability of
water and a high cost for water. That’s a practical issue which is very material if you
are a beverage company.
In Europe, under the EU Emissions Trading Scheme, there are all kinds of issues
that are affecting companies. They are already in a cap-and-trade scheme, but they
also have to begin to worry about the changes in seasonal demand. In fact, I’ve heard,
I think it’s in Canada, that there’s already been a radical shift in the load curve in the
power sector. I think it used to be an “N” and now it’s a “U”, or something like that.
Essentially, the pattern that was apparent previously, namely a pattern to reflect a
different demand in summer and winter, has now been leveled out. That temperature
effect is having an impact on your production and obviously on your projected
revenues. If you’re a hydro producer, clearly precipitation is very material. Even if
you’re a gas producer, a 2 degree Celsius increase in temperature, which if you’ll recall
is sort of the expected minimum scenario, has something like a 3 percent reduction
in the efficiency of the gas turbine. Those are the kinds of issues that are becoming
material, and companies, not just in Europe but even those outside a cap-and-trade
scheme or the carbon market, have to begin to factor them in. We at Merrill have to
think about these issues as we look at those kinds of opportunities, whether it’s M&A
activity or corporate finance advice.
As another example, let’s take an Asian consumer products and transport
conglomerate, a very large company based in Asia, that is keen to expand
its beverage operations. One of the key issues in that particular country in
Asia is that there is a concern, given the water scarcity that is arising and
will continue to arise, about the reduced availability of water and a high
cost for water. That’s a practical issue which is very material if you are a
beverage company.
Embedding the carbon opportunities
This is how I see Merrill Lynch at present embedding carbon opportunities across our
particular franchise (Table 4).
We have a commodities and fixed income group, investment banking, and wealth
management. What we’re trying to do is look for opportunities to develop new
products with a carbon focus in each of those three areas. Ideally, we’ll generate some
synergy from the fact that we do have these three separate, but related, franchises. A
good example is the structured emissions product, which is based on the fact that
we’re active in the commodities area and have an options desk and a trading desk. We
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can come up with a product that is potentially of interest to high net worth
individuals in the wealth management business who want to have some exposure to
the carbon market because, let’s say, it is fundamentally uncorrelated to the assets that
they currently invest in or look at.
Table 4 Merrill Lynch offerings of carbon-related investment opportunities
Commodities and Fixed Income
Context
 Trading, brokerage, and intermediation services for EUA market
 Carbon credit organization, hedging, and risk management of CER/ERU for 
investors, aggregators, and compliance buyers
 Carbon-driven debt/equity financing for projects that reduce emissions
New Products/Deals
 Underwrote European Investment Bank’s Climate Awareness Bond in 2007 focused 
on renewable energy
 Investors in Core Carbon Group, company undertaking projects that reduce 
emissions in Russia, and off-takers of carbon credits.




 Financial advice and due diligence where carbon value is material in cash flow 
forecast
 Raising capital and executing IPO for low-carbon technology companies
 Leveraged M&A, advising sales of low carbon technology companies
New Products/Deals
 Global coordinator for upcoming 20 billion euro IPO for Iberdrola Renovables




 Wealth Management business is a leader in wealth management for high and ultra 
high net worth individuals; offers a product distribution channel
 Blackrock, in which Merrill Lynch has an almost 50% stake, has assets of over $1.3 
trillion
New Products/Deals
 Blackrock manages market-leading $5 billion New Energy Technology Fund into 
which Merrill Lynch clients invest
 In 2007, Research launched a new Energy Efficiency Index, a Renewable Energy 
Index, and Carbon Leaders Index. Merrill Lynch clients access these themes via 
various structured products
 Tailored Carbon Emissions Tracker structured products based on EUA underlying
We’ve already begun to roll out some new products. We have a climate awareness
bond that we rolled out for the European Investment Bank earlier this year. We’re
doing some interesting principal investment activity. This is an important
contribution Merrill Lynch can make, namely, putting our own capital at risk and
saying that we see a business opportunity here – it may be too risky for many of the
clients we currently work with, but we see an opportunity that we would like to take
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advantage of. If we can invite certain clients to come along that’s great, but if not, we
feel very comfortable that this is something that is going to accelerate the shift to a
low carbon technology future and also something that is going to be inherently
profitable. A good example is a $35 million principal investment in Vulcan Power
Company, one of the small but growing geothermal companies in California. We are
heavily involved in the investment banking area and the renewables sector and we are
going to be global coordinator for the upcoming Initial Public Offering (IPO) for
Iberdrola Renewables, which will be the largest-ever wind power IPO. On the wealth
management side, as I mentioned, we have a whole host of new products which are
coming out on the back of the strong research and leading to new kinds of products
such as indices – whether it’s an energy efficiency index, a renewables index, or the
carbon leaders index I talked about – with products on the back which allow
individual clients to get exposure to carbon-related investments as well. That is
something, by the way, that we see a significant hunger for, not just in Europe, but
also in the U.S. and with our Asian clients.
We can come up with a product that is potentially of interest to high net
worth individuals in the wealth management business who want to have
some exposure to the carbon market because, let’s say, it is fundamentally
uncorrelated to the assets that they currently invest in or look at.
I’m now very happy to take on any questions. I will say that, in my first week at
Merrill, I sat down with the people in the communications team and we were talking
about what Merrill would like to do in this space and how we should think about our
profile in this area. Not coming from a banking background, I said that the Merrill
bull symbol was a problem for me. When I see a bull, I think of enteric fermentation
– I immediately get a methane emissions connotation. I’ve learned to get over that. I
look at the bull and I understand what it means now. I guess I will just settle for
“Merrill Lynch is bullish on the carbon markets.” Thank you very much.
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Question and Answer Session
QUESTION 1: Tradable permit mechanisms – price caps, auctioning, placement
I’d like to ask a quick question about tradable permit mechanisms. It seems as though
there are two interesting debates going on about mechanism design. First, to what extent
would you want to make it a hybrid system with a price cap set at a level to prevent
excessively high costs in cases of uncertainty of abatement cost? Second, where do you
want the system to be? Because currently we have very much a mid-stream system focused
on the power sector and in the grand scheme of things under Kyoto we are going to have
to have a more comprehensive scheme. How far upstream do we move the tradable permit
system? Or, do we try to have some sort of comparable alternative system for sectors that
are not best suited for a downstream solution like automobiles, for example?
I think in terms of the hybrid approach, you are on to something there. Inevitably
a cap-and-trade scheme is going to eventually incorporate elements that are more
tax-oriented and those which are more cap-and-trade oriented. The risk for me, and
I think from a carbon market perspective, is that if you somehow have a price cap you
essentially have, for some participants in the scheme, a de facto carbon tax. I
recognize that, particularly as we enter the stage of a massive frenetic policy debate on
what the U.S. bill is going to look like, I would be worried if there was a cap-and-trade
scheme with a price cap as some of the earlier bills had. One of them had a $12 per
ton price cap, at which you get minimal abatement. If you’re really after a carbon tax,
congratulations, this is what you are going to have. You saw the data from the IPCC
Working Group III – sure, there are some emission reductions that you can get for
numbers below say $10 per ton, but in terms of the sectors that are likely to be in the
scheme, not very much at all.
Where I would go with a hybrid instrument is actually a cap-and-trade scheme
with a significant amount of auctioning. I am not going to say 100 percent auctioning
because I think that has a significant competitiveness impact. But it shouldn’t be zero
percent auctioning and it shouldn’t be everything grandfathered; let’s say 20 to 25
percent initially with potentially a reserve price for those auctions. Basically, you build
in a price floor for some of the allowances you are distributing. I see that as a means
of providing price certainty, which is, of course, what everyone in industry is going to
say that they want. If one of your objectives is to stimulate innovation and the
development of new technology, you want to know that you’re going to get a certain
level of price for a certain period as opposed to, suddenly, the price going through the
floor and the kinds of investments you’re making just not paying off at all.
In terms of who I’d put in the trading scheme, I think transaction costs and
administrative costs are very important considerations; even the emission measuring
and monitoring protocols are also very important considerations. You really have to
go to the large point sources. I think that’s where you go first. That’s where the
European scheme has been most effective. It’s a relatively small set of installations but
represents roughly 45 to 47 percent of all European emissions – something like 11,000
installations across the EU 27. That’s pretty effective. Also, you don’t want to have
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constraints in the infrastructure that you need in the cap-and-trade scheme to
support it – the auditors, for example, making sure of the numbers and that the tons
of emissions are adding up to the allowances. Interestingly, talking to project
developers in the carbon credit market today and yesterday here in New York, I got
the sense that it’s at the emissions verification, the emissions auditing end, where
there are now bottlenecks in the system. If you have too many installations, who’s
going to provide all that type of infrastructure? 
QUESTION 2: Small island states – prospects in carbon markets 
In addition to being from FES (Yale School of Forestry & Environmental Studies), I am
currently working at the United Nations with the country of Naru and other small island
developing states. One of the things we’re working on is a report to brief them pre-Bali
on things they need to be looking at and concerned about, and they are very interested in
the carbon markets. In comparing their prospects in the carbon markets to prospects
under Global Environment Facility (GEF) grants or debt-for-nature swaps or anything
like that, what do you think is their probability for beneficial and profitable involvement
in carbon markets? They have very high per capita emission rates because their
denominator is so low. So their ability to create even $1 million gross would require some
countries to make a 20 percent reduction in their entire carbon footprint. What are your
thoughts on that and where would you guide them?
I must say that I don’t know much about the country, but my assumption would
be that it’s primarily an agricultural base, no? 
For Small Island States (SIDs) generally, yes, you can say that.
In the agricultural sector then you come back to my Merrill “bull” and you go to
enteric fermentation, methane reduction opportunities. If there’s rice cultivation, rice
is also a big producer of methane. You look at fertilizers as producers of N2O, and
potentially biofuels. Those would be the areas where you have potential, but potential
is not sufficient, as you know. You would need to look at the acquisition costs for every
ton of CO2. The good news is that the emissions reductions opportunities I mentioned
are all in high Global Warming Potential (GWP) gases. In theory, you should get lots
of reductions because of the factor by which you have to multiply the CO2.
What I don’t know enough about is whether you get the kind of scale in these
countries to have a project that is going to give you reductions worth pursuing from
a carbon market perspective. What I would hope is that the UN Development
Programme or the UN Environment Programme is looking at doing capacity building
in those types of countries to do at least a first screen as to what is possible. I think
that is an area where the UN has a lot of value to add, to give guidance as to whether
the private sector should then go the next step and develop projects in those areas.
I would say that even if that country or set of countries does not benefit directly
from the carbon market – which would be my first cut answer, that they’re not going
to benefit directly just because of the scale of the projects – they are benefiting
indirectly through the adaptation levy that is placed on every ton of CO2 transacted.
That is, 2 percent (I believe) of the revenues of every carbon credit project that comes
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through the UN process is set aside for adaptation. That money gets rolled back into,
I think, the GEF, which is managing an adaptation fund. I think the real issue at this
point is that we’re not quite sure how those funds are being used. In theory there’s
supposed to be an integration of adaptation planning into those economies, but I’m
not familiar with how far that’s gone yet.
QUESTION 3: Post-2012 Kyoto and client influence 
I have two questions. The first question is: in your market practice, how do you deal with
post-2012, especially in some of your products like forwards, since you cannot sign a
forward contract past 2012? Also, do you see any arbitrage opportunity between pre-2012
and post-2012 in this market? Secondly, I think you mentioned that Merrill Lynch is
influencing their clients by giving them risk advice to “go green.” Besides this, what else
can you do to influence your clients so they can have more awareness on environmental
issues and future opportunities?
On pre-2012, post-2012, that is actually one of the issues I am personally grappling
with right now because the challenge is that there’s no deep liquid market for post-
2012 EU allowances or secondary CERs (the carbon credits that come from CDM).
On the other hand, there are counterparties that do want to do trades over the
counter. The challenge is figuring out how we do that. I don’t have an answer in terms
of how we do mark-to-market, that’s something we’re exploring right now. What I
can say is that we are already essentially transacting in the post-2012 era by putting in
place in the Emissions Reduction Purchase Agreements a price option for any credits
that come from the project post-2012.
In the early days of the carbon market, there were lots of swift project developers
who essentially put into place zero cost options. They were taking advantage of market
asymmetry. Nowadays people are very much aware that there is a significant likelihood
that the carbon market will continue post-2012 and so the question is how you price
that option. A typical price that I’ve seen is on the order of 5 euros per ton for the right
to buy credits generated post-2012. That compares with a secondary price in the CER
market today of around 18 euros per ton. That’s how it’s dealt with practically.
The EU allowance market does have counterparties, particularly power companies,
which want to do trades post-2012 because they may be hedging their power revenues
past 2012 or they may be planning new plant building post-2012. I met with some of
my Merrill Lynch commodities guys from Houston and they were telling me that
already in the U.S. there are power companies that would like companies like Merrill
Lynch to offload some of the carbon risk for, let’s say, 10 years – from 2008 to 2018. So
we are having to grapple with how we price CO2 into the forward curve for power, even
in a country where there currently is no immediate carbon market. I don’t have an
answer for you just now, but it means that one has to look at the fundamentals and has
to take a view as to what the supply and demand for allowances and credits will be in
the U.S. – how much connectivity there’s going to be with the rest of the world, what
the marginal abatement cost will be, how significant the cuts will be – and arrive at a
number to say what we’re able to offer you and see if you want to do a deal with us.
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The second question was about risks and the sort of engagement that we have with
our clients. It’s challenging because we’re investment advisors. We’re not speaking on
behalf of the policy makers. But there are different roles we have where we can make
a difference. We have to start with our own staff first, by the way. We are only just now
embarking on this sort of higher level of training for sustainability issues, including
climate change, for our global investment banking team. They need to be aware of
some of the physical risks. These are the kinds of issues that are very new and our own
people need to understand them before we can go around advising other clients.
There are other forums that we can engage in. We are involved with a variety of
broad-based coalition groups – the International Emissions Trading Association, the
Carbon Markets Association, and Ceres here in the U.S.15 Each one of those groups is
also trying to engage on the topic of climate change and trying to make the
investment community and the regulated entities community aware of the kinds of
opportunities and risks that exist under climate change.
Finally, there are a couple of other dimensions, one of which is philanthropy. For
some of the activities we engage in, education for example, there is an effort within
Merrill Lynch to try and find ways to embed climate change into that activity. The
other channel is some of the university research that we might sponsor with the view
that it actually helps us, of course, because again, this is a difficult area. It will
continue to be a difficult area and we don’t have all the answers, so we would like to
engage with universities that are doing interesting research that might give us some
insights as to the kinds of solutions that would be of help to us later on.
QUESTION 4: Investment opportunities
Last week when Jon Anda was here, he drew what you would probably refer to as a
marginal abatement cost curve that had some of the initial costs as actually being
negative, meaning they would pay for themselves (energy efficiency, compact fluorescents,
etc), and then that curve went up back into the positive costs pretty quickly. He suggested
furthermore that many of the opportunities in the long term might not be so much in
renewable energy and that we should focus on clean coal and other such things that
would have a cumulatively larger impact in terms of emissions reductions. What is your
assessment for people wanting to invest in this space? What do you regard as some good
prospects to achieve those larger-scale abatements?
I am a big fan of the wedge theory.16 We need to avoid roughly 7 gigatons of carbon
and it’s a nice way to think about the problem – to break it up into digestible chunks
of one gigaton each. The thinking is that right now there are on the order of 12
different technologies that can deliver those scales of reductions. From an investor’s
standpoint, each one of those wedges looks attractive, whether it’s renewables,
nuclear, or whatever it is.
The other point comes back to the question of what is the right market
instrument. To get some of those so-called negative cost options implemented
quickly, it’s entirely possible that a cap-and-trade scheme isn’t the right way to go, or
a tax scheme isn’t the right way to go. You may need a form with base standards to
say, “Look, in industrial motors we know that this stuff on paper pays back pretty
carbon finance: environmental market solutions to climate change





See: S. Pacala and R. Socolow,
“Stabilization Wedges: Solving
the Climate Problem for the
Next 50 Years with Current
Technologies,” Science, 13
August 2004: 968-72.
quickly, but there are some legitimate barriers as to why this stuff isn’t getting
implemented, so let’s just say all new motors have to be of a certain efficiency
standard, or refrigerators and the like.” It suggests that we are going to have a
complementary set of measures and it also suggests that there are opportunities in
each one of those small technology areas too. Some of the principal opportunities
that Merrill Lynch is looking at are in micro-scale technologies – energy efficiency
devices, for example, that may be only applicable in one narrow application but
which globally have a chance to be replicated on a very large scale. The amount of
opportunity from a technology standpoint is just mind-boggling. The real challenge
is picking your winners and doing it in a time frame which is manageable.
The amount of opportunity from a technology standpoint is just mind-
boggling. The real challenge is picking your winners and doing it in a time
frame which is manageable.
QUESTION 5: Russian carbon market
Russia is looking to come into the market (once it does the paperwork) with this huge
number of carbon credits. I was wondering how confident investors like Merrill Lynch
and others would feel coming into the Russian carbon market?
I inherited a Russian project earlier this year, or possibly late last year. Merrill
Lynch invested in a company called the Core Carbon Group, a company based in
Denmark that is doing a bunch of projects in Russia in areas like tightening up
natural gas pipelines, N2O (nitrous oxide from adipic-acid manufacturing) – those
types of opportunities. We placed debt finance, took a share of the equity, and in
return got a carbon credit offtake agreement. That, for us, is another example of
getting synergy across commodities, fixed income, and investment banking.
In terms of the exposure that we have in the Russian market, it does make me a
little nervous, especially since the project is now in my P&L (Profit and Loss
Statement). But I am reasonably confident because although Russia has been slow, as
you say, in getting the paperwork in place, the scale of the opportunity is very
significant. I am reasonably confident that we will see the credits that we expect in
those offtake opportunities. My estimate is that Russia could produce something on
the order of about 100 million tons a year for each of the 5 years during the Kyoto
period, which is reasonably significant. That’s because they have massive opportunity.
The other thing you may have been referring to, though, is the surplus of Assigned
Amount Units (AAUs), otherwise known as “hot air.” I think that’s another question
which creates massive price uncertainty for everybody in the market. If Russia
somehow tries to monetize, I can’t recall the number offhand but I think it’s about 1
billion tons total in this surplus AAU budget, then it is just going to crash the market.
Hopefully one should take away that it is not in their best economic interest to do
that. If you take the view that they’ll act in an economically rational way, then they’ll
possibly monetize only a certain percentage of their surplus AAUs. At one point I did
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a calculation on this and I think it worked out that they would try to monetize on the
order of between 20 and 30 percent (it would depend on a few scenarios) of the
surplus AAU budget to give them their profit maximizing point. Somebody else I was
working with said, “Hang on, there’s another dimension here, which is that Russia
also stands to gain from increasing natural gas exports to Europe. I’m focused on
Europe right now because that has an impact on the EU emissions trading price.” So
you actually need to think about it as a double maximizing calculation because they
can maximize revenue from exports of natural gas plus exports of AAU’s. You would
get a different equilibrium point for the amount of AAU’s to monetize. It’s all fun as
an academic exercise, but the reality is, will there be any buyers of Russian hot air? 
At one point I thought Canada might be a buyer, but it is difficult to follow the
gyrations of the Canadian government. It does seem now as if they’re not going to
meet their Kyoto targets. Certainly I can tell you that the carbon markets are assuming
they’re not going to meet their Kyoto targets. Possibly Canada will do a bilateral deal
at the last moment with Russia to save face and say “We made it by 2012, so don’t give
us a penalty in the next phase.” Some of my colleagues in Europe think that Italy will
suddenly find itself behind in 2012 and will need to buy a bunch of AAU’s. Some
people say Japan may be a buyer of AAU’s because, as you know, there have been
nuclear outages in Tokyo and certainly in TEPCO (Tokyo Electric Power Company),
one of the main utilities. This means that Japan’s emissions have shot up more than
expected and as they don’t have a domestic emission trading scheme, they are relying
almost exclusively on the carbon credit market to get their reductions. We may see
some of that in the market, but it will be governments, not companies, who buy.
QUESTION 6: Career advice – coursework for the carbon markets
I wanted to shift gears a little bit so we can get some career advice from you. If you were
in graduate school today here at Yale, what types of courses would you take or subject
areas would you be sure to focus on to prepare yourself for a career in carbon markets,
keeping in mind that we have students here both from the Yale School of Forestry &
Environmental Studies (FES) and the Yale School of Management (SOM) – some people
will be going into NGOs, finance, a variety of interests.
One of the things that’s interesting about the carbon markets is that you meet
people with all kinds of backgrounds. My own background is chemical engineering
and management science as an undergraduate. I then did the MIT Technology and
Policy Program and, somewhere along the way, I think between leaving the United
Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) and then rejoining ICF International, I
did a graduate course in finance. I think the challenge of climate change and the
carbon markets is really a multi-disciplinary challenge. It is well suited to someone
like myself who is not a master of anything, but wants to have a finger in many
different pies. I think this is what makes Yale so interesting. My previous employer,
ICF, certainly used to be a big hirer of Yale grads precisely because of the
public/private nexus and the fact that ICF is heavily involved in the energy market.
My sense is that you’ve got a huge palate to choose from at this university and in
this program. You do have to take a balance of hard-headed courses, if you like
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(finance, economics, decision-making theory, options), but you also need to bring
substantive expertise about the science of climate change, the economics of climate
change in particular, as well as things like sustainability in general. There are multiple
dimensions to the problem and I think there is a need in all workplaces, not just
investment banks, for people who understand the different facets of the challenge.
QUESTION 7: Research topics
On a similar note, can you think of any specific research topics or maybe more general
areas of research that the carbon market or a company like Merrill Lynch may be
interested in?
Yes, lots actually. The carbon market is not the first environmental market – there’s
obviously been an SO2 emissions trading scheme here in the U.S. – but it is one of the
first environmental markets. We think that the carbon market is going to function
fairly well despite the teething problems and we think that there will be other kinds
of environmental markets in the future. So the question is, who is going to do the
cutting edge thinking and research about how those new markets should evolve? 
Let me give you a couple of examples of areas that we’re thinking about. One is
water, and the second is biodiversity. Already in the water industry, there are a couple
of locations, Australia being one of them, where there’s an emissions trading scheme.
For example, in some basins – the Murray-Darling Basin, for example – they’ve tried
to apply cap-and-trade type concepts to the sharing of water rights. Interestingly, of
course, the physical effects of climate change will have an impact on that particular
market as well. So that’s one. I think the challenge with water is that it’s very local. I
can’t ever imagine that there’s going to be a global water market, but maybe that’s an
area worth thinking about – just how far you can push that concept in the water
industry.
The second area is biodiversity. I must say, almost every week I’ve had someone
within Merrill Lynch say they’ve had a particular client – sometimes it’s a wealth
management client, sometimes it’s a client coming out of the commodity business –
who has an interest in forestry and the potential market for other types of
environmental benefits associated with forestry. I’m sure you all know that
deforestation is a key contributor to climate change. We have to put in place
mechanisms that avoid deforestation, that promote forestry and aforestation. We all
know that there are other global externalities which come with that – whether it’s
biodiversity or the hydrological benefits, for instance. Are we ever going to see a
market in those kinds of services? Believe me, there are lots of investors who would
be willing to take a bet that if you can do a sustainable forestry project and essentially
buy an option on the fact that there may be future markets in these other services,
that’s an investment they would consider if it was structured in the right way.
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Climate Change Investment Strategies:
How a Universal Bank is Leading
Investments in a Low Carbon Economy
Mark Fulton, Deutsche Asset Management
editors’ remarks
The penultimate talk in our speaker series, Mark Fulton’s address considers the topic of climate
change through a seasoned investment lens whose central focus supports the claims of many
of our other authors – that the economics of climate change investments are indeed attractive.
Additionally however, it reminds us how nascent the environmental markets are, especially in
the U.S., and how much more investment is both needed and forthcoming. Representing one
of the largest investors in the climate change space at about $11 billion in climate-related
strategies, the Deutsche Asset Management Division, for example, still only allocates slightly
more than 1 percent of its total monies under management to such investment types.
Most of the material in this chapter comes from a presentation that Mr. Fulton gives to
mutual fund and institutional investors to explain the strategic opportunities presented by
climate change. The content is therefore from a fiduciary perspective, marketing win-win
plays with the primary starting point of “making money.” Rather than looking through the
eyes of a carbon finance insider, this installment originates from an asset management insider
who sees and explains the increasing interest and potential in carbon. Illustrating this
potential is a common thread throughout the publication and it is difficult, for instance, not to
recall Jon Anda’s thought in Chapter 6 that “derivatives are going to be really important here”
when Mr. Fulton puts forth the statement that carbon “could become one of the biggest
derivative markets in the world.”
This is a talk about turning from “beta investing” to “alpha investing”, and the concluding
advice calls for a portfolio of investments that pursues new technologies and solutions while
still expecting “very good returns around some good, known technologies.” Interestingly, and
it should buoy some, given the climatic stimuli already in the pipeline, it is also one of the few
talks where adaptation, not just mitigation, is clearly included on the agenda. The ultimate
hope with such a portfolio effect is that “we’ll see a flood of solutions” and that putting all this
capital in place will then “enable the market with those solutions.”* 
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introduction
Hello, everyone. Now we’re going to turn from beta investing to what we hope is
alpha investing, where we try to outperform the markets. As a bit of background, I
am actually an economist and strategist by training, and also a head of equity sell-
side research. I’m certainly not a scientist, and I’m not going to be spending very long
on the science of climate change. As you will see, our thesis is that although the
science matters, in a sense, at the moment for investors, it also doesn’t matter because
governments are creating investable markets.
A word about Deutsche Bank. Deutsche Bank is a universal bank that contains
investment banking divisions within it. It also does retail banking and contains an
asset management division. I’m a member of the asset management division. The
asset management division has about $US800 billion under management. We have
about $US11 billion actually in climate change-related strategies, which makes us one
of the largest investors in the climate change space.
I’m going to focus here on what’s going on in the asset management division,
which at the moment is more related to the retail mutual funds that we have. I’ll
discuss what we are looking at in terms of investments that can be made, particularly
in terms of listed equities, but also in the private equity space as well.
context
I’m going to run through a presentation that we give to investors, both mutual fund
and institutional investors, who are interested in why, strategically, Deutsche Asset
Management thinks there are a lot of opportunities in climate change investment –
opportunities for investors to make money while doing “good.”
I’ll say right at the start that we talk about the triple bottom line, which of course
is something of which you are well aware. We talk about a win-win – an opportunity
to make money, to pursue returns, and at the same time have a good environmental
impact. But as a fiduciary, we take making money as the primary starting point. For
us, this is not primarily socially responsible investing, although we think it has those
characteristics. What we tell clients is that you can make really good returns here, real
alpha returns. It’s a win-win but we’re not relying on such investments being just a
“good” thing to do.
When I present on this topic people often ask if I am going to talk about the
science. I respond by saying, “Well, this is the greenhouse effect and it has been
around since 1824 when Fourier first talked about it in France.” This is not exactly
new science. A lot of scientists have been working on it. At the end of the day, it’s the
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) that has made the strongest case
that climate change is really taking place and that they can measure impacts for
human beings. I’ve got to say that Deutsche Bank and Deutsche Asset Management
certainly believe that something is going on. As you’ll see from my presentation, I’m
going to say you don’t have to believe it, but we as asset managers and in divisions
across the bank really think there’s something serious going on with climate change.
Hence, we come at investments from that standpoint.
We talk about a win-win – an opportunity to make money, to pursue
returns, and at the same time have a good environmental impact. But as a
fiduciary, we take making money as the primary starting point. For us this
is not primarily socially responsible investing, although we think it has
those characteristics. What we tell clients is that you can make really good
returns here, real alpha returns. It’s a win-win, but we’re not relying on such
investments being just a “good” thing to do.
investment perspective
We see that investors can do one of three things. One thing investors can do is say, “I
read all about the science and I think that something is happening. I really want to do
something about it and therefore there must be some investment opportunities out
there.” An opposite view is, “Oh, I don't know about that. I don’t really believe in
climate change so why should I bother? I’ll just forget about it.” The third route is the
middle road, which is basically to say, “Well, hang on! Whether you believe in climate
change or not, the science is believed by enough people who will influence their
governments to take action, which means that the regulators are going to create some
pretty serious markets.” Now you might ask yourself, “Well, do I really want to invest
in regulated markets?” The truth is that most markets – many, many markets – are
regulated. And many, many markets are created by regulators. Therefore we think that
this is still a powerful investment theme.
We tell people we think something is really going on with climate change, and
therefore we think this is a good investment space. When you are marketing to
American-based investors, which I do, there’s still some skepticism. In Europe, by
contrast, there seems to be somewhat less skepticism; in Europe, most people are
probably taking the first view. Yet American-based investors really want to accept it;
they want to do something about climate change. So when we say to people that the
markets have been created and that you can really invest in them, we do get a fairly
reasonable response. The other side of an investment is returns; they’re still going to
be putting their money to play in the win-win, which is a useful way of looking at
investment strategies.
“Well, hang on!  Whether you believe in climate change or not, the science is
believed by enough people who will influence their governments to take
action, which means that the regulators are going to create some pretty
serious markets.” Now you might ask yourself, “Well, do I really want to
invest in regulated markets?” The truth is that most markets – many, many
markets – are regulated. And many, many markets are created by regulators.
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What is going on with the science is indeed the underpinning of a long-term
secular investment trend. We think, however, that in the long run the science has got
to continue to prove that something is going on, and we think it will continue to do
that. To reinforce the long run trend, there are the IPCC (Intergovernmental Panel on
Climate Change) reports on climate change. There is Al Gore and An Inconvenient
Truth. There is the Stern Review1 on the economics of climate change; I’m sure you’ve
all had a look at it because it has influenced policy makers a great deal. These are the
public education efforts on climate change that have been very important.
We ultimately then have weather-related events and catastrophes. Unfortunately,
people are going to witness more and more weather-related events if climate change
is really taking place, which we think it is. As these weather related events take place,
there’s going to be somewhat more interest in what’s going on with the melting of the
ice sheets, increased hurricane frequency, and so on. That’s going to again galvanize
public attention.
Figure 1 Secular trends with cyclical overlay
Within the United States, the key point is that the current candidates for the
presidency have declared that they will do something about climate change. On that
basis and given that the post-Kyoto deal will need to be achieved in 2009 in
Copenhagen, one would imagine that there will be a great deal of pressure on the new
U.S. administration to act on climate change early in 2009. That’s going to draw a lot
of public attention to what’s going on, and therefore we believe people will look at
investment opportunities.
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The bottom curve in Figure 1 obviously indicates that there are going to be ups and
downs in the market over time. There are, in fact, ups and downs in the market at the
moment. Listed markets have taken quite a correction, and that’s caused some of
these climate funds to adjust. We think that’s an opportunity because this is a long
term secular trend and it’s not going away.
Figure 2 Size of carbon markets
How big are the markets? One of the
most interesting numbers I’ve seen
recently is the third one down in Figure 2.
When I first put up this chart six months
ago, New Energy Finance, which is a
consultant that looks at estimating the
size of markets, was talking about $100
billion into the cleantech sector by 2009.
They just published their view of what
happened in 2007, and it was $148 billion.
The amount of money flowing into these
markets has taken people somewhat by
surprise, and that includes all types of
capital flowing in from venture capital
right up through project finance, M&A,
and so on. And the Stern Review talked
about a $500 billion low carbon energy
market by 2050!
You can get a lot of really large figures.
What we try to do is to illustrate to
investors that these markets are already
emerging, are really quite significant, and
do lead to a lot of investment by
companies that focus on their bottom
lines. Indeed, this is a true economic force
that’s being created and it’s not just about
ethics. We think it will continue.
The amount of money flowing into these markets has taken people
somewhat by surprise, and that includes all types of capital flowing in from
venture capital right up through project finance, M&A, and so on.
We came up with four pillars for how to look at climate change investment
opportunities. First, because of the science of climate change and growing public
interest, there will be government regulation that will, in effect, create markets. Second,
Size of the Carbon Markets
$500 Billion
Value of low-carbon energy markets by 2050 
(Stern Review)
$100 Billion
Demand for projects generating GHG
emissions credits by 2030 
(UN)
$148 Billion
Worldwide investment in clean energy
(New Energy Finance – 2007)
$18.6 to $23.1 Billion
Estimated solar industry revenues by 2010
(Solar Buzz)
$15 Billion
Global fuel cell and distributed
hydrogen market by 2015
(The Climate Group – 2007)
$84 Billion
Cumulative net savings from energy
efficient products in the U.S. by 2012
(The Climate Group – 2007)
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these markets will lead to a price on carbon. Such carbon prices will result in, third,
companies taking action and fourth, new technologies and services being developed.
We’ve talked about the science and growing public interest in climate change. In
terms of carbon prices, they are both implicit and explicit. The explicit prices are those
created by cap-and-trade systems. In particular, we have a cap-and-trade system in
Europe which currently has a price for a ton of carbon dioxide at around 24 euros for
2008 delivery. An explicit cap-and-trade system establishes a greenhouse gas emissions
reduction target through a cap and then companies can trade their emission certificates
to establish a carbon price. An implicit system is basically taxes and subsidies.
The variation of carbon pricing is really quite huge. This is one of the issues facing
investors in the markets. There are so many different things taking place at the
federal, state and local government levels – so many different taxes and subsidies and
regulatory events that investors have to find their way through to identify the
investment opportunities.
What are companies doing about it? The companies we’ve been particularly
interested in are the companies that are looking for competitive advantages. They
know people want to do something about climate change and ask themselves, “What
can I do? Are there technologies, services, or products that I can use or offer? What
can I do to get involved in these markets?” These are what I’d call the opportunity
side. On the risk side, companies are basically asking themselves, “What is my
reputation risk here? What should I do in terms of corporate social responsibility?”
Finally there’s a question of whether or not at some point litigation will come into
play. Some people have drawn parallels with the tobacco industry from 20 to 30 years
ago. We don’t know how it will pan out, but certainly companies have got to take
these risks, not just the opportunities, into account.
In terms of technologies, we see a whole range of products and technologies, some
of them very well known and some of them not yet proven. There are essentially old
and well proven technologies, like energy efficiency, to untried technologies that
people are working on now like carbon capture and storage, which are still not yet
proven. This area is going to be a very interesting place for research and analysis.
What we say to fund or asset managers and investors, in terms of what research
services we can provide, is that we can help them understand these risks,
opportunities, and technology implications. However, we still need to understand
what’s happening in the climate models, particularly when we look at adaptation.
Overall, an investor needs to understand the evolution of policy regulation, the
forecasting of carbon prices, the corporate responses, and the technology
assessments. These are going to be the areas that analysts and portfolio managers are
going to use to create alpha in their investment processes.
Overall, an investor needs to understand the evolution of policy regulation,
the forecasting of carbon prices, the corporate responses, and the technology
assessments. These are going to be the areas that analysts and portfolio
managers are going to use to create alpha in their investment processes.
adaptation investing
When people talk about climate change investment, what do they mean? Most people
tend to focus on clean technology. That’s the alternative energy and cleantech sector.
That’s what you hear a lot about, and that’s what we would call mitigation. In other
words, how do you stop the carbon from being emitted? That’s obviously a very
important area of climate change investment.
An area that isn’t talked about so much, however, is adaptation. This sector plays a
little bit more to those investors who believe that climate change is really happening,
because adaptation is about what to do about the global warming that is already taking
place or that will take place in the future. On that basis, adaptation investing is driven
at the moment by people who really believe climate change is taking place; ultimately,
we think governments are going to get involved in adaptation regulation as well. In our
mutual funds we have both mitigation and adaptation in our investment universe.
Again, it is somewhat unusual for investors to include adaptation.
What are the sectors that are affected by these adaptation trends? What is our
investment universe at a sector thematic level from which we will then pick companies?
For adaptation, the area that you’re going to be most familiar with is water. That’s the
area that everyone’s talking about. It is going to be influenced by climate change and
therefore is an adaptation sector for investment. Investment within the adaptation
sector is also affected by many other global themes, from population growth to general
infrastructure issues. I’m not claiming that climate change is the unique driver of these
sectors, since there are other influencing factors as well. However, climate change
adaptation has been a good way of grappling with some of these very interesting areas
of investment. Water distribution, purification, and the whole infrastructure side,
including processing, has a lot of sub-sectors that investors are interested in. Ultimately,
the big one is the very infrastructures that carry and distribute water.
One of the things that’s been shown is that where there are fresh water supplies,
populations are often somewhere else. This disparity is increasingly going to get
worse according to the climate change models. There’s a big distribution issue here in
terms of getting water to the right place. This will bring a lot of public investment.
The question is whether you can have public-private partnerships involved in this
because large investments have to be deployed in these infrastructure projects.
What about agriculture, forestry and ecosystems? Here again, climate change is an
important element in the whole investment equation. There are a lot of opportunities
in this area, ranging from seeds to soil improvement, biotechnologies, and even
fertilizers. These areas of investment will come into play as climate change impacts
the agricultural sector more and more.
There’s a big distribution issue here in terms of getting water to the right
place. This will bring a lot of public investment. The question is whether you
can have public-private partnerships involved in this because large
investments have to be deployed in these infrastructure projects.
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With respect to human health, the impacts of climate change will bring a fair bit
of disruption in the way diseases are spread and ultimately, that’s going to lead to a
health response. Thinking about the climate change impacts on public health can be
quite depressing. However, the role of companies is to provide solutions to these
public health issues and, as a result, climate change investment will come into play.
Another area that one hears a lot about on the adaptation side is impact and
damage limitation management. I was at an adaptation seminar in Europe last week
with policy analysts and a lot of academics, and the big thing everyone was talking
about was seawall defenses. Rising sea levels are going to be a big threat in terms of
adaptation, and this brings forth a lot of questions such as “Do we have to anticipate
sea level rise? How much does protecting our coasts cost? What’s the discount rate we
should be using for the future? When do we make investments to protect our
coastlines – should we do it now, or do we wait?” There’s a lot of action around sea
defenses. Countries in Europe are investing quite a lot in this and will probably
continue to do so.
The unfortunate question is what we do about the many at-risk areas in
developing countries where there is not a lot of capital to deploy to protect these
coastal areas. We’re currently seeing a lot of development agencies wondering how
they’re going to get involved in adaptation strategies and deploy capital to protect
these communities. This tends to be more public sector focused, but I think it’s a very
important area of analysis for investment consideration. The Dutch, for instance,
have some great companies that build sea defenses. If you’re an investor, there are all
sorts of ways of playing the supply chain around that.
mitigation investing – energy efficiency
What about mitigation strategies for climate change investment, including power,
transportation, buildings, industry, agriculture, waste, and forestry? These are the big
mitigation sectors. This is where you get into the classic cleantech, solar, wind, water,
geothermal, bioenergies, and other clean technologies. This is the sector I think
you’ve had quite a lot of talks about, so I’m not going to spend a lot of time here.
One area I’d like to focus on is energy efficiency. One of the statistics that I grapple
with is that 40 percent of emissions come from buildings in some form or another.
Buildings are an end-use source of emissions – I understand they are very important
to Yale, as I was just talking to a student about how the university is working to reduce
its carbon footprint through energy efficiency. Tackling your buildings and
understanding what’s going on in these buildings is a very important area of analysis.
Deutsche Asset Management, through its RREEF business, is one of the largest asset
managers of property portfolios in the world. Our property portfolios are looking at
the whole greening of real estate very carefully. Green building is a very important
trend. There are some very interesting new technologies either in play or being
developed and some very old technologies like insulation that are fairly
straightforward.
This is a very interesting area for investors to watch in terms of the companies that
are developing these energy efficiency approaches and technologies. There is much
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lower risk and quicker paybacks with energy efficiency. You don’t have to worry so
much about positive carbon prices because in fact these are cost-saving payback
strategies. They have negative carbon prices associated with them, in effect.
climate models
Although this is a simple scientific chart, I was taken aback by it when I saw it in the
Stern Review.
Figure 3 The link between greenhouse gases and climate change
2
One of the things that concerns me with this chart is that most of the climate
models developed so far are linear. They’re not actually that dynamic. New dynamic
models are being developed at the moment. However, any student of economics,
engineering, math or whatever the academic discipline, knows that the world is not
that linear. It is for a while, and then it seems to go somewhere else. As you know, the
real danger is that climate change does indeed happen a great deal faster than linear
models are anticipating. There are feedback loops between how much ice there is and
its reflective capability, the ocean temperature and how algae are formed in the
oceans, and what’s happening in the deep ocean. A rather nasty feedback loop can
take root.
. . . the real danger is that climate change does indeed happen a great deal
faster than linear models are anticipating. There are feedback loops
between how much ice there is and its reflective capability, the ocean
temperature and how algae are formed in the oceans, and what’s
happening in the deep ocean. A rather nasty feedback loop can take root.
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The Economics of Climate
Change, October 2006.
Some of the scientists I’ve had contact with who are looking at the Antarctic and
the ice shelves are very nervous that a much faster reaction will manifest itself. One
of my questions to people is “How many feet of sea level are locked up in the ice
caps?” In Scientific American earlier this year3, one of the really well known climate
scientists pointed out that in the total polar ice caps there are 213 feet of sea level.
That’s a lot of potential sea level rise. If it starts to melt a bit, we could experience a
few feet of sea level rise quite quickly. With these sorts of dynamic feedback loops, it
is going to be interesting to see how the scientists model them and to what extent that
changes our understanding of climate change. I recently asked a scientist at a public
forum if he feels that we’re going to see more dynamic models developed and if
changes in climate are going to happen a lot faster than we thought. His response was
that it’s going to take several years to prove it. So although we’re not going to hear
about a three meter sea level rise rather than a 50 centimeter one very quickly, I do
think that for universities, this research on dynamic climate models may be very
interesting to look at.
In terms of extra deaths as a result of climate change, Figure 4 (below) from the
World Health Organization (WHO) indicates, unfortunately, that a large proportion
of the impact of climate change is going to be borne by the developing world.
Figure 4 Estimates of extra deaths (per million people) from climate change
4
policy and market solutions
I was talking to an economist from another very well known university the other day
about whether a price signal would be enough on its own – in other words, is creating
a carbon price all that is necessary? We asked ourselves, “Once we get to the right
carbon price via tax, cap-and-trade, or some other mechanism, can we then all relax
and let the great invisible hand of the market come in and provide the solution?”
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Behavioral economics suggests that we’re going to need some other things taking
place simultaneously. We can’t underestimate, even as we create more explicit and
transparent carbon prices, the roles that will still exist for standards and various
incentives to kick-start technologies and their adoption.
On cap-and-trade, this is an area that has recently received some criticism in
regards to the offset market and the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM). Leaving
that aside for the moment, the European carbon markets were running at about $30
billion of turnover in 2006. The real question is whether America adopts a cap-and-
trade system like other countries. These markets will then reach a real critical mass. If
this were the case, from our own forecasts by our carbon analysts, this market could
become one of the biggest derivative markets in the world.
We asked ourselves,“Once we get to the right carbon price via tax, cap-and-
trade, or some other mechanism, can we then all relax and let the great
invisible hand of the market come in and provide the solution?” Behavioral
economics suggests that we’re going to need some other things taking place
simultaneously.We can’t underestimate, even as we create more explicit and
transparent carbon prices, the roles that will still exist for standards and
various incentives to kick-start technologies and their adoption.
People like to throw around the idea of the trillion dollar market. Of course these are
guesstimates, but certainly it is just a way of signaling that cap-and-trade systems have
the ability to generate extremely large carbon derivative markets. We’re waiting for the
day when you turn on CNN in the morning and see the Fed funds rate, the U.S./euro
rate, the treasury bond rate, the oil price, and, beside them, the carbon price. When we
get to that point, then we know the markets have really taken carbon on board.
People like to throw around the idea of the trillion dollar market. Of course
these are guesstimates, but certainly it is just a way of signaling that cap-
and-trade systems have the ability to generate extremely large carbon
derivative markets. We’re waiting for the day when you turn on CNN in the
morning and see the Fed funds rate, the U.S./euro rate, the treasury bond
rate, the oil price, and, beside them, the carbon price. When we get to that
point, then we know the markets have really taken carbon on board.
At a global policy level, we’re waiting for the post-Kyoto deal that’s going to take
place in Copenhagen at the end of 2009. We believe that the next U.S. president,
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whoever it is, will be very serious about climate change and cap-and-trade. We’re
going to see something, and the questions are when and how strong will it be.
Carbon prices are currently trading in Europe at around 24 euros for 2008
vintages. There are a lot of people concerned about what occurred with carbon prices
in 2007 during the first phase trial where the allocations were in effect wrong.
Allowances were over-allocated and, as soon as the market recognized it, the carbon
price went to zero (see Figure 5). That caused a lot of angst. At the moment, however,
our carbon analysts believe that the right balance has been struck and the trend is up
(see Figure 6).
Figure 5 European price of carbon for Year 2007 emissions (EUETSY07 Index)
5
Figure 6 European price of carbon for Year 2008 emissions (EUETSY08 Index)
6
policy challenges – biofuels 
For those of you who are a little cautious about taxes and subsidies, Figure 7 below
suggests that it’s really complicated. This is for first and second generation biofuels.
At the moment there are many different ways that people are looking at biofuels and
there are a lot of people debating the biofuel market. The whole value chain can have
carbon finance: environmental market solutions to climate change














































































































































complex interactions going on in it, so you have to be very aware of the complexities
of these systems. Biofuels have become a very controversial issue. We only believe
second generation biofuels are the answer, and they have to be developed on
sustainable, marginal land, and use new technologies that are not going to disrupt the
agricultural supply chain.
Figure 7 Biofuel technologies – first and second generation
7
technology investing – the stabilization wedges
Going back to technologies, the work done at Princeton by Pacala, Socolow and
Greenblatt in 20048 showed what would have to be done to take 7 gigatons of
emissions out of the atmosphere and stabilize concentrations within the 450 to 550
parts per million range that scientists are talking about. They identified six major
areas including renewable electricity and fuels – the cleantech sector – energy
efficiency and conservation – an area we think is particularly important, and fuel
switching – switching from coal to gas, particularly in Europe. Fuel switching is
important – gas can provide a major reduction in carbon emissions when it replaces
old coal. Against new coal technologies this reduction is less, but it’s still significant.
The three other major areas, nuclear power, forests, and carbon capture and
storage, are slightly more difficult and controversial. The environmental movement
is extremely cautious about nuclear power, and there is an ongoing debate about the
tradeoff between safety, waste, and carbon footprint. As someone who’s taking on the
role of worrying about climate change, I believe that we need to look at nuclear
technologies. If they’re safe, we should try to handle the waste because zero carbon
footprints are extremely interesting. As you know, Senator John McCain is now
saying that he thinks nuclear power is going to be an important option. I think
governments around the world are going to have to put this back into what they’re
doing to address climate change. I don't think there’s any way around saying that
nuclear power will play a role with climate change mitigation strategies.
An area that interests a lot of you and also interests us at Deutsche Asset
Management is forests. Something like 18 percent of carbon emissions come from
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deforestation. At the moment there’s an enormous amount of work being done in
public policy and in the private sector concerning what can be done about avoided
deforestation and reforestation. Deutsche Bank is a member of the Prince of Wales’
rainforest project, which is taking place in the U.K. He’s got a lot of banks and a lot
of private sector people coming together to look at how to value a forest. How are we
going to really put a valuation on both the carbon and the other environmental
services that a forest provides? That’s a really interesting area. The Clinton Climate
Initiative is also very interested in this area. A lot of people are working on how we
get some value to forests. If we can see the value of forests, then how can we get
investors interested in that? Ultimately, we’re going to have to see investment dollars
flow into the forestry issue and that’s one of the most difficult areas.
Something like 18 percent of carbon emissions come from deforestation. At
the moment there’s an enormous amount of work being done in public
policy and in the private sector concerning what can be done about avoided
deforestation and reforestation. . . . How are we going to really put a
valuation on both the carbon and the other environmental services that a
forest provides? . . . If we can see the value of forests, then how can we get
investors interested in that? Ultimately, we’re going to have to see
investment dollars flow into the forestry issue and that’s one of the most
difficult areas.
We are looking at community-based forestry options. We think that’s an
interesting area. How can communities that are living in and around rainforests be
given an economic viability, instead of just cutting down the forest? A lot of people
are looking for an answer to stop deforestation on an industrial scale of millions of
hectares. But doing this on the community level is going to be difficult. The other
question is, are forests allowed into a cap-and-trade system? What happens if they are
given a value for carbon? This is a highly complex area.
The sixth area, which I feel quite strongly about, is carbon capture and storage
(CCS). The top 1,000 facilities on the planet in coal, cement, and industrial gases
create about 33 percent of carbon emissions. Can they be changed or can we capture
the carbon coming out of them? Capture and storage offers a very interesting set of
technologies – some of them are old and well known, while there are new, but costly,
versions being developed by many big utilities. Can we effectively take an existing coal
station, retrofit it, and capture the carbon coming out of the post burn? Again,
technologies are being developed, but they are expensive.
The really difficult part is the storage. How comfortable do we feel about the
storage issue? Where is it going to take place . . . in aquifers? How do we get it there?
As this is pursued further, infrastructure will be needed. Injection is currently being
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used in enhanced oil recovery (EOR). Oil companies are taking carbon and pumping
it back into oil fields to increase the recovery rates of these fields. There are different
ways it can be done, but at the moment there’s a general feeling that governments will
assume the liability around storage because I’m not sure many private sector
companies want to assume the risk of thousands of years of safe storage – it’s like the
nuclear waste issue. Can we really store it? What happens to it? In the United States,
the EPA is starting to think about where it could be stored.
This is a very important area because, at the end of the day, everyone has coal, and
hundreds of years of it. It’s going to be hard to take coal out of the energy mix, and
I’m not sure you do if you can capture the carbon and store it. This is a very
important element of climate change mitigation. Unfortunately it’s maybe 10 to 15
years down the road before it can be deployed in size.
How comfortable do we feel about the [carbon] storage issue? . . . There are
different ways it can be done, but at the moment there’s a general feeling
that governments will assume the liability around storage because I’m not
sure many private sector companies want to assume the risk of thousands of
years of safe storage – it’s like the nuclear waste issue. Can we really store it?
Overall on mitigation, our message to investors is that there no single answer.
We’re going to see a variety of investment areas come into play. We’re going to see
renewable energies, energy efficiency, fuel switching, and some nuclear power. We’re
going to see an attempt to work on forests, and ultimately I think we’re going to see
carbon capture and storage. Therefore, as investors, we want to make sure that we’re
looking at quality companies that are working on all of these areas within this climate
change mitigation space.
cost of abatement – the mckinsey curve
I imagine someone has shown the well-known McKinsey cost of abatement curve
during this lecture series. Essentially what McKinsey did for Vattenfall, the Swedish
utility, is to look at a set of what they call abatement curves for various technologies
and approaches to reducing greenhouse gas emissions. McKinsey tried to estimate
how much these technologies and approaches could save on carbon emissions, and
then at what carbon prices they become viable. The 450 parts per million level is
considered by many scientists to be what we should be aiming at in order to stabilize
climate change; this would increase temperature by about two degrees Celsius. There
is some controversy about whether the appropriate target is 450 ppm, lower or a bit
higher, but 450 is reasonable. The original McKinsey work suggests that at 40 euros a
ton CO2-e, most of these technologies seem to be in play, including some of the
carbon capture technologies. The price is currently around 24 euros per ton CO2-e.
fulton
yale school of forestry & environmental studies
129
Since we started using this curve six months ago, McKinsey is already planning “V2,”
as it’s called. So while I use the McKinsey curve for illustrative purposes since it’s a good
start in thinking about which technologies are viable at what prices, one, two, or three
years from now it might be a different-looking cost curve. There are different ways to
encourage different technology costs through policies and energy efficiency standards
that can achieve negative carbon prices. In other words, people should be taking such
measures because it makes economic sense, but sometimes it takes a little
encouragement for them to do so. Basically, in the middle of the curve sits a cap-and-
trade system. The really expensive stuff at the top of the curve probably needs direct
R&D technology subsidies to bring technologies down the learning curve (see Figure 8).
Figure 8 Cost of abatement (McKinsey) and policy approaches
9
Technology learning rates are important. Figure 9 presents some data that,
although a bit out of date, makes a general point that the cost of these technologies is
coming down. What’s interesting is that a lot of people are saying that onshore wind
Figure 9 Evidence on learning rates in technology10
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is very viable against oil and coal at current levels – and in fact lower than current
levels. I find at the moment that most analysts are using a long-term price of $60 per
barrel of oil; oil is currently at $110 a barrel, but everyone wants to stay cautious. Coal
prices have gone up very dramatically recently, as evidenced by contracts such as in
Australia and with China and Japan. So in fact, onshore wind is already looking pretty
viable as it stands. Offshore wind still requires some help; however, if oil and coal
prices and coal prices keep rising, a lot of these technologies don’t need government
subsidies – it’s a relationship between energy prices, what policies governments are
pursuing, and technology learning rates. A lot of what venture capitalists are trying
to do is to buy the companies that are going to drive these learning rates and then
push down costs.
fund investing
As an investor, we look at climate change strategies in different ways. One can look at
carbon strategies, at forestry given that there are a lot of timberland products out
there, or at infrastructure, in which we think are huge opportunities. One can also
look at cleantech, as well as diversified climate mutual strategies, agribusiness and
commodities, SRI (Social Responsible Investment) and ESG (Environment, Social
and Governance) strategies. At Deutsche Asset Management, we tend to concentrate
more on the economically-driven strategies.
We did some analysis towards the end of last year where we monitored around 256
mutual and exchange traded funds, managing about 45 billion euros – or somewhere
over $US60 billion. They are investing in different sectors, including agriculture,
clean energy, climate, environment, and water. If you looked at where the companies
with these funds are located, most of them are located in Europe and Asia (see Figure
10 below).11 The U.S. has got some, but not many. There are a few of us that are large
players in these markets, and certainly Deutsche Asset Management is one of the
leaders in terms of this particular mutual fund sector.
Figure 10 Mutual and exchange traded funds: location and allocations in five sectors 
Asia Europe US Total
INVESTMENT SECTOR
AuM # of AuM  # of AuM # of AuM # of    
(¤m) Funds (¤m) Funds (¤m) Funds (¤m) Funds
Agricultural 543 6 3,146 7 304 1 3,994 14
Alternative & Renewable Energy 1,536 5 10,190 38 1,612 10 13,338 53
Climate 1,651 14 939 16 19 1 2,608 31
Environmental, Green & Sustainable 3,277 26 9,626 86 793 9 13,695 121
Water 2,196 12 6,874 19 1,854 6 10,924 37
Total 9,204 63 30,775 166 4,581 27 44,560 256
To consider how successful climate change investors have been, let’s look at some
research by HSBC (Figure 11). HSBC has created a climate change index that can be
compared to the MSCI world index. The climate change index has outperformed the
world index pretty substantially, but it has fallen recently, which is no surprise
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11 Lipper FERI, Strategic Insight,
Simfund. Note that data also
include clean technology and
energy funds.
because many of the climate sectors are capital goods and thus cyclical sectors. The
fear of a recession has taken a toll on the way the market is pricing small and mid cap
companies. However, the climate change index hasn’t fallen much more than the
world index after having outperformed it quite substantially prior to that. At the
moment, the climate change story is actually holding up reasonably well, even in
difficult markets. If you believe this is some type of cyclical correction, then you’ve
got a secular trend in climate change, as we believe, which is going to create lots of
investment opportunities for people.
Figure 11 HSBC Climate Change Index
12
The climate change index has outperformed the world index pretty
substantially, but it has fallen recently, which is no surprise because many
of the climate sectors are capital goods and thus cyclical sectors.
By the way, this presentation is for informational purposes only and is not
intended to be relied on to make investment decisions. I’m happy to open it up and
take some questions.
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Question and Answer Session
QUESTION 1: Biofuels
Can you explain a bit further the figure that you showed on biofuels (Figure 7)?
On biofuels, I think the key question is whether they are sustainable. Everyone is
grappling with this. If you are really interested in this, I’d recommend Annex 7 of the
EU Directive on Renewable Energy. Annex 7 sets out the way the EU is suggesting that
people calculate sustainability, including land use. The big change is that you cannot
just use lifecycle analysis to focus on how much carbon you generate during
production processes; they want you to take into account the carbon debt of the land
as well.
Annex 7 sets out the way the EU is suggesting that people calculate
sustainability, including land use. The big change is that you cannot just use
lifecycle analysis to focus on how much carbon you generate during
production processes; they want you to take into account the carbon debt
of the land as well.
One of the more spectacular pieces of research that’s been released recently was in
Science.13 In cutting down rainforests, there is something like 400 years of carbon debt
to pay off before breaking even on carbon. There’s a lot of work being done on this
and a lot of controversy around it as well, but there’s no doubt in our mind that
anyone moving forward will have to take into account land use and be pretty sure that
they’re using sustainable sources of land in order to justify getting the sort of
certificates that I think ultimately will be required on biofuels. We’re heading toward
a certificate market, and to get a certificate, I think you will need to demonstrate that
your biofuel production comes from degraded or reclaimed land or that you are not
disrupting the agricultural food chain.
QUESTION 2: Oil price sensitivity of climate change investments and U.S. ethanol
production 
I have two questions. First, how would a drop in the price of oil from where we are now
affect these investments, at least in the short run, since I don’t think it would affect them
in the long run? Are such investments really insulated through regulation? Second, how
did we get to where we are with ethanol in the United States? 
On pricing, I’ve talked a lot about the importance of government regulation, as
this would serve to protect the markets and make sure they remain intact. I still think
a precipitous drop in the price of oil might lead some people to be a little more
cautious about the underlying economics in the long run. High oil prices really are
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one of the drivers catching people’s attention. But like you said, I don’t think a drop
would stop the basic underlying drivers that governments feel are in place to address
climate change.
In terms of corn ethanol, and I’m not an expert by any means, it’s been in America
since the 1920s and 30s. There are a lot of calculations concerning its carbon
footprint, its water use, and so forth, but remember MTBE? MTBE was used in petrol
(gasoline) as an oxygenating additive. It wasn’t a great thing to have in petrol, and the
big surge in ethanol, if you go back and look at the charts, happened when ethanol
was swapped for MTBE.
As always with these types of stories, there are lots of different things going on. The
debate is whether there is a better way of creating ethanol, and the cellulosic biofuel
technologies are extremely interesting. Cellulosic technologies can utilize a more
diverse set of inputs and would ultimately use a lot more waste as feedstocks. They
are also a lot more sustainable and energy-efficient. Wood – wood cellulose – would
be extremely efficient and through forestry, you could grow wood plantations, and
then use that wood for biofuel. That would be extremely interesting if you converted
marginal degraded land to plantations. That’s something we are quite interested in as
an investment opportunity. There are a lot of good things you can still do in this
space, and there are a lot of negative things you can say about corn ethanol. Most
people would like to see more sustainable ways of getting into biofuels, for sure.
QUESTION 3: Mitigation contribution from developing countries
The responsibility of mitigation looks like a tradeoff within the developed countries, and
yet in the balancing act I haven’t seen the data to show what India and China are doing
to impact such reduction efforts.
The forecasts are that China will soon become the largest emitter of greenhouse
gases and pass the United States. That’s not too far away. India is a big emitter also. It
is important to understand politically what that debate is all about. The OECD
nations put carbon up first, and the developing nations want to economically develop
and alleviate poverty. This is such a very complex political debate, but there is no
doubt that in simple terms – aside from who’s right and who’s wrong – the emissions
coming out of the stronger developing countries are, by now, substantial. Therefore
either the OECD is going to recognize that there is a historic bank of carbon up there
for which they will have to compensate and drive down their emissions even further,
or the OECD is going to encourage the developing world to join some type of a
carbon trading or emissions program in the next five years. That’s the big political
debate, which I don’t have any insight on, I’m afraid.
The Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) is currently receiving a lot of
criticism. The idea was that if caps were set a bit lower in Europe, then the carbon price
would not go too high if these offset projects were allowed to be developed in China,
India, and other non-Annex I countries. There would also be a transfer of technology.
Overall, CDM could introduce lower emissions as an idea into these developing
countries, funding them out of the developed world’s cap-and-trade system. This is
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causing a lot of soul searching at the moment as to how successful that’s been. But
certainly it has seemed to produce quite reasonable results in some areas.
QUESTION 4: Investing in transmission
You spoke about investing in infrastructure projects. What’s your position on investing in
transmission? It’s a big issue right now with large scale wind and solar projects.
We think it’s a very interesting area, and we’d love to look for opportunities –
probably us and a lot of big investors. Thanks for pointing this out. On energy
efficiency, I forgot to mention that one of the biggest areas of energy efficiency can be
found in the transmission grid. Vast amounts of electricity are lost between
generation and delivery and use. In fact, we’ve been investing in companies – listed
companies – that are interested in developing better ways of saving energy across the
grid.
Most people I’ve spoken with are really focusing on what type of grid is needed –
how flexible it needs to be, how these variable sources of energy, like wind and solar,
are incorporated into it, how to diversify where it is located, and how to extend it.
These are key policy questions, and it’s a very interesting area to see, again, whether it
will be some sort of public-private partnerships that will attempt to pull this together.
I sincerely hope so, because I think it’s one of the most interesting and exciting areas.
There are times when, if you spend your whole day looking at this topic as I do,
you can actually come out of the day a little bit depressed, thinking, “Can we really
get on top of this issue?” Look, for instance, at the projections of the number of cars
that are going to come on the road in the next few years. This feeling of depression is
countered by investigating what really could be done, and realizing there is a lot that
we could do.
There are so many different technologies in development and so many things
people are really passionate about trying to do. I think that’s the great thing. There’s
a lot of serious capital being deployed and a lot of serious people involved, which is
encouraging. One hopes that we’ll see this portfolio effect and, within five or ten
years, that we’ll see a flood of solutions. That’s what we’re trying to do – put all that
capital in place to enable the market with those solutions. I think the power grid area
is really crucial.
There are so many different technologies in development and so many
things people are really passionate about trying to do. I think that’s the
great thing. There’s a lot of serious capital being deployed and a lot of
serious people involved, which is encouraging. One hopes that we’ll see this
portfolio effect and, within five or ten years, that we’ll see a flood of
solutions. That’s what we’re trying to do – put all that capital in place to
enable the market with those solutions.
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Look at concentrated solar power (CSP) – I didn’t talk much about that. Many
people are believers in a single answer. So the CSP guys will tell you that if we put a
big power station in North Africa and another in southwest America, we don’t even
need anything else because they can generate vast quantities of energy. But again,
whether we’ll ever put anything that big in place in time, connected to the grid and
all the rest of it, I don't know. Meanwhile, we can probably put a lot of smaller
facilities onto the grid in the right places. This is an interesting area, and solar
technology is fascinating. It is an expensive one, but if you talk to some of the new
venture capitalists and entrepreneurs, they’re expecting to charge down the cost curve
on this one.
QUESTION 5: Forestry investments
Can you elaborate on what you see as some of the key forestry investments and whether
those are mostly in the Clean Development and Joint Implementation Mechanisms or if
there are opportunities for timberland investors in temperate regions to participate as
well?
At the moment we’re sort of focused on the big deforestation solution which may
come from the carbon markets. Let’s put a value on it. There is probably a carbon
price of some kind. Let’s look at bringing this problem under some sort of cap-and-
trade system. We’ve tended to take the view of looking at investments that might
financially work even without carbon prices. That’s why I asked whether there are
some community-based projects that could be looked at. Are there things in the
microfinance world that can be applied to forests?
I was out in Singapore at a forestry conference a couple of weeks ago. There were
a lot of big timberland players there. They are beginning to realize the significant
potential for carbon capture and efficient usage of plantations and timberland. I
mean, there’s no point in chopping down a rainforest in Asia to put up plantations.
We are beginning to get that. But is there an opportunity to find a lot of land that can
support forestry plantations, and can those forestry plantations then be used to have
an impact on our carbon footprint? This is an interesting area.
I’m also interested in the end uses of the plantations. Will we produce cellulosic
biofuel from wood? That’s going to be a very good use of plantation forestry. We
could get very efficient biofuel yields out of plantations. Then there’s the question of
locking up carbon in furniture and so on. Forestry can lead to a lot of carbon
sequestration — it’s really exciting and we better realize it’s not just the current thing
on how we save the rainforest. The whole timberland world can do a lot too, right
now, in good high yield investments.
QUESTION 6: Returns on project and equity investments
Have you ever done any studies on the different investment returns from project versus
equity based investments? If so, what’s the difference?
We haven’t as yet, and it’s quite early for a lot of these things. The basic listed equity
market investments are going to have a beta quality to some extent. We’re looking to
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try and add the alpha by picking really interesting companies around that. We’ve had
some venture capital/private equity project investments, and a lot more are building
up in the system now. The lead times are so long that we may not be able to have very
good measures on them yet.
In terms of these new technologies like new biofuel, new solar, and new carbon
capture – will these technologies pay off? That is a question we don’t know the
answer to yet. We believe they will if you choose the right one, but like all these things,
some are going to work and others aren’t. You have to have a portfolio of investments.
If someone actually develops an enzyme that someone can just throw on the waste
from agriculture and produce biofuels, that’s going to have a big return. The
questions are, have you got that, and what about the other twenty that it costs you to
work on at the same time? It’s that kind of tradeoff, but I do think there are some big
returns to be had in these new technologies. As always, it’s just a question of
pinpointing them. I will say that’s why we like the idea of still investing in the known
technologies that are going towards energy efficiency and around what we know is
happening at the moment. We think there are very good returns around some good,
known technologies.
Thank you very much.
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Chapter 6
Environmental Market Solutions for
Global Warming
Jon Anda, Environmental Defense Fund1
editors’ remarks
Jon Anda’s presentation can engage a wide range of readers, including those who are more
expert. One of his main aims is to provide insight into the nature of the climate problem
and the many roadblocks that have inhibited the U.S. from enacting national legislation.
He relates many facets of the climate issue, especially policy, to the practice of finance and
the realities of the marketplace, and thus makes the strong case, both explicitly and
implicitly, that financial involvement, in addition to scientific, political, and economic
efforts, is critical to dismantling these roadblocks, to identifying robust solutions and tools,
and to ultimately establishing a global carbon market. Aspects of this connection were
also later articulated by Professor Bradford Gentry during his closing remarks as moderator
of the panel on hedge funds
2:“To the extent that markets are going to be built to last, the
message needs to come from the investment community because the scale of the change
that’s needed globally is going to require massive shifts in long term investment.”
For those interested in the relative merits of a cap-and-trade versus a carbon tax, Mr.
Anda provides rationale for the preference of a hard cap on emissions explaining how
quantity-based regulation makes sense in the context of a climate risk that favors “the
bad side [rather] than the good side.” His analysis also incorporates such factors as
institutional reactions, risk aversion, capital formation, market frictions, incentivizing
strategic rather than tactical responses, and the benefits of an upstream cap.With respect
to cost containment of a cap, he concludes that our current financial technologies are well
equipped to enact such a system and that “we can solve the volatility problem.”
Perhaps more of a “501” talk than a “101”, this chapter is probably not best suited to
someone completely new to the subject, and further, some background in finance may be
helpful. Nonetheless, this chapter is not to be missed. In chapter one, Professor William
Goetzmann framed the challenge of creating a successful carbon market with the
question, “what mechanisms will help us achieve that?” In this chapter, Mr. Anda begins
to answer not just the “what” of this question, but also the “how.”*
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introduction
Today I’m going to talk about my homework. I’ve read the list of questions the
speakers in this series are supposed to address, and I fit my remarks into that outline.
I plan to go through each of those topics, one by one, and then take some questions
on each one.
The really challenging part of this kind of a talk is that some people are at 101 and
some people are at 501. I tend toward the 501 because otherwise I get really bored
doing these things. I come from the banking world, and I’m not used to teaching per
se, so if we’re not at the right level, maybe we’ll find out as we go through the
questions. I don’t know if you all know what topics I was supposed to address, so I’ll
just quickly go through that outline.
One of the items was reduction expectations. Since this is for people who have a
product for which they have to disclose what they’re actually planning to do about
emissions reductions, I’m going to instead talk about how much has to get reduced.
We’ll start with science and what the problem is. I’ll talk about the role of
government, where I’ll go into policy wonk speak, and we’ll talk about price versus
quantity regulations and the like. I’m going to talk about the role of finance and how
the markets work in this space, some of the market drivers, and then on into some of
the opportunities for all of you.
background
To start, let me give a bit of background about how I got here and what I do. I finished
business school way back in 1980 at Northwestern’s Kellogg School, and I actually
interviewed at the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and thought about
taking their offer to do market-based environmental policies. Instead, I went into
project finance. I worked on co-generation when we had the Public Utility
Regulatory Policies Act (PURPA) and I financed a coal gasification pilot facility
outside St. Louis. I was involved in all of these exciting technologies, all of which
collapsed when energy prices dropped in the early 1980’s.
I left project finance even though it was really what I wanted to do. I went on to
Morgan Stanley, where I spent 20 years. I was a banker and did all kinds of different
things. I ran sales and trading in Asia, headed banking in Asia, headed capital markets
and corporate finance. I was a vice-chairman – chief cook and bottle washer. I lived
in Chicago, in New York, and, for four years, in Hong Kong.
But when you reach the 20-year point at a firm like Morgan Stanley, that’s full
career and you can do whatever you want. What I wanted to do was work on climate.
I was on the advisory board of the Environmental Defense Fund, and the board of
directors – people like Julian Robertson who are very financially savvy – looked at
what we were doing in the organization and concluded that while we were really good
at science, policy, and economics, we were down in Washington advocating a hard
cap on emissions in a trading system when we didn’t know that much about markets.
We were hitting some walls. If we wanted to win on climate and win on a hard cap,
we needed a markets capability.
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An organization like Environmental Defense Fund can’t build that, but it can
certainly be rented or bought, or actually gotten for free by linking up with Wall Street
and bringing that talent to bear on the problem. I decided that this was a great
opportunity to use my skills for something that’s good for the world and I signed on.
I am now the president of the Environmental Markets Network at Environmental
Defense Fund. It’s a cool title and I’m president of something, but at the end of the
day, my job is to deal with road blocks to a stringent climate policy and knock them
off, one by one. Whether it’s a carbon tax or a safety valve, whether it’s China or trade
or leaving sectors out like transportation – whatever it is, it’s like putting your finger
in a dike. We have to deal with the road blocks and keep a process on track that makes
a meaningful difference in the problem.
I work with Nat Keohane, who came from Yale. I work with him very closely, but
I also work with the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) and with Duke
University. I also write think pieces and come up with market ideas to get what we
want, which is a hard cap on emissions. So that’s a little bit of background. I won’t
allow questions on background because I don’t want to talk about myself anymore.
reduction expectations: managing fat tail risks
Let’s go into the first topic, which is reduction expectations. What’s the nature of the
problem we’re trying to solve? Climate policy can be viewed as hedging the fat tail risk
of catastrophic climate outcomes. This is a hedging exercise, in Wall Street terms.
Climate policy can be viewed as hedging the fat tail risk of catastrophic
climate outcomes.
What we have is a lognormal distribution of outcomes from climate damages. I’ll
talk about one of these, but we actually have two. One of them is the sensitivity of the
climate to carbon in the atmosphere. It’s more likely that the atmosphere is more
sensitive, meaning that the temperature is more sensitive to atmospheric concentration
of greenhouse gases than it is less sensitive. I won’t debate that (you can read the
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) report), but it is a premise.
That’s not the only lognormal distributed risk. The damages for a given temperature
are also a lognormal distribution because of positive feedback loops. These are things
most of you know about. Ice melts, for example, and water absorbs radiation instead of
reflecting it back up so that more ice melts and permafrost gets exposed, etc.
On Wall Street we see this all the time, right? We have fat tail risks that are
managed dynamically. They’re in options – in kappas, alphas, thetas, and rhos. Those
option Greeks and risks get hedged dynamically. It’s very sophisticated. You look at it
and say “I gotta hedge this.” When I come to the world of climate, I find that a lot of
the intellectual effort here has gone into general equilibrium models and base case
analysis. Somebody’s base case says do this. I look at it and say, “No, this is a hedging
exercise and the risk looks heavier on the bad side than on the good side.”
Let’s think about that in terms of policy. What should policy do? One framework
is to use options again – policy should preserve an option on a stable climate. You
can tell me what you think a stable climate is, but for now let’s just call it two degrees
centigrade over pre-industrial. But policy should preserve that option. If we lose that
option, we have a lot of trouble. If the risk is lognormal, then knowing nothing else
about policy, you would say that it should probably be stringent and then let up as
opposed to being lenient and then stepping on the gas. If you step on the gas, the car
might not go because, in other words, we won’t have the technologies. Now, not many
people look at it that way, but those are the facts.
Policy should preserve an option on a stable climate. If we lose that option,
we have a lot of trouble. If the risk is lognormal, then knowing nothing else
about policy, you would say that it should probably be stringent and then
let up as opposed to being lenient and then stepping on the gas. If you step
on the gas, the car might not go because, in other words, we won’t have the
technologies.
Let’s just level set on our reduction expectations. I think the numbers that I use,
45-75-15, should be on a tattoo or something on all policy folks – 45 is today’s annual
emissions and 75 will be our emissions in 2050 according to one IPCC Business as
Usual (BAU) scenario. We can pick any numbers we want, but right now we have 45
billion tons of greenhouse gases going into the atmosphere each year. We’re going to
go to 75 and we need to get below 15. By the way, of this 45, roughly 30 of it is from
burning fossil fuels, but 15 of it is not. Most of the other 15, as you know, is methane
and deforestation.
Why does this matter? Why am I talking about this? When I get to the things about
career opportunities, about what you want to do in this field, and about what you
want to do in environmental finance, it is relevant.
Let’s just say Figure 1 is a cost curve for abating CO2. The latest IPCC report would
say up to 15 percent is abatable at a carbon price of zero. These are actions like
changing the light bulbs – you’re a moron, you’re spending too much money.
A lot of activity in environmental finance is down here in this negative-cost
abatement area. I met with a bunch of students, some of you here, and we went
around so that everybody had the opportunity to talk about what they’re doing.
People want to do renewables or people want to get involved in private equity or
hedge funds. Well, a lot of the activity today is in this initial 15 percent area. For
example, let’s find a project in China, light a match over methane, basically abate
methane, pay a couple of dollars a ton, and then wait a year to register the tons under
the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) and sell them for $32. It’s really a
commercial process. But it is not the kind of game-changing innovation we need to
hedge climate risk.
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Figure 1 Marginal abatement cost curve
As another example, consider a situation with a renewables portfolio standard in a
given state, big tax credits, and the right power purchase contract. Environmental
finance for solar or for wind is just securitization. The most important skill: learn how
to securitize. Get some experience in the mortgage industry . . . no, I’m just kidding.
But those kinds of activities are all down in the negative-cost abatement area, and
a lot of the big heavy lifting is further up on the curve. I’ll use that more later, but I
just want to level set. Okay, that’s enough on reduction expectations and the nature
of the problem. Let me stop there and see if we have any questions, violent
disagreement, or if I should proceed.
Audience comment: Underestimating risk of extreme climate events  
I have a disagreement on your assumption of well-behaved uncertainties in your functions.
I think these functions are not log normally distributed. We have much fatter tails and by
using this argument, you actually underestimate the risks of extreme climate events.
Underestimate them?
Yes.
Well, at least I won’t be too far wrong in terms of stringency then. Again, we can
go into that area, but I have to say that while I take that material, I didn’t develop it.
I’ve talked about this analysis with people like Stephen Pacala, who happens to be on
our board at Environmental Defense Fund. I don’t know that we should spend too
much time on that, but point taken. I wouldn’t state any of this as fact, but it is a
premise for the way we approach some of the policies that I’m going to talk about.
government
Now we’re onto the role of government. For me, the role of government means: what
are we going to do about the problem? This really starts with whether we want a
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Defense Fund advocate, which is quantity-based regulation with a hard cap on
emissions. It’s also clear that if you start with the premise that we have these
lognormal distributions of outcomes, then the number of tons to preserve an option
on two degrees is large – a lot of tons will need to be abated. Quantity-based
regulation is a very rational outcome of that kind of thinking.
It’s also clear that if you start with the premise that we have these lognormal
distributions of outcomes, then the number of tons to preserve an option on
two degrees is large – a lot of tons will need to be abated. Quantity-based
regulation is a very rational outcome of that kind of thinking.
What I’m going to do now is go directly into some of the factors that affect policy
and will affect your careers.
Stringency is a big issue. The stringency of the policy drives the price of carbon.
How broad is the policy? Having a really stringent policy on 70 percent of the tons,
let alone 50 percent of the tons, doesn’t get a whole lot done for the environment.
How clear is the policy? Is it a policy where you have to deal with different standards,
and even different cap-and-trade systems, state by state, nationally, and globally if
you’re a multi-national? Or, alternatively, do you have a relatively simple baseline for
what you have to do in greenhouse gases? Do you get credit for early action?
Some of the things we work on when I talked before about road blocks are in those
areas of how stringent and broad to make the policy, how to preserve those options,
and so forth. Length of policy is also critical as a very long-term policy will lead to
more capital investment than a shorter-term one.
Carbon policy road blocks 
I was with an academic the other day, one of the top people in the field, and he
remarked that there’s not that much left to do. It’s a good point. Do we need another
general equilibrium model of carbon prices and abatement? I don’t think so. Do we
need more science to decide we have to put a hedge in place? I kind of doubt it.
Do we need another general equilibrium model of carbon prices and
abatement? I don’t think so. Do we need more science to decide we have to
put a hedge in place? I kind of doubt it.
Now you get to the road blocks. What you should be asking me is, “You’re down
there, why doesn’t something get done?”
The biggest road block domestically right now is cost containment. Cost
containment can mean two things. One is that there’s a limited amount of money we
want to spend on this. So cost containment means we want a hard cap on costs, not
a hard cap on emissions. For that side of cost containment you need a carbon tax or
a safety valve. That’s what you want and nothing’s going to change your mind. If
there’s only so much you want to spend, that’s your policy.
However, if you say, “No, I actually do want a hard cap on emissions, but I’m really
worried about volatility,” then cost containment is about avoiding the spikes and the
big ups and downs. There are ways to manage that.
The state of the debate right now in Washington on cost is: Well, throw your cards
on the table. Is it a limited amount you want to spend? Is it a particular industry
you’re trying to protect? Or are you worried about volatility?  
We can solve the volatility problem. I’ve even written a paper recently about how
we can use volatility by using options in policy that will give a benefit to emitters and
their customers if we have a lot of volatility. That’s manageable. Cost containment is
trickier. At this stage in Washington, it’s really more about people disclosing what it
is they’re really worried about. When you get to the Carbon Market Efficiency Board,
for example, and to ideas about having an omnipotent player in the markets who can
sell allowances if prices get too high, that’s where you get into this issue – is it the total
cost you’re trying to limit or is it the volatility?
The biggest road block domestically right now is cost containment. Is it a
limited amount you want to spend? Is it a particular industry you’re trying
to protect? Or are you worried about volatility? We can solve the volatility
problem.
What are some other road blocks? China, India, Brazil, and Indonesia are very
obvious road blocks, and I think the state of the art on that comes down to three
possible outcomes. One is that the U.S. goes first, full stop. A second is that the U.S.
goes with something from China – an intensity target, a nod, a wink, something in
the middle. The third is that China and India come in, or particularly China, with
some kind of “premium benefit compensated reduction” plan, which means China
does take a hard cap, but it gets to keep going up while the rest of the world goes
down, and during the time it keeps going up, it can still sell allowances into a global
trading system.
We want the latter. That is, we want a hard cap even if it doesn’t start for a while.
We’d say it’s worth it to pay, like we do in CDM, during the interim. Put some money
on the table during that period. Where that money comes from and what gets done
is obviously one of the tougher roadblocks.
Another road block is, quite simply, that the losers are fighting a lot harder than
the winners are right now. The coal industry, for example, is represented by former
Senator Dick Gephardt. They’re very strong and they’re very powerful. They don’t
have to be pushed aside, but their concerns have to be dealt with and they put a lot
on the table. There’s a lot at stake and they’re very hard to beat. Let’s face it,
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particularly with respect to coal, 90 plus percent of the British Thermal Unit (BTU)
content of our reserves and China’s reserves (of conventional fuel) is in coal. That’s a
big road block that affects everything from national security to the current account.
Opportunities in policy
Those are some of the road blocks we’re dealing with in policy, but what are the
opportunities? What are the bright spots in policy? What about the point of
regulation? As an organization, I wouldn’t make a comment about our official stance
or the green group’s stance, but it’s starting to look like a higher point of regulation
is better. When you think about how to keep this simple and clear and how to get all
the tons in while there seem to be tons leaking out of the system, an upstream point
of regulation is very interesting. It’s interesting because utilities will run it through in
fuel costs. It’s interesting because you don’t have to monitor that many facilities in
China, for example, if in fact they do participate. The Bingaman-Spector bill is
currently the only bill in Congress that has an upstream point of regulation, but that
may change. The rest of the bills are generally hybrid systems. I think working up to
the level of the mine-mouth and the wellhead is an interesting opportunity.
When you think about how to keep this simple and clear, and how to get all
the tons in while there seem to be tons leaking out of the system, upstream
point of regulation is very interesting.
Another opportunity is, interestingly, our wealth effects. The work that’s coming
out is telling us that – and this is a good point though it’s hard to say this because it
will be very debatable – the wealth effects are very small, particularly in light of the
assumptions that drive them. Whether you take the analysis done by Dale Jorgenson
at Harvard and the Research Triangle Institute on the Lieberman-Warner bill or
whether you look at IPCC or some other source, you’re talking about changing the
GDP growth rate of the world by small amounts. The IPCC would say 0.12% a year.
Maybe you’d say GDP in 2030 will be 3 percent or less lower than it otherwise would
have been. This means that we don’t know where GDP is going to be, and it might hit
the level we would have otherwise expected in 2030 a year late, or something along
those lines.
I don’t want to make light of that, because there’s a lot of people involved here that
have very low GDP per capita and it’s not something to take lightly. But I would say
that the assumptions that fuel those numbers are for very, very substantial increases
in cost over time. The numbers assume there’s no commoditization of clean
technology, no break-through for the smokestack in coal or the retrofit plants. You
can’t model this and you can’t model the flow of capital in response to the policy. For
example, Exxon is worth half a trillion dollars, and maybe has earnings of $40 billion
a year. A little bit of those earnings pointed in this direction is very, very powerful. I
would also point out that coincident benefits are obviously getting a lot of attention
carbon finance: environmental market solutions to climate change
yale school of forestry & environmental studies
148
now in Congress, whether with regards to energy security or (and this is coming) we
want to invent it, we want the intellectual property, etc.
Let me leave it at that and take some questions, and then I’m going to go into
finance.
Question: Upstream regulation
When you say a high point of regulation like the mine-mouth or wellhead, do you mean
potentially putting a tax on the raw commodities? Or if you’re going to do a trading
system, would the cap go on utilities and the bigger users of those fossil fuels?
First of all, thank you so much for that question. I’m thrilled that you asked that.
Even within the environmental community, many people think that an upstream
cap-and-trade system is the same as a carbon tax. Please do not make that mistake!
No, no, no! One gets the tons out for sure, and the other doesn’t. The tax only gets the
tons out if they’re abatable underneath the tax price. I’m really talking only about a
cap on emissions, but setting that cap at the level of the fuel versus the level of the
emissions. Within downstream, mid-stream, upstream, I’m really talking about
upstream. I’d really urge you to read Robert Repetto’s piece, National Climate Policy:
Choosing the Right Architecture4, written two months ago. There have been many, but
that’s one of the most clear, forceful, hard-hitting, best pieces on that topic. But I’m
really glad you asked.
Question: Carbon tax versus cap-and-trade
I recently read a piece by John Holdren from the Harvard John F. Kennedy School of
Government comparing different policy options and would like to know, in your view,
what the costs and benefits are for a carbon tax versus a cap-and-trade for generating
dollars for developing renewable energy technologies, efficiency technologies, and then
also for correcting cost defects for segments of society that are negatively impacted
economically from higher consumer prices as a result of a tax.
Good, I’m glad you asked that. Let’s picture something you’re all familiar with: the
marginal abatement cost and the marginal benefit curves. Now, if the benefit curve is
flat and you believe it’s flat, then I could argue with you all day and you’re going to
choose price-based regulation. So let’s not go there. But if you believe otherwise, and
you believe that the volatility around these outcomes is very high, then you lose faith
in a dead benefit curve, as I call it. I don’t even call it a flat benefit curve; I call it a dead
benefit curve, because it’s no longer even relevant in policy. Nonetheless, you come to
a different place.
But I’m not going to talk about that. What I’m going to talk about is something
simpler and in the world of finance.
Let’s just talk about institutional reactions to the two. To an emitter and the innovator
under a carbon tax, what you’re saying is, “This is a price cap on your innovation. Beat
it and you can sell things. Don’t beat it and you’re out of luck – you don’t have a
product.” Institutionally, how does capital formation actually work? Our institutional
system for innovation has a lot to do with universities and others channeling ideas to
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venture capitalists so that these ideas end up in venture capital portfolios. Those
portfolios have one or two winners and a bunch of losers. The winners and losers are
decided by whose product can beat the competition, not on who can nose under a
government price cap. So I have a real issue on the approach of a carbon tax.
Secondly, what is the reaction of emitters? We could debate all day whether
emitters are risk-averse, but let’s say that you have a choice and you’re a utility. You
don’t innovate anything, you just buy from vendors. You have a choice to pay $12 a
ton (à la Bingaman’s safety valve), or a carbon tax at $12 a ton. Or you have the choice
of taking a chance on technologies and you start engaging with suppliers and the like.
Well, if you’re at all risk-averse, you might say, “I’ll pay the $12 until I’m sure.”
Why would risk aversion exist? Well, there are a few things in finance that could
lead you to that conclusion. There are clientele effects. Who owns utilities? They’re
low beta stocks. They have investors who expect most of the cash to be returned to
them. They never invent anything. They don’t take risk. Can that change? Of course
it can change, but there are clientele effects; there are principal agent problems. Why
do public companies get bought out and the owners make a gazillion dollars doing
it? There are frictions in the markets.
When I look at it, I say, “Great, you put a price cap on innovation and emitters. You
think that anything under $12 is going to work, but I think there’s going to be a bias
that your $12 isn’t really $12 – it’s effectively less because there is a preference.” There
again, we could debate it all day.
A quantity-based system, however, over a long period of time will result in a strategic
response rather than a tactical response from emitters. Emitters can always say that they
will respond tactically to price-based regulation, that they can always pay to pollute, and
so they don’t have to turn the ship around. On the other hand, if you told me we’re
going to have 60 to 80 percent reductions in emissions in the U.S. by 2050, and you
really believed that was set in stone, you would turn the ship around. You don’t leave it
to your CFO to manage your short position on allowances. You back up the truck on
R&D, you say carbon’s getting out of the system, and you respond strategically.
Emitters can always say that they will respond tactically to price-based
regulation, that they can always pay to pollute, and so they don’t have to
turn the ship around. On the other hand, if you told me we’re going to have
60 to 80 percent reductions in emissions in the U.S. by 2050, and you really
believed that was set in stone, you would turn the ship around. You don’t
leave it to your CFO to manage your short position on allowances. You back
up the truck on R&D, you say carbon’s getting out of the system, and you
respond strategically.
So those are a few thoughts. I have written on these things, but that’s a summary.
As you can tell, I’m pretty passionate about the issue.
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finance
Let’s go on to talk about the role of finance. The first role I just covered – namely, if
we have a tactical response, it’s going to be great for Wall Street and finance because
it’s going to be all about managing your allowance position, trading, optimizing. You
wouldn’t want to go work on Initial Public Offerings (IPOs) and venture capital. If
the response is really going to be tactical, you may as well be an intermediary. It will
be very much like what we see today down in the negative cost end of the abatement
curve (see Figure 1), with people trying to do things that are trading-oriented.
A strategic response is a little different. Let’s say that we get to what I’m talking
about, which is a hard cap on emissions with a long-term trading system, and that
institutions really believe we’re going to take carbon out of the system. Finance is
absolutely critical in a couple of areas.
Think about capital allocation. Think about portfolio rebalancing. These aren’t
little things. You completely change the system. Portfolios are hugely exposed to fossil
fuels with no hedge whatsoever. There’s going to be capital that wants an exposure on
the other side of fossil fuels.
Emitters aren’t going to invent much. Look at the people who emit. Look at the
innovation of our electric utility industries or our auto industries. Nothing against
them, but these are not hotbeds of technological innovation. Somebody has to make
sure that capital goes through the food chain from the innovators to the emitters and
that portfolios get adjusted.
Think about capital allocation. Think about portfolio rebalancing. These
aren’t little things. You completely change the system. Portfolios are hugely
exposed to fossil fuels with no hedge whatsoever. There’s going to be
capital that wants an exposure on the other side of fossil fuels.
There is an awful lot in finance that needs to be done. I would just comment as an
aside that, in this space, I find that finance is way underweight in the policy area. When
you start talking about moving GDP around, you’re talking about big numbers, and
you have the economists, the scientists and the policy wonks saying we’re just going to
turn this over to a market. None of them are really markets people. Finance is really
needed to create a global carbon market, and we’re a long ways away from that.
What else on finance? Markets are going to have to be liquid, transparent, and
they’re going to have to have volatility that’s mostly abatement cost volatility, not
volatility driven by the system itself. For me to say that I really want a hard cap, then
I have to buy off on some of the work done by Denny Ellerman. You have to
acknowledge that if everything is going to move around and if this is going to be the
cheapest policy tool, these markets have to really operate. They have to be liquid. They
probably can’t be like the commodity markets are today, where nobody knows what
people are trading; all the trading is currently upstairs and no one knows what’s going
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on. You can’t have volatility induced by the system. Volatility should mean that the
markets are volatile because someone just got a really good chilled ammonia solution
for flue gas for coal. That should move the market. Not some trade that someone did
upstairs and nobody has any idea who the counterparties were or what happened.
Markets are going to have to be liquid, transparent, and they’re going to
have to have volatility that’s mostly abatement cost volatility, not volatility
driven by the system itself.
Thinking about that kind of marketplace, it’s going to take a lot of finance and all
the skills related to finance to have that happen.
Derivatives
Derivatives are going to be really important here, so let’s take some examples.
Derivatives is a bad word, and certainly not a word to use in Washington. Jake Jacoby
at MIT once said, when I was talking about volatility, that they have a really good rule
of thumb on volatility – don’t use the word. Don’t use it, the V word. Don’t even say
it in Washington, D.C.
Let’s consider an emitter and let’s think about something people don’t talk about
much: asset duration. If we were talking about PCs and the life cycle was 18 months,
that would have a different risk characteristic than capital stock that lasts for 50 years.
Let’s take an emitter who says, “Look, I think I have some good abatement
technologies; I have a few things that are in a pilot phase and I think by 2015, I’m
going to be long allowances, not short. But I’m not sure, and my clientele doesn’t like
a lot of risk; it’s going to hurt my stock price – not over the long-term, but at least
near term.” The idea of buying out-of-the-money call options on allowances arguably
might cause you to make a more efficient decision about that 50 year capital stock
than you would if you didn't have any protection. The idea of risk management and
tools for risk management are very important here. Every emitter, day one, is short
allowances.
They may immediately say, “No I’m not, I’m long; I’ve got all this low-hanging
fruit down here.” But ultimately they face it: people don’t like to be short things. The
idea of derivatives is really important.
Auction mechanisms
Another example is the application of auctions in a cap-and-trade system. I think
people envisioned expanding something like Kyoto for the rest of the world, but it
only covers 8 percent of the world’s emissions. We might need something, particularly
in offsets markets, where auction mechanisms are used to price things like
deforestation, etc. It’s a really interesting field. It’s definitely the leading edge, and
again, another application of finance.
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Implications for finance
Does this matter for finance? How big is this? I can cautiously generate one number
by taking the world’s 45 billion tons of emissions today at European allowance prices
or a little less. Let’s take 30 U.S. dollars per ton, for example. This implies that we have
a value of the world’s emissions today of $1.35 trillion, which means that if we put out
10 years worth of allowances, that’s $13.5 trillion, or about the size of the U.S.
economy. That’s a really big number.
It’s not really that relevant because most of those allowances will be used by people
who need them, but with one-third of those 45 billion tons of emissions coming from
deforestation, methane, and other things that might enter a trading system
exogenously, there’s going to be more trading than you think. This is a very, very large
market.
With one-third of those 45 billion tons of emissions coming from
deforestation, methane, and other things that might enter a trading system
exogenously, there’s going to be more trading than you think. This is a very,
very large market.
Another way I like to think about finance in markets is to look at the U.S. Let’s say
we have 6 billion tons of emissions from burning fossil fuels and value that at $30 a
ton. That’s $180 billion dollars a year for a year’s worth of allowances. I talk to people
like the NCEP (National Commission on Energy Policy) that say we’ve got to auction
these allowances. 50 percent says NCEP. Some groups are now saying 100 percent.
And I say, okay, let’s do 50 percent. Let’s say that we set policy stringency that gives us
a $30 price and we auction off 10 years worth of allowances. Hmmm . . . That’s $180
billion for the full slice and $90 billion for half. Federal expenditures, excluding
transfer payments and interest, are about $1 trillion – so that’s 9 percent. That is huge.
Obviously I’m not the first one to point this out. MIT says we’re headed towards
roughly 15 percent of federal revenues being funded by carbon if we auction over
time, or even if we tax5. These are really big numbers. Again, all aspects of finance are
critical, and the amount of work done in the area of double-dividend or even double-
burden is light relative to what needs to happen for policy. And by light, I mean
within the U.S. Treasury Department.
market drivers and opportunities
When I think about market drivers, I really think about what you are going to do in
this business. Do you want to work in this field? Where are the opportunities? What’s
happening?  
Market drivers are the Pacala and Socolow wedges6, right? We all agree with that.
We all know what they are, and we all know there is no killer-application or silver
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bullet on the horizon that will give us energy without carbon emissions. It’s a bunch
of different things. You can debate how big each slice of the wedge is, but it’s a wedge.
What do you want to work on? 
Referring back to Figure 1, right now, as I alluded to earlier, all the activity is in the
negative abatement and low parts of the curve. Market drivers today are the Clean
Development Mechanism (CDM), which brings a $32 per ton price versus what it
costs for the cheapest tons, even the ones that have no additionality to the system.
These are things like solar, for example, where you spread around the tax benefits,
have a good power contract, and it’s completely securitizable. All the easy stuff.
What I’d encourage you to do is look through IPCC’s reports, consider the $100 a
ton by 2030 scenario, and look at where some of those things might come from.
They’re up in the higher parts of the curve. No one in my earlier prep session with
some of the students said, “Gee, I really want to work on coal – I really want to work
on clean coal and carbon capture and storage (CCS), and I want to work on retrofits,
on nuclear, or on deep geo-thermal.” The negative cost and lower parts of the curve
is more arbitrage-oriented. The game-changing part of the curve is really technology-
oriented.
When I think market drivers, I wouldn’t build your career down in the negative
abatement area. The higher parts of the curve are where the longer-term career will
be. If you believe we’re going to have a policy and you want to stay in this for a long
time, you can start down in the lower parts, but it’s going to go away quickly. The
people who are invested in the game-changing work are the ones who are going to
have the more interesting projects when there aren’t any more opportunities such as
lighting a match over methane in China and selling it for $32 a ton.
Intellectual property rights
The only other comment I want to make about market drivers and opportunities is
to say that there’s some debate about who’s going to invent things. Will it be the
public sector or the private sector? At Environmental Defense, we are heavily betting
on the private sector. This is really not going to be military industrial complex style
where the government funds it and figures out the answer – we can’t do synfuels
again. That’s how I started my career in the early '80’s.
If that’s the case, there are some things that are going to have to happen, like
intellectual property rights, for example, and protection of them globally. These are
going to be really important to the kinds of opportunities you might pursue. In other
words, are you inventing something for the 300 million people in the U.S. or for the
6 billion people on the planet? Obviously, the answer lies somewhere in between. If
you can have real intellectual property protection when you invent something and
spread it over all abatements globally, it gets really exciting, and you invest a lot more
capital.
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In other words, are you inventing something for the 300 million people in
the U.S. or for the 6 billion people on the planet? Obviously, the answer lies
somewhere in between. If you can have real intellectual property
protection when you invent something and spread it over all abatements
globally, it gets really exciting, and you invest a lot more capital.
I’m going to stop there for the moment and take some questions. I’ll finish with a
brief wrap-up on careers afterwards.
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Question and Answer Session
QUESTION 1: Energy conservation
I think rather than relying on technology to accomplish much of the abatement in the
lower parts of your curve (see figure 1), you have an even larger opportunity in energy
conservation. I wonder why you didn’t include that; it’s the low-hanging fruit of that piece.
Conservation is implicit in everything I’ve said, so I’d be indifferent. I think the
shape of the conservation curve probably has a lot down at the bottom before it starts
rising so yes, absolutely. Matter of fact, it’s important to be agnostic about solutions.
Once you have a market, a hard cap, and a price, it doesn’t matter, for example, if the
abatement comes from carbon capture and storage (CCS) or one of my favorite ideas
— that anybody who wants a franchise that puts a wire into your home or even to have
Spectrum Cable has to basically tell you about your power usage. You ought to be able,
while you’re recording Grey’s Anatomy, to say, “I’ll take the brown out option next
month on my power bill.” There are all kinds of things, but which of those win? I just
don’t want the government to pick winners. I don’t want somebody to say that at $7.40,
that’s the answer, that’s what we should spend. I don’t want that. I want the market to
figure that out, and I have a feeling, like you, that efficiency will be integral. If I weren’t
doing this, one of the best businesses is working on sensors, monitoring information
systems for efficiency. I think it will just rip it up as an investment area with policy.
It’s important to be agnostic about solutions. There are all kinds of things,
but which of those win? I just don’t want the government to pick winners.
I want the market to figure that out, and I have a feeling, like you, that
efficiency will be integral.
QUESTION 2: Passing national carbon regulation
I’m really excited about the work that you did back in the '80’s when you realized there
wasn’t a lot of concern for this. Now we’ve seen Al Gore bring it to the mass media and a
lot of people are really looking into the potential for energy markets. There is concern and
I’m just curious — have you seen that, in the policy, people are willing to move this along?
Look, there are eight bills or so in Congress right now. I think we will have a bill
on the floor of the Senate. The Senate’s goal is to have one on the floor before the
United Nation’s Climate Change Conference in Bali7, so that’s very ambitious. There’s
a lot of activity, and it ebbs and flows. The House of Representatives was really active
in the spring and then it slowed down. The Senate wasn’t doing much. Now the
Senate, led by the Lieberman-Warner bill, is racing like crazy. Does that mean we’ll
have signed legislation this administration? Most would say no. Will the bills that
make it through to the floor be the standard for the next administration? Maybe, they
might be. I think they’ll matter.
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Conference of the Parties
(COP) to the UNFCCC (United
Nations Framework
Convention on Climate
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Indonesia from the December
3 to December 15, 2007
I don’t really see any of the presidential candidates who will fight this. I think we
will have legislation. The key now is this road block issue of sticking your finger in all
the holes of the dike. Lots of tons leak out of the policy all the time and you’ve got to
put them back in. One day last spring someone came up with the idea: let’s have an
off ramp. We’ll do the policy and after a given number of years, we’ll blow it up with
a grenade if China isn’t in. That would really limit investment in clean technologies.
I think it’s not about the will necessarily. Now it’s about dealing with these road
blocks.
QUESTION 3: Most effective carbon legislation 
I have a question related to the bills. Bingaman, for instance, has a $12 cap which I think
almost turns into a tax, but I think you were saying that it is also upstream. So do you
have an opinion on which of the bills are most effective? Bingaman has the benefit of
being upstream but also undermines that benefit with that $12 versus the other bills. Is
there one that Environmental Defense Fund or you are currently favoring?
That’s a great question, and another one I have to say thank you for asking. We
favor the most stringent bill possible, so we don’t back a specific bill. What we have
backed officially is the U.S. Climate Action Partnership (USCAP) statement which
calls for 60 to 80 percent reductions by 2050, an economy-wide cap-and-trade system,
and as broad a use of offsets domestically as is feasible, without a safety valve.
Although the USCAP statement refers to a safety valve, it says that any safety valve
could impair the integrity of the hard cap.
What we would say about Bingaman is that you can set a policy stringency that will
allow the market to actually trade below the safety valve price, but at $12 that’s not a
very stringent policy. We adamantly do not support it and furthermore, we believe
that any level of policy stringency that we support will turn Bingaman into a carbon
tax at $12. You know very well that the most common price path out there to preserve
an option of two degrees would be about $40 from 2010-2050 up to $100 by 2030.
That would be MIT’s 167bmt case8 and the most stringent policy would be from
IPCC. Similar results would come from any of the models you look at.
I don’t like to throw those numbers around because, again, the people who write
those models will say that we can't model all this capital that will come in. The upside
for coal alone is enormous. It’s so big that a lot of capital will come in, and if that
capital produces new technologies, it changes everything. Even though we’re not
modeling that, I’d still say at $12, you pass Bingaman right now with carbon trading
at $32 or equivalent in Europe for 2008 to 2012 and trading at $40 plus for the trades
in 2013 (and there are people trading for 2013), which is a trade based on expectation
of a policy. What does the U.S. look like? It looks like there’s only so much it wants to
spend. It’s really that simple.
Now, 5 percent real appreciation in Bingaman is nice. It’s helpful, but it’s still price-
based policy. Let’s talk about that 5 percent appreciation. I happen to know, since I did
this simple math on my calculator, it would take 19 years for Bingaman to get to $30
a ton, which is a level frequently discussed for carbon capture and storage (CCS). Is
that enough to stimulate that investment? It will lead to a tactical response where
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emitters say, “Well, I know I’m good at $12. Yes, I’ve got to do something, but I’m not
going to turn the whole firm around, and my shareholders wouldn’t like it if I did.”
QUESTION 4: Coal and nuclear 
You’ve mentioned clean coal, CCS, and nuclear as fitting into the areas you think are
most interesting. Can you give us your current projected vision for how you see those
playing out into the different bills that are being proposed and the sorts of proposals you
all are supporting? If people are saying they want to move from renewables to coal, what’s
it going to look like in your view?
Another question I’m glad you asked. I wouldn’t say I’m in support of those, so
why do I say those two things? I say them for a couple reasons. I want to encourage
people to understand that they have to get their hands dirty to solve this problem.
There isn’t a killer application, and I’m not advocating nuclear. Almost every student
that I talked to before this session said he was going to work in renewables. Well that’s
great, but we’re not going to get to under 15 billion tons by 2050 globally if all the great
minds from schools like Yale go work on renewables. There are actually quite a few
people already working on them.
Just get your hands dirty. Think about big, tough engineering and think about
things that aren’t going to make you a buck today. I say it as a provocateur, but I also
say it politically. The best analysis of policy out there is MIT’s Report 1469, which you
might be aware of if you’re a policy geek. What it says about the coal industry is that
there is a certain amount of coal production now, and when we implement policy the
coal industry basically takes a 15 year vacation. Coal then returns to levels larger than
today’s once we have CCS technology by around 2030.
Well, you know what? Rick Boucher runs the sub-committee for John Dingle that
has to sign off on legislation. What’s the number one industry in Rick Boucher’s
district? Coal. It’s in Virginia. The mines flood and the workers leave the
communities. You can’t sort of leave it hanging and say we’ll just take a 15 year
vacation; the coal industry cannot take a 15 year vacation. Therefore I say coal because
politically you’ve got people advocating the making of coal into gasoline – coal to
liquids, which gives you the privilege of driving your car and emitting twice the
greenhouse gases. When you have people saying, “Energy security is the issue, forget
climate; we want to put coal in our cars,” then you’ve got to get into clean coal.
You also have China, which has obviously much higher coal intensity than we do.
If we want China to get in, somehow, some way, without talking about coal, then we
have some issues. I really do it as a provocateur. I apologize for any confusion I caused
in that, but I think it’s a framework worth thinking about, both from a career
standpoint and from a policy standpoint.
QUESTION 5: Tax, cap-and-trade, and stringency
I have a question regarding carbon tax versus emission trading. Some policy experts
suggest that a carbon tax would be more successful at minimizing the amount of carbon
in the atmosphere over the long-term. Also, what do you think in regards to postponing
the adoption of a carbon policy with a more stringent policy versus adopting the best
policy that we have at the moment?
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There’s a carbon tax price that will be stringent. We all know, obviously, the beauty
is in the details. Let’s go to the last part of your question first, about stringent versus
non-stringent and then get back to price versus quantity. It depends to some extent
whether you believe we have this higher risk of a bad outcome. The way I put it is that
if you want lenient policy, what you’re really saying in Economics 101 language is that
we want to be able to spend more money on butter, even though we know we might
need the guns to fight a war. Do you want to spend a lot of money on butter and then
find out you needed the guns?
In some places you’d say,“Yes, I want my butter. I want to consume and I don’t want
to buy the guns until the last minute, until I know I need them.” Well, what if when
you need them they’re not there, and what if the risk you’re talking about is truly
catastrophic. You buy homeowner’s insurance even though your house is very unlikely
to burn down, but even if it does burn down and you didn’t insure, you could probably
still find a place to live. But catastrophic climate risk is very different than other risks
– it can’t be rectified. I have a hard time with lenient policy from that standpoint.
You buy homeowner’s insurance even though your house is very unlikely to
burn down, but even if it does burn down and you didn’t insure, you could
probably still find a place to live. But catastrophic climate risk is very
different than other risks – it can’t be rectified. I have a hard time with
lenient policy from that standpoint.
The other concern is how you get the guns. I’m not smart enough to say that I
know where these tipping points are, but I do know businesses. I’ve worked with
General Electric Company (GE) a lot; I talked to Google a lot, who I worked with
taking public. I know these businesses. I think that there’s a point in quantity-based
regulation where they say, “Look, if carbon is coming out of the system and you get a
lot of capital deployed, the risk is that you bought guns when you could have bought
butter.” At that point you pull back in the policy and you say, “Damn it, we have all
this clean coal. What a waste! Let’s just burn the old stuff. It’s a lot cheaper and it was
more fun. Just light the match, pulverize coal, and let it rip.” To me, that’s a pretty high
class problem. The other one doesn’t look so high class. Why do you have businesses
standing up and saying 60 to 80 percent reduction? Utilities are saying it. Oil
companies are saying it. I find it hard to respond to that sentiment. What they’re really
saying is, “We invest in very long life assets; this is coming. Just tell us the rules and let
us innovate; we’ll solve the problem.” That doesn’t bring us to $12 a ton in my mind.
QUESTION 6: Carbon taxes and avoided deforestation in carbon policy
A couple people have touched upon my two questions, but I’m going to go a little further.
The first one is with respect to price versus quantity. Last semester I wrote a paper looking
at taxes versus caps and talked to staffers on the Hill. I surveyed about 25 staffers, and
they all said that hands down, a tax would be the most efficient way to move forward on
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carbon. Then I asked if their boss would vote for that. And they said no, definitely not. So
I think, though Representative Dingell and others are thinking about having taxes, the
political feasibility angle is a really important one to think about. How does that play into
Environmental Defense Fund’s thought processes and their policy stance.
Secondly, looking at a lot of the bills right now on carbon, Lieberman-Warner is the
only one that really goes into avoided deforestation issues in terms of offsets and potential
offsets. Do you think that’s something that should be incorporated into U.S. policy at this
point, or should we wait until that is decided the UN Climate Change Conference in Bali? 
The latter question would take about an hour to answer, but I’ll try to give you a
quick one. The simple answer on tax versus cap-and-trade is to ask why the staffers
would say that. I’ve been in capital markets my whole life. Carbon markets are
complicated. They’re hard to understand.
I find the whole carbon tax discussion a bit odd because if you’re talking about the
tax versus auctioning allowances, you’re really talking about a fixed price signal versus
one that the market determines, and you better figure out what to do with the money
– either cut taxes or the government spends. This decision is the double-dividend or
double-burden issue. Simply put, if you raise taxes on a bad thing (carbon) and cut
taxes on good things (labor or capital), you get a double-dividend from climate policy
which means that you help the environment and you make the economy more
productive. If the government spends the money then the economy gets less productive.
In terms of the deforestation portion of your question, as you know 7 or 8 billion of
the 45 billion tons today are from deforestation. That’s a deceiving number because the
tons don’t grow as fast and they’re not going to be eliminated, but the argument is that
if the cost curve of deforestation has a different shape than the rest of the curve,
particularly if it’s low in the early years, it obviously makes the price of carbon less and
it helps the environment. Of course you want them in, provided you can monitor them.
Would we want it in right away? Yes, absolutely, we’d want it in right away, but we
don’t underestimate some of the complexities of dealing with basically a dualopoly of
sellers in Brazil and Indonesia. Monitoring is complex. What will be done if some
tons turn out to default, meaning that you said a ton was a ton and it was 90 percent
of a ton? The satellite technology is available, but is currently part of a cancelled
budget for NASA. There are some complexities, but doing the cheapest abatement
first makes the process more efficient and deforestation will do that. That’s a long way
of saying yes, we want it, and we know there are complexities, and we’re working on
ways to get around them.
Even if deforestation is not in cap-and-trade, it could be in a compensated
reduction scheme, in some kind of a foreign aid payment, or also in some kind of an
auction process. There are plenty of ways to get it into the system, and it should be
brought in.
QUESTION 7: Financial market reaction to proposed U.S. carbon legislation
Where do you look to see how financial markets respond to what’s happening in
Washington? I know that all the major environmental groups had nice things to say
about Warner-Lieberman, notwithstanding that it covers 70 percent of the economy, etc.
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Where do you look to see the financial markets reacting? Are they reacting? Do you see
any leap in the call option price in Europe for 2013? Or is it too soon to see the financial
markets reacting to that kind of change in Washington?
The financial markets are reacting, absolutely. Not the big dollars, but the markets are
reacting. You’ll see an article in Bloomberg magazine this month (I know because I’m in
it). The article will talk about a company owned by First Reserve called Blue Source that
is basically buying up cheap abatement – not to sell in CDM and not to sell on the
Chicago Climate Exchange (CCX), but rather, to be long tons at a reasonable price.
Think about that. I talked before about portfolios and the like. If I told you right
now that you could buy a portfolio of the bottom end of the abatement curve for $2
or $3 and, if it’s really diversified, would you pay $10 a ton for a very diversified
portfolio? I would. If you pay $10 a ton and if half of it was included you effectively
paid $20 a ton. If we have a carbon price like what we see in Europe, and it happens
within five years, then that’s a great return. People have already gotten on to that.
Let me talk about two of the dynamics: one good one and one not so good one.
Down in the bottom part of the abatement curve (see figure 1) is a not so good one.
I know a bunch of the big hedge fund players and it’s just too good to play the CDM
stuff. Why do the heavy lifting? Why hire engineers? Why learn about new
technology? The cheap stuff is so damn good. In a way that’s a distraction from the
big stuff, but a very lucrative distraction. That will come.
The good development is disclosure. Because of Kyoto, because of shareholder
response, and because of what’s happening in Congress, companies, by and large big
multi-nationals, have developed greenhouse gas registries. They already keep score. To
the extent that you get what you measure, they’re measuring it. That already creates
momentum on Wall Street to think about who’s got what – who’s long and who’s short.
By short allowances I mean that, in some policy, you don’t have a lot of good options and
you’re short tons of abatement. In what companies is that short or long position reflected
or not reflected in their stock price today? That’s already there. So those things are good.
conclusion
Let me wrap up. I’ll just make a comment on the career side. I think a lot of people
mentioned investing as the place where they want to be in this. I think that’s a good
thing. I think private equity and hedge funds are the hot space; there’s no question
about that. There are people out there like us at Environmental Defense Fund who
are looking for a very stringent policy in something global. If that happens, it will free
up a lot of the tougher opportunities. Imagine yourself in your career – whether as a
principal, an agent, a service provider, or a policy maker – and think about where you
fit into that big eighty-five percent reduction from business as usual in tons. Think
about what your role in that is.
The good news is there are lots of roles. The thing you have to challenge yourself
on is looking ahead to what it’s going to look like and picking out a role that has
sustainability.
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Funding Solutions to Climate Change:
A Philanthropy Panel
James Gustave Speth, Yale School of Forestry & Environmental Studies (Moderator);
Stewart Hudson, Emily Hall Tremaine Foundation; Michael Northrop, Rockefeller
Brothers Fund; Ted Smith, Henry P. Kendall Foundation
editors’ remarks
This presentation occupies a unique space in our series, providing an inside view of
how the foundation world is responding to the challenge of climate change. The
actions of the three distinguished panelists indicate that “yes,” it is responding,
and responding mostly through highly strategic efforts that work to build from the
base of the pyramid.
Nonetheless, the prevailing sentiment is that more needs to be done and that
foundations generally don’t realize how much is at stake with the climate issue.
This, of course, is not a sentiment solely applicable to the foundation world for, as
Ted Smith points out, “People tend to move and to act in the face of perceived
danger or perceived losses. We’re talking about a time span here that is very hard
to bring front and center in terms of the immediacy of what’s going on.” A greater
sense of urgency and responsibility is, however, felt by this panel, as typified by
Michael Northrop’s comment that “I just don’t think there’s a way to be too radical
about what we need to do on climate change.”
Though it doesn’t dispel the adage that “if you’ve met one foundation, you’ve
met one foundation”, this chapter does fulfill Stewart Hudson’s hope that we
“learn a lot about foundations here.” The audience was grateful for the directness
with which this panel spoke, and moderator Gus Speth’s closing words are still
fitting months afterwards, “let’s thank the panel for their wisdom and their
candor.”* 
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introductory context
Ted Smith: I didn’t want to create a new organization. It’s awfully hard to start from
the ground up. And yet, climate change was something that I thought touched every
sector of society. It was not an environmental issue in our judgment. We were faced
with making a judgment early on that, in fact, the climate issue was going to be a
broad-ranging issue. As a result, we went ahead and created a new organization at
that time and named it Clean Air-Cool Planet.
That organization has now grown to the point where it has a $2 million annual
budget. One of its distinguishing hallmarks is that there are now over 800 colleges
and universities that are using its computer program to calculate their carbon
footprints. In creating a new organization, we hoped to begin to get the word out in
such a way that people would begin to notice that there is change going on and begin
to see how that change can be measured.
We also thought tactically that if we started in New England with a grassroots
approach – this comes from a reflection on the American political system – and if we
were able to build a base in New England for a climate change lobby of some kind
through our delegation in Washington, we would ultimately begin to affect national
policy. We had a strategy to begin at the base and work toward a national policy. I think
what you’ll find out from the other presentations on this panel is that we all three share
a common concept that the American political system can be built from the base to
influence national policy. If you need one marker to ask yourself if that is the right
strategy, ask yourself how much Al Gore was able to do for eight years in the White
House without that backing from below. My answer to that would be very, very little.
It’s interesting to see, now that he’s not in the White House, what he’s been able to do.
I think what you’ll find out from the other presentations on this panel is
that we all three share a common concept that the American political
system can be built from the base to influence national policy. If you need
one marker to ask yourself if that is the right strategy, ask yourself how
much Al Gore was able to do for eight years in the White House without
that backing from below. My answer to that would be very, very little. It’s
interesting to see, now that he’s not in the White House, what he’s been
able to do.
Another thing we did was to put a stake in the ground early in 2003 and say, “We’re
going to do green school construction throughout New England.” Why? Strategy-
wise, what institution really matters in communities? Well, there are several. There
are churches, schools, city offices, and so on. We thought that schools would be a very
influential place to begin an introduction of climate and also, as we saw energy prices
going up, of energy concerns.
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In this case we borrowed from California's high performance schools that had
already established, to a great extent, how to go about this. We decided to move that
strategy to New England and adapt it for New England. We then found that each state
is adapting this strategy to suit its particular purposes. Again, the strategy behind
that, and from the perspective of a foundation that is proactive, was to see if we
couldn’t influence the broader community at the grassroots level in terms of where
the world was going.
Another thing that we did was to put a stake in the ground early in 2001 and
say, “We’re going to do green school construction throughout New England.”
Why? Strategy-wise, what institution really matters in communities? We
thought that schools would be a very influential place to begin an introduction
of climate. Again, the strategy behind that, and from the perspective of a
foundation that is proactive, was to see if we couldn’t influence the broader
community at the grassroots level in terms of where the world was going.
We soon found a young man named Billy Parish who had stepped out of his
curriculum at Yale and had decided that climate change was going to be a really
important subject for the future. We picked him up with a small amount of funding
at that time, and he’s gone on to do really wonderful things in terms of a nationwide
climate challenge that some of you (will) know about. That’s rank opportunism.
When an opportunity came along, we just picked up on it.
We have now, as a foundation, become totally 100 percent climate and energy
focused. We’ve done that over the last three years. We moved in that direction and
persuaded our trustees to do that because we saw no greater issue before the century
and before the body politic than the climate/energy issue. I’m saying climate/energy
because a lot of where you get to climate is through energy policy.
We have now, as a foundation, become totally 100 percent climate energy
focused. We moved in that direction and persuaded our trustees to do that
because we saw no greater issue before the century and before the body
politic than the climate/energy issue. And I’m saying climate/energy
because a lot of where you get to climate is through energy policy.
Just to tell you a story, today the lead editorial in the Boston Globe was about the
electricity grid of New England that provides electricity for the six New England
states. Ratepayers had been taxed to build a fund of some $5 billion to be able to
supply electricity so that the lights in this room don’t go off. We got in there two years
ago by funding five organizations which have been referred to as “junkyard dogs.”
They were the best NGOs (non-governmental organizations) working on energy in
New England and they went after the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission to see
if we couldn’t get into the bidding on that $5 billion for demand side reductions. It’s
one thing to increase supply, which is what presumably the fund was going to do, but
we said, “We can make that easier and not have you build new coal fired plants if we
can wedge into that and promise to deliver reductions in the demand for energy.” We
were successful in that. The bidding has gone on, and the lead editorial in the Boston
Globe today touted the fact that demand side reduction is now a part of the equation.
Here’s a case where a foundation got in early and was able to make some kind of
change that matters.
One other thing that I’ve learned strategy-wise is that energy is its own field. There
are very few foundations in our entire nation that have any energy competence. It’s a
specialty. Until I could hire a Vice President, which I did, with deep business side
energy experience as well as public experience in renewables, we couldn’t be valid to
play a real role in energy.
I should take one minute now to say what we’re doing in Cambridge,
Massachusetts. This is innovative in a sense. We’re trying to make Cambridge a model
for the nation by implementing a massive energy reduction scheme that we have
established through a new NGO, the Cambridge Energy Alliance. Two innovations are
a part of this. One is a city-wide campaign that will take place over the next four or
five years, neighborhood by neighborhood, almost mimicking a political campaign, to
cause people to register the fact that they can reduce energy consumption.
The second part is leveraging private finance. We have invested $250,000 in this to
create the new institution. We are hoping to leverage as much as $100 million into
Cambridge alone through private financing for investments in energy efficiency. Why
energy efficiency? It is the low hanging fruit in terms of emission reductions at this
time. Renewables are coming along, and they will come along, but it’s going to be a
long and slow process in many cases. Energy efficiency is right there to be tackled in
the major urban centers, municipalities, and in the universities, for that matter, as
Yale can demonstrate.
Why energy efficiency? It is the low hanging fruit in terms of emission
reductions at this time. Energy efficiency is right there to be tackled in the
major urban centers, municipalities, and in the universities.
Let me come to the end of my introduction by articulating the two major themes
of climate change, and then we can hear from the other panelists and from the
audience through questions.
One of the major themes is mitigation – reducing greenhouse gases. You’ll hear
much more about that. It seems to me that if we are able to come to a regulated
market, both domestically and internationally, my own behavior ultimately will be
affected in terms of the kind of car I buy, the kind of fuel I buy, and so on. Daily life
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is going to be impacted by a regulated energy economy that pushes the price of
carbon way beyond where it is now. I’m happy that the market is going to make major
inroads on that side.
For the second major component of climate change – adaptation – there is no
market mechanism that’s going to handle very easily what is already forecast to come
down the road in terms of changes. There’s going to be chaos. I could mention Katrina
as one example, not necessarily attributing it to climate change, but giving you a sense
that we’ve really got a challenge. That challenge will play out in many different ways, and
it will play out at a pace that is faster than any of us imagined, I think. I’m speculating
now, and the speculation goes this way – the change that’s coming in human disease, in
hydrological systems (that is, fresh water), in forests, in agriculture and crops, and in a
variety of other things, is going to be faster than we are able to encompass in our
traditional research designs and protocols. My belief is that we’re going to need ways to
monitor this faster change and ways to get feedback loops working into adaptation that
we simply don’t have available today. We do have interactive technology in a way we
didn’t, however, and there are ways to get feedback that we didn’t previously have. What
we don’t have, I’m afraid, are the governmental structures at all levels that will allow us
to nimbly respond to those changes as quickly as we must.
For the second major component of climate change – adaptation – there is
no market mechanism that’s going to handle very easily what is already
forecast to come down the road in terms of changes. There’s going to be
chaos. I could mention Katrina in that chaos as one example, not necessarily
attributing it to climate change, but giving you a sense that we’ve really got
a challenge.
I’ll leave it right there just to give you a sense that we’re working on the frontiers
and that we don’t have answers to a lot of the questions that are coming along, but
we’re biting into them.
Michael Northrop: With climate change – just a little issue – it’s hard to know
where to start, actually. I came to the foundation community out of the NGO
community, where I had to fundraise and had gotten to know foundations a little bit.
I ran and helped grow an organization for six years called Ashoka, which is a
phenomenal organization. Its founder is a Yale Law School graduate, Bill Drayton,
who some of you may even know about. He’s become kind of famous. It’s amazing.
For such a shy and unusual guy to have become such a famous man is, I think, really
striking, and it’s the power of his ideas that make that happen.
I left because we were having a baby and I couldn’t travel six months anymore, and
I thought, I should go to graduate school. I went and, while there, became interested
in the environment. I had previously been interested in it, but I was never a card
carrying member of Greenpeace or anything like that as a kid. I was 32 years old or
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so after becoming a late graduate student, and started realizing that I was writing all
my papers about the environment and trade, the environment and economics, and
the environment and politics. I thought, well, this is telling me something. I tried to
think about where to go and what to do, and I knew about these weird foundations
because I had had to raise money from them. I thought that would be a great gig – I
could go out and do cool stuff and not have to raise money. That would be great. If
only I could find a foundation that would be proactive and let me go do stuff and
provide the capital so I could do it.
Luckily, I hit the foundation community just at a moment when I think, at least in
the environmental field, we were making a shift from a very academic focus where
there were a lot of PhDs running programs to people who were activists and had
come out of the NGO community. It was just pure luck, and I managed to convince
the foundation president at the time, a guy named Colin Campbell who was the
president of Wesleyan University in Connecticut before he came to the Rockefeller
Brothers Fund (RBF), to let me be a proactive grantmaker.
In the early days at the RBF, I thought of myself as a kind of a plant in the
foundation world; I’m really an NGO guy. Now, 15 years later, I’ve been doing it for a
while and I guess I’m really a foundation guy. I do still feel like it is a very unusual
opportunity to go out, make things happen, create opportunities, and to be proactive.
We are not one of those foundations that waits for the mail to come in and opens it
up and says, “Yes, No, Yes, No.” I think that’s the conventional wisdom about what
foundations do. I guess we’re an example of one that does not do that.
When I got to the RBF, amazingly there was a preexisting interest in climate
change. The RBF had had the foresight in the mid-1980s to start exploring the issue,
and I think laid the groundwork, to some degree, for the UNCED meeting in Rio1 in
1992. It was a pretty significant accomplishment that was achieved with a couple of
hundred thousand dollars over a few years.
I learned about all of that after I got there. The program was fairly broad-based
when I arrived, and I made it even more broad-based, thinking I wanted to work on
everything. We did landscape conservation, forestry, marine conservation, trade and
the environment – a whole bunch of stuff – and we did that for about ten years. Then
about five years ago, we realized that of everything we were working on, probably the
major, major threat to everything was climate change. We needed to be devoting
every dollar that we had and every ounce of our resources to climate change to try to
make sure that marine resources, forest resources, large ecosystems, and everything
else didn’t go to hell. We had been working on climate change, but it was incremental
and it was up and down, and it wasn’t that significant, frankly.
About five years ago, we realized that of everything we were working on,
probably the major, major threat to everything was climate change. We
made the very conscious decision to just take every dollar we could muster
and move it to climate change.
The program that I now administer is essentially a climate change program. We
still call it the “sustainable development program,” but it really is a climate change
program. We have some grants that still live in these other spaces where we used to
work, but essentially everything is climate.
If I had to define what we’re doing, I’d say we have two goals and four strategies.
Goal number one is to create a global system to deal with this problem of climate
change. That’s kind of a big goal, and we do work on that in all kinds of ways. But goal
number two is really where we’re spending our time, and that is that we need a U.S.
federal response to climate change. We can’t get an international response to climate
change that deals with it in a meaningful way unless we get U.S. federal policy on
climate change.
That’s really what we’re trying to do. It’s a terrifying prospect because I hate the
idea that we’re dependent on what Washington does. It’s just misery to think that
that’s where we have to spend our time. And more and more over the last five years,
we’ve been getting closer and closer to actually working in Washington itself.
We need a U.S. federal response to climate change. We can’t get an
international response to climate change that deals with it in a meaningful
way unless we get U.S. federal policy on climate change.
The four strategies get us to Washington, but we’re only just getting there now after
five years. It’s hard to even know what the order is of these strategies because they
really all intersect. Nonetheless, the first strategy is to make the case that climate
action is economically possible, even beneficial. That’s to counter the myth – and it
is a myth – that if you take any action on climate change, you’re going to ruin the
economy. That may be the major thing that holds us back from taking action on
climate change politically. If you’re a politician and you’re going to do something that’s
going to harm the economy, you’re going to lose your job. You can’t do that. Politicians
are very scared of the charge that somehow they’re going to hurt the economy. And
business leaders are in exactly the same position. If you’re a CEO and you’re going to
hurt your bottom line results this quarter, you’re going to lose your job. Your
shareholders are going to get really angry at you, so you’re not going to do it.
In a busy world where people don’t have time to think very hard about a big,
complicated issue and hear over and over that climate action is going to hurt the
bottom line or hurt the economy, they don’t do anything. That’s been the case for a
long time. But as you look around over the last 10 to 12 years of experience, you realize
that, in fact, a lot of people somehow, even despite the fear that they were going to
hurt the economy, took action. When you look at what they did, whether it’s the few
federal governments, state and provincial governments, cities, or companies, every
single one of those categories is represented by leaders who have been able to take
action, reduce emissions substantially, and do it in an economically beneficial way.
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In a busy world where people don’t have time to think very hard about a
big, complicated issue and hear over and over that climate action is going
to hurt the bottom line or hurt the economy, they don’t do anything. That’s
been the case for a long time. But as you look around over the last 10 to 12
years of experience, you realize that, in fact, a lot of people somehow, even
despite the fear that they were going to hurt the economy, took action –
leaders who have been able to take action, reduce emission substantially,
and do it in an economically beneficial way.
When we began to figure that out, we thought that we ought to tell that story
because when you tell that story, you make action more politically possible. We’ve
done that over and over again. Someone is here from The Climate Group. We created
that organization five years ago essentially because we needed a voice out there saying
that it’s possible to take action on climate and do it in an economically beneficial way.
We’ve worked with many other organizations to make that case. In every other
aspect of our climate change grantmaking, we make sure that this is an integral part.
Unfortunately, the environmental community doesn’t spend a lot of time in the
economy; they spend a lot of time in the environment. It’s a problem, because they
keep losing politically and it’s because they just don’t work in the economy. Making the
economic case is an incredibly important part of what we do and I’ve got to say we
don’t do enough of it. We need a lot more of it because it is still the number one issue
that’s going to stop us from getting an effective climate policy in the United States.
Our second major strategy has been supporting sub-federal action on climate
change. We’ve done a lot of work with states, but also with cities. You may not know
it, but there are almost 30 states in this country with comprehensive climate plans.
They’re not all implementing them, but it’s the first step. In the analysis that they’ve
done, they’ve been able to show that they can reduce emissions substantially while
saving money and generating economic opportunity. These are Republican and
Democratic governors saying this across the United States.
We have been supporting sub-federal action on climate change. You may
not know it, but there are almost 30 states in this country with
comprehensive climate plans that they have built. There are more than 800
mayors in this country who have committed to taking action on climate
change to a level that would get them to the Kyoto commitment.
We’ve also worked a lot with cities. There are more than 800 mayors in this
country who have committed to taking action on climate change to a level that would
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get them to the Kyoto commitment, which specifies a 7 percent reduction below 1990
levels. A lot of them are just getting started, but they’re all talking about it. It’s very
politically significant to have this group of mayors that people trust saying those
things, and in many cases taking steps to reduce emissions.
We’re now working hard to try to figure out what we can do to make sure that those
experiences, at the state level in particular but also at the city level, get integrated into
federal policy-making in this country. Unfortunately, in Washington there’s very little
conversation about how to integrate state action with federal policy – they’re two
parallel tracks, and we’ve got to somehow find a way to get them together.
Our third strategy has been to develop the non-environmental constituency call
for action on climate. We’ve felt for some time that the climate issue has been locked
inside the environment box. In part it’s because the environmental community has
done such a great job of really raising the issue. Unfortunately in America today, the
environmental community does not rule the roost and cannot make federal policy by
itself, and in fact, can do harm in many parts of the country if they are the ones
carrying the flag.
For the last three or four years, we’ve worked very hard to support non-
environmental voices that can carry the flag on climate change. Among them are the
evangelicals and admirals and generals – you probably saw the report last year of the
admirals and generals.2 I think it’s one of the most significant things that’s happened
in the national political debate on climate change. Business leaders, like the ones who
work with CERES, are also now out front on the issue. So are investors. The renewable
energy industry is already a $60 billion industry in America and has real political heft.
Mayors, women, builders, labor are out there too. This broad array of non-green
interests has made an important difference politically in America on climate. Getting
these constituencies into the game, building the political diversity that we need in the
country, has been a big part of what we’ve been doing.
Our fourth and last strategy has been to try to take all those pieces and put them
together and build an effective national campaign that will really drive the issue
towards a successful federal policy conclusion. And boy, that’s the complicated part.
That’s the part that’s really dependent on Washington, and that’s where we are now.
It’s a really tough place to be.
There are some good signs. There is a new organization called 1Sky,3 which you
should all look at . . . I think 1Sky is the only organization in the country today that
aspires to be a kind of choreographer of all the public voices on this issue. We need a
heck of a lot more of it, and we need to find a way to get the environmental
community folded in, in a way that they’re not threatened, and to get the business
community in, and many, many others.
And maybe, just maybe, we’ll have a President in six months or so who will really
get it, and who will really want to lead on this issue. That is probably the key thing. If
any of you can do anything to push on presidential candidates, do it. That’s really
important because all those other building blocks of a successful federal policy will be
meaningless if we have another George Bush in the White House or a President who
is intimidated into not taking action.
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The last strategy is to try to take all those pieces and put them together and
build an effective national campaign that will really drive the issue towards
a successful federal policy conclusion. And boy, that’s the complicated part.
That’s the part that’s really dependent on Washington, and that’s where we
are now. It’s a really tough place to be.
So that’s kind of how we are thinking about it. It’s very holistic and systemic. We
can’t do any of that well enough to make a difference on our own – it’s only through
the efforts of lots of others that it will make a difference.
Stewart Hudson: You’ve been patient, so I’ll be brief. I’m really curious as to what
brought you out this evening. You could be home making dinner and getting ready for
“American Idol” or whatever is on tonight. So please, think about that in your
questions. I’d really like to know what makes people interested in attending these talks.
I also know that if I were to sit up here and tell you how smart we are or how smart
I am at the Emily Hall Tremaine Foundation, then, because I know too many of you
in the audience, you’d call me on it. Hopefully we can exchange what we do know
about foundation work and climate. And in that regard, I want to thank Yale for
pulling this group together. Earlier, Gus Speth mentioned an article that he wrote in
1981, which ironically is the year I graduated from Yale. I can tell you I wasn’t thinking
about climate at that time. I didn’t even know what climate and energy were. Like
Michael, I wasn’t an environmentalist. I doubt there’s a student on campus today who
doesn’t know something about climate change, and therein lies hope.
1981 came and went, and I became gainfully employed and took a job at the
National Wildlife Federation. In 1986 this guy walks into my office – Ted Smith –
who’s from a foundation. I just saw dollar signs, but actually Ted brings a lot of
expertise. I should tell you that in the foundation world, with regard to climate
change, he’s known as the optimist. (Not really.) 
In the future, we will be dealing with a lot of different issues here. One of them that
Michael just alluded to is trade issues and trade and environment. In 1990 Michael
and I were having a talk – I think it was somewhere in a nice place in France – about
trade and environment. So, I have learned from each of the three here on this panel,
and really appreciate being here and continuing to learn from them.
I doubt there’s a student on campus today who doesn’t know something
about climate change, and therein lies hope.
It is in fact a privilege to be in the funding community. I sometimes think it’s an
act of cowardice, having been in the nonprofit world, but really and truly you have so
many different options available to you. We all mean to make the most of them.
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I came late to climate. In 1986 when former Senator Al Gore, Senator Tim Wirth,
and Senator John Heinz were holding hearings on these issues, I didn’t get it. I just
didn’t get it. But now that we have grown up with this issue a bit, we all know how
critically important it is to address this. To have the opportunity to do so in the guise
of being a foundation officer is a great gift. Every other Wednesday I have to remind
myself of that because the other occupational hazard you fall into is that you forget
how hard people work on the front lines. Many of you I see in the audience are on the
front lines.
I would say that part of what makes success is doing well with the hand you’re
dealt. I’ve told this story publicly, but we all work for families. I work for the Tremaine
family. In 2001 when we were trying to figure out what the environment program
should be, we had a Hummer driver and a Toyota Prius driver on the board. Therein
lay opportunity, because our approach had to be a big tent approach. There was no
way we were going to get away with any kind of rigid, ideological approach to this
issue, and thank God.
I will also acknowledge that I wish I could take credit for focusing our grant
making on Connecticut because Connecticut has served as an example of what states
can do. Connecticut serving as a model is very, very important because it takes away
the argument that we can’t do this at a federal level, or that we can’t do this in other
states. I’m glad that California has followed our lead. (I had to put in the plug.) 
One of the things that’s important as well – and this might involve some
maturation on my part – is understanding what tools are now available to us in this
year, in this time. I think many of us have talked about finance. I can guarantee you
that in 1986 when I started in the environmental world, there was “us” and there was
“them.” People who had money on Wall Street – they were “them.” They are still
“them,” but, as you’ve probably learned through this wonderful series, there’s now an
opportunity, given the realities of the world, to apply finance and apply capital in
ways that are environmentally productive.
I can guarantee you that in 1986 when I started in the environmental world,
there was “us” and there was “them.” People who had money on Wall Street
– they were “them.” They are still “them,” but, as you’ve probably learned
through this wonderful series, there’s now an opportunity, given the
realities of the world, to apply finance and apply capital in ways that are
environmentally productive.
Another observation is that many of the people who are in the financial
community want the same things as those who consider themselves environ-
mentalists. So finance is a new tool, though I don’t want to overstate it. You can still
have your own skepticism about the degree to which capitalism works productively
in these issues, but we are about forming markets so that capitalism can work in a
philanthropy panel
yale school of forestry & environmental studies
175
productive way. We’re also about people, and that’s another very important thing that
the environmental community forgets at its own peril. Further, we’re about different
kinds of people, whether it’s Hispanic communities along the border in Texas or
whether it’s about the environmentally stressed communities in our own backyard
here in New Haven. We have to be about all people. And, by the way, as all of you
know, that’s not just Americans.
While we haven’t done a lot of work internationally at Tremaine, it’s because, as
Michael said, the first step to “getting in the game” is to get the U.S. pointed in the
right direction. The way to do that has been to support state and local movements,
and that has been really the engine of progress in the last six years.
The first step to “getting in the game” is to get the U.S. pointed in the right
direction. The way to do that has been to support state and local
movements, and that has been really the engine of progress in the last six
years.
There’s more that can be said but I’ll just end with this. I interviewed one of my
dearest friends for a job. Since you have to do this the same for everybody, I asked the
same question I asked everybody else. I said, “What are your weaknesses?” And she
gave me an answer that I think is appropriate to your consideration of foundations.
She looked me in the eye, she sighed, and she said, “Ah, weaknesses – there are so
many.”
I hope you do learn a lot about foundations here and let us know what you’re
interested in. Thanks for coming out.
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Question and Answer Session
Gus Speth: I was asked as the moderator to start the questioning, but I don’t think I’m
going to do that. There are too many interesting-looking people out here in the
audience that I’m sure have their own questions. You all came a long way to hear these
people and to ask them questions, so let’s throw the floor open.
QUESTION 1: Insurance industry4
My brother is head of Chubb Insurance in New York, and the insurance industry has
made major statements on climate change. It strikes me, and no doubt you’ve all thought
about this, that the insurance industry is a major partner for climate change. Many of
them need to be brought out as leaders so that the American public will understand
what’s at risk, and not just along coastal waters. I think many of them would be happy
partners on this in terms of awareness, and they see it as a moral issue, too.
Michael Northrop: We work with insurance companies less than I’d like to. Munich
Re and Swiss Re have been the most vocal European big reinsurance firms, and they
have the most to lose.
It’s a little shocking how little direct intervention there is in the policy debate by
insurance companies anywhere. A lot of them have been approached on this for a
number of years, and it still mystifies me that they aren’t doing more about it. I think
they feel they’re so good at managing their own risk that they think they can get out
of the way of the liabilities that are coming their way.
There’s been a huge flight of insurance companies away from risky clients, and it’s
really hard to insure a house in a coastal zone in the United States now, which is a real
shame. I think in part this is a result of a lack of good public policy. There needs to be
more intervention to create safe harbor for insurance companies to help guarantee
that they’ll be made whole if they continue to provide insurance for those who are at
risk. But I can’t say there’s been a huge rush. I think AIG might be the most substantive
of all the insurance firms. The person who staffs the work who’s based in New York is
terrific, and she’s really helped move the company in a big way. I remain hopeful about
other firms, but there hasn’t been a rush to being as active as we might like.
QUESTION 2: Expanding regional, state, and local efforts
At least two of your foundations have focused clearly on regional, state, or local efforts. I
think that’s really important, and I think you’ve pointed out accurately that that’s where
some real progress has been made. What have you done to take that experience to try to
do more outreach to the other states and spread that message around the country?
Stewart Hudson: Well, the first thing that comes to mind is how much Michael
Northrop has done in that regard. There was a meeting January 6th and 7th that
Michael convened with environmental commissioners from a variety of states who
are like-minded. We have tried to have a regional focus and bring people together
among regions – the Northeast, the Southeast, the Midwest, the Pacific, and
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Mountain West, for example. In that regard, there is an increasing sense among the
states of what other states are doing. It’s nowhere near where it needs to be, so you do
raise a good point.
What I thought you were going to ask was what’s being done to take all of that state
progress and inform and adjust federal policy so that it takes advantage of the state
progress rather than getting in the way of it. That, of course, will be the subject of the
Yale Conference of Governors on Climate Change5 that will be held in April 2008.
Michael Northrop: There’s a terrific group called the Center for Climate
Strategies.6 They are the ones who have been providing the technical assistance to
governors to design their responses as states. It’s been a very quiet effort; they’re not
very public. They serve really as technical assistance providers, not as advocates.
They’re working right now with almost 20 states all over the country that are
designing these comprehensive plans. Their argument works with governors because
their first step is to talk to the governor and say that if you want us to come help you,
we will, but we need you to sign off on this work and to get behind it. And if you do
so, you’re going to find that you can save a lot of money because of the energy
efficiency measures that will, by necessity, be a big part of your plan. Further, if you’re
clever, you’re going to find ways to bring all kinds of new enterprise development
opportunities to your state – new industry creation, like other states that are in real
leadership positions, such as California and Connecticut.
It’s a terrific message, and it’s why so many governors have moved so fast over the
last four or five years to take the step of designing these climate action plans, which
are very comprehensive, get us to the place where scientists think we need to be, and
also lead to positive economic results. Find the Center for Climate Strategies; they’ve
got a nice web site. They have a map that shows you which states are moving and tells
you what they’re doing.
Gus Speth: All right. This is too much of a love-in.
QUESTION 3: Water and geological carbon sequestration
Thank you, Gus, for the invitation to be a little bit harder hitting. Stewart, in regards to
what you said about foundation weaknesses, I think that there’s been tremendous
progress made in terms of the understanding of the climate issue, in terms of the
messaging, of getting individuals to change their behaviors, and trying to have the private
sector change their behaviors.
But thinking about the adage that we’re only as strong as our weakest link, I’m very
concerned about the reliance on carbon sequestration as a major piece of climate change
response without looking at the implications of carbon sequestration on our drinking water
supplies. There’s rule making that’s on a fast track at the Environmental Protection Agency
(EPA). I have not found one foundation that’s willing to support a hard look at that
practice. I think that while we’re under the guise of protecting our air, we have to be very
forthright about looking at the drinking water supplies as well. Why is there this major gap?
Stewart Hudson: I thought you were going to talk about weaknesses in the
foundation world, which gives me the opportunity to say I don’t think that
foundations in America have a clue as to how much our fat’s in the fire in this issue.
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We will contribute in a meaningful and visible way to helping this problem be solved
over time, or I think Americans will say, “Now, why is it you guys get a tax break?”
So, I’m sorry that you didn’t ask that question, but thanks for letting me answer it.
Ted Smith: Let me give you an interpretation and then a positive cast. My
interpretation is that there are too many silos. Those who work on water, work on water
generally, and those who work on forests . . . you and I know that they need to cross
over. It seems to me the optimistic thing is that the climate change agenda tends to
bring all these silos under the same umbrella. As we’re looking at carbon sequestration
and carbon storage in forested landscapes, we’re also looking at ecosystem services at
the same time. There’s a real two-for-one as this carbon market begins to emerge and
if we get it right, we can manage those forests for that double objective.
QUESTION 4: Human elements of adaptation
The issue I want to raise is related to the people impacts. Obviously it’s going to take
people to solve this problem – businesses, labor, other sectors. But if you look at the
progress made thus far reflected by the Lieberman-Warner bill, there’s hardly any effort
in the allocation of resources through this cap-and-trade system to deal with the human
impacts of climate change, either in a domestic sense or in an international sense.
Recently there was a UNDP (United Nations Development Programme) report that
acknowledged that it would cost $86 billion a year to deal with the adaptation required
to deal with the already realized consequences of climate change. Yet it doesn’t seem to be
an area that foundations are very interested in funding or addressing. Most of the
resources, most of the political debate, most of the lobbying is focused on the mitigation
strategy. I’m curious why not. If we’re really concerned about the security consequences,
the ethical considerations, the economic consequences, why can’t we seem to get this issue
on the table?
Michael Northrop: It used to be that if you talked about adaptation, the sentiment
was that we can’t do that because it means we’re not really trying to solve the problem.
It was seen as a dodge. There was this very strong reaction in the NGO community in
particular, and the foundations I think probably followed suit, to just not do it.
It’s been interesting in the last couple of years to see more people talking seriously
about adaptation. The Rockefeller Foundation announced a big program a year ago
to put a large amount of money, about $50 million, into adaptation. They’re working
hard on it, and it’s just a drop in the bucket compared to what’s necessary.
So I don’t think there’s a good reason. The first thing to say is there is some
movement finally, and that things are headed in the right direction. People are
starting to look at it seriously and pay attention to it because they’re realizing that
climate change is here now and we can’t avoid dealing with the human impacts.
I was just out in Utah with the former mayor of Salt Lake City, Rocky Anderson,
who’s a climate hero who reduced Salt Lake City’s carbon footprint by 30 percent over
the last four years. It’s really just amazing what he did. He’s just stepped down from
being mayor.
He has started an organization which is going to very deliberately link the human
impact of climate change and populations around the globe, particularly in
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developing countries, as a human rights concern. It’s shocking to me that that issue
has not been more forward in our consciousness, and I think it’s partly because of this
hangover of not wanting to deal with it – it meant we weren't mitigating and thereby
not solving the problem.
Two billion people in this world are at risk from climate change. How anybody can’t
be just totally overwhelmed by that – not that that necessarily means you’re going to
do anything about it – escapes me. I don’t see how the United States foreign policy
establishment can’t be directly concerned about this because, as the resulting refugee
crisis does develop, we’re going to be directly impacted by it economically, politically,
militarily, you name it. It’s the biggest crisis coming down the pike for the world.
Maybe people are waking up to it. Maybe Rocky Anderson can help make some of
that happen. Maybe Oxfam International can make some of that happen. I hope so.
Ted Smith: Just one short comment – we can learn from others, too. I don’t know
that there’s any institutional representation of climate change adaptation in this
country. What I’m saying here is that the Australian National University has
established a center for climate change adaptation and has been working on
adaptation for some five years or so, well ahead of us, and there are opportunities
beyond our boundaries to pick up what others are doing.
Stewart Hudson: I just want to add a couple of things. Think of carbon allowances,
which create a lot of revenue or will create a lot of revenue, as a mail train. Everybody
wants to rob the mail train. When it comes to adaptation, you’re quite right that the
human elements of adaptation have gotten short shrift. Most of what’s in Warner-
Lieberman is about wildlife, and it’s about wildlife because the group that represents
wildlife issues got in there and worked really hard. That’s what any group who wants
to advocate their position will have to do.
Think of carbon allowances, which create a lot of revenue or will create a lot
of revenue, as a mail train. Everybody wants to rob the mail train. When it
comes to adaptation, you’re quite right that the human elements of
adaptation have gotten short shrift.
But beware that, when you say adaptation and the human elements of it, you have
in mind what that money should go toward, and not just in the United States. If you
look in practice at how others might be using adaptation and trying to rob the mail
train, which, by the way, we’re all trying to do, you might find adaptation dollars
going to – I don't know – land acquisition. Is that really where that revenue should
be going? That’s a question.
Michael Northrop: Stewart will know the numbers, but our friends in the
evangelical community actually fought very hard to make sure that some of the
allocations from the auction and the most recent negotiation around the Warner-
Lieberman bill go towards adaptation in developing countries. It may be that the
evangelicals are the ones who are going to push this the hardest. They were successful
doing so – they got some more money in the pot.
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QUESTION 5: Role of universities and support for science
I have two questions. What do you see as the role of leading universities in the United
States and around the world in addressing the climate change problem? And secondly, as
a follow up to the question about how carbon sequestration affects our water supply, it
appears to me that many of the foundations are focused on policy, but what about the
science? Where do you see support for the basic sciences?
Ted Smith: I’ll take the first part of the question – the role of universities in this. I
would argue, and have argued, that the emergent generation that is in our universities
today is absolutely critical in terms of moving toward a political constituency that
ultimately is going to deal with this over the next several decades. It’s not a quick fix,
as we know. If our universities here and abroad aren’t really preparing these citizens
in some way to take activist roles, it seems to me a huge opportunity is being missed.
We can see the emergence of something of a movement on college campuses
across the nation. I’m not familiar with Europe and how it’s gone there and elsewhere.
But, boy, I am counting very heavily on this generation to repair or ameliorate some
of the sins that have been created to this point.
A second point is very obvious to those of you here at Yale, and that is that the
university administration can put stakes in the ground and assert itself very strongly
in this way. There is a nationwide movement in that direction in terms of going
toward carbon neutrality. We should be careful how we talk about that, but clearly
there is a push in the direction of becoming carbon neutral.
The second part of your question has to do with the funding of science. I spoke to
an MIT (Massachusetts Institute of Technology) crowd a couple of weeks ago. My
observation was that the private foundations by and large had moved away from
funding universities and university science. I don’t have the data on that, so I can’t
prove it. But over the last decade or so, as I’ve watched it, there’s been more
movement to policy and toward activism – working with NGOs and away from
universities. I’ll allow you to speculate on that a little bit, but I think to some extent
universities have priced themselves out of the market. The overheads that go with
this, at least for small foundations, which I can speak for, are just beyond what we can
do even though we have enormous respect for science. We’re gobbling it up in any
way we can in order to tutor and inform our own decision making, but we simply
don’t have the resources to be a part of it. There may be other answers.
The overheads that go with funding science, at least for small foundations,
which I can speak for, are just beyond what we can do even though we have
enormous respect for science. We’re gobbling it up in any way we can in
order to tutor and inform our own decision making, but we simply don’t
have the resources to be a part of it. There may be other answers.
Stewart Hudson: I’ve got to agree with Ted. We had a grantee (a non-profit) who
gave us a proposal with no overhead, and I said, “Why not? You should put some in.”
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This was a $100,000 proposal, and then he put in $300 for overhead!” I’ve got to laugh
when I get some of the university proposals that are over 100 percent; I still can’t
figure out the math on that. The interesting thing is that universities have done a great
job on the science. The untold story – and Gus Speth is part of this as much as
anybody – is that the science on climate has been just blue chip science. It’s really a
story that will last for a long time. Foundations are kind of limited in terms of the
amount of dollars we could make available to that.
The science is coming from universities and the science is coming from other
places. We have lots of science. What we hadn’t had a lot of are two things – policy
work and project work. There’s a variety of different ways that foundations can invest
– not even just from their endowments, but also in grants that are in the form of
project-related investments. We were lucky to find our way into some project-related
grants in Connecticut. Science has been a guide, and always will be. We’ve done some
policy work that we funded, but also projects. As to university leadership, Yale's
President Richard Levin is doing it, and he’s taking some risk in doing it, which makes
it more valuable.
QUESTION 6: More programmatic endowment investments
I have a question about the potentially positive business and investment opportunities
around climate change. In foundations, you have the program side and then you have
your own endowment side. On the endowment side, have you looked at any investment
strategies in this area? I know it’s a sensitive topic. On the foundation side, oftentimes
you’re investing in non-profit sorts of entities, but what about social ventures or things
that have a for-profit and nonprofit side to them in this area? Are you seeing more of
that? Do you find those sorts of things?
Stewart Hudson: Every time we’ve raised that issue with the Tremaine family,
which, by the way, consists of a couple of different generations, it’s sort of like Bambi
meets Godzilla. We just haven’t agreed on an approach. That doesn’t mean we’re not
going to keep trying in different ways, and it’s interesting across generations because
the younger generation has an individual who runs a hedge fund and invests in some
of this stuff. But I will be open and honest and say that we have not been successful.
As I tell people, it may be the one thing that, whenever it is I move on to something
else, I’ll say, “Gosh, I wish I could have got that.”
Michael Northrop: Someone will fund a campaign that will beat up foundations to
invest in the right things. It will happen because it would be really easy to do. I’ve
heard several foundation people mention this in the last few months. Foundations are
vulnerable because they are easily embarrassed. There is a public trust and tax benefit
to maintaining their asset values.
Speaking as a program person concerned about climate change, not as someone
who manages our financial portfolio, I see this as a real problem – 95 percent of our
assets could be put to better use. The reason why it persists as a problem is that we
have a Chinese wall in foundations, for lots of good reasons. But as a result, it isn’t
those with the program perspective who manage the assets. It’s the people who are on
the finance committees who often live a little bit outside the foundation, who are
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charged with maintaining their fiduciary responsibility to the return profile of the
invested funds. They tend to be fairly conservative folks, and the worry they have is
that, if we do this, we’re going to sacrifice returns.
There is a need for more information as to whether we can avoid sacrificing
returns. Everything I read as a non-expert indicates to me that some people out there
think it’s possible to invest wisely programmatically and financially. But I admit I am
not an expert. My intuition is that this will change. It’s overdue. Foundations have
been talking about it for 15 years.
Ted Smith: This goes back to my point about lack of accountability of foundations.
If you want to cause this to happen, how do you make it happen? There isn’t an easy
mechanism to do it.
The one modestly hopeful note is that there is, within the foundation community,
a movement toward what they call “mission-related investing.” If you look at the Bill
& Melinda Gates Foundation, the Hewlett and Packard Foundations, there is an
enormous amount of money that could be directed in ways that would be additive to
the kind of agenda that we’re following. You’ve really hit a sore spot there, and I’m
glad you did.
The one exception that I’ve seen recently, and maybe it’s intelligible, is Google. The
owners of Google really are gangbusters for renewable energy. They’re taking some of
their wealth and investing it as venture capitalists, if you will. I can tell you that’s not
a model that everybody else is going to follow.
Stewart Hudson: I just want to say as well that there are foundations that are taking
the lead on this. The F.B. Heron Foundation7 is one. Also, if you don’t know Steve
Viederman as an advocate, he doesn’t let go easily and he’s another leader getting in
front on this. There are people that are doing the right thing.
QUESTION 7: Mayors, university presidents, and citizen engagement
My question is about, Salt Lake City not withstanding, the 791 signatories of the U.S.
Conference of Mayors Climate Protection Agreement. There’s something like 951 cities
listed on the Sierra Club’s “Cool Cities” campaign. They have adopted the ICLEI
framework, and they’re all stuck on three. That means they’ve signed an agreement
saying we’re going to move on this. There are also 492 college and university presidents
who have signed the Presidents Climate Commitment.
Their timeframe for action is pitifully slow compared to what we know we have to do.
Where are cities and universities? How are they engaging the citizenry, who we know are
responsible for anywhere from 50 to 85 percent of carbon? Where is the action to help
citizens recognize what is possible? Where is the urgency? How do we help these
university presidents, chancellors, and mayors escape the political cover of knowing that
their plans will outlive their tenure?
Michael Northrop: Everything has a beginning, a middle, and an end, and I guess
we’re at the beginning with the mayors and the university presidents. The fact is that the
vast majority of those 800 plus mayors don’t have the resources to staff a person in their
city office to lead this work. It gets really complicated, and, as a mayor, there are so many
other things you’re dealing with, and many of them are life and death, here and now.
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It’s really tough, but the leaders in that community have shown that it’s possible.
We need to find other ways to support cities to follow through on their good instincts.
There’s no good model in the country of a state that supports its municipalities to
take action. I think that’s an opportunity that we’ve just begun to look at. Something
along these lines is just getting going in Florida to try to help design a support system
for municipalities. Up the political food chain, there is no integration between states
and the federal government on climate policy; there is even less integration between
cities and states or cities and the federal government on climate policy.
If you were serious as president of this country about climate change, you would
start a city program for climate action. I suspect that the first president that we have
that’s serious about climate change will do that. It’s such a smart thing to do. It’s a
political win, so let’s hope we get to that point. I think with President Bush we just
haven’t had the opportunity.
The political rhetoric has been very important and let’s take advantage of that to
the best we can, while waiting for the day, soon to come I hope, when we can get the
resources and all the other things we need to really make it all happen.
If you were serious as president of this country about climate change, you
would start a city program for climate action. I suspect that the first
president that we have that’s serious about climate change will do that. It’s
such a smart thing to do. It’s a political win.
Ted Smith: There’s an intellectual challenge here that perplexes me. People tend to
move and to act in the face of perceived danger or perceived losses. We’re talking
about a time span here that is very hard to bring front and center in terms of the
immediacy of what’s going on.
The one way that we’ve tried to bring that forward is by funding the Union of
Concerned Scientists to do scenario work showing what might eventuate on the land,
given different temperature levels through the balance of this century.8 They did it
first in California, and they’ve now done a study in New England using scientists from
throughout New England. If you don’t like the climate here (i.e. New England) now,
the projection would be that you’ll be in Virginia or possibly in North Carolina in 30
years with the projected temperature increases. Trying to find ways to get people to
think about what’s going to come down the road 20, 30 years ahead, or maybe even
sooner than we know, is a really tough challenge. Scenarios would seem to be the best
option we have now, but they have their limitations as well.
QUESTION 8: Foundation collaboration
The NGO community has become very savvy in coordinating their activities. I
congratulate the foundation community in spurring that coordination between the
Green Group and USCAN (U.S. Climate Action Network) and now 1Sky’s guiding
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principles. To what degree do you think the foundation community is working together
to make sure that their activities are complementary?
Stewart Hudson: Well, I’m a recovering Washingtonian, so it’s good to hear that the
groups are working together. I think you’re right. I don’t know that I would credit the
foundations with that as much as the individual leadership of some of these
organizations who have recognized that, with an issue of this historical import, you
have to put the issue ahead of your ego, and they found a way to do so.
That having been said, there are some substantive differences on political strategy
between some of the green groups and some of the groups working at a local level. I
wouldn’t overstate the ability of the foundations to influence that.
As far as the foundations working together, good question. There is a word called
“collaboration” that is defined differently by different foundations. You can see here that
we’re not just making nice here; we (i.e. the panel) work together. Sometimes we fund
the same thing and sometimes we don’t. Michael recently served, and I continue to
serve, on the Climate and Energy Funders Group. That’s one way of bringing it forward.
When I came to the Tremaine Foundation (and there’s business people on the board),
I just kept shaking my head because I kept thinking that these banks can get together and
do multi-million if not billion dollar deals in a week. It takes us a little longer, and for a
lot less. It is a problem about how the foundation community moves, and I think we
ourselves need to feel a greater sense of urgency and responsibility, as Ted has said.
QUESTION 9: Sustaining mildly effective organizations
My question perfectly ties into the last question. Foundations are the life blood of all the
NGOs that are out there at the moment. There are a lot of NGOs, and some research by a
professor here, Garry Brewer, suggests that a lot of them are sustained, despite mild
effectiveness, by the ego of the funder, whereas a market economy might let them fail. In
what ways do you think that the foundations can, should, or are trying to aggressively cull
these mildly effective organizations to pool the money towards really effective organizations
and not sustaining things that are just making the slight improvements that we see?
Michael Northrop: Luckily, I think most groups are not dependent on foundations.
And foundations can actually make a move to get away from a group for whatever
reason – maybe just because they’ve been funding them long enough that it’s time to
cycle and do something else. A lot of these groups will find alternative mechanisms
for raising funds, which in many respects is a good thing.
There is something to be said for the over-proliferation of groups and for the value of
trying to bring more groups together and do more mergers inside the non-profit
community. It doesn’t seem, though, to be the trend that I find out there. Fortunately, it’s
not our role to try to pick the ones that should be disbanded and put back together again.
So, I don’t know that we have that much of a role, actually, in fixing the problem.
QUESTION 10: Over-politicization 
How do foundations avoid getting over-politicized so they can continue to solicit new
types of grant recipients in states or in sectors that might not seem natural fits for climate
change policy?
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Stewart Hudson: You can be overly politicized in so many different ways. You can
be ideologically bound and blinded so that you don’t make certain grants. Actually,
Ted (Ted, I never told you this) awakened me to the idea that we could make grants
to state agencies. I never knew that. That’s not in the playbook, especially the
playbook I learned in the early 80s. It led to these wonderful relationships. I always
think of it as a headline, something like “State Bureaucrat Becomes Climate Hero.” It’s
not a headline you read, but you should. There are ways of understanding that
whatever tool in the toolbox works you ought to use it.
The other part is that we should talk a lot about boards. Even in a family
foundation, the boards can constrain or expand your choices.
discussion of funding transformative change
Gus Speth: I have a question for you. Are you funding things that are radical enough to
address successfully what a lot of people are now perceiving as an emergency situation on
climate? You’re doing great things, you’re doing very innovative things, and you’re moving
this system along, thank goodness, and God bless you. But what if in fact we are on the cusp,
as, say Jim Hansen and others believe, of a true disaster – a planetary disaster? If you
accept that, do you think that you’re operating in a way that sufficiently challenges the
system? Someone once said good government is just plain old government in a hell of a
fright. Is the foundation community in the U.S. putting that hell of a fright into our system?
Ted Smith: I think the foundation community, if you want to call it a community,
operates within the American system. It responds to boards consisting of people
largely coming out of the business community and out of the higher tier of wealth.
Cultural values are brought to the foundation by who brought the money forward.
As a product of the University of California, Berkeley in the sixties when I really was
radicalized, I don’t see that radical movement at all today in America. What it would
call for would be for us probably to expend all our money at the student level to see
if we couldn’t radicalize an emergent generation. Maybe others have a better
suggestion for that, but you don’t see that happening at all.
Stewart Hudson: I guess the way I feel about it is that it is always a good reminder,
because whether it’s 450 parts per million or, as Jim Hansen says, a hell of a lot less,
we will inevitably be facing a future where we will have to tighten whatever legislation
comes out of Congress or any of the states. We are gaining some ground on it as the
state-based climate movement is going to be forcing the feds to go further than they
otherwise would. You may not believe me now, but a year from now we’ll check in on
this approach. Because some of the states have gone so much further, it raises the bar.
The other thing to think about is that when you teach a kid to ride a bike, the first
thing is to keep peddling. The presidential candidates left in the race are committed
to doing extensive work on climate. One of them who has done a lot is John McCain.
But I think now there is an opportunity to say, “Well, that’s great that you brought it
from here to there, but this bill only does 60 percent of what’s needed.” Maybe there
are some other folks around in that pool who will raise the bar even higher.
That’s not really a radical approach, but I think it’s akin to the constant state of
improvement that needs to be built into this system.
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Michael Northrop: Gus, no, I don’t think so. At all levels of society you’re finding
people who aren’t being radical enough about this issue – the citizenry, the policy
makers, the NGOs and the foundations. I think we all need to be more radical about
it. I can point to individual things we’ve done that have been really edgy, though, and
could be described as radical.
Gus Speth: I thought the 1Sky initiative was gutsy, though.
Michael Northrop: It’s definitely gutsy. There are other things that we need to be
adding into the mix, but we could do a hell of a lot more. We live in kind of a
conservative time, too, where marching down the streets or chaining yourself to a
coal-fired power plant isn’t necessarily socially acceptable behavior, and people worry
about that. We are getting to the point now where, as Gus has said himself, we have to
start thinking about that stuff. I think the kids are radicalized on college campuses
today, and they are offering some sense of really putting themselves on the line to try
to make some real change in a hurry. Let’s hope there’s more radicalization. We need it.
QUESTION 11: Spending more on climate change
There’s a little bit of a trend with some foundations – Belden and Atlantic Philanthropies
– that they’re just going to spend out. At what point do you say, “It’s bad enough that
we’re going to spend 30 percent, or it’s bad enough that we’re going to spend 50 percent
over the next couple of years and see what we can really do?”
Ted Smith: One quick response to that is that it’s almost bordering on the criminal
for foundations to look at that 5 percent IRS rule at this time, in this era, facing what
we’re facing. In my case, I went to our trustees and said, “We need to invade the
endowment now. Now is the opportunity.” They in fact did go into the endowment,
and added 40 percent to my budget a couple of years ago. I think every foundation
that’s working on climate change should be doing that now. There’s no excuse not to
do it as far as I’m concerned.
Stewart Hudson: When you’re working in a foundation environment where you
have a lot of different board members with a lot of different perspectives, or like the
Tremaine Foundation which funds in the areas of art, learning disabilities, as well as
climate, you’re always making political judgments. Even if your heart is in the right
place – and this issue is not like any other environmental issue and frankly not like
any other social issue – it’s the realm of the possible that matters.
I want to say that my other colleague Ashley Sklar here – she and Nicole Chevalier
have emboldened me and our Environment Committee to say we ought to try to run
this up the flagpole for the Tremaine Board to consider. Then I say, “Well, Kendall did
it.” So, wish us luck. But it is something where I think we are gaining on it, and people
understand that this is an unprecedented social, historical, and economic as well as
environmental issue.
QUESTION 12: Funding the youth 
I’d like to direct this towards Mr. Smith and Mr. Northrop in particular. You both have
referenced the movements on college campuses and the need to bring the youth into this
movement, and that’s where you think the future lies. How ready are you and your
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foundations to walk the walk and fund new organizations run exclusively by students
who haven’t been indoctrinated into the status quo?
Michael Northrop: I can say that in the last two years we’ve made a major
investment in a group called the Energy Action Coalition and its founder, Billy Parish,
who Ted referred to earlier. We are so pleased by what they’re doing. I was in
Washington in the fall, and they brought 6,000 students from around the country,
3,000 of whom went up on the Hill and held meetings. Those kids really shook people
up. It was great. They went in and argued for what scientists say we need. They did it
in a way that I think was extremely useful, powerful, and politically salient. They were
so strong they even got resistance from some of the environmental groups as they did
it, who thought their message was too politically untenable; but in the end it seemed
extremely powerful. I heard many people say they stretched the envelope of what was
politically possible by being so strong. I went down and volunteered for the weekend
to observe on my own time, and it was great. I was very moved by everybody who was
there. These young people are so impressive. So, we’re already on that road, we would
like to do a lot more, and we will do more.
Ted Smith: We’re doing about ten different things with student groups, and I want to
push down below the college level. Middle school students are probably the best age to
do their school’s carbon footprint. The downloadable program is something they could
do a lot better than I could, actually. I’m trying to look for ways now to energize
bringing that into the public schools in Boston and Cambridge, and then I know what
will happen. They’ll take it home because there are home calculators for those kids. If
you go down to the fourth and fifth grade, these are the kids that told their parents to
stop smoking. I have real hope that we can bite them at that stage, and that by the time
they get to Yale or elsewhere, they’ll be flaming radicals in terms of what has to be done.
QUESTION 13: Unintended consequences
I think one of the problems with radical action is that even if your heart is in the right
place, oftentimes that sort of action can lead to unintended consequences. Organic
farming and fair trade programs sometimes have economic and environmental
detriments that outweigh their benefits. It’s great to drive your Prius, but ten years down
the road what are you going to do with the battery? As foundations responsible for
financing NGOs and environmental initiatives, you’re removed from the final
consequences of each of these actions. How do you ensure that programs you fund end up
avoiding those unintended consequences?
Stewart Hudson: I think the Patriot Act took care of some of the worst stuff you’re
worried about. But, more seriously, this discussion seems to suggest a lot of
“either/or” choices. Things that are radical are as important as things that are
pragmatic and successful. Some foundations like to do radical, some foundations like
to do pragmatic, and some like to do both. I have seen hardly any examples of things
that have been funded that are so out of control that one would say, “Why did you do
that, and why didn’t you rein it in?” I’m sure there are examples out there, but what I
also think is that this issue has forced itself upon us such dire distress that what might
have seemed radical 10 or 20 years ago is hardly radical now.
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I’ll also end by saying that I am uncomfortable with any of us defining for your
generation what your role is in all of this. Frankly, what I have seen – and this is an
observation not a prescription – in the difference between my generation and yours
(beyond the age difference) is that yours brings so much more to the party. There are
people who like a radical approach. There are people who understand how the world
of finance connects to all of this and the discipline that is associated with that. There
are people who are great scientists who are young. What is most impressive about
young folks now who are working on this is they have a lot of different tools in play.
I think that’s a very rich thing because it gives you a lot of choice.
closing remarks
Ted Smith: We have really challenging occupations, and very interesting and
wonderful ones. We have to be up on science. I read Science and Nature every week.
We have to be up on the political scene and understanding where that is going. We
have to be diagnosticians with respect to organizations. Are they really up to the roles
that we want them to play? We have to make judgments of human flesh. Has that
CEO really got the vision in his/her head to take that organization where it should go?
We have to respond to boards, as you’ve heard already, and so on.
I think what you’re seeing is three of us who are reaching and reaching, and doing
the best we can, probably making mistakes along the way. But it’s a worthy profession.
If there’s anybody here who’s interested in it, I wouldn't warn them away from it. But
like a venture capitalist, you are taking risks when you make grants. You go out there
if you want to be out on the front edge, and we do that. Some things come out better
than others.
I’ve just enjoyed the opportunity to talk frankly about some of the things we do.
Thank you.
Michael Northrop: It’s fun to be here. Climate change is so terrifying. I don’t let
myself go to that place very often because I am solution-oriented and I’m very much
an optimist about things. I see so many good things going on and I can only be
hopeful. But this discussion about being radical – I don't think we can be radical
enough on this issue, given what’s going on. I’d like to leave that message with you.
Stewart Hudson: Well, I think “radical,” “impact,” and “informative” – think of
Ceres,9 which has done all these wonderful shareholder resolutions and actions which
have had a great impact. Or think of the Carbon Disclosure Project10 and things like
that. For those of you who might be interested in foundation work, I would strongly
encourage people to get experience in the non-profit or for-profit sector ahead of
time for a variety of reasons.
As Ted said so well, you have to bring a lot of different things to the foundation
world. It’s more of an assembly process than anything. It’s important to develop some
of those skills in the non-profit world or the for-profit world because you will bring
more to the foundation world.
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Investing in Climate Change: A Panel
on Hedge Funds
Bradford Gentry, Yale University (Moderator); Benjamin Block, Ardsley Partners;
Andy Ertel, Evolution Markets; Paul Ezekiel, Credit Suisse; Martin Whittaker,
MissionPoint Capital 
editors’ remarks
This chapter comes from a talk presented in Greenwich, Connecticuta to an audience
largely composed of hedge fund professionals. The panel consists of experts from
different disciplines within environmental finance who discuss climate change
investment with the hedge fund industry in mind. Given the current public
commentary surrounding hedge funds, the positive role that this industry can play in
more robust environmental markets may not be initially obvious. But as Andy Ertel
explains from the onset, “First of all, we want to create a global pool of liquidity.” We
also recall Professor William Goetzmann’s words from Chapter 1: “If carbon markets
work, if the financial technology applied to environmental problems works, it will enlist
an unusual and eclectic community of economic players, from hedge funds to savers to
speculators and so on, into thinking about forecasting and estimating the effect of
environmental carbon.”
This chapter picks up after Win Neuger’s addressb and begins with introductions
from the moderator, Professor Bradford Gentry, followed by an overview of the NYMEX
Green Exchange by Andy Ertel. The panel discussion starts with a prompt about the
impacts of an economic downturn, and then opens up to a question and answer session
that includes such topics as ideal term structures for regulation, the depth, liquidity,
and environmental benefits of the environmental markets, the role of financial
engineering, the opportunity in green building, and the prospects of the Regional
Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI).
In addition to fulfilling an important niche within our publication by providing a
perspective specific to hedge funds, this chapter also delves into more general themes
such as the potential for creative finance in the environmental markets, the ability of
carbon to create as well as increase and decrease asset value, and the importance of the
policy community to obtain input from market participants – which is the subject of
this chapter’s closing remarks* 
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1 
The founding partners of the
NYMEX Green Exchange
include Evolution Markets,
Morgan Stanley, Credit Suisse,
JPMorgan Chase, Merrill Lynch,
Tudor, Constellation Energy,
RNK Capital, Vitol, ICAP, and
TFS Energy.
introduction
Bradford Gentry: I’m delighted to be here. At Yale we have the Center for Business and
the Environment that has been looking to make the sorts of business environment
connections people are making tonight. This evening is a wonderful addition to the
Carbon Finance Speaker Series that we’ve been hosting this year, with the Tremaine
Foundation’s support, to dive into these sorts of questions. It also allows me to
understand better a headline I saw in the Financial Times back in September that I
never really quite understood: “Carbon Shields Hedge Funds.” This was back when
the market was the frothiest and the article talked about niche strategies coming
through undamaged. I’m hoping our panelists and all of you in the audience asking
questions can explain to me what exactly was going on there.
We have a terrific panel tonight to dig into these issues. Ben Block is a Senior
Analyst of Renewable Energy Strategies for Ardsley Partners. Paul Ezekiel is the
Global Head of Carbon Trading at Credit Suisse. Martin Whittaker is a Director of
Environmental Finance Strategies at MissionPoint Capital Partners, and Andy Ertel
is CEO of Evolution Markets.
nymex green exchange
Andy Ertel: The notion of the exchange was that if you look around the world and
read the press announcements, there’s a push to create little pools of liquidity as we’re
trying to solve a global issue. Mother Nature does not care if we emit greenhouse gas
in St. Louis or Singapore. It’s not like mercury and mercury trading, which is one of
the next federal programs that’s coming here in the United States. It’s not like sulfur
dioxide or nitrous oxides, which are real local issues. These are some global issues that
we have to address. So first of all, we want to create a global pool of liquidity. I think
we’re well on our way with our founding partners1, and actually the next round of
international partners.
We also wanted the highest environmental integrity. Without naming names, there
have been a lot of questions about some of the voluntary offsets that are out there in
the market, and not just in the OTC (Over the Counter) market, which, by the way,
for carbon is 60 to 70 percent of that global volume. Most of it goes through
brokerage organizations like us, rather than exchanges. They might be given up for
exchange clearing, but they are actually executed OTC.
The voluntary market is one that’s been problematic. There has been the
possibility of investigation by the FTC (Federal Trade Commission). It’s really been
an inquiry at present on the quality of carbon credits. These are things that are kind
of besmirching the name of the carbon markets. In terms of size, the voluntary
markets are still tiny. They were valued at more than $300 million in 2007 versus
about $80 billion in the total global carbon market. They are still a very small
fraction, but an important fraction if you’re a business or an individual that wants to
make a difference and use offsets; we have to know that the quality is there. That’s
something that we’re moving forward on for the product suite for the Green
Exchange which will launch before the end of 2008.
We’re looking at a variety of high-quality voluntary carbon standards, including
something called the Voluntary Carbon Standard, which is work led by the
International Emissions Trading Association (IETA) and The Climate Group, the
Gold Standard, and credits generated under the California Climate Action Registry
(CCAR). There will also be a focus on the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI)
market, which is here in the U.S. Northeast; it will be the first compliance market for
carbon here in America. We’ll be also looking at sulfur dioxide and nitrogen oxide
futures, as well as launching into carbon internationally both in the EU emissions
trading system for EU allowances and for CERs, or certified emission reductions,
which are the developing country reductions under the Kyoto Protocol. Voluntary
renewable credits through the Green-e standard here in the U.S will also be
supported.
There will be a slew of products in the NYMEX Green Exchange, all with excellent
integrity, a global pool of liquidity, and more competitive rates than anybody else out
there. It’s a very exciting time. We are beginning to talk about water, biofuels, and
other environmental commodities that will be part of the future of the Green
Exchange.
impact of economic downturn
Bradford Gentry: What’s the impact of the current financial turmoil and the possibility
of a bear market on what you’re seeing here? The Financial Times headline I showed
earlier said that everybody should go to carbon because that will smooth everything out.
What are you all seeing from an upside/downside perspective?
Benjamin Block: Certainly there are going to be advances and declines because it’s
just the business that we’re in. From the long-term perspective, one of the things that
we like to think about is that renewable energy and energy in general are very much
driven by project finance. When you’re thinking about project finance, you’ve got a
couple of things that you want to consider. What’s the price of your output? I don't
think that very many people foresee oil declining to $30 or $40, as was floated out
there before. Renewable energy was viable when it was $60 to $70, and I have a hard
time believing that it’s going to go down below that. We think that energy prices are
going to stay high and although we might see a short-term decline in demand, we’ll
most likely see long-term growth in line with general economic growth.
The second factor is interest rates. You have to finance these projects, and especially
the large scale ones. Thanks to Helicopter Ben (Ben Bernanke, Chairman of the
Federal Reserve) today we have a nice low 3 percent interest rate that we’re dealing
with, and that should help push some of these projects, especially because energy
demand is viewed by the financing community as stable.
There will be bubbles. There will be ups and downs. We’ll hopefully mitigate these
with some good portfolio management and over the long-term this should be a very
constructive sector.
Paul Ezekiel: As a new asset class or an alternative asset class, private equity in the
renewables space is absolutely on fire at the moment. For those of you who may have
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seen some of the deals out there, there are actually two $5 billion funds being raised
right now – one by River Stone and it looks like Credit Suisse will probably be doing
one as well. As an asset class it seems to be completely unaffected. In fact, one could
argue there’s been some bias into funds like this that probably have limited
correlation to the rest of the broader market issues at the moment.
There will be bubbles. There will be ups and downs. We’ll hopefully
mitigate these with some good portfolio management and over the long-
term this [renewable energy] should be a very constructive sector.
From a carbon perspective, it’s a completely different game. Actually, one of the
bigger risks (and it’s probably an outside risk) to the U.S. signing up to some sort of
formal trading construct is if the U.S. goes into some sort of extended economic
recession. In such a case, the chances of its signing up to some meaningful cap goes
down significantly. But of course, this is obviously speculation.
Andy Ertel: I would say the impact that we’ve seen in the short-term has been over
the last couple of weeks. Carbon prices have taken a beating and some of the carbon
stocks have been taking a beating, but it’s mostly been a kind of global selloff in both
the equity markets and the commodity markets. Carbon in the European Union
tracks very well versus power, coal, etc.
I think this downward trend is going to be short lived. Coal prices actually rallied
to record levels this last week. Carbon, I think, is taking a breather for a short time.
The biggest risk is maybe some of the development and liquidity of the markets long-
term in terms of what we’re seeing as VAR (Value at Risk) being pulled back by some
of the banks that have exposure from the other aspects of the trading markets. But I
think Paul was right. Economic recession is the biggest risk to long term climate
change policy. If the economy is in real bad shape, it’s just not going to be very
popular to put an additional cost on there.
You can take the counter view and say that in a tough economic time, cap-and-
trade here in the U.S. is really about seeking greater efficiency. We still emit twice as
much carbon as Europe per capita. We have a long way to go on efficiency and energy
independence, and that’s probably part of the economic issues that we’re facing today.
You can take the counter view and say that in a tough economic time, cap-
and-trade here in the U.S. is really about seeking greater efficiency. We still
emit twice as much carbon as Europe per capita. We have a long way to go
on efficiency and energy independence, and that’s probably part of the
economic issues that we’re facing today.
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Martin Whittaker: I agree completely. Resource use efficiency is going to be a
hallmark of a bear market, and that isn’t just energy. That transcends new
technologies and new building materials. It really can push through entire sectors. I
agree that the carbon price is likely to be affected if we do enter a recession or a
prolonged recession, and that any chance of a freely floating carbon price is probably
diminished. It’s likely to be capped by whatever federal regulation comes along, which
is not good for the market in our opinion.
A lot of the publicly traded stocks are very thinly traded, so it doesn’t really take
much of a selloff to push them down. That’s partly what’s happened as well with
some of the AIM (Alternative Investment Market) and London traded stocks.
Bradford Gentry: Let’s take questions from the audience now.
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Question and Answer Session 
QUESTION 1: Ideal terms for regulations 
One of the points you’ve made is that this is a very regulatory-driven environment, and yet
with a lot of the regulatory aspects, whether they’re carbon emission reductions, production
tax credits, etc., everyone can see the sunset out there. It could be a year, four years, etc. What
would you consider an ideal term for some of these regulations? Would you like to see ten
year structures put in place or something that could match project finance profiles?
Andy Ertel: One of the success stories of emissions trading has been in sulfur
dioxide. The utilities always have a 30-year forward allocation. They have 30 years of
credits on hand that they can sell for cash today to finance a scrubber or any other
new control technology. One of the fundamental problems we had in the EU trading
system was a three year window of allowances. You’re not going to finance any
fundamental change with three years of capital. It just doesn’t happen. If you look at
the utility industry in particular, these are huge capital investments and you’re talking
about 20 year investments. Ten years really should be the minimum.
One of the fundamental problems we had in the EU trading system was a
three year window of allowances. You’re not going to finance any
fundamental change with three years of capital. It just doesn’t happen. If
you look at the utility industry in particular, these are huge capital
investments and you’re talking about 20 year investments. Ten years really
should be the minimum.
Martin Whittaker: If you look at what happened in the Clean Development
Mechanism, we blew through some of the industrial gas projects right away. We want to
try and drive through new technologies. I agree with Andy. I don't know what the right
number is, but it’s longer than three years and hopefully longer than five years because
that’s about the time where it starts to become meaningful from an investor’s perspective.
But I would also say that you made a point about it being regulatory-driven. For a
lot of the efficiency-driven companies that we’re looking at, in fact, monetization of
the environmental benefit is a kicker. It’s an additional return; it’s gravy. You get a lot
of environmental benefit that doesn’t necessarily have to be monetized in the form of
a tradable credit. It’s not necessarily the case that in all investments in the clean energy
space that you have to have a heavy dose of regulation to make them successful.
Paul Ezekiel: Just quickly in regards to coal power, the big issue, as Andy
mentioned earlier, is uncertainty. We’re seeing situations in the U.S. where potential
buyers of assets have walked away just because they can’t get their heads around the
contingent carbon liability. That’s becoming a little clearer today, but it’s still
uncertain. It’s obviously impacting asset valuations.
Anecdotally, there was an interesting experience pre-Christmas when I was
approached by the Treasurer of New South Wales, one of the largest states in
Australia, who you may have read is privatizing their four largest coal plants. As a $20
billion privatization, it is probably the largest this year. We are actually advising them
on the disposal of those assets. Interestingly enough, he asked us to come down to
Sydney and spend some time with him to figure out how investors or potential
purchasers of these assets will value that contingent carbon liability. This is in a non-
regulated market, Australia. They’ve just recently signed the Kyoto Protocol, but they
are unregulated. The bottom line is that it’s not worth $20 billion. Is it worth $15
billion with that contingent liability? Because if I’m buying those assets, I know that
there’s going to be some sort of cap-and-trade regime.
We’re seeing situations in the U.S. where potential buyers of assets have
walked away just because they can’t get their heads around the contingent
carbon liability. [Uncertainty] is obviously impacting asset valuations.
QUESTION 2: Depth of the market
Other than, say, long equities under private equity or trading public equities in climate
change-related companies, is there a market for several billion dollars in either trading
carbon credits or investing in the futures-like instrument? I’m just curious what the
market is offering now to an investor who wants to allocate substantial amounts.
Paul Ezekiel: That’s an interesting question. As far as a hedge fund appetite goes at
the moment, we’re seeing probably ten of the largest multi-strategy hedge funds with
a dedicated strategy in carbon. They’ve done some of the earlier deals, taking some
pretty interesting profit off the table, but they’re finding it increasingly hard to
compete. This is certainly the case in some of the more interesting P&L or margin
opportunities which are really emerging market project focused. It’s very difficult for
a hedge fund, no matter how large the assets under management, to have access to
these projects in the field. Increasingly they’re coming to us looking for structured
exposure to essentially take structured risk.
How deep is that market? It’s hard to say. The new thing that we’re starting to see
is a few dedicated pure play carbon hedge fund deals which are smaller, probably $250
to $500 million in size, but in total it’s probably a couple of billion dollars of
dedicated capital. That’s probably a good guess.
As far as a hedge fund appetite goes at the moment,we’re seeing probably ten
of the largest multi-strategy hedge funds with a dedicated strategy in carbon.
[. . .] The new thing that we’re starting to see is a few dedicated pure play
carbon hedge fund deals which are smaller, probably $250 to $500 million in
size, but in total it’s probably a couple of billion dollars of dedicated capital.
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Andy Ertel: I would say there’s about $5 billion out there in terms of carbon funds,
environmental funds, etc. There are very few, but an example of a successful one is RNK
Capital, who closed their fund at $500 million. They’ve been closed for over a year and
have a long waiting list, but they’ve had 90 percent plus returns for two, three years.
There are a lot of folks out there that have long only-carbon funds. In some ways, with
long-only carbon funds, why bother? These are complex markets. There’s a lot of
regulatory driven events. I think one of the things that you’ll see is that these markets are
going to continue to grow and grow in liquidity. Looking at some of the commoditized
energy products, we see this is a huge growing business. The hottest sector of natural gas
trading today, for example, is options. You go down to the floor at NYMEX and so much
has gone electronic. The only growing pit down there is the options pit.
If you look at the EU allowance market, it’s still very small in terms of options
trading. One of the things that we are doing at the Green Exchange is that the first
two years will be quarterly contracts, and we’re going to have quarterly settles and
options. That’s an area that’s really nascent and really does not have the level of
trading expertise that you see in other places. There’s a lot of activity in the funds that
actually specialize in more commoditized businesses and trading opportunities
because, to be quite frank, of the trading expertise in Europe in this very big growing
market. The sophistication is not what you see in the world oil market or gas market.
I’m not sure I would say this in Europe, but it was not the top guys who got
promoted to trade FX (foreign exchange), electricity, or gas. You have to understand
that four years ago nobody took this market seriously at the European utilities. Now
that’s changing. Credit Suisse, for example, has come in and built a really good
banking team in these markets along with a trading and execution team. That’s one
example of the kind of professionalization of these markets.
There are tremendous growth opportunities and there are a bunch of new up-and-
coming managers out there. My old partner, David Candola, is launching a new fund
and the reality is that the next wave of managers are coming in. Renewables trading
is still nascent. A lot of these markets are very young with a lot of room to grow.
There’s a lot of opportunity.
QUESTION 3: Betterment of the environment
My question is geared mainly toward Martin. What steps are you taking so as to not focus
purely upon profit making through carbon trading, and also include a focus on the
betterment of the environment?
Martin Whittaker: At the moment, we don’t trade credits directly. We’re a growth
equity fund. We’re investing in businesses, and we’re not a hedge fund. We feel that
the better the environmental benefit of some of these companies, the better they are
at solving the underlying problem of emissions reduction or energy efficiency and the
better we’ll get paid because that’s really what’s driving value. That’s why this market
is growing and that’s why it exists. I don’t see it as being a tradeoff. We do a lot of
research, and we spend a lot of time understanding the fundamental trends affecting
different segments of the clean energy industry and answering just those questions.
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That’s why we didn’t make any biofuel investments in the last couple of years, and
that’s why there are other sectors that we’ve stayed away from. We didn’t think the
environmental entitlement was there. It’s just a very strong focus of our analysis, and
we track it with our portfolio companies, but we don’t see it as being a tradeoff. We’re
totally profit-driven.
Benjamin Block: If I might add something to that, if you’ve watched the solar
market for the last 18 months or so, what you’ve seen is this: a company comes out
and announces that it’s expanding its capacity and lowering its costs, and then the
market rewards it with a giant increase in share price. This is just incentive-based
behavior. You expand because you’re going to get paid for it. One of the repercussions
of this expansion has been that the cost of solar electricity has come down
substantially. So if you take care of the economics, you’ll get this market-based
behavior and the environmental benefits will follow.
QUESTION 4: Role of financial engineering  
Andy, it was interesting to hear Paul talk a little bit about CDO (Collateralized Debt
Obligation) technology being implemented back in December. How much do you think
what we’ve learned in financial engineering is going to help get this market to higher levels?
Andy Ertel: I really think that we’re still in the very early stages of creative finance.
A lot of what’s gone on has been very bread and butter in terms of the sophistication
of these markets. A number of the banks, for example, are working on securitization
products. That’s one aspect. The derivative markets are really just beginning. A lot of
the contracts that we are coming out with are both on Green Exchange and physically
settled contracts. The building of ETFs (Exchange-Traded Funds) and other product
classes . . . we’re really in the first inning of a nine inning game, and we know it’s going
to go at least nine innings.
What we really need now is for the legislators to listen to some of the market folks
about how to build a simple and effective program. What scares me is the political
engineering that’s being talked about in Washington in terms of price caps, safety
valves, and a federal reserve for carbon. When I start hearing that, I just think about
political intervention and chaos in the market, and markets like certainty.
What we really need now is for the legislators to listen to some of the
market folks about how to build a simple and effective program. What
scares me is the political engineering that’s being talked about in
Washington in terms of price caps, safety valves, and a federal reserve for
carbon. When I start hearing that, I just think about political intervention
and chaos in the market, and markets like certainty.
Martin Whittaker: I’d like to make the point that the underlying risk in the delivery
of some of the carbon credits and the project-based carbon credits is just not well
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understood by most of the investors. We’re still at the very early stage and a lot of the
projects are underperforming. Landfill gas projects, for example, are under-
performing because of insufficient engineering data on leachate collection and things
like that. We’re not getting the carbon credits that we thought we would. This is going
to be a big asset class, but I still don’t think a lot of the basic risks around delivery of
project-based carbon credits have really been teased out yet. The worry is, of course,
analogous to that of subprime mortgages. If we start to replicate that activity and
don’t learn from history, then we’re doomed to repeat it.
We’re still at the very early stage and a lot of the projects are under-
performing. Landfill gas projects, for example, are underperforming because
of insufficient engineering data on leachate collection and things like that.
We’re not getting the carbon credits that we thought we would. This is going
to be a big asset class, but I still don’t think a lot of the basic risks around
delivery of project-based carbon credits have really been teased out yet.
QUESTION 5: Green building potential
I want to get your opinion on the potential for green building. I know Win mentioned the
potential for sustainable buildings.2 With energy efficiency, water efficiency, and waste
reduction, there’s so much potential to build an infrastructure with the energy and the
environment in mind. It really is in need of capital investment at this stage and these
types of projects are something that can be done today. By contrast, a lot of the other
things are out into the future – we’re still waiting for technologies, for example.
Andy Ertel: Absolutely true. I just got back from the United Arab Emirates where
they’re going to be building a city for something like 50,000 to 100,000 people that’s
going to have a zero carbon footprint. It will include everything from green roofs to
water collection systems to composting to automatic systems that work so that when
you go on vacation, your air conditioning automatically turns off in your apartment.
That’s on a very big scale.
QUESTION 6: Prospects for the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI) 
Will RGGI work?
Andy Ertel: I had very high aspirations for RGGI, and we were an advisor to
Governor Pataki in the original design of RGGI. But to be quite frank, I’m a little bit
scared about the 100 percent auctioning provisions that are now going into this. For
background, basically every other emissions trading program to date has handed out
an allocation of credits to the affected sources along with some auctioning. For
example, the U.S. sulfur dioxide program initially had two and a half percent
auctioning to ensure price discovery and liquidity because nobody knew what would
happen in an emissions trading program since it was the first. There’s now this
groundswell for auctioning and New York State has taken the lead.
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2 
Win Neuger, Chairman of the
AIG Investment Group, spoke
earlier in the evening at this
event.
Here is the issue. Even though there’s a small reduction in allowances and
emissions under the cap during the first couple of years, we could get significant price
shock in that because there’s no allocation. The market is only two percent short, but
in reality, every unit is 100 percent short at the outset. What happens if the 200 people
in this room represent 200 hedge funds, participate in the auctions, and tie up, as
speculators, a large amount of the carbon that will be available?  Are we going to turn
the power off? No. The concern is that this is a little bit of an experiment at a time
when RGGI has the possibility to do for regulated carbon in the U.S. what California
did for deregulation of the power markets. That scares me quite a bit because this is
a very important mission that we’re all on, and it’s very important that all of us in the
financial community play a role in its success. When you start putting in price caps
and getting highly experimental, it just makes me nervous.
Martin Whittaker: My sense is that RGGI is going to probably kick off just fine, but
that it will be superseded by a federal program. It reminds me a little bit of the U.K.
Emissions Trading Scheme which was just enveloped by the EU Emissions Trading
Scheme (EU ETS). At this point, the only presidential candidate that I knew that
wasn’t in favor of cap-and-trade was Giuliani, and he’s now out of the race.
closing remarks
Bradford Gentry: We’ve got a very complicated market in its very early stages. It
sounds like opportunity to me – lots of opportunity for financial institutions to
speak with each other about how to do this. I think most importantly though, are
some of the last comments about regulation; the policy community needs to hear
from you all. To the extent that markets are going to be built to last, the message needs
to come from the investment community because the scale of the change that’s
needed globally is going to require massive shifts in long term investment. Insights
from all of you into that process for policy makers will be critical, and that’s why we’re
delighted to be part of this kind of a conversation today between the state and the
hedge fund industry.
We’ve got a very complicated market in its very early stages. It sounds like
opportunity to me – lots of opportunity for financial institutions to speak
with each other about how to do this. I think most importantly though, are
some of the last comments about regulation; the policy community needs
to hear from you all. To the extent that markets are going to be built to last,
the message needs to come from the investment community because the
scale of the change that’s needed globally is going to require massive shifts
in long term investment.
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Investing in Clean Energy and Climate
Change: A Private Equity Panel
Mark Barnett, Foley Hoag (Moderator); Jeff Miller, The Tremont Group;
Jeff Possick, MissionPoint Capital; George Sorenson, FE Clean Energy Group 
editors’ remarks
This chapter provides an inside look into the private equity approach to climate change
investment through a panel that, as moderator Mark Barnett notes,“represents a good
cross section of folks who have tremendous experience in investing in clean energy and
alleviating climate change from a variety of perspectives.” One of the last talks in our
series, it was also one of the most well attended, as was best observed by our colleague
who commented that the room was virtually “bursting at the seams.”
Short introductions are followed by a moderated panel discussion that covers four
major topics. The first, investment philosophy and the role of mission agendas in
investing, sets the chapter’s candid tone when all panelists point to satisfaction in the
confluence of “doing good” and “doing well” but then come, in their own way, to Jeff
Possick’s conclusion that fiduciary responsibility defines their main aim – “We certainly
don’t have the luxury of sitting on our hands.” The middle two topics, economic and
legislative sensitivities of clean energy and climate change investment, draw on the
panel’s experience as best typified by Jeff Miller’s initial response to the affects of
economic volatility:“I’ve been at this long enough to have gone through many of these
cycles, and they’re all different but they’re all the same.” The final topic concerns the
role of technology in climate change mitigation and results in one of this publication’s
liveliest conversations on energy efficiency.
The chapter closes with a question and answer session that includes more on energy
efficiency and technology, water, supply chain challenges, coal, sustainability
standards, renewables, and career advice. While many of these subjects can be tracked
throughout the book, the viewpoints presented here are insightful and, at times, rich in
anecdotes. This can probably be no better exemplified than by George Sorenson’s segue
into explaining the difficulties in utilizing non-uniform feed stocks in emerging
economy biofuel projects: “We wake up at night in hot sweats with bad dreams seeing
donkeys lined to the horizon all carrying cane trash to supply our biomass plants.”*
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introduction
Mark Barnett: Thank you, everyone, for being here this afternoon for our panel,
“Investing In Clean Energy and Climate Change.” We have a really great panel for you
this evening, so I’m not going to talk for too long. I will provide a few moments of
introduction and then get out of the way to get the discussion going.
This panel represents a good cross section of folks who have tremendous
experience in investing in clean energy and alleviating climate change from a variety
of international and domestic perspectives. I’d like to invite each of them to
introduce themselves because they’re far better qualified to do that than I am.
Jeff Miller: My name is Jeff Miller. I have a firm called the Tremont Group which
is based in Boston and focuses on investing in energy through the particular lens of
environmental impact regulation and opportunity. I’ve been involved in energy
investment going back to my days at Goldman Sachs. A group of us left Goldman and
formed the Beacon Group back in the early nineties and invested in energy; we had
a second fund with a particular focus on energy technology. After our sale of Beacon
to JP Morgan, I was at JP Morgan Partners focusing on energy and energy technology
and formed Tremont in 2000 to carry on the investments.
The focus of Tremont is on the entire energy chain with a view of how
environmental regulation, particularly climate change regulation, is going to create
winners, losers, and investment opportunities.
George Sorenson: I’m George Sorenson, one of the Founders of FE Clean Energy
Group. Our primary focus is on emerging markets, and we define our investable
emerging markets as Latin America, Central and Eastern Europe (including further
east), and Asia.
We started back in ’98 or ’99, when carbon was still kind of a glint in everybody’s
eye. We started in Central and Eastern Europe where businesses with centrally
planned economic models could no longer afford to produce their own power or
upgrade their own inside the fence power plants. We came in with an energy
outsourcing energy efficiency strategy, and that’s how we began. Over time as carbon
and as renewable energy projects increased, we became more involved in them.
We are on the project finance side of the business. We don’t do high tech and we
don’t do cleantech. We just do renewable energy and energy efficiency projects in our
selected emerging markets.
Jeff Possick: I’m Jeff Possick, and I’m with MissionPoint Capital. We fit between
the other two.
Our tagline at MissionPoint is financing the transition to a lower carbon economy.
The firm is only about two years old, though it grew out of the previous activities of
two of our founders.
We split the world into four pieces: no carbon energy such as renewables and
nuclear; carbon energy such as improving the efficiency of existing fossil fuel type
structure; energy efficiency; and environmental finance. We are a growth equity
player, so we are not necessarily taking direct technology risk, though we will get
involved in later stage venture companies. We’re looking for businesses that are on the
cusp of major growth and need capital to achieve that.
private equity panel




Mark Barnett: To start things off, I think one of the interesting things about what’s
happening in the world of clean energy and climate change investment is the
confluence of some pretty tremendous business opportunities with a sense of a real
mission driven investment culture. People see a need for these technologies to be driven
forward for reasons having to do with a sense that the global climate is changing.
This is interesting for me personally, having been at Yale as an undergraduate
where I was very passionate about environmental issues. That seemed to have nothing
to do with business at the time, and then, having come back for law school, I saw a
tremendous change. I think the confluence has even accelerated since the time I’ve
been here, and this is something that we’re going to explore a bit on this panel today.
I’d like to ask each of you to talk about your investment philosophy and strategy in the
area of clean energy and climate change. To what extent do you feel that the mission
driven element is a factor either in your personal motivations or in the motivations of
your LPs (Limited Partners) or investors?
Jeff Miller: I take very much a market-based approach to investing. Our strategy is
to look at the entire energy chain, consider what the BTU (British Thermal Unit)
values are on a relative basis, use a macro approach to assess the impacts of
transportation and fuel switching, and ultimately try to anticipate how
environmental externalities are going to get priced into the system and where the
opportunities are. To that extent it’s very much a quantitative analytical approach.
Having said that, from a personal investment perspective, there is a confluence of
things that has engaged me since I was here at Yale as an undergraduate. One of my
classmates is Frances Beinecke and I’m on the Board of the World Resources Institute
(WRI) with Frances. So to the extent to which you can get a confluence of the two,
it’s very satisfying, but our investments have a fiduciary duty to our investors, and our
approach is to look at this analytically and see where the opportunities will emerge.
We have co-invested in many of our investments with funds that are more on the
activist side, but from our perspective it’s ultimately going to be the markets that
determine whether or not it’s successful. We’re looking to find opportunities where
that’s going to happen.
George Sorenson: We are pretty proactive. We will go into a project when it’s 80
percent developed, typically a brownfield development where the energy production
concessions are in place. We’ll take construction risk. We’ll send our technical guys in
to help the local developers.
When we look at a market, we identify an opportunity in that market, and then we
try to build a project development platform off of that opportunity so that we can
replicate it over a number of projects. An example would be India. We identified
hydro as an interesting opportunity there. The country was power short and, the last
I checked, God wasn’t building any more hydro sites. We obtain a site and as other
sites are taken up, the existing sites become more valuable due to their subsequent
scarcity value. That is our area of focus in that market. In other markets we might
take a different focus.
From a personal standpoint, I’m a true believer in renewable energy and global
warming, and I would like to do what I can as a businessman to solve that problem.
From an economic standpoint, my investors want a rate of return. If they do well by
the world, I think that they’re very happy with that, but first and foremost they want
a rate of return.
I’m a true believer in renewable energy and global warming, and I would
like to do what I can as a businessman to solve that problem. From an
economic standpoint, my investors want a rate of return. If they do well by
the world, I think that they’re very happy with that, but first and foremost
they want a rate of return.
Jeff Possick: Our approach is very similar to the approach that Jeff Miller was
describing. We start from a very research-based look at things, trying to locate the
biggest bang for the buck in terms of climate change, with the assumption that the
mitigation of climate change is one of the biggest problems facing the global economy
in the foreseeable future. The companies that are in the best position to facilitate that
mitigation should see outsized returns. That’s the angle at which we approach it.
Certainly the folks within the firm all feel very strongly about what we’re doing,
and that’s how we came together at the beginning. But, much as my fellow panelists
have said, we have a fiduciary responsibility to our investors. Our investors have
invested with us because they think they can get the best rate of return possible. They
believe in what we’re doing, but it’s a bonus, not the main aim.
Mark Barnett: Just a quick follow on. Do you see differentiations among your LPs?
Obviously there are a range of different types of LPs out there looking to put money into
private equity funds. Do you see some of them more patient or less patient in terms of
what’s happening in the clean energy and cleantech sector?
Jeff Possick: We have. We have an unusual investor base in that we have a relatively
small group of institutional investors in the fund. There are certainly people who
found us originally because they were involved in environmental causes in which
some of our founders were involved. They are very deeply concerned about that side
of things, but they certainly make up a very small proportion of the money in the
fund. We certainly don’t have the luxury of sitting on our hands.
effects of an economic downturn
Mark Barnett: Turning topics for a second, the world economy seems to be experiencing a
downturn phase. How is that affecting the clean energy sector from your perspective? 
Jeff Possick: From our side of things, the biggest impact that could potentially
occur – and who knows whether it will – is that with the economy in the state that
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it’s in, we could conceivably see less willingness to add additional burden to the global
economy. It may slow down the pace of things like carbon legislation, whether it’s
cap-and-trade or whether it’s a tax. We may see a slowdown in the rate that we’re
adding renewable portfolio standards, whatever they may be. There’s probably less
willingness to tack on something that’s going to add extra cost to doing business and
to living your life.
Mark Barnett: George, I want your opinion on this as well, but one of the things I
want to throw in is that there’s an interesting divergence of opinion out there, at least in
the press, where some would say that the clean energy sector is actually recession proof
because of mandates from government, because of high oil prices, and because of a
variety of other factors such as technology being further along. Others would say no, the
clean energy sector is actually more susceptible to downturn, maybe because of some of
the emotion built into some of these valuations.
Jeff Possick: It probably cuts both ways. We’re less likely to see legislation, as I just
mentioned, but by the same token you see people focusing on what you might call the
net positive economic benefit projects. These are the projects or the companies that don’t
need legislation to go forward, the ones that are basically saving you money because oil
is $106 a barrel, or whatever it is today. There’s definitely an increased push for finding
ways to lessen our dependence there just because of the pure economic side of it.
It [an economic downturn] probably cuts both ways. We’re less likely to see
legislation, as I just mentioned, but by the same token you see people
focusing on what you might call the net positive economic benefit projects.
George Sorenson: Jeff (Possick) puts forth a very valid point, which is we’re going
to see a lot of guys get hurt in this little decline because they have invested in projects
for reasons other than pure economics. We kind of have a postulate, and in emerging
markets everything seems to be magnified for the worse or for the better. That
postulate is that since energy is a regulated business, generally speaking, you must be
in a country where the alternative to not having you invest in projects is worse than
having you invest in projects. The only worse alternative for a politician facing high
cost power, is for his voters to turn their lights on and have nothing happen.
We look at countries where there is a real need for power or where the pollution is
such that it’s beginning to bother the local residents, so they have to make changes in
the way they generate their energy. That’s a sort of driver that allows you to then come
in and really make a difference, and also not be cheated from a return standpoint by
the local regulatory bodies.
Jeff Miller: I’ve been at this long enough to have gone through many of these
cycles, and they’re all different but they’re all the same. The volatility is never that
much fun, and I must say that if you go into an investment thinking that you’re in the
last round and the next stop is an IPO, chances are you’re going to be disappointed.
We have several companies that we have invested in, and it has never yet been the last
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round. There’s always one more round. We have two companies that we’re ready to
file as ones who are now waiting it out. So, you’ve got to always anticipate that access
to the public markets is something that may happen, but don’t have that as your
primary source of liquidity.
Having said that, we’ve seen tremendous interest from investors in this particular
sector for several different reasons. One of our portfolio companies has a carbon
capture technology for coal fired power plants. A year ago we were quietly developing
interest, and now the level of interest has become rather silly; frankly, the challenge
in that environment is finding the right investors who understand what they’re doing.
We have another company that’s focused on smart grid technology. That has also
heated up. It went through a boom and bust cycle, as the public market comparables
traded up and then collapsed again. But there’s a sustained level of interest
anticipating that smart grid is something that has to be adapted because for a lot of
reasons it’s the low hanging fruit in any sort of climate change scenario.
We have another company that is now worth probably two and a half to three
times what it was a year ago just based on the perception that again, the smart grid is
something that’s timely.
So, those areas have been somewhat countercyclical, but overall I’d say it’s
probably big net negative, and I think the issue of trying to pass something in terms
of carbon constraints when the economy is contracting is going to be far more
difficult than it would have been had we been in an increasing economic cycle.
effects of legislation
Mark Barnett: Since you all, in different ways, hit on the legislative piece, let’s jump
there. I heard a positive tone from each of you in terms of thinking that climate
legislation would actually be pretty central to the sector. Do you view legislation in this
area fairly positively from a general point of view, and are you thinking of specific types
of legislation you’d like to see?
I ask in part from a perspective of being very familiar with a lot of investors
complaining about government and regulation, and in the clean energy space, they can
particularly get in the way by distorting subsidies and the like. We’d be interested in your
general thoughts. Obviously I imagine we’ll hear some positive voices on a carbon tax,
but to the extent you can give us some of your more nuanced thoughts on this issue, we’d
be very interested to hear them.
Jeff Miller: Well, I think the critical tool is getting market pricing right. Gus Speth’s
new book2 focuses on what happens when the markets don’t work and it’s a scathing
indictment of markets that don’t work. On the other hand, when the markets do
price in the externalities and the incentives for capital to form, they become an
incredibly powerful tool.
When the markets do price in the externalities and the incentives for
capital to form, they become an incredibly powerful tool.
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My concern is that there is an insufficient focus on the difficulties of getting
market pricing, whether it’s a cap-and-trade system or whether it’s a carbon tax, to
really work because, given the scale, it’s far more complex and difficult than anything
we’ve done; and then we’re also adding on the problems of international trade and
transfer. I think the signals indicate that there’s a lot more positive activity, and, just
based on the window that I get through the work that WRI is doing in D.C. fielding
requests from congressional staffers, there is a sense that something is going to
happen very soon.
Now, my concern again is that a lot of the people on the hill are truly clueless as to
what all of this is. For example, some of the briefings are about what is this CO2
problem, why do I need to be worried about it, and is this for real? There are two very
thoughtful questions in the trade-offs between the economic efficiency of a carbon
tax versus a cap-and-trade system and then how to use the proceeds. For all of that to
catch up and come up with something that’s intelligent, I think we’ve got a lot of work
to do. I’m concerned that people do not quite appreciate how long it’s going to take
for that to be developed.
On the other side, I’m also pretty jaded about what happens when you get
lobbyists who are good at getting subsidies. The whole corn ethanol thing is a case in
point where you need to be very careful about letting some of those monsters loose.
George Sorenson: In emerging markets, I’m not sure that we’re quite as worried
about subsidies as we are about the general regulatory environment that allows one
to get a rate of return. There are markets out that don’t even have a regulatory regime
in place. You don’t want to invest in a market where, for example, you don’t know
what your tariff rates are and where you can’t execute long term power off-take
agreements at prices with escalators.
Generally speaking, I’d say in emerging markets there’s less of this. I will say, and
there are exceptions, that for near competitive technologies such as wind, we’ve seen
a number of markets provide subsidies over a longer period of time than in the U.S.
The problem I see in the U.S. is that power subsidies in the form of special tariff rates
must be renewed every one to three years. You can’t build a 20 year plan on legislation
like that.
Emerging markets can’t get away with that. They have to put in a little longer term
legislation, and that’s been helpful to us.
Jeff Possick: I would probably echo some of what Jeff (Miller) said. Again, I think
the key thing is really figuring out how to get the market based mechanisms working
appropriately. Also, to echo George’s point, the biggest problem right now, based on
what we’ve gathered from talking to the consumers and energy companies, is just the
regulatory uncertainty around all of this. A lot of utilities expect that at some point
there’s going to be something about carbon and they would just love to be able to
know what it will be so that they could figure out how to deal with it. Right now
they’re all kind of taking stabs in the dark to figure out what the best mitigation
pathways are because nobody really quite knows how it’s going to pan out.
This would speak to getting something in place, and then trying to figure out how
to make it work; once it’s in place we tweak it.
Mark Barnett: What about the regimes that are already in place? George, let me ask
you, do your projects at all tap into credits available under Kyoto via the Clean
Development Mechanism (CDM)?
George Sorenson: Yes. We have derived credits in our hydros in India and in China.
They’re all CDM projects. It seems to me that every country is a little different, but at
least those two – India more than China – seem to have fairly clear pathways to
getting the credits. Once you are working within a methodology that’s already been
approved by the UNFCCC (United Nations Framework Convention on Climate
Change), the road seems to be fairly clear.
We have derived about 2 million tons worth of credits from our hydro plants, and
those have contributed anywhere from 200 to 400 basis points to the return. And, you
know, in hydro you’re always late from a construction standpoint. You’re always in the
middle of a hill someplace and there’s a problem. So that extra couple of percentage
points added to the return really helps to alleviate some of the risk.
We have derived about 2 million tons worth of [CER] credits from our hydro
plants [in India and China], and those have contributed anywhere from 200
to 400 basis points to the return . . . that extra couple of percentage points
added to the return really helps to alleviate some of the risk.
Mark Barnett: And have you done investments or much work in some of the domestic
trading mechanisms that exist? Have you dealt with the Chicago Climate Exchange or
state programs trading around RECs (Renewable Energy Certificates) or white tags?
George Sorenson: We haven’t done anything yet. We’re focused on emerging markets.
Mark Barnett: Jeff (Possick), I know you’ve dealt with these to some extent and have
looked into these types of market instruments.
Jeff Possick: We have. We are actually part of a joint venture with GE and AES
called Greenhouse Gas Solutions which is a purely U.S. focused carbon business. The
business targets what is currently the voluntary market for carbon from top to
bottom – from developing and financing domestic projects all the way up through
long term sales agreements for carbon credits.
Jeff Miller: We have looked at various mechanisms going back to the mid-nineties,
and for a variety of reasons have not yet pulled the trigger on them.
Mark Barnett: What is one of the reasons that you have not yet pulled the trigger?  Do
you see what’s happening now as a constructive path towards an ultimate solution, or
just something else? 
Jeff Miller: It’s hard for me to project because just three years ago I can remember
a WRI board meeting where there was wide level of despondency about where things
were. And in the last 24 to 36 months, we’ve seen such an accelerated level of activity,
and a lot of it’s very serious. The point that has been made really resonates. Part of it
is actually driven by corporations who desperately need a set of rules. There is this
view that corporations are just this monolithic thing that bounces along, but the fact
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is every year they make capital investment decisions either to maintain their value or
to grow their business. Therefore, every year, they’re forced to make decisions such as
what technology or fuels to use. Some of these investments, particularly in the utility
sector, have a 50 year life. So, it’s impossible to come to a screeching halt and wait for
a ten year period.
Part of [the recent, accelerated activity] is actually driven by corporations
who desperately need a set of rules. There is this view that corporations are
just this monolithic thing that bounces along, but the fact is every year they
make capital investment decisions either to maintain their value or to grow
their business.
Activity such as USCAP (U.S. Climate Action Partnership) – a number of U.S.
corporations and utilities that have basically come together with non-governmental
organizations and environmental organizations to try to devise a path forward to
develop a set of rules – was largely motivated by the concern that chaos is worse than
regulation. The flip side of that is that many of these are multinational corporations
who have to do business outside the U.S. and are frankly finding it difficult to do
business, recognizing that there’s a different view outside the U.S. And so, in many
respects you can’t be held hostage.
climate change mitigation through technology:
energy efficiency
Mark Barnett: Turning to a specific question on technology, I’d be interested in your
thoughts on where you see the biggest potential for impact from a climate change
perspective. Where are the technology areas or resource areas that you think could have
a really demonstrable impact on the need to transition to a low carbon economy?
Jeff Possick: Our general view from a bang for your buck perspective, and I think
this is probably a pretty widely held view, is that energy efficiency and improving
efficiency of existing technologies gets you huge returns in terms of the amount of
carbon that you can mitigate. You can implement software upgrades to a gigawatt
coal fired power plant, for example, that can achieve a 1 percent increase in efficiency.
That’s essentially ten megawatts of carbon free power since you’re getting that power
out of the same carbon that you put in before. And you can do that for a few hundred
thousand dollars, whereas building the equivalent capacity of renewables will cost
you many multiples of that– orders of magnitude more. We are certainly taking a
hard look to figure out who the potential winners in that arena will be.
George Sorenson: I just want to spend a second more on that subject as a sideline.
Energy efficiency is the base of the pyramid, but the problem is that, in a typical
corporation, the responsibility for energy efficiency at the operating engineer level
and the decision making responsibility say at the home office level are quite different.
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The engineer is not necessarily rewarded for taking a risk to make a more efficient
plant, but he certainly is penalized if the thing doesn’t work the way it’s supposed to.
Our general view from a bang for your buck perspective, and I think this is
probably a pretty widely held view, is that energy efficiency and improving
efficiency of existing technologies gets you huge returns in terms of the
amount of carbon that you can mitigate.
The operating guys up above tend to be bean counters and they’re counting your
money – my money – so even if they have no intention of doing it, if I’m making too
much money then they won’t do the project because they think they’ll do it
themselves.
It’s very hard to implement energy efficiency solutions. We have a number of
ESCOs (Energy Service Companies) around the world, and you’d think it would be
the simplest thing in the world, but it’s really quite difficult to do.
Energy efficiency is the base of the pyramid, but the problem is that, in a
typical corporation, the responsibility for energy efficiency at the operating
engineer level and the decision making responsibility say at the home
office level are quite different. The engineer is not necessarily rewarded for
taking a risk to make a more efficient plant, but he certainly is penalized if
the thing doesn’t work the way it’s supposed to.
Jeff Possick: To follow up on that, I think we’ve started to see a change to some
extent as energy has become such a big cost for a lot of companies. We’re starting to
see energy management and energy efficiency move higher up the corporate food
chain with corporations that historically really didn’t care about, or deal with, their
energy usage. Historically this was very much the operational level – it’s the plant
manager or store manager for example. We’re now seeing corporations putting in an
Executive Vice President of Energy Usage or similar positions.
We’ve started to see a change to some extent as energy has become such a
big cost for a lot of companies. We’re starting to see energy management
and energy efficiency move higher up the corporate food chain with
corporations that historically really didn’t care about, or deal with, their
energy usage.
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That has been one of the side effects of higher energy prices. Energy is beginning
to rise up the chain – all of a sudden the amount you’re spending on energy goes
from being a tenth of a percent of your operating margin to being a percentage point
or 2 percent of your operating margin. People start to pay a lot more attention, and
we’re seeing a lot more traction there.
Part of the traction is also working the financial incentives associated with energy
usage, changing the way that energy efficiency projects are financed. We’ve got a
company that we’re involved with whose whole business is financing energy efficiency
projects. Historically there was not a whole lot of market for that in commercial real
estate or large scale residential type developments, but that’s starting to change, which
is a positive thing.
Mark Barnett: Before we leave energy efficiency, I’d like to follow-up. Jeff (Possick),
you just started into what I am interested in – are there innovative financing models
you’re seeing that, in addition to high energy prices, are pushing this sector along?
Jeff Possick: I think there definitely are. I will hesitate to talk too much about them
since the ones that I can describe in any detail are all proprietary. But there certainly
are changes as to who is making the original capital outlay. Moving things out of a
corporation’s capital budget and into their operating budget can often make things
more palatable because then you’ve got a small cost or you’re replacing an energy bill
with a bill from a different company. You therefore don’t have people who are
required to achieve payback periods that are very short on capital outlay; they can
conceivably have operating leases that can make things work.
George Sorenson: From strictly a private equity point of view, our target rates of
return are around 20 percent net to our investors. So if we were to go to a DuPont and
propose an energy efficiency project to them, we may have too high of a cost of capital
for them to allow us into their project.
When we’re doing energy efficiency, we end up in emerging markets doing
medium sized projects in the middle market which can sometimes be kind of scary –
these include companies that have developed projects but prefer to have equity capital
at even a 20 percent return versus leveraging their balance sheets further. That’s an
area where there’s a lot of opportunity, but as it’s a little difficult to quantify from a
credit risk standpoint, many investors stay away from that part of the market.
Jeff Miller: In terms of areas of opportunity, just looking at the scale of the invested
base of power generation and looking at the IEA (International Energy Agency)
forecasts in terms of fuel use, coal is by far the largest area. It represents half the
generation capacity here in the U.S., and the forecasts are 40 percent globally going
forward to 2030, whatever regime you’re looking at. So, given the scale of the problem,
everything to limit the carbon impact around coal fired generation is critically
important. It’s absolutely necessary that this be part of it. MIT did an excellent study3
on the future of coal in a carbon constrained world – it came out last year and really
emphasized that point.
Again, everything, as Jeff (Possick) mentioned, regarding the efficiency on a coal
fired power plant is huge. The carbon reduction curve as you go up for incremental
efficiency is very favorable, both for retrofit as well as new technology – be it
3
The Future of Coal: Options
for a Carbon Constrained
World. An Interdisciplinary
MIT Study. ISBN 978-615-
14092-6
integrated gasification combined cycle, or super critical to get the efficiency up, or
carbon capture and sequestration. There’s an enormous infrastructure that has to be
put in place to deal with carbon capture as well as with sequestration.
In terms of areas of opportunity, just looking at the scale of the invested
base of power generation and looking at the IEA forecasts in terms of fuel
use, coal is by far the largest area. It represents half the generation capacity
here in the U.S., and the forecasts are 40 percent globally going forward to
2030, whatever regime you’re looking at. So, given the scale of the problem,
everything to limit the carbon impact around coal fired generation is
critically important.
In my view, the second major area relates to everything around the smart grid,
whether it’s on the transportation transmission side, on the distribution side, or
behind the meter in efficiency, bringing that together in an intelligent fashion that
includes both software and hardware. We’re not talking about major breakthroughs
in technology. I think the opportunities are to fashion business models that can take
advantage of the hardware and software, and to create market incentives to develop
them. Flattening out the load duration curve presents enormous opportunities, and
then combining that with plug-in hybrids creates behind the meter opportunities for
everything from remote internet-based access to somebody’s water heater. So, from
2:00 p.m. to 4:00 p.m., for example, they crank down your water heater or your air
conditioning. All of this can be implemented in a very rapid timeframe, and that is
the low hanging fruit. I think that is the next major opportunity.
I think the opportunities are to fashion business models that can take
advantage of the hardware and software, and to create market incentives
to develop them. Flattening out the load duration curve presents enormous
opportunities, and then combining that with plug-in hybrids creates behind
the meter opportunities for everything from remote internet-based access
to somebody’s water heater.
Mark Barnett: Great. Thank you. I think at this point we’ll open it up to some
questions from all of you (the audience) just because I’m sure you all have questions
you want to ask.
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Question and Answer Session 
QUESTION 1: Smart grid and demand response technologies
Thanks for coming today. I actually wanted to piggyback off that last comment with
respect to smart grid solutions and demand response technologies. Are you finding those
opportunities domestically, or are there interesting opportunities abroad, specifically in
emerging markets where solutions on the demand side really have a place, whether it’s
demand response aggregators or on the metering side? Are there opportunities in
emerging markets for such technologies?
Jeff Miller: Well, I could speak to the domestic side in North America. We actually
have a smart metering company that has seen tremendous interest over the last 18
months. Canada is a major leader in this area. We’re also seeing a lot of activity among
southeast utilities – Duke Energy is a major leader. Texas has been quite active, and
California has mandates as well. So it’s beginning to develop. Utilities are not
generally early adopters. Most utilities are programmed. It’s the tipping model idea –
that if x number of people do it, I will do it. So finding somebody who’s programmed
first, let alone second, third, fourth, and so on, is extremely difficult. Now, once they
move, they move in lemming-like fashion, but overcoming that initial tip is very
difficult.
George Sorenson: In emerging markets, I’m not sure most of the utilities are quite
there yet. I’ll give you an example although it’s not really a smart grid example. We
invested in a project in India for illumination. The way the Indians, at least in this
particular area of India, turn their lights on and off is that there is a guy who rides
around on a bicycle in the morning and evening. He turns the streetlights off in the
morning and turns them on in the evening. This company had a little semaphore that
you install. It controls 200 lights and it has a cell phone receiver. Through the
semaphore they are able, by computer, to turn the lights on and off automatically.
Additionally, if any of you haven’t been able to sleep at night, and you get up in the
middle of the night, you may have noticed that the lights look really bright. They are
bright because the grid load is less, and so the lights are drawing more power off of
the grid. If you can drop the load down to a normal brightness you can save power.
By automating the process of turning lights on and off and regulating the electric
load, we reduced energy costs 44 percent a month for this particular municipality in
Bangalore. So these are the sorts of technology levels with which we’re dealing. You
can see we’re not quite to the point where one would employ a smart grid system in
these markets.
QUESTION 2: Water
Have any one of you ever thought about how water would be included in your portfolio
in the future?
Jeff Possick: We absolutely are looking at water. Part of our strategy around looking
at climate change is looking at adaptation to climate change, and a big part of that is
obviously water. Particularly, a lot of the energy infrastructure that’s getting built is,
in a lot of cases, increasingly water inefficient. That’s going to be a key area and there’s
a lot of work to be done there because it hasn’t been a huge focus for a lot of people.
It’s only starting to come into focus, particularly in this country where we haven’t
really thought about it to a large degree in a long time.
Part of our strategy around looking at climate change is looking at
adaptation to climate change, and a big part of that is obviously water.
Particularly, a lot of the energy infrastructure that’s getting built is, in a lot
of cases, increasingly water inefficient. That’s going to be a key area.
Jeff Miller: We would agree with that. Any of the generation technologies, including
hydro obviously, and anything that does a conversion generally require water. So water
becomes a critical element and often a binding constraint in feasibility.
George Sorenson: We haven’t invested in water to date other than making sure that
our facilities turn out cleaner water than that which went in.
QUESTION 3: Supply chain challenges
Can you describe some of the supply chain challenges you’re having with the energy
efficient technology investments, if any?
Jeff Possick: Part of what we look at very closely is supply chain. We’re not
necessarily only focusing on downstream technology, and we do look back up the
supply chain. We have seen a huge number of supply chain pinch points in a lot of
these markets. We’re trying to view them as opportunities rather than as the obstacles.
George Sorenson: We have a lot of issues with supply chain. We wake up at night
in hot sweats with bad dreams seeing donkeys lined to the horizon all carrying cane
trash to supply our biomass plants. The problem with renewable energy, particularly
with biomass, is it’s a non-uniform material. And so, the higher tech you go in the
boiler, the more problems you have.
I’ll use an example – this was luckily a project we didn’t do but one from which we
learned. There was a rice house project built in Thailand about two years ago. They
didn’t option up their rice husk; they just decided they would buy it on the open
market. Since rice husk is really quite light, they paid by weight. What would happen
is the rice husk would come in and the Thai farmers would add a little water to the
husk or maybe a little sand to the husk to increase the weight and make a little more
money. This would hit those boilers and then as the sand melted, all of a sudden they
would have glass inside their boiler and the broilers would break down.
This was a real issue. What we were able to do with our project was to contract
directly with a rice mill. The mill owner is also the owner with us on the project. The
rice husk comes right out of his mill at the same temperature and humidity, and goes
into our boilers. So, it really reduces supply chain risk. With biomass, you can’t
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depend on a supply chain that’s 100 miles long. It’s got to be close to your facility.
Otherwise you’re going to have a problem. And you have to option your raw material
up before you build your plant. That’s what’s going to happen, or that’s what’s
happening to the palm oil producers right now. They built these beautiful plants, and
palm oil’s 5,500 Malaysian Ringget at a ton. They can’t make money producing
biofuel at that raw material price.
Jeff Miller: Analyzing the supply chain is a critical part of the investment, either
offensively or defensively – offensively to see if you can extract monopoly rent and
defensively to make sure that you’re not going to get squashed. I’d say it’s probably
one of the biggest challenges we have had in our investment in late stage either pre-
commercial or pre-IPO companies trying to develop everything from upstream
supply to a distribution route. If you’re dealing with an established market on both
ends, chances are you’re going to get squeezed. Everything from IP protection to
avoiding predatory pricing and predatory terms and conditions is extremely difficult.
Analyzing the supply chain is a critical part of the investment, either
offensively or defensively – offensively to see if you can extract monopoly
rent and defensively to make sure that you’re not going to get squashed.
Often investors overlook the challenges of what happens after you successfully
develop the technology. But then you’re getting into the commercial game of who
benefits. That can be very painful if you have a backward map for how you’re going
to bring the technology to market. It’s important to make sure that you have multiple
routes and competition and various strategies, and that you can stay liquid so that
you’re not going to be under somebody’s thumb.
George Sorenson: One other item with regard to supply chain, and with a lot of
these technologies is that some of these fuels that we’re now using didn’t have a use four
or five years ago. When they started using sawdust in Europe, people paid you to take it
off their hands. Then the price of sawdust went up 10 to 20 times as demand increased
for its use as a fuel. And so, it’s very hard as a financier to predict the price of a substance
that transitions from having no use to all of a sudden having a use. Where will the
pricing of that substance end up? So, that’s a critical factor as we get into some of these
renewable technologies that are using fuels that no one’s been interested in before.
It’s very hard as a financier to predict the price of a substance that
transitions from having no use to all of a sudden having a use. Where will
the pricing of that substance end up? That’s a critical factor as we get into
some of these renewable technologies that are using fuels that no one’s
been interested in before.
Jeff Miller: Just to follow up on that, we’ve seen many cycles of this. It happened
in garbage. It happened in waste coal. And so, it’s something that’s very important to
focus on.
Mark Barnett: Are you saying biomass projects get built without contracted supply?
George Sorenson: Yes, fewer now than before, and we’re seeing fewer biofuel
projects – biofuel meaning biodiesel or ethanol – get built than before.
I think guys are finding that they’re struggling with getting raw material supplies. It
requires so much low BTU fuel to fire even a ten megawatt boiler. You just can’t believe
how much fill you need. So, there is still some of that going on, but we don’t invest in it.
Jeff Possick: We’ve also seen, on that end, that in many cases there may be a developer
who says that he’s got contracted supply, but if he’s contracting with 500 guys who go
out and pick up tree trimmings, this is probably not a contract with which you can
really do a whole lot. If the contracted guys decide they’re not going to come that day
and they don’t show up, that’s just the way it is. Or, if they end up with fewer tree
trimmings, you get lower fuel; if they give you crappy trees maybe they don’t burn.
Mark Barnett: Biomass projects have their own special challenges. Projects I won’t
name ran into problems when it was realized that trucks would be having to go
through the center of town pretty much 24 hours a day to get the necessary fuel
supply to the project. That didn’t go down too well with city hall. Other questions?  
QUESTION 4: Career advice: Coursework   
I’m going to switch gears and ask you a different type of question but one that is equally
important. What type of coursework would you suggest that we take here while in school in
order to be able to obtain positions similar to yours and to then be effective in such positions? 
Jeff Miller: When we are recruiting, we’re really looking for people who have a
toolbox and also have the judgment skills. It’s hard to describe it. I mean, clearly we
like people with analytical and quantitative backgrounds. We like people with
engineering backgrounds, with economic skills, and who certainly have finance skills,
but give me a good OR (operations research) person who can actually think through
a problem. I think the real issue is to view this as something that may go out of favor.
I’m actually amazed at the number of people who view energy and environment as
an exciting place. Having recruited when we first launched our fund back in 1992,
trying to convince people to invest in energy and the environment would bring
responses like, “Why would I want to do that?” Things do go in and out of favor, so
be careful what you ask for.
George Sorenson: That being said, developers were a dime a dozen right after
Enron went under. Now we can’t find them. In our company, I guess the position to
aspire to would be one of a developer. That’s the person that goes out, gets the project,
and basically runs the project. This means they’re running not only the financial side
of the project or dictating who should run the financial modeling, but also tasking the
contracting, the accounting, and the negotiations with the promoter.
Since we only work in emerging markets, one requirement would be language. We
really like to have people with a native fluency in a language. And the more different
the culture – since I see some potential Chinese speakers here – the more we would
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want someone who would understand that culture and speak that language. Financial
background and modeling is a must. And, going along with what Jeff (Miller) said, if
we can get an engineer or two in the mix, that’s great too because then we don’t have
to teach them, for example, what a boiler is.
Jeff Possick: I don’t have a ton to add to what George and Jeff (Miller) have already
said. I think the background in finance is a key thing for what we’re doing, but
understanding and having an interest in the technologies and the markets that we
play in is also key.
To echo what Jeff (Miller) said about how this comes and goes, I started out my
career as an investment banker doing oil and gas banking because if one wanted to do
energy, that’s what there was. Nobody cared a whole lot about what we’re all talking
about right now when I was living in Houston and oil was $10 to $12 a barrel.
Getting a basic understanding for how these markets work, not just the clean
energy aspects, but energy broadly is important – the rest of the energy world is a lot
bigger than just clean energy. Those are often the ultimate drivers of the kind of stuff
that we’re all doing.
Jeff Miller: Following up on Jeff ’s (Possick) point, if you’re in this business, you’ve
got to love fat tails. Our second fund experienced oil at $10 and at $100. You’re living
in the fat tails, and you’ve got to be able to deal with that level of volatility.
Just one final point – one of the tests we always do is the HP 12c test. For the non-
geezers in the room, this [shows a financial calculator] is a Hewlett-Packard 12c. This
was the early days of finance when the registered limitation enabled you only to do
20 cash flows. From my perspective, if somebody cannot conceptualize a problem and
put it in an HP 12c, that means that they haven’t thought it through.
One of the biggest problems we have encountered is the numbers on a page
problem – going immediately go to an Excel spreadsheet and creating reams and
reams without ever stopping to think. The discipline of actually having to frame a
question is one of the key things because in this business it’s ultimately not about the
complex analytical. You’ve got to be able to do that, but it’s also about judgment – do
I really want to do this? how does this fit together? As an investor, you’ve got to fall in
love with something and at the same time be extremely disciplined about what can
go wrong. It’s that aspect or that thoughtfulness and the cultural awareness that
George talked about that’s so critically important. Ultimately that’s what you’re
getting paid for.
As an investor, you’ve got to fall in love with something and at the same
time be extremely disciplined about what can go wrong.
QUESTION 5: Investing in coal 
Given the recent amount of attention and fiscal support for renewable energy, what’s
changed in coal that makes you want to look at coal and think of it as a viable option?
Jeff Miller: As far as coal is concerned, again, it’s half the installed base. And on a
BTU basis, what is the price per million BTUs between coal and the alternative?
Having a huge differential on a price per million BTUs, if we go to a lot more gas,
chances are it’s going to drive us up to be in competition with global LNG here in the
U.S. That will increase the spread between coal and gas, making it difficult to put a
stake in the heart of the existing capacity. So, you’ve got to do something with it.
Secondly, when you overlay issues of energy security, and if you don’t have nuclear
on the table, coal becomes a very important part of that equation. So, whether you
like it or not, it’s just in the mix because of the scale issue. Even if we aggressively
develop all of the renewables we can, such as solar, wind, etc., the added problem of
managing the transmission grid because of the unpredictability and the unreliability
of these renewable resources creates a huge penalty from a capacity perspective in
keeping the grid energized. We saw that in Texas just recently where they had a front
go through and we had the problem of accelerated wind use followed by the wind
dropping off; it created transience in the transmission grid that made it very difficult
to manage. You need a certain amount of base load capacity that’s there. And again,
that goes back to either nuclear or coal.
Jeff Possick: Following up on that from our perspective, it’s not necessarily a question
of new coal. It’s a question of what to do about the fact that 40 percent of the already
installed base is coal. How do we make it more efficient? How do we make it cleaner?
How do we wring the most power out of it for every piece of carbon input? That’s really
the way that we come at it, and I think that ties to what Jeff (Miller) is saying.
George Sorenson: Also, in China, every year they’re adding the equivalent of the
installed base of France, and most of it is coal. So, there’s a huge base that needs to be
dealt with just in China alone.
Mark Barnett: Jeff (Miller), you mentioned base load power. Other than potentially
nuclear or “clean coal”, what are other potential new technologies down the pike that could
come along to provide base load power if, of course, you think there are any viable ones?
Jeff Miller: One of the things that has been the holy grail in renewables is
combining storage with renewables. This would allow you to have an unlimited
capacity for a portfolio of renewables that can then create base load through storage,
which can be compressed air, pumped storage hydro, or something else. There are all
kinds of versions of storage that get into distributed resources, and even plug-in
hybrids can become effectively a way of storage.
That is a major opportunity for having a double impact. One is flattening out the
load duration curve, and the other is creating renewable and non-carbon sources as
primary sources of generation.
George Sorenson: Between nuclear and coal, there’s a big space of years in terms of
how that will play itself out. I’m not sure we know what all of the base load
technologies will be. There are a number of technologies out there that have a lot of
promise. Somebody asked about the opportunities in our sector. Ocean thermal
energy conversion, additional geothermal, solar thermal – these are what I’ll call near
base load technologies. You could certainly put them together with some sort of a
storage mechanism. That sort of thing will have to be addressed more so over the next
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three or four years. In regards to the thermals, solar is probably the least of it, but
ocean thermal, though still very expensive, holds a lot of promise, particularly for
countries where there is a large thermal incline between surface water and depth.
Follow-up question: I agree completely, and the situations that you’ve just described
existed before renewables became popular. I guess my question is, were you investing in
coal technologies before renewables? If not, why are you investing in coal technologies
now? What’s changed either policy wise or financially?
There are a number of technologies out there that have a lot of promise.
Somebody asked about the opportunities in our sector. Ocean thermal
energy conversion, additional geothermal, solar thermal – these are what
I’ll call near base load technologies.
Jeff Miller: It goes back to the differential between cost per million BTUs and
whether or not the differential covers the externalities between the two fuels.
George Sorenson: We’re not investing in coal technologies, but we’ll look at
pollution mitigation technologies like coal tailings and things like that. We’re looking
at some of those projects in China to try to get an additional payment for doing
something else besides burning the coal. But we don’t build coal plants.
QUESTION 6: Standardization on sustainability and emissions trading
Would you comment on the role of standardization for the cleantech sector, in particular
thinking about the role of standards for sustainability? We’ve seen some very interesting
examples of business models that have been built around one particular approach that
ultimately then fell out of favor because of the view of the marketplace about
sustainability or lack thereof. And can you also comment on standardization with respect
to emissions footprint, carbon footprint, and other emissions trading mechanisms?
Jeff Possick: There needs to be some sort of uniformity of how to account for a lot
of these things. One of the big problems that cropped up with current policy is
around the renewable fuel standards – they’re now talking about potentially altering
them to include some kind of carbon input/output measure. I think that’s going to be
a really key thing. What they’ve set up now is something that basically ended up being
a farm subsidy; it doesn’t really have any climate benefit and arguably does some
climate harm.
To the extent that you can build that kind of standard into the legislation, people
at least will be accounting for things in the same way. Depending on how you draw
the box around it, corn ethanol can look significantly better than gasoline or it can
look quite a bit worse. Those kind of problems do need to get addressed in the
standards, at least as they’re written into policy.
George Sorenson: Sustainability is a pretty broad topic. The issues that we see are
fundamentally the fragmentation in the global renewable energy market between
various countries. Let me give you an example from biofuels.
There’s no way that corn or cellulosic in the near future is ever going to compete
with ethanol made from sugar cane in Brazil. Brazil is the lowest cost producer. The
cane fields in Brazil look like Nebraska, but instead of corn it is sugar cane. And they
can grow it very efficiently. Yet, we can’t utilize Brazilian ethanol in the U.S. because
politically that would be unpalatable.
But there’s another issue as well that we have not yet addressed. How would we
reward a country like Brazil or countries like Malaysia or Indonesia for doing
something that would be desirable for us – afforestation, preventing deforestation,
etc? That would require a multilateral treaty, and I don’t see it. We are taking two steps
back as opposed to two steps forward on that. I may be more pessimistic than the
other two here at the table. That kind of integration is required to really address the
sustainability issues.
But there’s another issue as well that we have not yet addressed. How
would we reward a country like Brazil or countries like Malaysia or
Indonesia for doing something that would be desirable for us –
afforestation, preventing deforestation, etc? That would require a
multilateral treaty, and I don’t see it.
Jeff Miller: I think your pessimism is well warranted, George. Market design is one
of the most difficult and unfortunately least glamorous ends of it, but it’s absolutely
critical, and getting measurement in this area is where you start.
The biggest challenge is in getting clear, transparent pricing and deep liquid
markets to move this stuff around. That’s going to create the virtuous circle of
competition, and it’s going to then deal with investment so that you’re going to be
able to raise capital – that’s the positive cycle we need to get on.
If you don’t get it right, then we’re going to get gaming and we’re going to get all
kinds of perversity, which will, in turn, create an enormous amount of cynicism.
From an investor perspective, such an atmosphere makes it far more difficult to
participate. From a capital formation perspective, it would be incredibly inefficient.
Market design is one of the most difficult and unfortunately least
glamorous ends of it, but it’s absolutely critical, and getting measurement
in this area is where you start. The biggest challenge is in getting clear,
transparent pricing and deep liquid markets to move this stuff around.
That’s going to create the virtuous circle of competition, and it’s going to
then deal with investment so that you’re going to be able to raise capital –
that’s the positive cycle we need to get on.
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Mark Barnett: Jeff (Miller), don’t you think we’re kind of, at least from an agriculture
perspective, seeing a gaming of the system right now?
Jeff Miller: Oh, believe me, I can give you some war stories about that. I absolutely
agree and I think that’s the horror story that we have to be very careful of. We need to
set up a system where the stuff gets measured in a way that is truly transparent while
recognizing that it’s complicated; it has to be done in a very fair and objective manner.
Follow-up question: I appreciate your comments about sustainability, but would you
also comment on the second part of the question having do with emissions trading
components? As we are looking at more and more liquid markets with respect to carbon
and other kinds of emission trading, where are we now and where do we really need to
go?
Jeff Miller: Again, that is a huge open area. Whether you have a carbon tax or a cap-
and-trade system is a major point of departure. If you have a tax, who gets the
proceeds? If you have a cap-and-trade system, do you have an auction or do you
allocate the permits? And if you allocate permits, do you allocate them to the fuel
producers, to the polluter, or to whom? To determine the affect on the economy, these
are very difficult analytical questions and they also create an enormous opportunity
for misbehavior on the political side.
Whether you have a carbon tax or a cap-and-trade system is a major point
of departure. If you have a tax, who gets the proceeds?  If you have a cap-
and-trade system, do you have an auction or do you allocate the permits?
And if you allocate permits, do you allocate them to the fuel producers, to
the polluter, or to whom? To determine the affect on the economy, these are
very difficult analytical questions and they also create an enormous
opportunity for misbehavior on the political side.
After trying to get the U.S. system in place, we then have another set of hurdles in
order to clear the market internationally so that we can have something that is
tradable with the EU. It also requires everything from getting the metrics right to
getting into some issues that involve our trade agreements because we could trigger a
back door trade war as part of this if we’re not careful.
George Sorenson: The real tragedy of Kyoto is that we had a chance to create some
uniformity even though that uniformity was flawed. We have to get back to some sort
of uniformity. For example, what if I generate carbon credits in India, what am I
going to do with those? There are 25 credit regimes. Which exchange do I trade those
on? That has to be integrated.
Jeff Possick: The early projects going through the process set up by Kyoto to get
certified emission reductions encountered a hugely inefficient system. Admittedly, a
predecessor to my company benefited from it with a company called Eco Securities
that was one of the early experts in how to get projects through the system. Now that
has finally started to work out whereby there’s a lot less rigmarole as more and more
types of projects have been certified. If there is a set up for a U.S. system, that’s going
to be a big part of it. There are already people who are taking very different views on
how that’s going to play out— you have some players in the U.S. market who say there
should be geologic sequestration and forest sequestration, for example. All of these
folks have a vested interest in trying to push the market in one way or another that
may or may not be the best route overall. That’s the hardest part of the whole thing.
QUESTION 7: Replacing fossil fuels with renewables 
Google last year announced a program with great fanfare. They called it “RE Less Than
C – Renewable Energy Cheaper Than Coal.” Vinod Khosla, a noted venture capitalist in
California, talks about the “ChIndia” price – getting renewables to a price where it would
be cheap enough to be adopted in China and India without subsidies.
How does that relate to what I hear the panel saying in terms of the importance of a
global regime, putting the externalities back into the system? Are these pipe dreams, what
these others are talking about, or is it just in parallel? We need to try to get to a point
where renewables are cheaper than coal, but we also need help getting there faster.
George Sorenson: Well, it depends on the sector you’re talking about, but I think
Vinod Khosla is dreaming if he thinks that renewable biofuels are going to replace
petroleum any time soon, if ever. I was at a conference in Hamburg three weeks ago
where we were talking about cellulosic ethanol. Even the amount of available biomass
for cellulosic, assuming that we had the plants, is such that it can’t handle it all, either.
You’re talking about a very low BTU product trying to replace a very high BTU
product (i.e. petroleum).
This is probably something that has a number of solutions over a number of
technologies. I don’t think the goal of necessarily zero petroleum, if that’s the goal –
I’m not sure it is – is going to happen, at least not in my lifetime.
QUESTION 8: Innovative technologies  
You just mentioned a number of technologies in a number of areas. I’ve been wondering,
doing large scale project finance you have to worry about regulatory futures and
technological obsolescence of what you’re doing to a minor extent. But you just said a few
minutes ago that in terms of new base load technologies, you don’t see much on the
horizon that, for instance, would put some of your projects underwater. What about other
areas of the energy chain? Where do you see possibilities for innovative technologies that
somebody’s working on in their garage right now? Obvious examples are smart grid,
some sort of new storage technologies, and maybe transmission technologies. Are there
any other areas where you think there are real opportunities for improvement?
George Sorenson: Remember that building a plant is a process of four to seven
years. These are huge industrial undertakings. You don’t have the kind of rapid
replacement that you would have in, say, electronics. But there are some areas where
you could experience some revolutionary technologies, such as in the energy
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efficiency or energy savings area, or in motors and some of these other areas. There
are a couple of little companies, and actually some super conductor type
technologies. They’re not viable for a regular line, but in a high use area where you’re
running tremendous amounts of voltage across a very confined area, they’re very
interesting. These are the sorts of technologies that I’d consider revolutionary.
Jeff Miller: Following up on that, there’s a whole array of devices around the smart
grid that basically deal with everything from hardware to software and the mating of
the two. There are various challenges such as making an AC grid behave to
monitoring and getting instantaneous reaction to the transmission grid.
The other area is in any form of storage – batteries, for example. This is a very
important area right now for transportation as well as for onsite backup and storage.
Other efficient ways of being able to store energy to flatten out the load curve, to
provide voltage support, and to provide distributed generation are key areas right now.
Thank you.
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Investing in Cleantech – A Conversation
between a Venture Capitalist and an
Entrepreneur
Anastasia O’Rourke, Yale School of Forestry & Environmental Studies (Moderator);
Howard Berke, Good Energies and Konarka Technologies; Lise Dondy, Connecticut
Clean Energy Fund
editors’ remarks
Chronologically, this was the final talk in our speaker series, and one that we were grateful
to have been able to present before the end of the academic year.The moderator, Anastasia
O’Rourke, begins by introducing the two guests and then providing an overview of the
cleantech market. Based mostly on her original research and findings, it includes an
examination of cleantech trends and analysis of the drivers behind the trends: “What is
driving growth in [cleantech] investments is also the number of investible companies and
innovations, not just the amount of capital that is now available. Venture capital is one part
of it, but not the only factor driving growth.”
The second segment of the chapter is a moderated conversation that explores a diverse
set of topics including career pathways to cleantech, challenges of funding new
technologies and bringing university and lab technologies to market, pressures created by
short-term venture capital money in more conservative industries, investment possibilities
for disruptive technologies, the need for interdisciplinary skill sets in the cleantech industry,
and refreshingly, given the technical aspects of the subject, the importance of human
capital as the backbone of a successful cleantech venture. The range of topics covered here
reflects the wide breadth of collective experience embodied by the guests who, despite
being a small panel of two, also manage to offer a variety of different perspectives. As
Howard Berke explains, “For some of my answers, I’ll be the fox in sheep’s clothes – that’s
the venture capitalist . . . [for others] I’m the sheep in fox clothes – that’s the entrepreneur.”
Continuing the momentum, the question and answer segment touches on subjects from
politics and policy to competition and market dynamics to water investments and
skepticism concerning carbon capture and storage. By the end, this dialogue achieves what
Lise Dondy describes as one of the aims of the Connecticut Clean Energy Fund: “Our
philosophy has been that the public needs to become educated and aware of what these
technologies are, what they can do, and how important they are.”*
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introduction
Anastasia O’Rourke: Tonight we’re going to talk about cleantech. To begin, I would
first like to introduce this evening’s guests. Afterwards, I will give a short presentation
on cleantech venture capital based on my own research here at Yale, and then we will
proceed with a conversation on venture capital and entrepreneurship.
Howard Berke is a Senior Adviser to Good Energies1 and Chairman and Co-
Founder of Konarka Technologies.2 Good Energies is a private investment firm, and
it’s been investing a lot in solar photovoltaic companies and wind power developers.
It has offices in London, New York, Toronto, Washington, D.C., and Zurich,
Switzerland. Konarka Technologies is a company with venture capital backing. It’s
raised over $100 million and is an innovator in the development and
commercialization of power plastic, which is a material that converts sunlight to
energy. Howard is a Yale College alumnus.
Lise Dondy is President of the Connecticut Clean Energy Fund3 and Vice President
of Connecticut Innovations.4 The Connecticut Clean Energy Fund is an electric
ratepayer-supported fund that invests over $30 million per year to support clean
renewable energy in Connecticut through incentives, programs, and initiatives.
Connecticut Innovations is the administrator of the Connecticut Clean Energy Fund
and is a quasi-public venture capital fund that invests primarily through preferred
stock in the high-tech sector where it uses private sector disciplines to achieve public
sector goals. Prior to joining the Clean Energy Fund, Lise served as Managing
Director of Investments with Connecticut Innovations. Lise is a Yale School of
Management alumna.
cleantech venture capital overview
Cleantech is a popular term in the venture capital community that has been picked
up by the media. Figure 1 shows some of my research data on the numbers of
mentions of “cleantech” or “greentech” in the press since 1990. The number of such
mentions increased quite quickly after 2002 and almost exploded in 2006-2007.5
Figure 1 Number of media articles mentioning cleantech, clean tech, greentech and green tech from
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Figure 1 shows that not only has cleantech gained a lot of attention, but there is a
lot of hype around it, which has been seen in the investment space.
Figure 2 North American and European venture capital investments in cleantech: Total yearly amount
invested ($ US M) and number of deals (Cleantech Group & SVB Alliant, 2007)
Figure 2 shows data on cleantech venture capital investments by the total number
of deals and the actual size of the investments being made in Europe and North
America.6 We can see that growth has been both in terms of the absolute total
amounts invested and the total number of deals. In addition, each and every
investment, on average, has gotten larger. Last year in particular there were a lot of
very large venture capital deals in the $100 million range, which is quite unusual for
venture capital and somewhat unique to the cleantech area.
Where was this investment happening? Table 1 presents some of the regional
clusters that are emerging. The bulk of venture capital right now is on the U.S. west
coast and also here in the Northeast, as well as Eastern China – far more than in the
U.K., for example, and that was a bit of a surprise when the Cleantech Group started
tracking it. Australia, which is where I am from, is way down the list here at about $50
million, though there is growth also in that market.
Table 1 Cleantech top 10 regions for venture capital investing
7
(Cleantech Venture Network, 2007)
 U.S.: West Coast ($1.9 B)  U.S. Midwest ($293 M)
 U.S.: Northeast ($777 M)  United Kingdom ($280 M)
 Eastern China ($420 M)  U.S. Southeast ($254 M)
 U.S.: Southwest ($419 M)  Western Canada ($210 M)
 U.S.: Northwest ($329 M)  Eastern Canada ($185 M)
An interesting aspect of the geographic distribution of investments is the
emergence of regional clusters becoming known for certain technologies. I’m
observing that these cleantech clusters tend to form around and near universities. It
6 
The data was collected by
Anastasia O’Rourke in collabo-
ration with the Cleantech
Group. More detail can be
found in the report “Earth
Wind and Fire: A perspective
on Cleantech” published in
2007 by SVB Alliant (Silicon
Valley Bank).
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just so happens that there’s a small battery technology cluster in Florida, and that’s
because there are two professors there who have been very productive in getting out
their technologies and there was an infrastructure to support them. So what is
driving growth in investments is also the number of investible companies and
innovations, not just the amount of capital that is now available. It’s quite interesting
to think about cleantech in terms of all of the levels of innovation and all the different
elements that you need to start a company and to really grow and be vibrant. Venture
capital is one part of it, but not the only factor driving growth.
An interesting aspect of the geographic distribution of investments is the
emergence of regional clusters becoming known for certain technologies.
I’m observing that these cleantech clusters tend to form around and near
universities.
There are different areas within cleantech: energy storage, infrastructure
generation, and efficiency – where about 60 percent of the VC money is going. There
are also a range of other cleantech areas as well which this pie chart depicts (see
Figure 3).
Figure 3 Amount of VC invested per cleantech segment: North America and Europe for 2003-2006
(SVB Alliant & The Cleantech Group, 2007)
This brings up an important point, which is that I think cleantech isn’t really a
sector per se. It is an area or theme whose technologies come from other sectors being
applied in new ways, towards cleantech applications. We’re calling it cleantech
because these applications of technologies have an environmental benefit along the
way. How you measure the environmental benefit of these technologies can be a bit
tricky, but some are quite obvious. In the clean energy space, for example, I think we
wouldn't argue too much that solar is cleaner than coal fired power plants. But in
some of the materials areas it really depends on where and how those materials are
being applied, and what sorts of markets they are going after.
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One of the reasons that venture capitalists’ excitement levels concerning cleantech
are high compared to say five or ten years ago, is that there’s been a lot of innovation
happening in a variety of other technology areas or sectors which is now applied to
cleantech. Advanced materials and nanotechnology, IT, sensors, wireless
communications, and everything in between really enable all sorts of applications in
the cleantech arena at a cost point that just wasn’t possible before. Many of the
companies that investors look at are using these technologies to new ends.
So who are the buyers of these technologies? There are a range of companies from
utilities and large energy users to agricultural producers and pharmaceutical
companies. One thing I’ve noticed in my research on cleantech venture capital
investments in North America is that the bulk of those companies are business-to-
business type companies. They’re not selling to the final domestic consumer, but
instead selling to somewhere in the supply chain across various industries.
One of the reasons that venture capitalists’ excitement levels concerning
cleantech are high compared to say five or ten years ago, is that there’s
been a lot of innovation happening in a variety of other technology areas
or sectors which is now applied to cleantech.
This is quite important when we think about how these companies get into these
markets, especially the large industrial markets that are often rigid and hard to access
for a small startup company. But it also means that if they break through the
opportunity could be very large.
Having provided that overview of cleantech venture capital, let’s begin the
conversation with our two guests.
Moderated Conversation
Anastasia O’Rourke: Welcome back to Yale, Howard and Lise. We’re really pleased to
have you here. What I’d propose to do is actually put a couple of questions to you,
then open it up to the audience for general questions.
career pathways to cleantech
The first question is around your own pathways to the area of cleantech. One of the
things I mentioned is that many different technologies can be applied to cleantech, and
what I’ve seen is a lot of entrepreneurs who are coming into the cleantech space from
technical backgrounds in other areas as well. Both of you have worked in various
technology areas aside from cleantech, and I wonder if you could share a little bit about
your pathway towards this area, what got you interested in it to begin with, and when it
started.
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Lise Dondy: For me the opportunity presented itself as I was working at
Connecticut Innovations doing investments. I’ve always been intrigued with
companies associated with the environment. In fact, one of my jobs prior to
Connecticut Innovations, and my first job after graduating from Yale’s MBA
program, was recycling market development. So I had a sense of some of the
environmental implications out there. At Connecticut Innovations I worked with
some early stage energy or energy related companies.
I was very interested when the opportunity to head the Connecticut Clean Energy
Fund came about. My position, which is different than a typical venture capitalist,
presented the challenge of combining public policy with private ways of investing.
While that is true with Connecticut Innovations in general, it is even more so in the
cleantech space, especially energy. Connecticut Innovations was founded to use
private sector disciplines for a public purpose, which in the case of Connecticut
Innovations is creating jobs within Connecticut. The Clean Energy Fund takes this
public purpose even one step further and focuses on the benefit to the environment
and to long term impact on energy deployment. It offers the opportunity and
challenge to do that effectively, given that we have the real opportunity to deploy
money that comes from the electric rate payers in the most efficient and effective way
possible.
It was a very interesting challenge to me. It brought together many facets of what
I learned at the School of Management in terms of finance, public policy, and always,
the organizational behavior perspective in whatever we do and whatever way we do
it. So that’s how I got to where I am right now.
It [the Connecticut Clean Energy Fund] was a very interesting challenge to
me. It brought together many facets of what I learned at the School of
Management in terms of finance, public policy, and always, the
organizational behavior perspective in whatever we do and whatever way
we do it.
Anastasia O’Rourke: Howard, can we have the Cliff Notes version for how you launched
13 startup companies over the years and finally came to cleantech?
Howard Berke: Thirty-five years ago I sat in this very room sweating a final, and I
suspect, like today, that it was the Thursday of finals week. I was just finishing up my
environmental science class final and I was thinking, gee, I know oil someday is going
to be $120 a barrel (not really). The Cliff Notes version is 13 companies and 3 wives
later, here I am. That’s the short version.
The long version we don’t have time for, but I have participated in a variety of
technologies. I tend to joke about myself, so hopefully you’ll know that there’s a
serious message in there somewhere, but what I’d like to say is through a variety of
technologies and wives from different nations, I’ve evolved a perspective. The
perspective I have evolved comes not from being in the cleantech space or even
energy for 35 years of my career. It’s a perspective of once being married to an
American and once being married to a Brit and now being married to a Swiss lady.
It’s the integral of having worked in innovations, in medical science, in bioscience, in
computing and IT, and how it is that I got to alternative energy cleantech, as it was
not called when I started Konarka, without knowing that oil was going to be $120 a
barrel. If I had known that, I would have been a speculator, and I’d be a multi-
billionaire and I’d leave my wealth to Yale University.
What I did believe, and I still believe – and I can even give you an insight into what
my 14th company will be— is that the planet is shrinking, resources are depleting, and
the human population has grown probably past where the almighty ever expect it
would be. There’s such competition for resources and there’s such competition
among humans and other species. The lesson I learned in this room 35 years ago
perhaps did set me on this course because I became convinced that unless we get off
this planet, which some day we will – but not in our lifetimes, then we’re all
competing as species and we’re all competing for a finite amount of resources. The
only thing that keeps us going and perpetuating ourselves as a civilization is our
ingenuity, our ability to invent our future — because if we couldn’t do that, we
wouldn’t even be left on this planet. We’re all competing with one another and with
all species for a limited amount of resources and, gee, isn’t that what energy and
alternative energy in the world is all about these days? So, perhaps Yale did set me on
the right course.
The lesson I learned in this room 35 years ago perhaps did set me on this
course because I became convinced that unless we got off this planet, which
some day we will – but not in our lifetimes, then we’re all competing as
species and we’re all competing for a finite amount of resources. The only
thing that keeps us going and perpetuating ourselves as a civilization is our
ingenuity, our ability to invent our future . . .
cleantech ecosystem
Anastasia O’Rourke: Getting back to this idea of the cleantech ecosystem, Lise, I was
interested in your comment about linking the combination of public policy and private
investment and how those two intertwine. I think in the cleantech area that’s much
stronger than perhaps in other technology areas because we’re dealing with
environmental externalities which governments may or may not regulate.
It seems that many of the state-based clean energy funds have played a leading role in
getting these technologies up and running at a very early stage.7 Can you tell us about the
specific gap that the Clean Energy Fund tries to focus on? Instead of competing with private
investors, what types of things do you look for to fill that gap? Is the Connecticut Clean
Energy Fund similar or different from other state funds like the one in Massachusetts?
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Lise Dondy: Most of the fund is focused on bridging the gap between the
technologies that exist and what they cost. They are classic incentive programs that
are necessary until we get to the success of Howard’s company and hopefully others
that are going to really bring the cost of these technologies down.
Part of it is just figuring out clever ways to spend the least amount of money and
promote the most amount of installation. That’s really the bulk of our program. But
to the point of this panel, in terms of venture capital and encouraging new
technologies, we’ve always sought not to replicate what the private sector is doing,
and to find those gaps where the private sector is not investing. Inevitably, in any
sector, it’s always in those early stage investments. We do that through two means.
One is through equity investments for which we use a small fund. The other is
through what we call our operational demonstration program, which funds the first
field test of a product. We’re helping companies get out of the lab and into the field.
We are supporting the beta test. These investments have a soft return, so they are
structured as a non-recourse loan. However, if the company is successful, we get a
return of our money plus a little bit of upside, but not what we would get if we did
an equity investment.
It’s really trying to get some of these products and encourage companies to get
these products out there without taking that very early stage R&D risk. So, there is a
big gap right there that we’re trying to address.
Anastasia O’Rourke: Howard, the technology that Konarka had first started to
commercialize originally came from the University of Massachusetts chemistry
department and I read that it was under a grant from the U.S. Army, which is quite
interesting. Can you describe your experience of spinning out technologies from
universities and what sorts of things seem to work or not work in those kinds of licensing
arrangements?
Howard Berke: First let me represent who I am or from what perspective I’m
speaking. For some of my answers, I’ll be the fox in sheep’s clothes – that’s the venture
capitalist. I am a venture capitalist and I’ve been an angel investor. I’ll let you know
when I’m the fox in sheep’s clothes and then I’ll let you know when I’m the sheep in
fox clothes – that’s the entrepreneur. I’ve had the opportunity and the experience to
have both perspectives, but in my heart I’m truly the entrepreneur. I like being the
sheep more than the fox, but I do represent a whole herd of foxes.
At Konarka, we were a spinout of both the University of Massachusetts and the
University of California. Two individuals that I networked and met were Dr. Sukant
Tripathy, who tragically passed away just before Konarka was founded – he was the
innovator, a brilliant polymer scientist who organized the Plastics Innovation Center
at the University of Massachusetts – and  Dr. Alan Heeger, from U.C. Santa Barbara,
who is a Nobel Laureate in chemistry for his work on conductive polymers.
It’s not the first time that I have partnered or licensed technology off the campuses.
In the cleantech space, specifically in energy and uniquely in alternative energy, there’s
been a legacy of decades of technologies coming off of research campuses, be they
university campuses or the government labs, and not just U.S. government labs, but
also European, Japanese, and Australian labs. So it’s not atypical.
carbon finance: environmental market solutions to climate change
yale school of forestry & environmental studies
234
I know many people in the Department of Energy that lament that they could be
doing a better job than they are doing. We are starting to do a better job at leveraging
innovation at the national labs in the U.S. and finding opportunities to work with
private capital to do a better job in taking technologies from our national lab
campuses – NREL (the National Renewable Energy Lab) of course, but also Sandia,
Los Alamos, and the Lawrence Berkeley National Labs. There is a concentrated effort
at the Department of Energy with people I know well trying to replicate what
happens on the private side and make the public side more efficient about moving
technology out of the labs and into startups or license with larger companies.
In the cleantech space, specifically in energy and uniquely in alternative
energy, there’s been a legacy of decades of technologies coming off of
research campuses, be they university campuses or the government labs,
and not just U.S. government labs, but also European, Japanese, and
Australian labs.
I think what is atypical now is the number of persons who are going on those
campuses talking to graduate students or scouring the business plan competitions.
This really has accelerated the activity almost to a feverish pitch. It’s almost getting a
bit counterproductive. It’s just too much of a feeding frenzy. Certainly I believe that
the innovations have and will continue to come off the campuses more so than the
corporate R&D laboratories around the world.
Anastasia O’Rourke: As a follow-up, Howard, I’m curious why you think it’s counter-
productive? From my perspective, there’s such a huge demand and huge need for these
technologies in the world. Are you worried about a kind of bubble mentality or that these
companies or technologies won’t be any good? What’s your chief concern?
Howard Berke: You can call them bubbles. I don’t really think in terms of bubbles
because then people think in terms of capital formation and then corrections and
valuations and those sorts of things. But there have been waves of technology. Not too
long ago there was a PC wave, and there’s been a variety of biotech waves –
monoclonal antibodies and then genomics.
My concern is too much money chasing too premature technologies with too few
experienced founders with minimal management around it, trying to push science
faster than science wants to be pushed, and adopting technologies before they’re
ready to be productized. I believe you put in those ingredients, you turn up the flame
on the beaker, and it will explode out of the beaker. That’s what 35 years of a lot of
venture capital and entrepreneuring has taught me. That’s what concerns me. Not
individual persons and science, but just stepping back, the perspective is that I think
we’re turning up the heat under the beaker a little bit hot.
Particularly with energy technologies, these technologies traditionally have had
long gestation periods. They have enormous environmental impact. If you get them
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wrong, they can cause a lot of damage. We know that. And so, I don’t believe in the
rush to solve a problem. Often times if you do it too quickly you create a problem
larger than the one you’ve solved. We as humans have experienced that. So I think
maybe – just maybe – we should turn the heat down a little bit.
My concern is too much money chasing too premature technologies with
too few experienced founders with minimal management around it, trying
to push science faster than science wants to be pushed, and adopting
technologies before they’re ready to be productized.
Good Energies has this perspective. We’re very long-term patient investors because
our source of capital is family wealth, not traditional venture capital. We think these
companies and these sciences and these technologies will take a lot longer than most
venture funds will be comfortable with and then there will be disenchantment; that’s
not a healthy thing to have happen.
regulatory interaction
Anastasia O’Rourke: Lise, from the perspective of the Connecticut Clean Energy Fund,
do you have the ability to turn up the heat on the regulatory side, given that you are part
of the government? Can you describe that interaction to us?
Lise Dondy: What I’ve learned, and to Howard’s point on patience, is that this is
really true in energy-related technologies because they intersect with the regulatory
environment. My last four years at the Clean Energy Fund, in contrast to what I was
doing before at Connecticut Innovations, a very patient investor, is dealing with the real
challenges that the regulatory environment poses for innovation. We have fortunately
as a fund been able to be at the table to help shape some of the policies that are
necessary to address some of the barriers renewables face in the state in becoming
competitive with fossil fuel based energy systems. But that whole regulatory overlay of
what you need to do, including hiring in-house counsel with regulatory experience to
follow all the dockets and be sure that we intervene, is a very long process.
A couple of very large renewable energy projects that started four years ago were
conceived through the regulatory environment because they had to contract with the
utilities. They are now finally getting contracts. And these are not new technologies,
but they’re new to the utility environment; we’re not even talking about real
innovation here. When you get to innovation and it intersects with the regulatory
environment, that’s a challenge. You have to learn how to at least be at the table and
help form what’s going on from a regulatory perspective.
When you get to innovation and it intersects with the regulatory
environment, that’s a challenge. You have to learn how to at least be at the
table and help form what’s going on from a regulatory perspective.
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Howard Berke: Can I just make a quick comment? Anastasia’s overview was
excellent. It was very informative and insightful. One way it was insightful is that you
saw that 85 percent of the business is business-to-business, which translates into slow
rate of adoption, conservative, and very, very risk averse. Then combine that with one
of the most conservative industries on the planet, which is energy and the utility
sector. Further combine that with the need for policy which is supportive – and we
know how speedily policies move through the nation’s capitals – and then combine
that, which I think is perhaps the challenge of the century, with coordination on a
global basis amongst nations. I believe what we’re facing is perhaps a need for a
solution that cannot possibly be solved in the time in which we expect or want it to
be solved. What are the consequences of this?
I’ll get more philosophical later, but the point I’m trying to make is that we are in
one of the most conservative industries and everything points to it taking a lot longer
than you would like. We are also talking about attracting capital that has the
expectation of a liquidity event within three to five years or capital that has a return
on investment of 30 to 40 percent or higher – and the longer you go out to returns of
30 to 40 percent, well start calculating the cash on cash returns that have to have a 30
to 40 percent return when your investment is 10 to 12 years old! That’s why I saw that
things are maybe getting a little too hot.
partnerships in “disruptive” technologies
Anastasia O’Rourke: Following up to that, perhaps you could shed some light on why
Konarka has so many corporate strategic relationships. When I looked at your website,
there’s a bunch of companies there, and I wondered what role these corporate
partnerships play to the company?
Howard Berke: I’ll answer that question but continue the theme. I’ve been involved
with several disruptive technologies. Steve Jobs expressed it best, saying something to
the effect that if Apple was such a disruptive company, why has he worked so hard for
20 plus years? Somehow in human nature we want to believe that disruption can
happen, but oftentimes the disruption is really an evolutionary process that in
hindsight looked like a disruption, but for those who were terribly involved in it, was
10 or 20 years of sweat and toil. What makes Konarka interesting to a good many
people is that they see it as disruptive technology, which it is. They see it as a
disruptive way by which to manufacture something differently compared to how
photovoltaics (PV) are now made, meaning we print them whereas the rest of the
industry uses semiconductor processes for manufacturing.
It’s disruptive because we talk about carbon as our building block – not carbon
dioxide and not carbon monoxide, but the atom carbon. Photovoltaics used to be
something like 99 percent silicon, but with the success of First Solar, putting all that
cadmium out in the environment, they’re now maybe 95 percent silicon. So there was
a statement right there, but that’s a few percent silicon reduction; we’re the
contrarian. We’re saying not the silicon atom, but the carbon atom. Now I still believe
we have 60 million years of Mother Nature telling us it’s carbon and not silicon. But
we don’t have 60 million years to return money to our investors.
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Somehow in human nature we want to believe that disruption can happen,
but oftentimes the disruption is really an evolutionary process that in
hindsight looked like a disruption, but for those who were terribly involved
in it, was 10 or 20 years of sweat and toil.
What I think has helped in generating enthusiasm and capital and the associations
that we have around the world – and I can give you all good business reasons, but
what the underlying emotion is – is that there’s a belief that Konarka is on to
something that can be quite significant and, looking back, be disruptive. Hopefully I’ll
be old enough and still living to look back and say, “Yeah, I guess that was disruptive.”
It’s the emotion. Every decision is both cerebral and emotional, right? In the end
venture capitalists think with their minds and invest with their hearts. They have to
believe that there’s something quite special about this company. Many people believe,
and I truly believe, there’s something very special about Konarka. What we’re doing
is very special. That’s not to say it’s not going to take a long time.
In part, that’s how we’ve attracted a good many Fortune 500 companies and
leadership venture funds. I can tell you there’s good science underneath it and good
reason to believe we’ll have low cost PV. But, again, there has to be an emotional belief
that there’s something special going on inside Genentech, inside Google, inside
Konarka. I mean, you have to believe there’s something – some secret sauce,
something special going on.
emotion in investment processes
Anastasia O’Rourke: Lise, what do you find in your own investment process and the
programs that you’re administering – how much of that emotion gets parlayed into a state
fund? I mean, it would seem that State funds are especially concerned about making very
careful decisions, given that it’s public money. Is that a fair characterization?
Lise Dondy: No, not entirely. Connecticut Innovations itself is quite special. We
were capitalized through taxable revenue bonds of about $65 million. Since 1995, it’s
been the return on investments that goes into other investments, so it’s an evergreen
fund. We’re not on any state budget. We actually have the luxury of operating pretty
much outside of the political arena.
From the investment perspective, it’s very similar to what Howard’s describing. I
think he described it really well. What we are able to do and have done – and there’s a
qualitative difference between ourselves and pure venture capitalists – is acquire patient
capital with the realization that instead of expecting 60 percent returns, we can exist and
keep on recycling that money with 20 percent returns. Our internal rate of return (IRR)
over that period of time from 1995 to today is about 21 percent. It’s kept us going.
For the Clean Energy Fund, however, I think your characterization is more correct.
It is public money. It comes from the electric rate payers, and the amount that we can
actually put to risk capital of the total proportion of funding is much less. That part
is always going to be risky and I believe it’s extremely important that we take those
carbon finance: environmental market solutions to climate change
yale school of forestry & environmental studies
238
risks because without them nothing’s going to change. We’re going to continue to face
the energy crisis and the energy technologies that are the incumbent technologies.
New technology is a huge part of the answer to climate change, to energy prices, to
a myriad of things. It’s extremely important, but within the context of public money,
we have to take that into consideration.
It’s extremely important that we take those risks because without them
nothing’s going to change. New technology is a huge part of the answer to
climate change, to energy prices, to a myriad of things.
interdisciplinary skill sets
Anastasia O’Rourke: Howard, you have personally and successfully started and managed
many companies in industries other than cleantech. What skills from those sectors did
you bring to cleantech, and what are the skill shortages out there today that the cleantech
industry faces?
Howard Berke: That is an excellent question. Let me ponder here because I wasn’t
anticipating being asked that question. A healthy trend going on in cleantech and
cleantech investing is that you’re seeing entrepreneurs from other industries moving
in and founding and joining with founding teams. That’s a very positive thing.
What you’re seeing is interdisciplinary scientific teams coming together to solve very
challenging science in a way that one discipline couldn’t possibly be able to conquer.
These are all very, very positive trends; the perspective that entrepreneurs from a
different industry can bring or the interaction between disparate disciplines and science
can really help. I liken it to Ben needing Jerry, or the Varian Brothers having paired a
technical person with a very adroit marketing and business development person.
What you’re seeing is interdisciplinary scientific teams coming together to
solve very challenging science in a way that one discipline couldn’t possibly
be able to conquer.
In summary, some very important aspects from other industries that I and other
entrepreneurs from those industries can bring into the cleantech space are, number
one, the value. In fact, the greatest value is human capital. In the energy business it’s
too easy to focus on the iron, the steel. I tell this to my fellow senior colleagues at
Good Energies. We put out a lot of winter buy in’s because we’re an upstream and a
downstream investor. But I always say to them, “Ask yourself who the hell designed
these turbines and these blades and the materials that go into those blades. You think
you’re project developers. I’m telling you it’s all human capital.” It’s all innovation
because I’m really an upstream technology type investor.
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Other disciplines have learned, such as the biotech and IT industries, that the
number one value inside your cleantech company is the human capital. If you lose
that focus, if you don’t attract the very best, if you can’t retain the very best, and if you
don’t encourage an environment of innovation and challenge, then you will not have
a successful cleantech venture backed company. Certainly there is no greater human
capital industry than IT in the software industry, for example. I mean, you’re just
shipping a bunch of electrons.
So number one is the value of human capital. Number two is IP strategy, because
if you create human capital, how are you going to get a return on it? That translates
into IP strategy. What I find is that a lot of startups do a lot of IP, filing, and all that,
but there’s no strategy. That’s just blocking and tackling. The real value is IP strategy
and how to strategize a return on the human capital that you’ve created.
Number three is positioning. I find that there is a lack of marketing and marketing
savvy in these companies because you’re positioning a new technology against an
incumbent technology, and you think people are just going to run and buy this stuff.
I’m afraid not. So, really the discipline of how you introduce a disruptive technology
against an incumbent technology – that mind set, which you can get from people out
of Levi Strauss and from a lot of different places other than the cleantech community
– is very important.
Those are the three things: the human capital, IP strategy, and how you position a
disruptive technology vis-à-vis the incumbent technology. These are business
practices that can come and are coming from other industries into this space for good
reason. You need the metal benders and of course you need the welders. But it’s the
intellectual side of creating the business that can come from the other disciplines that
have done it well.
Lise Dondy: I would add that the absolute success factor comes down to the people
involved and the management involved. I don’t think it’s special at all to cleantech; it’s
essential to any successful company. Clearly with any successful company it is first
and foremost the management involved.
Anastasia O’Rourke: With that we’ll now open up the conversation and take
questions from the audience.
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Question and Answer Session
QUESTION 1: Carbon legislation
What are your thoughts as to the timeline and the impact of the proposed carbon
legislation within the U.S. and globally?
Howard Berke: We of course already have carbon trading, right? The European
Community, having signed on to the Kyoto Protocol, has implemented on a regional
basis, and quite a large region, a carbon trading regime that has established a market-
based price for carbon. We also in the United States now have two regional carbon
regimes, one here in New England called RGGI (Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative)
and then one in the western states; people are trying to figure out how they will
interface with one another.
It’s already happening on a regional basis. On a national basis in the U.S., the
Lieberman-Warner Act is one of the five introduced bills in congress that’s getting the
most attention. In terms of timeline, nothing will happen until the next presidential
administration other than a lot of discussion and talk, and I heard this from a former
Secretary-level person who should know, too. We’re going to see a lot of talk in 2008
and we’re going to see serious negotiation around a bill in 2009 with a bill probably
coming out in late 2009. We will probably see two to four years of debate as it works
through the EPA and all the agencies, figuring out all the regulations, publishing, and
receiving public comment. We might even see the merger of the EPA into the
Department of Energy before it’s over.
When people talk about how we’ve got to cut carbon emissions quickly and that
the ice sheets are melting . . . well, I visited Alaska and I am often in the Alps. You can
see the glaciers are melting faster than the politicians can figure what to do.
Realistically I think we will see this all passed and implemented within three to four
years, which is really the time in which the Kyoto Protocol will be replaced. That will
all get discussed starting in Copenhagen.9
Someone asked me about carbon capture because I had a debate with someone
about this, too. Everybody thinks carbon capture is a technology that exists today, and
that we should just implement it. And I always say, “Really? Tell me why that
technology won’t hurt the environment, and then I’ll come back ten years from now
and you can show me the technology and maybe prove to me that it doesn’t hurt the
environment.” We don’t have that technology today.
Anastasia O’Rourke: It’s quite interesting to see that the cleantech and clean energy
industry isn’t waiting on this. I mean, it’s moving pretty much full steam ahead and a lot
of the markets are not in the U.S. for these reasons. There are many U.S. companies that
are selling in Europe because the markets are already established there.
Howard Berke: It’s happening now and CEOs and board rooms of Fortune 500
aren’t waiting for the politicians to figure it all out. But the question is, when will 70
Prime Ministers sign something and when will the President sign something? That
will take some time. It’s all happening on a regional basis, in Europe and the New
England states. Connecticut has certainly taken leadership, and now that’s extending
to the Mid-Atlantic states.
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9 
The United Nations Climate
Change Conference in 2009
will take place in
Copenhagen, Denmark. The
goal for the conference is to
enter into a binding global cli-
mate agreement that will
apply to the period after 2012.
If what you’re asking is, as that’s happening, does that put heat on our industry to
innovate and get products out the door, then the answer is very much so, it does. But
what’s more important is not that it happens, but that there’s some clarity about how
it will happen. What’s unique about the energy industry, in some ways similar to
telecommunications, is the enormous amount of capital that has to be deployed to
build infrastructure. What’s different about the telecommunications industry is that
the telecom industry turns over its infrastructure every ten years.
The energy infrastructure turns over every 30 to never years. In the United States
it’s getting to be never years. As others have said, what’s the benefit of never having a
World War on your soil? We never had to replace destroyed infrastructure. What’s the
negative side of never having a World War on your soil? We’ve never replaced our
infrastructure. It’s been with us through both World Wars.
When you’re deploying an enormous amount of capital and making 30 to 50 year
infrastructure decisions, you’re not going to be in a hurry to make those decisions if
there’s uncertainty about the policies and uncertainty about the regime by which
those returns on investment will be calculated. It’s that uncertainty which is, in some
ways, even more restrictive than what actually gets passed.
When you’re deploying an enormous amount of capital and making 30 to
50 year infrastructure decisions, you’re not going to be in a hurry to make
those decisions if there’s uncertainty about the policies and uncertainty
about the regime by which those returns on investment will be calculated.
It’s that uncertainty which is, in some ways, even more restrictive than what
actually gets passed.
QUESTION 2: The pull of consumer markets 
I was disappointed to hear how long it takes to deploy new technology so I think we need
more social entrepreneurship. I appreciate what you were saying about the marketing. I
know the Connecticut Clean Energy Fund funds energy efficiency programs through the
utilities, but you’re still very likely to have someone go to Home Depot and buy the least
efficient water heater that he can buy. So, upstream there is all this innovation, and
downstream this depressingly ineffective lack of efficiency.
Howard Berke: Well, one of the questions Anastasia had on her list was about
Konarka’s marketing. We’re actually focusing on consumers because consumers are
very rapid adopters of new technology. In fact, post World War II and certainly since
the 1950s, consumers have led the way in the early adoption of every technology –
every technology – and certainly in communications and media, just on and on and
on. So Konarka is focusing its technology for more rapid deployment amongst
consumers and into consumer devices.
I think you raise an excellent point. The consumerism of alternative energy and the
consumerism of solar will accelerate the rate of adoption, but such consumerism is also
predicated on policy because the cost to the consumer is in many ways prohibitively
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high for certain technologies. The consumer could be the faster adopter, but he is also
the most cost sensitive. But when you get it right, like hybrids for example, and when
you get the incentives and policies right, things can happen in years, not decades.
Lise Dondy: To add to that, I’d like to first note that we are the Renewable Energy
Fund, not the Energy Efficiency Fund. Part of our equation in looking at this from a
state program side, not the venture side now, is that there has to be both the supply
and the demand. Under our programs we’ve created an awareness program, and it
was actually Bryan Garcia10 who helped to conceive this communities program.
Our philosophy has been that the public needs to become educated and aware of
what these technologies are, what they can do, and how important they are. The
communities program incentivizes people to sign up for clean energy with the aim of
creating the demand for clean energy; the reward, through the fund, is solar
technology on public buildings that the community members earn for signing-up for
clean energy. We’ve seen a huge growth in demand for clean energy in these
communities. Seventy-five towns in Connecticut have now joined the 20 percent by
2010 clean energy campaign. That’s almost half the towns in Connecticut.
As a result, I would venture to say that public awareness in Connecticut on climate
change and on the impact of renewable energy and new technology is much higher
than in many other parts of the country. Even from the state program level, we have
to come up with the most innovative ways to move the public along in its thinking
and in its awareness so that these new technologies are demanded.
Howard Berke: Raise your hand if you’ve ever heard of the Energy Star program.
Everyone in the room. If you go around the world, in just about every developed
nation folks have heard of the Energy Star. EPA’s Energy Star program, working with
the Department of Energy and working with industry, all on a voluntary basis, has
been one of the greatest successes for energy efficiency and saving a Watt, educating
consumers, and branding products. If I were President or the Secretary of Energy, I
would build on that very rapidly because it’s a brand that people trust. It’s a way
consumers get information immediately at the shelf about what they’re buying and
about its relative efficiency. I would like to see Energy Star stickers on probably ten
times more things than we’re currently tagging. In fact, Congress mandates now that
the Energy Star program be expanded.
Anastasia O’Rourke: If I can just jump in for a moment, I think one of the
problems with Energy Star is that it only measures energy efficiency and only on one
phase of a product’s life cycle. We all know that products have more environmental
impact than just the amount of energy they use. I think part of the reason that Energy
Star has been successful, though, is that it is just one factor – it’s measurable and
relatively easy to understand. There are other labeling and certification systems out
there that try to take a more holistic lifecycle view of a product’s environmental
impact. It can be hard, though, to make that into a simple message for the consumer.
QUESTION 3: Breaking into and surviving in the market – access to capital
Anastasia, you had an interesting chart (see figure 2) that showed the total amount
invested in the last five years along with the total number of deals. From the numbers on
that chart it looks like the dollars per investment has gone up about a factor of two-and-
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a-half over the past two years, which tells me that there are a lot more follow-up
investments than new investments.
For the past nine months I’ve been investigating PV manufacturing and I’ve identified
in North America about 100 companies in various stages of startup or production in PVs,
both in thin film and silicon. Fewer than ten of those are multinationals like BP or GE.
Most of those are dependent on venture capital, private equity investment, or perhaps on
an IPO to survive over the next five years.
My question is two-fold. One, is there now a very large barrier to entry for somebody
who has the next really good idea, for example, in PV manufacturing? Two, how many
of those other 90 companies who aren’t solidly funded by a multinational or who aren’t
public are going to survive in the next five years?
Howard Berke: Again, a good question. Let me put my Good Energies hat on. I’ve
been talking as Howard the citizen, Howard the individual, Howard the
Entrepreneur, Howard Konarka, and now let me put my Good Energies cap on.
I’ll start with a ten second commercial/infomercial. Good Energies is the largest
investor in renewable energy in the world. Being of Swiss origin, it’s not our nature to
go around boasting about that, but last year New Energy Finance tracked all this for
2007. We were the largest in transactions in the world, and Goldman Sachs was
number one in dollars. We’re a very private, but very large group. There are now nearly
70 full time people in Good Energies just investing in renewables and energy efficiency.
One of our flagship companies in five years grew from a five founder startup to the
largest cell producer in the world, Q-Cells, which we founded and still own 49
percent; this is a company that couldn’t raise a nickel of capital. They couldn’t raise a
euro of venture capital in Europe when they were founded six years ago, and today
they surpass Sharp as the number one solar cell producer in the world.
Access to capital is the question underlying your question. Do you have to be a
multinational to come on the landscape and compete? I give you Q-Cells as an
example that you don’t have to be a multinational. Today Q-Cells is a multinational
and it’s the largest, most profitable company in Germany. It is a company that wants
to be, and may some day be, a Fortune 100 company. But only six short years ago it
was five guys who couldn’t raise money from the German venture community. Marcel
Brenninkmeijer, the founder of Good Energies and the family member whose capital
we invest, went where no one would go and he invested several millions of dollars. Of
course now it’s a public company.
So I don’t believe, by our own example of Q-Cells, that it’s not possible to compete
with the established Fortune 500 companies that are either in it or getting into it.
Speed the clock forward five to ten years from now. The answer is that it’s getting
more and more challenging for a startup to break out and become the next Q-Cells
or the next Renewable Energy Corporation, which is another company we built. It’s
getting more and more challenging, but that’s not unusual, that’s typical. You don’t
see the next Genzyme or the next Google happening so quickly, right?  The reality in
venture investing is that the probabilities are over 80 percent that the liquidity event
will be an M&A transaction, no matter what technology sector. Frankly, I think the
number is going to be even higher in this sector. Why? Because of the amount of
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capital required to build these companies, the amount of infrastructure to support
these companies, and the fact that it’s a global market that requires channels and
support in 70 nations. This is what multinationals do, and they do it well.
I frankly believe that the access to capital more and more will come through
corporate partnering, and companies will find themselves being acquired along the
way and have to complete their build out to the market in the hands of a
multinational.
The reality in venture investing is that the probabilities are over 80 percent
that the liquidity event will be an M&A transaction, no matter what
technology sector. Frankly, I think the number is going to be even higher in
this sector.
Take Great Point Energy, for example. They’ve received hundreds of millions of
dollars of capital. I don’t want to speak out of turn. I know all the investors there, and
I know the three founders. But it’s hard to see how Great Point would take on the
world without being acquired by a company that has the ability to build those
gasification facilities all around the globe. I wish them great success. In fact, I think
they’re a great company and they are doing great things. But I believe they will
eventually reach a scale where they have to be part of a multinational or strategically
aligned, and the capital will no longer make sense to come from venture capital.
QUESTION 4: Competition from larger players
This question is in regards to your reference to displacing incumbent industries. Recently
the Rockefeller family filed shareholder resolutions to encourage diversification into
renewable energy industries. Do you think that as incumbent companies begin to
transition to clean technology and sustainable activities, it somehow threatens Konarka’s
competitive advantage, its uniqueness? Or does it facilitate your company’s growth
because of reduced resistance from regulatory agencies?
Howard Berke: I’m a little confused by the question. Konarka’s focus is initially to
introduce our technology in unregulated markets and markets that are not subsidy-
based. If you want to power an RFID (radio-frequency identification) tag, you don’t
need government approval for that and you don’t collect the subsidy for that. But if a
piece of plastic can make an RFID tag powered forever, that’s a market.
From a Konarka perspective I don’t see any threat. There are threats, but not that
one. More globally, Jim Rogers is somebody I really admire. Some would say they
don’t admire him because he’s building a nuclear power plant, but the reason I
admire him goes back to my earlier experience. In the telecommunications industry,
one of the technologies I brought to the world and made a few dollars on, but more
importantly felt that I was really making an impact, was IP communications. I was the
contrarian who said that you can move video, audio, and interactive media over an IP
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network, and use jerky R box (Regional Bell Operating Company) with your DSL. And
they said, “Well, Howard, you don’t have a Ph.D. What do you know? Don’t tell us.”
Back in the telecommunications days when geeks were playing with IP, we were the
jokesters (I mean, you’ve got to be kidding – you’re going to move video over the
public Internet – you’re out of your mind!). But there were a few very insightful
CEOs of those telecommunications companies that said, “Well, wait a second. You
know, maybe – just maybe – these guys might be the future.”
So, come to Jim Rogers. There are some utility executives that are rethinking their
business models, rethinking how they would generate returns for their investors. The
challenge for them is that they are a regulated industry. And so when Jim Rogers says
that he wants to bring efficiency to his 14 million rate payers, he’s got the vision. When
he says that he wants to make the homes more efficient and earn revenue and profits
for doing it, he’s got the vision. I think Jim Rogers is a great visionary. The problem
is that it’s such a regulated industry and he has to overcome the PUCs (Public Utility
Commissions). He has to overcome a lot of inertia in individual states for him to
realize that new business model.
If what you’re asking is whether there is a threat of larger and established players
coming into this, my answer is bring it on, because if you want to change the world,
you ain’t going to change the world one startup at a time. As romantic as that sounds,
it’s not the way the world changes. When the utilities start embracing new business
models and when the Fortune 500 move into an industry, then you know you can
change the world.
If what you’re asking is whether there is a threat of larger and established
players coming into this, my answer is bring it on, because if you want to
change the world, you ain’t going to change the world one startup at a
time. As romantic as that sounds, it’s not the way the world changes. When
the utilities start embracing new business models and when the Fortune
500 move into an industry, then you know you can change the world.
QUESTION 5: Extending federal tax incentives for renewable energy
How are the venture capital community and small startups dealing with Congress’s
inability to extend the federal tax incentives for renewables and what effect does all this
uncertainty have in small startup companies?
Lise Dondy: It’s a huge problem. Policy uncertainty poses huge risks for startup
companies and larger companies alike. The renewables industry is an emerging
industry, and the fits and starts make it impossible for companies in terms of
planning – from large wind turbine companies down to small solar companies.
Everyone should keep putting pressure on Congress to pass the investment tax credit
(ITC) and the production tax credit (PTC).
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It’s a huge problem. Policy uncertainty poses huge risks for startup
companies and larger companies alike. The renewables industry is an
emerging industry, and the fits and starts make it impossible for companies
in terms of planning.
Howard Berke: One of my four half-time jobs was to help organize an event in
Washington. The President spoke and five cabinet members were there. Privately, the
President said that he agrees that the PTC and ITC need to be long-term and
predictable in order for capital flows to efficiently move into this sector. In fact, what
he said privately is that he believes they should be permanent. He understood that
uncertainty is the four letter word. It may be four syllables, but it's a four letter word
to the capital markets. The energy market is a $1 trillion industry, the largest in the
world. It invests hundreds of billions of dollars per year on a global basis. Anything
that holds back the flows of those capital dollars obviously slows down the rate of
adoption and the turnover in infrastructure.
I couldn’t agree more about the predictability of the ITC and PTC, which is really
the regimen we have in the U.S. The Europeans have their feed-in tariff, which works
a lot better. But feed-in tariffs aren’t really the American way, and they’re very difficult
to do with 50 states and 50 PUCs. I can lecture on why feed-in tariffs won’t work very
well in America, but that aside, before Memorial Day, I think you’ll see the ITC and
PTCs extended. They won’t be permanent and they won’t be long term, but they will
be extended.
The other difficulty is that Congress never passes a tax bill in a Presidential election
year; it’s never happened and it probably never will. So no matter which way it comes
out, the other party is blaming the other party. What we’re going to see is not a
comprehensive tax bill, we’re just going to see a whole bunch of extensions. I think
Congress has figured it all out, and it will get done before Memorial Day. I hope so.
I’m putting a big solar system on my house and I want to take that ITC this year . . .
before November.
QUESTION 6: Cleantech incubators
Howard, you talked about the long gestation periods for cleantech startups and the need
to develop human capital and better management for the early companies and immature
technologies. Certainly for Connecticut Innovations and the Clean Energy Fund, you’re
looking to develop early stage companies, create jobs in Connecticut, and create the
ecosystem for that.
Why aren’t there more incubators here in Connecticut to create that ecosystem to
nurture those early stage cleantech companies? Why has that not happened around the
clusters, around Yale, the University of Connecticut, or other markets?
Howard Berke: I can speak for Massachusetts and the rest of the nation on what’s
going on, but I’ll let Lise speak for Connecticut. I can tell you the biotech incubation
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campus at Yale has been a tremendous success. I don't know the details and there must
be some reasons, but from my perspective it’s Yale so there’s great bioscience. The
Biotech Park’s been a great success and that’s a great question to ask; I don't know the
answer. I’m always on the MIT campus and what’s going on there is not a renaissance,
it’s is a revolution. 68 percent of the business plans in the business plan competition
are energy-related. I remember getting invited to speak to the Energy SIG, a special
interest group that was formed at MIT, when it first got started. I was the first speaker
and now they can’t even find an auditorium big enough for the group.
I can go on and on. What’s happening on MIT’s campus ought to be happening
here at Yale as well. It’s certainly happening on the UC campuses and elsewhere.
Maybe Yale, because President Levin has been a great leader on carbon and all of that,
which I admire, needs to replicate the success with the biotech incubator on campus
for cleantech as well down here in New Haven. I vote yes to that.
Lise Dondy: I would add that if you look at the amount of state dollars going into
economic development around innovative initiatives, there really is not much coming
out of the state. There’s a real deficit there of putting some serious money behind
innovative economic development.
Anastasia O’Rourke: I would view it also as an opportunity. I think that there’s
enough of a groundswell and interest now to build something great to that end.
Howard Berke: For Konarka’s start we have $15 million in government grants from
the U.S. and Europe and over $100 million of venture capital. We started with a seed
round of $1.1 million. Noubar Afeyan, who is the founder of Flagship Ventures, was
on a panel earlier this week and had a great comment which I want to share with you
because I absolutely agree. He said that there is a danger in giving entrepreneurs too
much money too early. It’s happening because there’s so much capital moving into
venture capital; there’s so much private equity floating out there and fewer places to
invest it. Too much money too early is being hurled on to entrepreneurs, and it does
not make them capital efficient. It makes them lazy and sloppy, and it doesn’t make
them face tough decisions. This has been proven over and over again.
One of the questions Anastasia had for us was whether we need a new type of
investment group for this new wave of technology and focus on cleantech. Now,
Good Energies is very different, but it’s different for reasons that don't have to do with
the technology. It’s different because it’s family and we invest 3P (People – Planet –
Profit), so societal environmental returns are calculated on every investment we
make, not just the economic return.
The typical venture capitalist is not that way, and Noubar is raising the point that
it’s great to see the numbers going up, but too much capital too early, particularly in
A-rounds . . . my goodness. A good A-round was about $1 million to $3 million.
Putting $10 to $20 million into A-rounds with unproven entrepreneurial teams –
what are the VC’s thinking? The lessons of the past are lessons hard learned, and you
can go from bubble to bubble and see that the VCs fall into a behavioral pattern that’s
somewhat creating their own problems.
Less capital earlier and forcing tough decisions to be made by the scientists and the
entrepreneurs is a healthy thing. We at Good Energies just seeded a new battery
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technology company, which we haven't announced, with two other investors. Three
huge global investors get together and we seed a new battery technology off of a
campus and we think it could be a very disruptive new battery technology at low cost
for vehicles. Guess what? Three global venture funds that have the ability to put in as
many millions or tens of millions as they want gave them $900,000 ($300,000 each)
and said that until you make your milestones, we’ve got deep pockets, but you aren’t
getting the money. You’re going to have to make some tough decisions and you’re
going to have to show us real progress. If you don’t like it, you can take venture capital
from other sources. That’s real company building, real venture capital.
Less capital earlier and forcing tough decisions to be made by the scientists
and the entrepreneurs is a healthy thing. Until you make your milestones,
we’ve got deep pockets, but you aren’t getting the money. You’re going to
have to make some tough decisions and you’re going to have to show us
real progress. If you don’t like it, you can take venture capital from other
sources. That’s real company building, real venture capital.
QUESTION 7: Water investments
One of the things that I work on is nanotechnology for water treatment. And one of the
things that always interests me is that I see 60 percent of investment in cleantech going into
the energy sector, and of course that’s very heavily tied to other technology areas whether
it be with materials or water-driven processes. Some of these water technologies are very
energy intensive. Are you seeing the tie-ins between segments, and do you have any
projections for the growth of water investing? There are obviously challenges in water and
water investments. Do you see that becoming bigger in the short-term or long-term future?
Howard Berke: Remember I told you about the idea I had for my 14th company?
At Good Energies we don’t currently invest in water-related things. Our main focus is
alternative renewable energy. We don’t do biofuels because we didn’t believe in
competition with crops, and we were right. We were right environmentally, we were
right economically, and we were certainly right financially because people have lost a
lot of money in bioethanol.
But we believe that water is coming, and we actually have a separate fund not yet
folded into Good Energies that’s investing in this. It’s called the Entrepreneurs Fund.
I once spoke at the U.S. Chamber of Commerce at a nationally televised event. They
were really annoyed at me that I actually asked the audience a question, because you
can’t ask the viewers out there. But the question I asked is, what are the three
substances of life? They are clean water, clean air, and safe and abundant food. And I
asked the audience what is the common denominator for all three?  Energy. So when
you talk to the planners of Masdar City and Abu Dhabi in the United Arab Emirates,
it’s all about desalinization of water and energy.
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If we’re going to get to 10 billion people on this planet, it’s going to be about food,
clean water, and clean air. We’re already seeing food riots and ninety percent of
China’s groundwater is contaminated by U.S. standards. If we can produce food with
less energy, less demand on clean water, do it in an environmentally responsive way,
and have adequate protein for 10 billion humans on this planet, many of whom are
rightfully moving up in the economic strata and therefore eating more food, well . . .
that’s my 14th company because it’s all about energy, water, air and food. If we don’t
figure that out pretty darn soon, we won’t be 10 billion happy people on this planet
because there isn’t enough resource.
There are certain venture funds that are investing quite a bit in water, and a
growing number. I actually think that the percentage may not appear that high to
you, but there is growing interest. Good Energies ourselves through our sister fund is
investing. I personally, as an entrepreneur, believe that it’s water and food coming
next. You may not see the percent increase because the total pie is getting so large for
cleantech investing that the absolute dollars are certainly going up.
QUESTION 8: Picking winners in public policy and funding technology 
Thank you, first of all, for putting on a very enjoyable talk. I’d like to return for a minute
to the regulatory piece, especially as it pertains to the national level. You mentioned carbon
capture and storage, and in the Lieberman-Warner Bill, which is currently the most
recognized bill, there is a 4.5 times bonus for carbon capture and storage, so that every ton
of carbon dioxide that’s secured from this particular method is worth four and a half times
as much as a ton of carbon dioxide secured through any other means. You think about why
this government subsidy is written in, and it’s not very hard to speculate why it exists.
The first part of my question is do you think it’s possible to push and ultimately pass a
national carbon  policy that doesn’t appease to such an extent large players like, for
instance, the coal industry? What role does cleantech have to play in that political process?
As a second part of the question, regardless of what winners are picked by a policy,
what would a national carbon market mean to the cleantech space?
Anastasia O’Rourke: I will say that within the cleantech area, many investors are
starting to form industry associations to lobby for certain policies and laws to support
cleantech companies’ growth. They are aiming for those laws to be created in such a
way that they’re technology neutral, so that the incentives are set up in such a way that
the best technology wins.
Howard Berke: Picking up on Anastasia’s comment, I was at a private dinner about
two years ago with a retired Senator who for many years was the Chairman of the
Senate Committee for Energy. He said that in his 25 years sitting on that committee,
many of those years as Chairman, that every time they thought they had the answer
to the technology at which they should throw a lot of money they were wrong. They
really suck at picking the winners, and he said that it’s about time they realize how
bad they are as a Congress in picking winning technologies. That’s for the VCs in the
private market to figure out.
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Now, if we have a carbon regime, we ought to also have a complementary mandate
for renewables. I truly believe that. A carbon regime is necessary, but not sufficient; a
renewables mandate is also necessary.
He said that in his 25 years sitting on that committee [Senate Committee for
Energy], many of those years as Chairman, that every time they thought they
had the answer to the technology at which they should throw a lot of money
they were wrong.They really suck at picking the winners, and he said that it’s
about time they realize how bad they are as a Congress in picking winning
technologies. That’s for the VCs in the private market to figure out.
Such a mandate, however, ought not to be selective about technologies. That’s very
dangerous turf. If legislators want to push technology, don’t put it in mandates.
Increase the budget for the Department of Energy’s national labs or make a lower
capital gains tax rate and watch how the VCs throw more tens of billions of dollars at
it. But don’t sit up there on CSPAN and think that you can pick the technologies. VCs
are wrong 80 percent of the time and right 20 percent of the time. Hopefully the 20
percent equals a 40 percent rate of return on the money spent.
Someone once said to me that VCs must be really stupid because if they knew
which company was going to be the home run, why did they waste all those billions
on the other companies. The reality is that they don’t know. It’s all about investing in
a portfolio, right? So, I tell the senators to invest in a portfolio, invest in the national
labs, invest in venture capital, invest in universities, and invest in science. But don’t
think that you can pick the winners because even VCs can’t pick the winners better
than 20 percent of the time.
We need a renewables mandate as a complement to a carbon regime, we need
Congress not to think that they know all the answers, we need more funding for our
national labs and our universities, and we need to keep the focus on entrepreneurship
and capital investing in this space.
Lise Dondy: I would add that we need to have a very proactive federal government
on all of those fronts, and it’s been lacking for so long. The innovation that’s been
going on in these areas from policies such as Renewable Portfolio Standards has really
fallen to the states. That’s just a piecemeal way of doing things, and we really do need
the national policy and the commitment of dollars.
Howard Berke: Lise has an interesting perspective, and I’ve seen this in
Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, and the other leadership states in fostering cleantech in
their state. I couldn’t agree more about federal leadership.
Lise’s perspective is that you’ve got to separate policy from economic development.
What’s happening in the state level is that, because of the lack of federal leadership,
we’re seeing the states taking leadership and confounding the role of economic
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development with policy and mandates. Even if we have national policy and
mandates, there is absolutely a role for each of the 50 states. Do you know what that
role is?  Come put your business in my state. Entrepreneurs, start your companies in
my state. Universities, foster innovation and keep it in our city of New Haven. Keep
it in Storrs.
The states will always, and should, be their own greatest cheerleaders. It’s not a
matter of should we be doing more solar as a nation. Of course we should. But if the
Governor of Pennsylvania wants to compete with New York State for that startup or
that European company that’s homing itself into the United States, to me that’s
economic development that should go on, and in fact it is going on. Often times it is
complicated by policy being mixed in there. Would you [Lise] agree with that?
Lise Dondy: I do agree. There are clearly economic development policies on a state
level. What has happened is that the energy policy and all the regulations that we’ve
talked about have gotten mixed up with economic development policy, and they
should be separate. The energy policy should be on a national level, and a lot of the
incentives at labs and at centers of excellence need to also come from the federal
government, especially early R&D funding. States can’t fund early R&D at the level
that’s needed. That’s part of the food chain of innovation and it’s really been sorely
lacking. So I agree that economic development policy will still be at a state level, but
I’m really talking energy policy.
Energy policy should be on a national level, and a lot of the incentives at
labs and at centers of excellence need to also come from the federal
government, especially early R&D funding. States can’t fund early R&D at
the level that’s needed. That’s part of the food chain of innovation and it’s
really been sorely lacking.
Howard Berke: Let me ask the audience a quick question. Raise your hand if in the
next five years you think you’ll be starting a cleantech company, working for a startup
cleantech company, or, for that matter, any cleantech company. Okay. Now put your
hand down unless the number one reason why you’re starting that company or
joining that company is for economic personal return. If the number one reason, the
number one objective, is financial return for yourself and the founders, keep your
hand up. Okay. So, now we’re down to about two or three hands, right?
Let me give you a piece of advice. Nothing I’ve ever done is for money. Why I’ve
turned down other venture funds and joined Good Energies is because there’s more
to investing than making money, and there’s more to starting a company than making
money. Money is on my top three list, but it never makes number one.
The reason to do it is not your wallet and not your brain, but your heart. I can tell
you that the heart is not measured in dollars and cents because when a guy falls in
love, he will give his last penny to court that woman. Dollars and cents are not the
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way the heart operates. That’s where passion comes from. If you don’t have the
passion, you ought not to be an entrepreneur. If you don’t have the passion, you
ought not to start a company. Passion does not come from your wallet and doesn’t
come from your brain. It comes from your heart. So if your heart’s not in it and you’re
thinking it’s a way to make return, then don’t start a company.
Let me give you a piece of advice. Nothing I’ve ever done is for money. Why
I’ve turned down other venture funds and joined Good Energies is because
there’s more to investing than making money, and there’s more to starting
a company than making money. Money is on my top three list, but it never
makes number one.
Anastasia O’Rourke: Well, that’s a great way to end our conversation – and this
series for that matter – with a bit of passion and heart. Thank you, Lise and Howard,
for a great discussion on investing in cleantech and the role of venture capitalists and
entrepreneurs.
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Insuring the Future in a Changing
World: The Impact of Climate Change
on Insurance and Financial Products
and Services
Ralph Mucerino, AIG Global Marine & Energy
editors’ remarks
During the Philanthropy Panel discussion, Michael Northrop commented that it is surprising
“how little direct intervention there is in the policy debate [concerning climate change] by
insurance companies.” This is not the first time we have heard such a sentiment, and it indeed
seems to follow that the insurance industry – given its natural positioning as both insurer and
investor with respect to many of the challenges posed by climate change – would be a major
participant in such dialogues. In this chapter, Ralph Mucerino, representing the largest
commercial insurance company in the world, operating with about $1 trillion worth of assets,
addresses the link between the insurance industry and climate change “within the context of
AIG’s business.” He does so in a way that is both substantively and anecdotally interesting, as
one might expect from a well-traveled “insurance journeyman” with a long and illustrious
career in the insurance industry who underwent a “personal epiphany” on climate change a
few years ago.
The chapter is organized by sector, moving through renewable and alternative energies, coal
and minerals, oil and natural gas, chemicals, paper and forestry products, and insurance products
and services. The driving interest within each of these sectors is risk management and
opportunity. With respect to biofuels, for example, “All of these technologies, whatever they
may or will be, have been or will be insured for property and liability insurance, as well as
environmental insurance. We will [also] invest in these technologies from both an equity and
debt perspective.” The subsequent sections on sustainability initiatives and environmental
investments are, again, mostly within the context of AIG’s business but not exclusive of more
general principles. The conversation regarding sustainability, for instance, carries into the final
section of the talk where we are reminded of the underlying human element of business: “We
each have the ability to influence what companies do because we manage the company.”
The question and answer session largely focuses on insurance in carbon markets, catastrophe
risk, and the role and ability of insurance companies to conduct business under uncertainty. The
conversation ends with some examples about catastrophe management capability, supporting
the claim that, up to a level, anticipatory measures can be less costly than responsive ones.*
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introduction
I really enjoy participating in these types of presentations because it allows me to
grow, understand, and learn more about what is going on in the world around me
and within the halls of academia. I’m not a scientist. I’m what you could call an
insurance journeyman. I’ve been in the insurance industry for a long time and it is
something that I have made a career out of.
About two or three years ago, I underwent a personal epiphany on climate change.
Certainly, being in the insurance industry, I was aware of pollution and the
environment because these are things that we insure on a daily basis. From the
standpoint of having a clear intellectual understanding of climate change, I am not
an expert, but I am somebody who has spent a lot of time looking at climate change
within the context of AIG’s business, as a citizen of the United States and the world,
and certainly as a parent.
It is clear to me that something is happening. When you look at the debates that
have gone on for a long time, you have some people looking for unequivocal proof
that climate change is there and is man-made. I don’t know how many things in life
are really unequivocal. Maybe the love of your dog is unequivocal.
When we look at the issue, we hear two simple words – climate change. When I
think of the thousands of issues that are associated with climate change and the
number of people that will put themselves forth as experts in climate change and say,
“Here is the answer,” the one thing I have learned over the past couple of years is that
there is not one answer. It starts with turning the lights off when you leave a room
and builds from there.
When you look at the debates that have gone on for a long time, you have
some people looking for unequivocal proof that climate change is there and
is man-made. I don't know how many things in life are really unequivocal.
Maybe the love of your dog is unequivocal.
context
Let me give you a little background about AIG before we begin the presentation. AIG
is a company that operates globally. We were founded in Shanghai about 85 years ago
by an American man named C .V. Starr. C.V. worked for an insurance agency in
Shanghai before moving west to start AIG. AIG operates in over 100 countries and is
the largest commercial insurance company in the world. For those of you that read
the business pages, you will know that we have received some unfavorable notoriety
over the past few years, which hasn’t been all that good, but I believe that we are a
great company that does good things.
We operate with about $1 trillion worth of assets, $800 billion of which we manage
as part of an overall investment portfolio. We invest about $60 billion a year in
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different initiatives focused on our insurance portfolio business. We have undertaken
new business initiatives in China and India. We were one of the first companies into
China through an effort of our former Chairman, Hank Greenberg, who spent nearly
25 years building the Chinese franchise. We have also established operations in India
in partnership with the Tata Group, which as you know is an industrial titan. AIG is
a global company and therefore we see issues on a global basis. We do not sit here in
our U.S. offices and look outward to try and figure out what’s going on in the rest of
the world – we are a part of that world.
In my own career at AIG, I have had the good fortune of traveling through Asia,
including Japan, Korea, China, Pakistan, India, and in Africa to places like Kenya,
Zimbabwe, and Egypt, as well as Israel, and in Latin America to Brazil and Argentina.
In doing that, I’ve gained a unique global perspective that you can’t buy, because you
have to live it.
When AIG looks at the issues that are happening relative to climate change and
insurance, we are looking at some very basic changes with the environment, like water
supply. More and more, the concern about water and the concern about the absolute
supply of water is manifesting itself much more regularly. When we look at some of
the solutions that are out there that are perceived to provide alternative energy
sources, we have to look at the amount of water that they consume. To produce a
gallon of ethanol, for instance, it takes twice as much liquid to produce that ethanol.
There are some very profound issues with water.
Think about the impacts of changing seasonality on peak power demand. What
happens when temperatures change? The need for energy changes. Then think about the
role of water. If we don’t have a reasonable supply of water, then there will be certain
forms of energy that will be impacted by it. Power plants need water. If there are
abnormal droughts as a result of changing temperatures and differing seasonal patterns,
then our electric infrastructure gets impacted by climate change through water.
If there are abnormal droughts as a result of changing temperatures and
differing seasonal patterns, then our electric infrastructure gets impacted
by climate change through water.
I just came back from a trip to the Middle East and India. I met with some
investors in Abu Dhabi, where one of their primary concerns is water. How do we
sustain our population when faced with low water supplies? Luckily for them, they
don’t have a large population, but they do have a very rich population that still needs
water to survive. Given the issue of water, they are now purchasing equity interests in
water technology and management companies and bringing those technologies and
management skills to Abu Dhabi so that they can figure out a way to export water
throughout the Middle East and North Africa.
They are looking at some very interesting types of water technology. One
technology is an innovative irrigation management system that puts sensors in the
roots of vegetation, be it grass, trees, shrubs, or crops. These computerized sensors
determine when water is needed at a specific point in time for that vegetation to grow
and the amount of fertilizers necessary; both are then automatically distributed.
There are some fascinating water technologies being developed, and investors in Abu
Dhabi are taking an interest in them.
As an insurance company, we tend to look at catastrophes and changes in the
environment and regulation as something that presents us with an opportunity to
provide not just a public service by insuring our customers but to also increase
shareholder value. We look at everything that is going on in the world concerning
climate change and the environment as an opportunity. If you look at the divisions
that we have inside of AIG, many of them were set up to respond to opportunities.
Take for example D&O (Directors & Officers) insurance. About twenty years ago,
during a period when shareholder lawsuits were relatively unknown, a spate of
lawsuits involving shareholders suing their Boards of Directors suddenly ensued. AIG
came into the market with a Directors and Officers liability policy that became the
standard for the market. Whatever is causing a disruption in the marketplace is also
seen as an opportunity for an insurer/investor.
Whatever is causing a disruption in the marketplace is also seen as an
opportunity for an insurer/investor.
renewable and alternative energy
We view renewable and alternative energies and new regulations as issues of
opportunity for our business. We have been involved with insuring and investing in
renewable energy for a long time. One of the first things that we did once climate
change started to become much more public was to set up the Advanced Energy
Solutions Group and ecoPractice focusing on alternative and renewable energies and
other green initiatives. We then dubbed it an eco-practice. Did we do that because it
was a nice thing to do? Absolutely not. We had a number of motivations. There were
challenges from climate change. There were also political reasons, because our
company is a global citizen made up of people from around the world. And when you
look at the trillions of dollars that will be invested in renewable energy, alternative
energy, and energy efficiency over the coming decades, it is a business and something
a lot of investors really want to be a part of.
If you look at this climate change issue as a business continuum from 1 to 10, with
10 being a developed business and zero being a nascent business, I honestly believe
that we are much closer to zero in understanding all of the business potential and
implications that are associated with climate change and the opportunities presented
by alternative and renewable energy. Therefore, we are just beginning to develop
products and services that are meaningful to the buying public.
When we look at alternative energy, there are some people who will try to make it
appear as though alternative energy sources are relatively new. Disregarding climate
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change for a moment, coal liquefaction technology has been around since World War
II, and we really developed it to a higher extent in South Africa. Hydrogen technology
is starting to emerge, but in fact, has been around for quite a while. Take biomass, for
example. When you look at a typical facility for turning biomass into energy, it is
nothing more than a furnace that boils water to create steam and energy. Does this
sound like very sophisticated technology? 
If you look at this climate change issue as a business continuum from 1 to
10, with 10 being a developed business and zero being a nascent business, I
honestly believe that we are much closer to zero in understanding all of the
business potential and implications that are associated with climate
change and the opportunities presented by alternative and renewable
energy.
Having said that, when we look at solar technology, we know that solar is at an
early stage of development, and, to produce any realistic level of power, it will also
require taking acres and acres of land to place these photovoltaic panels. Yet there is
technology that is being currently developed that, instead of a flat photovoltaic panel,
places a series of mirrors that focus solar rays to create an intense source of heat that
will in turn create power and provide energy for not only heating but also for cooling.
Look at some of the biofuels like ethanol, which have had a mixed history. We
know there need to be technologies to support cellulosic ethanol if we’re going to
move into a new chapter on energy. Certainly, various plants that produce oil are
becoming more prominent and will be part of our future. All of these technologies,
whatever they may or will be, have been or will be insured for property and liability
insurance, as well as environmental insurance. From an investment perspective, we,
as the largest provider of debt and equity investing in the United States, will invest in
these technologies from both an equity and debt perspective.
Coming back to some of the statistics, AIG insures 70 percent of the operating
capacity for waste energy, 60 percent for geothermal, and 50 percent for wind power.
In the wind industry there is a combination of investors, which includes companies
like Florida Power and Light, the largest provider of wind power in the United States.
There are private investors coming into these markets as well, and we look to insure
the performance of these projects and technologies.
We learn from looking at a sector, and we respond to the needs of the market by
providing value-added services. Since we have regional operations, we are very close
to the changing business trends and the needs of the different markets in which we
operate around the world. Given our global presence, we have begun to establish
specific programs like the sustainability council we organized in the European Union.
This council was established to listen to the needs of our customers as they deal with
emerging sustainability trends. The council allows us to take a better look at what
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types of risks these companies are confronted with in order to then determine a
business response by AIG to address those needs.
With respect to the issue of carbon credits as part of the Kyoto Protocol, it was
expected that the carbon credits would encourage investment, and they have. We
thought, however, that AIG would be bombarded with requests to insure carbon
credits – they haven’t yet emerged as an insurable exposure, but they will. Once the
full impact of carbon trading hits Europe and other parts of the world, insurance will
be needed to cover the delivery risk for carbon credits.
With respect to the issue of carbon credits as part of the Kyoto Protocol, it
was expected that the carbon credits would encourage investment, and
they have. We thought, however, that AIG would be bombarded with
requests to insure carbon credits – they haven’t yet emerged as an
insurable exposure, but they will.
coal and minerals
In regards to the coal and minerals sector, it is safe to assume that right now we are
still a fossil fuel driven energy world. Based on the information that I have seen, this
trend doesn’t seem to disappear or change dramatically for another twenty years or
so. For coal, there are many different types of risks, including transportation
disruptions and flood losses for major mining companies like BHP Billiton and Rio
Tinto. These mine floods are disastrous events and they have increased, we think,
because of the changes occurring with the environment.
There is also the issue of carbon capture and storage. When we use coal, we are
going to emit carbon unless we do something to capture that carbon and store it
someplace. We can either bury the carbon emissions from coal, or even inject the CO2
emissions into a dormant oil well to encourage additional production of oil,
recognizing that this oil will lead to the production of more greenhouse gases. The
technologies around carbon capture and storage are still new and expensive. In
regards to liability, the law is unclear in terms of what happens to the stored carbon
should something adverse occur. The U.S. and the states aren’t willing to take on that
liability. In time, a whole new body of research and approaches will ensue and AIG
will identify business opportunities as the markets develop and technologies
improve.
oil and natural gas
Given the differing qualities of fossil fuels in the oil and natural gas sector, the
production of carbon emissions varies. Some fuels produce less, while others produce
more carbon. One of the major risks for the oil and natural gas sector is hurricane
damage. Look at what happened to the infrastructure for these sectors with
Hurricanes Rita and Katrina. These were mammoth facilities that were just destroyed
with these hurricanes. Clearly when you look at the United States and the Gulf of
Mexico, given the number of refining and storage of oil sector-related businesses that
exist there, there is still a tremendous risk even to this day of a hurricane-related event
impacting the sector.
chemicals
In the chemical sector there is growing demand to improve energy efficiency,
especially as it relates to biotechnology. AIG is spending a fair amount of time
learning about technologies. What’s available today? What’s going to be here
tomorrow? There are technologies that take bacteria, introduce CO2, and then
produce a form of biodiesel. Unfortunately, one of the side effects is that the bacteria
produce waste from this process which makes the technology less cost-effective. There
is a lot of work being done in this area, including research with nanotechnology, at
different labs around the world.
paper and forestry products
I just had a conversation with a doctoral student here at Yale about forestry and some
of the unique risk exposures there. We were talking about the exposure of releasing
radioactive materials into the atmosphere that have been stored in the forests
surrounding and upwind of Chernobyl. Climate change has a significant impact on
forests, especially when you look at the damages that can be caused by wildfires and
drought on forests and timber production. As we know, forests are one of the best
ways to sequester carbon, and in the case of Chernobyl, radioactive waste too.
insurance products and services
AIG is developing a number of products and services to bring to market that will deal
with some of these industrial sector risks. We are heavily involved with products
involving environmental coverage around clean-up and legal liability around
pollution. I will discuss a remediation project later that demonstrates our capability
in taking our expertise and regenerating a city to make it productive. We are
developing products around carbon credit delivery coverage, which I have already
mentioned. One of our companies, Lexington Insurance, has a product that will
essentially rebuild a damaged facility or the damaged part of a facility with more
energy efficient and green materials. We have both residential and commercial
versions of this product called “Upgrade to Green.”
We take existing forms of insurance and apply it to things that are relevant today.
For example, there is a manufacturer of wallboard targeting the Louisiana and Gulf
Coast market. They have a wallboard product that essentially is resistant to winds up
to 150 miles per hour and also has a resistance to a certain type of flood. We put up a
warranty product at AIG on this wallboard that essentially guarantees that it will
perform. If the wallboard product does not perform, then there will be economic
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compensation to whoever bought the wallboard. In offering these kinds of products,
again we have an ongoing dialogue not only with the manufacturer, but also with the
New Orleans Reconstruction Authority to determine what the need for this kind of
product is to support the areas of reconstruction.
We also provide project finance advisory services. We are working with the
government of Alaska and the Kake Indian Tribe to come up with a program for
developing and financing renewable energy that will lead to the replacement of diesel
power for the entire state, managing their greenhouse gas emissions more effectively.
We have been working with our technology partners at United Technologies, the state
government, and some investment capital on these projects to help make them
happen.
sustainability initiatives – participation, process, and
products
When looking at an investment, we look at the investment relative to the
sustainability of the company that we’re investing in, and factor in the social and
environmental responsibility of those companies as well as their governance and
ethics before we make an investment. In looking at the environmental aspects of an
investment, we clearly look at GHG emissions, the risk of climate change regulations
on the business, and the impact the product has on the environment. In regards to
social responsibility, before we make an investment we look at a number of things,
including diversity, health and safety compliance, as well as transparency and
accountability in terms of governance and ethics.
We have a formalized process that we apply regularly to our investments called the
3P process, which includes participation, process, and products. Through this process
we are building upon our existing due diligence platforms and embedding the
principles of sustainable finance into the architecture of our investments. AIG is a
member of the United Nations Environment Programme Finance Initiative, a
signatory and sponsor of the Carbon Disclosure Project, and the first major insurer to
become a member of the Investor Network for Climate Risk. In regards to the Carbon
Disclosure Project1, this program is focused on how S&P 500 companies voluntarily
disclose their greenhouse gas emissions and manage climate change risk. While the
Carbon Disclosure Project is voluntary, compliance has been increasing and more
information is being made available to investors and others as part of this project.
In regards to products, we have fixed income project finance products for
renewable energy. We also make equity investments as well including social awareness
and socially responsible mutual funds in the U.S. and abroad. We have a Japanese
corporate social responsibility fund and a variety of other equity funds, including the
AIG Sustainable Future Fund which I will talk more about. We are taking funds in
which we manage, participate, and invest in projects and businesses around the world
that are socially responsible and focused on sustainability.
We also invest in infrastructure projects in different parts of the world to assist in
enabling those economies to achieve some of the things that are necessary to manage
their greenhouse gas  emissions. Microfinance is a very interesting investment space
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and we undertake direct investments in these projects through Blue Finance. There
are whole segments of society that do not have the ability to access capital and get any
kind of finance or credit capability. We are talking here about amounts of money
equivalent to borrowing between $25 and $50, where access to capital is important to
keep a small business alive for a period of time so that their sales can sustain
themselves. To support the microfinance markets, there is now something called
micro insurance, which I was involved in when I was managing the Africa and Middle
East region. We set up a micro insurance product in Uganda that was focused on a
very limited accident and health benefit. The accident and health benefit was a death
benefit that allowed for the proper burial and financial support for relatives to come
in from different parts of the country in order to pay respects to the deceased.
We also invest in companies that develop greenhouse gas abatement projects like
Sindicatum Carbon Capital. Sindicatum is a project development company based in
London that focuses on various types of carbon-related projects that generate carbon
credits and alternative energy. They put funds together to invest in a business or a
country that is pursuing greenhouse gas abatement projects which produce carbon
credits from things like wind farms, solar power, or some other clean energy project.
Sindicatum has also developed a technology that captures methane from coal mines
and in some cases turns that methane into an alternative fuel.
On participation, we have a corporate-wide commitment to sustainability, with
the objective of creating value to AIG shareholders, clients and employees. We have
been recognized as a leader as one of the “100 Most Sustainable Companies” at the
World Economic Forum – where we were number 47 on that list. And we have also
received a number of green building awards, which I will address.
investments in the environment
Being that we are in the insurance industry, we are a source of funding. We are long-
term investors. We are not looking to invest money and take a short-term benefit or
gain. As I mentioned, we have invested assets of over $800 billion, of which $60
billion is our annual investment appetite. We are working on a $500 million deal right
now with the International Finance Corporation (IFC) to put together a fund that
will focus on energy efficiency and clean energy, providing debt financing for
businesses that want to improve their efficiency and carbon footprint. As I
mentioned, we have project finance investments in renewable energy, with
approximately $450 million in technologies like geothermal, hydroelectric, solar,
wind. We recently completed an equity investment in a solar power plant in Spain.
The Olivenza Solar Power Plant was a small investment of $32 million, but is a typical
deal for the types of investments that we will be making on a localized basis.
The AIG Sustainable Future Fund focuses on Western and Central Europe as well
as other developed and emerging markets. This fund invests in deals of various sizes
ranging from 5 to 40 million Euros. It has an industry focus and focuses on clean
technology, carbon finance, and nutrition and lifestyle.
We have also done some interesting things with real estate investments. The AIG
Centre in Dublin, Ireland, was designed and built with energy efficiency in mind,
including solar shading and natural daylighting, high performance glass, underfloor
air distribution systems, and river water for cooling. The AIG Tower in Hong Kong is
another example of green real estate. Here we have energy efficient lighting controls
and building materials made from sustainable sources. These investments are all
aimed at managing our own environmental and carbon footprint.
Within our green real estate investment portfolio, we also have an extraordinary
project in Atlantic Station in Atlanta, Georgia. This was the largest urban brownfield
project in the United States, involving 138 acres in midtown Atlanta that was
deteriorating the property values of the area surrounding it. It was the site of a steel
mill that had contaminated the local environment. Our environmental division,
directed by Joe Boren, led the remediation of this property. The remediation involved
12,000 truckloads worth of contaminated soil, reclaiming 11 acres of green space, and
recycling 150,000 cubic yards of material. In looking at where Atlantic Station was and
where it is today, this was an extraordinary accomplishment that was not only good
for the environment, but now helps the economy of the city of Atlanta. As a result of
Atlantic Station, we have won a number of awards, including the EPA’s Best
Brownfield Redevelopment Project and recognition by the U.S. Green Building
Council via LEED certification.
We also undertook another green real estate project at a resort we own called
Mount Mansfield in Stowe, Vermont. Our real estate division invested in a $300
million expansion of this resort. We worked in collaboration with the Audubon
Society in terms of its design to minimize the environmental impact. We provided
alternative electric transportation from various parking areas at the resort. That
project won an Audubon Society award for the environmental manner in which this
project was developed.
These projects are good for the environment and for business. One of the things
that I have noticed in terms of making investments in the environment is that you
can’t have one person in the company who anoints himself as the czar of
sustainability or GHG management. Sustainability has to be pervasive throughout
the values of the company. It has to permeate the culture of the company. It has to
become part of the business of the company. It has to become part of how we develop
people in the company. It is a business practice – a regimented business practice in
which you believe. Like myself, it took time to understand the benefits of
sustainability, but now I have become very passionate about it. This does not just
apply to me, but to others throughout AIG who do not engage in this kind of stuff
overnight. It’s not just about one person, but the entire company.
the future
So we have come full circle. Having discussed all of these areas of AIG’s business, does
this resolve the issue? No, it does not, but what I have discussed gives you a sense of
how AIG manages a business in a responsible way by providing products and services
to our customers in a way that makes sense and goes a long way to building
sustainability in a company, all the while creating long term shareholder value. The
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concepts of sustainability and shareholder value are not mutually exclusive and we
need more companies to recognize that.
Sustainability has to be pervasive throughout the values of the company. It
has to permeate the culture of the company. It has to become part of the
business of the company. It has to become part of how we develop people
in the company. It is a business practice – a regimented business practice in
which you believe. Like myself, it took time to understand the benefits of
sustainability, but now I have become very passionate about it.
What does this all come down to when you have a company that is made up of
people like you and me? We each have the ability to influence what companies do
because we manage the company. As long as we are responsible from the standpoint
of the asset base and needs of the company, and as long as we also recognize that we
are citizens of the world, then I believe we have a win-win. By pursuing sustainability
and shareholder value, we challenge ourselves in new ways. If we don’t challenge
ourselves on these issues, then what is going to happen? 
The concepts of sustainability and shareholder value are not mutually
exclusive and we need more companies to recognize that. We each have the
ability to influence what companies do because we manage the company. If
we don’t challenge ourselves on these issues, then what is going to happen?
Let’s take nuclear power, for example. You know that 50 percent of the population
will say nuclear power is a bad thing and the other 50 percent will say that it is a good
thing. People will say, “Well, look at Chernobyl, or look at Three Mile Island.” What
happened there as a result of nuclear power? Not much happened at Three Mile
Island, but Chernobyl was a disaster. And people worry about what else is going to
happen. Considering the current safeguards, the fact that in the United States the
average age of a nuclear engineer is 48 years old, and the fact that schools are not
producing these engineers anymore, and if you believe that nuclear power is part of
a climate change formula going forward, then we better do something quickly.
Look at coal as another example. My division is the largest writer of workers’
compensation insurance for the coal sector in the United States, so I have a vested
interest in what happens up here. You have to ask yourself as the focus on greenhouse
gas emissions increases and becomes more intense, what happens to coal without
carbon capture and storage? What happens to coal without the ability to get into coal
gasification or liquefaction without an adequate capture on top of that as well? 
I don't know, but we have all heard about the tar sands in Calgary where the whole
issue is whether certain carbon taxes are going to be applied. This alternative source
of fossil fuel with carbon taxes will not survive, because it will then be unaffordable.
And herein lies the conundrum. There are issues relative to energy security and
climate change, very serious and important issues that have to be dealt with.
With ethanol, the price of tortillas in Mexico went through the roof because
everybody was taking corn and turning it into ethanol. Is that a good thing? 
With water, there are many challenges in many parts of the world. Consider how
we are defining our coastal assets. I’ll bet you that if you went down to New Orleans
right now, you probably wouldn’t see much change in the levees today compared to
what existed in 2005. I am not being a critic here, but this is a very complex problem.
We don’t just build new levees overnight. And then when you consider the
displacement of people that occurred, the fact that half the population is gone
forever, and that perhaps you were one of the people who had all of their memories
and history wiped out in the space of a few days, then these become very complex
issues that have to be dealt with. The fact remains that those assets in New Orleans
still have to be protected. So how do we prevent things like this from happening
again? We have to be sustainable. We have to develop alternative energy. There is an
estimate that wind power will see a 700-fold increase over the next 20 to 30 years.
When you look at the issue of the environment and climate change, you have to
ask yourselves whether we have a national energy policy that makes sense and is
viable. You draw your own conclusion on that. I think this will become one of the
main issues that the next President of the United States has to quickly address once
he takes office.
When you look at the issue of the environment and climate change, you
have to ask yourselves whether we have a national energy policy that
makes sense and is viable. You draw your own conclusion on that. I think
this will become one of the main issues that the next President of the
United States has to quickly address once he takes office.
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Question and Answer Session
QUESTION 1: Carbon offsets
Thank you very much for your presentation. I’m curious, regarding your sustainability
protocol and what you have set up within your company, does it include paying or
purchasing carbon credits for everything that AIG uses? If you have looked into it, how
much would it cost? And have the shareholders approved it?
Yes, we have purchased carbon offsets to offset our carbon footprint. I don’t know
what the cost of that was, but clearly there is a process in place within the company
to have that kind of expenditure approved. We do have control over it, and it is
something that our Board of Directors would have been very involved with since they
represent our shareholders. This was not a shareholder initiative per se, but it’s
something with which the board was personally involved.
QUESTION 2: Pricing delivery risk insurance
Could you talk a little bit more about products that you are developing in terms of carbon
credits and the delivery risk for carbon credits? I guess part of the challenge for AIG is
how to price these financial products since there isn’t really a market for them currently.
How are you going to determine what is a fair market value for these products?
The basic issue around pricing is determining what the intrinsic value of the credit
is. Currently our customers have not been knocking on our door to insure these
credits. I think as the carbon trading mechanisms come further into play, and once
those values are established in the market, then you’re going to have a number of
different products, whether they’re hedge products, products that insure the value of
those credits, or whatever it might be. What has to happen first and foremost is that
there has to be some kind of trading mechanism around the value of these credits.
Once that’s done, the value and the market, then all of the exposures are pretty well
definable because it’s just another financial product of interest to the customer.
QUESTION 3: Assessing the long-term variability in water distribution
My question is about water. There’s obviously great certainty that climate change is
occurring, but, as you mentioned, not great certainty about the distribution of water that
may result from that. Can you talk a little bit more about how both sides of your business
– the insurance business and the investing business – are assessing that variability?
From the standpoint of our investing criteria, if a source and a guarantee for the
access to water is associated with that investment, then we will bring in engineering
resources to assess the viability in terms of the supply of water in a given area. The
results of this study then play an active part in the decision-making process relative
to that investment. There is certainly a lot of public-related data in different parts of
the world that relate to the supply of water.
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What is more difficult is when you try and project out what the supply of water will
be 20 or 30 years from now, and how that is going to be impacted by the changing
climate. That analysis is less of a science and more like an art. This is something that we
are learning to do to support our estimates and investment considerations. This is an
area where new developments in science are necessary, and we are continually learning.
QUESTION 4: CDM insurance
Are any insurance companies insuring CDM projects now in the European market and
what about the first years post-Kyoto? Is the risk of delivery fully reflected in the price?
Nobody is guaranteeing the credits at this point in time. What we will insure is the
physical entity. For example, if you are investing in windmills in China and getting a
credit as a benefit from that investment and something happens to the windmill, we
will cover that physical loss of that asset, but not the value of the credit.
QUESTION 5: Flood and storm insurance
It is my job here in the State of Connecticut to prepare for sea level rise and stronger
hurricanes – two of the expected outcomes of climate change for coastal regions. Could
you help me understand a little bit more about the importance of flood and storm
insurance? I have gathered that flood insurance from the private sector is not popular,
and in a lot of cases, the insurance companies aren’t even offering flood insurance. Could
you help me understand when AIG or any other insurance company makes a decision to
say,“We’re not going to offer insurance policies at any price”? It seems like there always
has to be a price that is right for flood insurance. How is that type of decision made?
One of the principal tenets of insurance is something called fortuitous loss –
meaning a loss that occurs by accident or chance. For example, when a fire or accident
occurs, you are going to pay a loss. However, in certain areas of flooding like in the
Gulf of Mexico, that is not necessarily as fortuitous a loss as it might be. It’s
predictable. You know it is going to happen, and you know you are going to pay the
loss. Then it becomes a gamble more than it is a fortuitous loss because there is an
inevitability associated with the unfortunate event. Some parts of the United States
and the world do not allow you to price this. For example, when you look at what
happened to the cost of homeowners insurance in some parts of the Gulf area, people
were losing their homes or had to give up their homes because they could not afford
to buy homeowner’s insurance. It would have cost them thousands and thousands of
dollars for flood insurance, which they couldn’t afford.
We can charge for such insurance, but how many people out there can really pay for
it in that kind of an instance? That is why there need to be federal programs to provide
both flood insurance and what they call flood plans. Just like any other business, we
have to figure out whether or not an investment is going to make a profit for the
business. There are some areas when it comes to flood insurance in particular that you
know are not going to make a profit because flooding is such a regular event. In cases
of flooding, we are not dealing with just 1 in a 100 or 1 in a 150 year events. Flooding is
going to happen. I insure a lot of oil rigs in the Gulf of Mexico. I can tell you that the
carbon finance: environmental market solutions to climate change
yale school of forestry & environmental studies
270
mucerino
yale school of forestry & environmental studies
271
wind that tipped those rigs over five years ago has done a lot to that industry. There isn’t
enough insurance premium in the Gulf of Mexico to pay for that kind of exposure.
There are situations where you cannot price insurance because you know you’re going
to lose money. That’s where federal intervention and subsidies have to come in.
We would like to insure these types of cases, and believe me, AIG prides itself on
being very creative and proactive in bringing products to market. We were one of the
companies that continued to provide flood insurance to different areas of the Gulf of
Mexico on a commercial basis. We didn’t leave it. There is a certain price associated
with that, and those who can afford to pay the price are paying it. You get around this
with different levels of deductibles and maximum limits. There is a whole new way of
underwriting these risks. It can be done and it is being done at least for commercial
customers in particular but not household customers. In regards to household
customers, how much can a customer afford to pay for flood insurance? There is a
certain budget that you live with, and that is where federal assistance comes in to
insure homeowners.
Let’s take another example – post 9/11 and insurance products for the airline
industry. It is safe to say that immediately post 9/11, no company out there was
providing insurance for the airline industry – none, zero, nada. Without that
insurance, those planes could not fly. Without that insurance, the banks would not
provide financing. Three very senior people in AIG – our former Chairman, the
current CEO, and a retired Senior Vice Chairman of the company went to work in the
days after 9/11 and put together a product with the capacity, at a price, to enable the
airline industry to start flying again absent any security issues. The insurance
mechanism does work, but there are limitations when it comes to some of the natural
events that you can’t predict.
The insurance mechanism does work, but there are limitations when it
comes to some of the natural events that you can’t predict.
QUESTION 6: Catastrophe risk
How is AIG changing their operations with respect to catastrophe risk and where do you
see this going in the future, given that there is considerable uncertainty about the
magnitude of damages resulting from climate change, and especially given the fact that
costs for claims have risen tremendously? I don’t remember the exact number, but the
cumulative catastrophe risk claims between 1980 and 1992, for example, were less than
the claims of some subsequent single events.
It all starts with being able to understand where your exposures exist. For example,
what if I do not know how much I am insuring that is exposed to wind or flood
damage in the Gulf of Mexico? If I don’t know, then I am really rolling the dice. We
have a very rigorous program for tracking our exposures to risk so that we know
exactly what level of risk we have in any given area. That is number one. Number two,
we use some very sophisticated modeling devices that are able to help us understand
what the 1 in 150 year event is, the 1 in 500 year event is, and we use that information
in order to determine what our exposure to risk is.
In understanding where we have our exposures, in understanding how to use these
advanced modeling techniques, we come up with a tolerance for risk. We then say that
we can have this much exposure and it has to generate this much in the way of
premium in order for us to stay in that market. These are very sophisticated,
empirical mathematical and statistical approaches to determine where we develop
products to manage these risks.
In understanding where we have our exposures, in understanding how to
use these advanced modeling techniques, we come up with a tolerance for
risk.We then say that we can have this much exposure and it has to generate
this much in the way of premium in order for us to stay in that market. These
are very sophisticated, empirical mathematical and statistical approaches to
determine where we develop products to manage these risks.
QUESTION 7: Uncertainty due to changing probabilities 
In terms of those models, the probabilities might change because of climate change. And,
at the same time, if you’re doing empirical studies, perhaps there have to be two events
within the next 50 years to make a statistically significant change to a previously assumed
1 in 100 year event. How do you proceed with this type of uncertainty?
Our underwriters, our actuaries, these modeling companies, are all trying to factor
in climate change. Understanding the impact of climate change is still an art in terms
of determining how climate change is going to affect floods and winds. It’s not like
you can look at the date and make an objective assessment any more. This area is
evolving. The more we learn about the impact of climate change, the more we are able
to reflect that in our models. The more we can reflect that in our models, the more
we are able to apply that to how we manage our business.
Understanding the impact of climate change is still an art in terms of
determining how climate change is going to affect floods and winds. It’s not
like you can look at the date and make an objective assessment any more.
This area is evolving. The more we learn about the impact of climate
change, the more we are able to reflect that in our models. The more we can
reflect that in our models, the more we are able to apply that to how we
manage our business.
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QUESTION 8: Catastrophe management capability  
What is your opinion in terms of our capacity as a society to handle these types of risks
and what institutions need to be strengthened?
When Katrina occurred, one of the saddest moments of my life was watching
American people stand by the roadside with helpless looks on their faces. Look at
what happened in a society like ours, where we have a democratic form of
government and a high level of wealth, when this catastrophe came upon us. We
seemingly learned for the first time how to deal with these types of situations and we
saw the conflict of control. Who was in control? The city, the state, the federal
government? It took FEMA a while to get into New Orleans to help.
I think our capacity to respond to risk has to get better. We have to make sure there
is proper coordination. We need to take the politics out of it and empower specific
agencies to act without having a specific sanction at a given point in time. The time
the catastrophe is occurring is not the time to take a vote, it is the time to act.
Sometimes our ability to act is impaired by our form of government.
Look at what happened in a society like ours, where we have a democratic
form of government and a high level of wealth, when this catastrophe
[Hurricane Katrina] came upon us. We seemingly learned for the first time
how to deal with these types of situations and we saw the conflict of
control.
There needs to be more investment in catastrophe management capability. I have
to tell you that some of those things are being done by private industry. For example,
when you look at the wildfires in California, one of the things that we invested in to
protect our clients was fire trucks. We had our own fire truck that would essentially
go into an area where there was a threat, but they weren’t there to put out the fire.
They were there to prevent the fire from spreading to our insured clients.
When you look at the floods in the U.K., there was one of our employees going to
work and he happened to see the flood waters rising. He was in a group of ours called
the Private Client Group, which essentially insures the more expensive homes that are
out there. He went back to the office to determine how many homes we were insuring
in this area. We then sent trucks out with sandbags to protect those properties, and
they weren’t damaged . . . except the house next door, which was insured by somebody
else. That is an example of how industry needs to take a look at what its
responsibilities are and aid and abet our clients in the form of advice, technical
consultation, and more participation in an actual catastrophe event.
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Winners and Losers in a Low Carbon
Economy: A Look at Innovest’s
Carbon BetaTM
Mario López-Alcalá and Hiroshi Minami, Innovest Strategic Value Advisors
editors’ remarks
Mario López-Alcalá and Hiroshi Minami joined us from the Manhattan office of
Innovest to present their research product, “Carbon Beta,” which is an analytical
platform designed to provide “a comprehensive analysis of corporate risk and
performance.” While most other chapters discuss, at some point, the emergence of
climate change “winners” and “losers” and the importance of carbon issues to
company performance, this chapter’s primary aim is to introduce a methodology
for characterizing and quantifying these companies and issues.
The main thesis of their approach is that “the integration of sustainability and
finance helps us identify these intangible sources of risk and value, which are not
fully captured by traditional accounting and finance methods.” After Mr. Minami sets
the context, Mr. López-Alcalá explains the drivers and logic of these “intangible
sources”, the methods for identifying them, and the limitations of less complex, one-
dimensional analyses. The whole value chain is within their scope, and while there
are general points to be pulled from this discussion, technical details are also
expounded upon. Some of their central findings are that “variability is wide between
and within industry sectors, and yet these exposures are not fully priced into asset
values”, and that, in spite of this and the difficulty in sometimes obtaining robust
data, the “carbon leaders” are starting to outpace the “carbon laggards” as
awareness of climate change issues and regulation increases.
Mr. Minami finishes the presentation with a case study of the electronic
equipment and instrument sector, illustrating some details about their research
methodology. And, although this chapter concludes, as always, with a question and
answer session with our audience, the conversation that day went on for a good
while after the Yale University Netcast team had stopped their recording equipment.* 
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Good afternoon. My name is Hiroshi Minami. I graduated from Yale University
almost seven years ago, in 2001, and the last time I visited New Haven was several
years ago so I’m very happy to be here today.
I want to say thank you to the Center for Business and the Environment at Yale for
having us here. We are very glad to have this opportunity to present our research and
our research product. First we’d like to go through an overview of Innovest – what
we are doing, how big our company is, and where we are located. Mario will then
present our Carbon Beta research product. Lastly, I’m going to show you some case
studies.
context
Let me start by giving a very brief introduction to Innovest. We are an investment
research company in the environmental, social, and governance areas (ESG). That’s
our specialty. Based on our research, we do some consulting work and also asset
management sub-advisory services. We have approximately 80 analysts worldwide.
This is the largest analyst team in the world in the ESG area, as far as I know. We cover
more than 60 industry sectors and almost 2,300 companies globally, including U.S.,
Japanese, and European companies, and also some other Asian companies and
companies in emerging markets. We have offices in New York, Toronto, London,
Paris, Sydney, Tokyo, and San Francisco. New York and Toronto are the largest offices.
We provide our research primarily to institutional investors, and approximately
$1.3 billion is under our sub-advisory mandates. Eight of the top twenty-five global
asset managers in the world use Innovest research. Our key clients are major
institutional investors like UBS, HSBC, ABN Amro, State Street, ABP, BNP Paribas,
and CalPERS.
Why are we doing research for investors in the ESG area? This is what we call
“iceberg balance sheet” investing (see Figure 1). Above the surface you see an iceberg,
and that’s measured by traditional financial analysis. However, underneath the
surface, we have more intangible values that have not been evaluated by anyone,
which include governance, environmental, human capital, and stakeholder issues.
Carbon issues are becoming more and more important recently and have started
affecting the financial capital of companies.
We have several major research products. One is called Intangible Value
AssessmentTM, or IVA. This is our core product. It’s a comprehensive industry and
company analysis of the ESG space. But today we’re not going to present IVA, we’re
going to present Carbon BetaTM. Carbon Beta is a comprehensive analysis of
corporate carbon risk and performance. A third product is the Global Compact
Screen and Activity Screen. Some of our clients want this type of information –
research on a company’s involvement in certain activities such as weapons
production, tobacco, or alcohol. We do this kind of research too. All of these research
products are available through our web site called Innovest “i-rating”.1
I’m going to now pass the podium over to Mario to present Carbon Beta.




Thank you, Hiroshi. And thank you to the Center for Business and the Environment
at Yale for the invitation from Bryan Garcia and Eric Roberts.
Drivers and logic
I would like to introduce our analytical platform called Carbon Beta. In the words of
the Chief Executive of the Carbon Trust, Tom Delay, “There will be large creation and
distribution of shareholder value in the transition to a low carbon economy. There
will be winners and losers, with the winners more likely to be those businesses that
take time to understand and address this complex area.”2
“There will be large creation and distribution of shareholder value in the
transition to a low carbon economy. There will be winners and losers, with
the winners more likely to be those businesses that take time to
understand and address this complex area.” – Tom Delay, Chief Executive,
Carbon Trust
What are the drivers? Climate change has several different drivers that become the
logic for investors to consider and that also drive global industrial restructuring.
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These drivers include regulation, litigation, competitiveness issues, and reputation
problems that companies might face. The consequences of all of these issues are
going to impact the investments and, of course, the normal course of operations for
a business. Each of these drivers can affect operating costs and different performance
metrics within the various industry sectors and businesses.
What is the logic for investors to invest in these sectors or companies? The logic
for investors, as Hiroshi mentioned, is that the sustainability characteristics of
companies are becoming increasingly critical to their competitiveness, profitability,
and ultimately their share price. The sustainability analyses that we perform can
provide additional insights about a company’s strategic management capabilities,
organizational agility, and ultimately their financial performance potential. By these
additional insights, I mean that the integration of sustainability and finance helps us
identify these intangible sources of risk and value, which are not fully captured by
traditional accounting and finance methods.
At Innovest we have been doing research on carbon for the last seven years. What we
have learned so far is that climate change is emerging and is already the number one
sustainability risk driver for global industrial restructuring toward a low carbon future.
Carbon risks are much more broadly and unevenly distributed than previously thought.
While more and more investors and corporations are now paying attention, most
of them are a long way from integrating the net climate exposure of their assets into
actual investment strategies. In this sense, awareness and action do not go hand in
hand. Maybe a lot of you are aware of the McKinsey quarterly survey, which indicates
that executives view climate change issues as important for companies, seeing both
opportunity and risk. However, we have found that what companies say and what
they actually do are not necessarily the same, and awareness alone makes very little
difference regarding the terms of their actual performance.
While more and more investors and corporations are now paying attention,
most of them are a long way from integrating the net climate exposure of
their assets into actual investment strategies. In this sense, awareness and
action do not go hand in hand. We have found that what companies say and
what they actually do are not necessarily the same, and awareness alone
makes very little difference regarding the terms of their actual performance.
What drives a company’s Carbon Beta? Strategic governance drives the extent to
which companies integrate climate change factors into their business planning and
overall risk assessment. There are some sectors for which this is not necessary because
companies in those sectors, or those sectors specifically, don’t deal that much with
climate issues, but there are other sectors for which it is core to their business.
The Carbon Beta of a company depends on their products as well – be they direct,
indirect, or embedded carbon intensities. That is, the whole value chain emissions
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profile of a product matters – the energy intensity of the company’s operations, the
consumption patterns, and the electricity source mix utilized. If the electricity source
is a coal plant, for example, it’s likely that the Carbon Beta rating will increase, but if
the electricity source is nuclear or wind, there is a different risk profile.
The geographic distribution of assets relative to specific regulatory and tax-related
considerations also affects the Carbon Beta. For example, it is different to produce
CO2 emissions in Germany than it is in Ecuador because of the different regulatory
frameworks the companies will be facing. The ability of a company to recoup higher
carbon-driven compliance and operating costs from customers also drives the
Carbon Beta — that is, whether a company has the ability to transmit the regulatory
cost of carbon of its products without losing too much of its international
competitiveness.
The technology trajectory – the level of progress achieved towards adopting and
replacing production technologies – influences the Carbon Beta. It is cheaper and
easier for some companies to abate emissions than it is for other companies because
of marginal costs and, in general, their ability to identify and monetize revenue
opportunities either by increasing their cost efficiency in manufacturing or by
creating new opportunities for products and services.
The takeaway point from this whole presentation is that climate change is not only
a risk that companies should address, but it also represents a huge level of
opportunity for which companies can also take advantage.
Analytics platform
The Carbon Beta analytics platform is a unique carbon profiling database of over
2,300 diverse companies around the world, with in-depth analyses on carbon
profiling for about 850 companies. We have fewer companies with in-depth analyses
because for some companies, software companies and the advertising industry, for
example, climate change may not be a very big issue. For electric utilities or the
mining industry, however, climate change is a very big issue. For the intense carbon
sectors, some 40 to 45 sectors that we cover around the world, it’s important to go
into an in-depth analysis using Carbon Beta.
The Carbon Beta analytics platform identifies and quantifies carbon risk
exposures on both a company-specific and a portfolio-wide basis. The Carbon Beta
analytics platform includes carbon emissions, estimated compliance costs based on
where the companies operate and what the relevant regulatory regimes are, and an
analysis and subsequent rating of company risks, management, performance trends,
and opportunity in terms of carbon.
The ultimate goal of the platform is to have a signal, a ranking – what we call a
Carbon Beta ranking – that identifies companies that are better positioned to benefit
from carbon regulation and that have the potential to generate additional returns
from the sale of their products and services.
I will explain this platform using three primary analytic elements. We’ll consider
exposure at the industry level, and then carbon issues at the company-specific level.
Lastly, we’ll look at turning that data into carbon financials for a company.
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The ultimate goal of the platform is to have a signal that identifies
companies that are better positioned to benefit from carbon regulation and
that have the potential to generate additional returns from the sale of their
products and services.
Industry sector exposures
The industry-level analysis identifies the exposures each sector has regarding climate
change. We look at three different metrics for industry exposure – direct carbon
intensity, indirect carbon intensity, and carbon market sensitivity – and then a
combined carbon intensity rating. We use a scale from 0 to 5 that looks at each of the
three metrics.
The carbon direct intensity is an indicator that captures the exposure to carbon
regulations and constraints. This relates strictly to direct emissions – the emissions
that are coming from manufacturing processes or from operations over which the
company has financial or operational control. The carbon indirect intensity metric
relates to electricity usage. It captures the sector sensitivity to upstream energy costs
and potential impact as a result of a carbon-constrained economy. The indirect
carbon intensity is proportional to energy consumption, but if you are a producer, it
is also sensitive to your options for generating cleaner electricity.
The third metric is carbon market sensitivity, which is an indicator that captures the
sector elasticity or sensitivity to climate change. Carbon market sensitivity looks at
whether the products from a particular sector will experience a shift in consumer
preference. Industries with high carbon market sensitivities include sectors that produce
goods that have high greenhouse gas emissions during their useful life such as oil and gas
products or cars and trucks, sectors that have invested assets that can contribute to
carbon emissions such as finance and insurance companies, and sectors that emit
significant carbon emissions like energy generation technology and manufacturing.
These three metrics together constitute what we call carbon combined intensity.
These three different metrics and the compounded metric go into a scale from 0 to 5,
with 5 being the maximum intensity and 0 the minimum intensity. In the example
below, you can see that electric utilities are very carbon intensive. In terms of these three
metrics, the metals and mining industry is also very intensive, but it does not have as
much carbon market sensitivity as the electric utilities. With regard to insurance, banks,
and diversified financials – bankers don’t emit that much CO2 (besides the flying they
do everywhere!), but their clients do. They finance clients who are building coal power
plants, for example. That is why we give them a high carbon market sensitivity.
We also weight these metrics according to each sector. In the auto industry, for
example, the metric that will be most heavily weighted will be the carbon market
sensitivity metric because cars are highly sensitive to consumer preferences regarding
their fuel efficiency. The units in which we measure these intensities depend on the
sector. There will be sectors in which products will be very homogenous – for
example, a megawatt of power from electric utilities. Here there is a homogenous
sector product which can be measured in terms of a megawatt of power and the tons
of CO2 produced by that megawatt of power. On the other hand, in the chemical
sector, there are diversified heterogeneous products, so sometimes the unit of
measurement has to be CO2 emissions per unit of revenue.
Table 1 Example of industry sector exposure elements of Carbon Beta
Industry Carbon Direct Carbon Carbon Market Carbon 
Intensity Indirect Sensitivity Combined
(in-house) Intensity (downstream) Intensity
(upstream)
Electric Utilities 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0
Metals & Mining 5.0 5.0 3.0 4.4
Insurance, Banks & 
Diversified Financials 0.0 2.0 5.0 1.7
Source: Innovest
Company-specific carbon analysis
The second element of the research platform is the company-specific carbon analysis.
I would like to say that it is sometimes erroneous to assume that a company’s carbon
footprint is paramount or the only factor to be assessed in determining the risk for
investors. Climate risk has four dimensions, not one. We analyze the company’s
carbon management strategy, its carbon risk exposure, its strategic carbon profit
opportunities, and its improvement trend regarding carbon issues. These four
different pillars are what constitute a Carbon Beta rating.
When looking at carbon management strategy, we assess how each company
develops its risk management capability regarding carbon. When we look at the
carbon risk exposure, we look at the impact the corporate operations have on climate
change regarding their own emissions as well as their exposure to the consequences
of climate change – for example, pending regulatory schemes to reduce greenhouse
gas emissions and extreme weather events. With regard to strategic carbon profit
opportunities, we determine if a company has a well-developed business strategy and
research and development investments that will result in the development of low
carbon products and services. These may comprise anything from direct technical
solutions to changes in services and operations that address climate change and lower
emissions. The improvement trend is an overall trend or performance measurement
for a company regarding how it is dealing with these carbon risks and opportunities.
Carbon analysis is not a one dimensional issue, but in fact is a complex problem
that needs more sophisticated analysis across a number of pillars. The Carbon Beta
analytics platform identifies the best positioned companies regarding carbon issues.
Carbon analysis is not a one dimensional issue, but in fact is a complex
problem that needs more sophisticated analysis across a number of pillars.
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Carbon financials
The third part of the analysis platform is the carbon financials. The basis of this is to
look at how the most important short and long-term consequences of climate change
are being considered from a corporate standpoint. In this sense, there are carbon
regulation realities that present risks to each of the companies. Many companies
claim that the costs of carbon regulations will be relevant to their international
competitiveness. Through carbon financials, we try to uncover what the impact may
be that a company is going to experience. It has been done at the macro level with the
Stern Report2 and many other reports. We have tried to do this at the company level.
The first of the elements of this model is the Weighted Average Country Carbon
Reduction Target (WACCRTTM). Depending upon where companies are operating
across the world, there are different regulations. Ultimately, this metric sheds light on
the fact that, given the government regulatory constraints by country, a company
with high levels of greenhouse gas emissions that operates in non-regulated locations
will experience a different competitive environment relative to peers that are largely
based and operating in regulated areas.
A second element of the model is the carbon price. In general, we use carbon price
variations from three different cases – minimum, maximum, and an expected case.
With this data and the regulatory analysis, we calculate a compliance cost for a
company – how much it is going to cost the company to comply for a period of a year
with the regulatory regimes. Table 2 shows the different elements of the model and its
output for a specific company.
Taking into account the compliance period for the legislation, we also calculate the
net present value of the carbon abatement costs. We put these abatement costs in
terms of the EBITDA and market cap of the company, just to provide a bit of context.
We also use specific industry discount rates for the different companies we analyze.
Table 2 Cost of compliance example for a company
WACCRT                                                                                                                                 
-8.00%
Expected Case Minimum Case Maximum Case
Carbon Price ($/TCO2e) $28 $18 $45
Annual Cost of Compliance $394,192 $240,298 $632,622
($1,000)
Exposure (% of EBITDA) 4.43% 2.70% 7.12%
NPV of Carbon Abatement Costs 
to Meet Emissions Reduction 
Targets ($1,000) $1,738,554 $1,104,585 $2,791,417
Exposure (% of Market Cap) 2.34% 1.49% 3.75%
Industry Discount Rate  7.70%                           
Source: Innovest
findings of carbon beta
Part of the platform also looks at the carbon positioning of the company, and
specifically, its carbon emissions. We are interested in direct emissions, the emissions
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that are produced by the company, as the ones that are actually being regulated. We
compare these emissions to the competitive set to establish a benchmark and
determine the positioning of the company we are analyzing. In general, we use a
carbon intensity metric that is in tons of CO2 per million dollars because of the
heterogeneity of different outcomes or different products the various sectors have.
When we have more of a homogeneous product in a particular industry, we use tons
of CO2 per the specific output metric of that sector. We have found with our analysis
that variability is wide between and within industry sectors, and yet these exposures
are not fully priced into asset values.
From our analysis, we can see different industries with the cost of compliance as
high as 50 percent of their EBITDA, and even within the same industry variations
between companies of 3 to 13 percent (see Figure 2). So, there are different impacts in
these analyses and which industry you are in matters.
We have found with our analysis that variability is wide between and
within industry sectors, and yet these exposures are not fully priced into
asset values.
We have also found that robust data is scarce and difficult to obtain. This creates a
major information advantage, or disadvantage, for investors. It might sound
unbelievable that even for projects in which companies commit themselves to
disclose information, they in fact don’t do it properly. This represents a critical part
of this analysis.
Figure 2 CO2 regulatory cost of compliance as percentage of EBITDA
Source: Innovest
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CO2 Regulatory Cost of Compliance
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Max case Min case
To help create an optimal portfolio performance, we combine quantitative analysis
with institutional quality carbon risk research. We have found that if you look at just
one aspect of the problem, such as emissions levels, it is likely that you will miss the
peaks and will not generate any additional return. Figure 3 shows the results we have
gotten from our research so far. It shows the performance of the companies that are
deemed in a good position (i.e. above average rating) regarding climate change
compared to those that are in a worse position.
The difference between these two portfolios is around 3 percent from June 2004 to
June 2007. The two portfolios have been neutralized for each sector based on regional
effects. As you can see, from January 2004 to September 2005 the above-average rated
companies were underperforming in comparison to the below-average rated
companies. However, after the third quarter of 2005 companies deemed carbon
leaders started outperforming carbon laggards. As the first carbon market started in
January 2005 (EU ETS), there was a lag for the effects of a carbon-constrained
economy to be felt in the financial markets.
We also did this type of analysis for different regions. We did it for the U.S., and it is
very interesting to see that in the U.S. these two lines are very close until March 2007.
After March 2007, you can really start seeing how the leaders are behaving differently.
The reason is similar to the above. At the beginning of 2007 there was a windfall of
climate change related acts that were introduced to Congress, triggering awareness not
only among the general public but specifically in businesses and in the financial markets.
Figure 3 Performance of laggards and leaders
Source: Innovest
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Difference Above Average Innovest Rating (World) Below Average Innovest Rating (World)
Ultimately, through the carbon analytics platform we formulate a proxy signaling
companies with good management. Companies with good management are likely to
have a positive performance in the market. In Europe, for example, the difference is
around 14 percent.
There are other approaches to analyzing carbon, of course. What we found is that,
just like solutions to climate change, there is no silver bullet to analyzing climate
change investments. No one can say that the solution for climate change is carbon
capture and storage or nuclear energy. All of them need to be a part of the solution.
Also regarding carbon analysis, there is no silver bullet in assessing the effects of
climate change in corporate risk and performance.
limitations of one-dimensional analytical approaches
There are some other analytical approaches that are more one-dimensional such as
emissions and disclosure-only analysis. I would like to go into the limitations of each
of these approaches.
The first one is analysis based on the level of the company’s emissions only. What
we have found is that this one dimensional analysis doesn’t really go far enough. It
misses the company’s carbon risk management, strategic opportunities, and
improvement, which represent more than two thirds of the equation.
Further, we have found that big emitters could be a good bet in a carbon-
constrained economy. For example, Statoil is a leader in carbon capture and storage
and renewable energies. These two issues are strategic profit opportunities that will
continue to give companies leadership in the integrated oil and gas sector in a low
carbon economy. It would be inaccurate to assume that an oil and gas company or a
company in another carbon intensive sector (such as electric utilities) is inherently a
bad investment choice under this new carbon-constrained reality.
Regulatory constraints for carbon vary by country. Companies operating in
regions with no carbon legislation do not face the same regulatory burden as
companies operating in highly regulated locations. Focusing only on emissions levels
disregards this global regulatory reality.
Still another limitation is that a big emitter could be improving over time. If
emissions are grandfathered, then the company might already be under the abatement
target and benefit from the allocation of allowances. That is, in order to reach an
emissions reduction target, permits are allocated for free according to the company’s
historical levels. In this sense, a company could have a high level of emissions but it
might have been improving over time. Therefore, if emissions are grandfathered, this
company might be already under its mandatory emissions level and have a surplus of
allowances. Good companies that have been improving in the way they manage their
carbon risk may be punished just because of their size and sector classification.
In summary, the major shortcomings of models that focus exclusively on
greenhouse gas emissions is the complete disregard for a company’s strategic
management of carbon risks, business opportunities related to low carbon products
and services, and the actual history of carbon mitigation. In our view, this approach
misses more than two-thirds of the climate change factors likely to impact
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shareholder value. Therefore, an investment policy based purely on reducing the
carbon footprint might harm financial performance.
Regarding disclosure-only analysis, it is a good first step, but it is not enough.
Information that is disclosed is notoriously unreliable. It’s inconsistent across
companies and over time, and generally not validated by independent third parties.
Therefore, disclosure is not a good proxy for performance.
Regarding disclosure-only analysis, it is a good first step, but it is not enough.
Information that is disclosed is notoriously unreliable. It’s inconsistent across
companies and over time, and generally not validated by independent third
parties. Therefore, disclosure is not a good proxy for performance.
Figure 4 investigates the relationship between disclosure and financial
performance. We compared the share price performance of companies deemed under
the Carbon Disclosure Project3 as “disclosure leaders” to the share price performance
of those deemed “disclosure laggards.” The results in the performance graph below
should be somewhat unsettling for those placing undue reliance on purely disclosure-
based analysis: there is no difference between the financial performance of disclosure
leaders and disclosure laggards. Publicly disclosed information alone is an insufficient
basis for achieving superior investment returns.
Figure 4 Limitations of disclosure-only based analysis
Source: Innovest
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Hiroshi Minami
carbon beta case study 
By way of example, I’m going to show you one of the sectors I cover, the electronic
equipment and instrument sector. According to our analysis, this sector has a carbon
combined intensity of 2.1. This intensity was measured between 0 to 5, where 0 is low
and 5 is high. 2.1 is relatively low, yet I chose this sector because there are some
interesting practices done by companies in this sector.
First and foremost, it is important to understand where the electronic equipment
and instrument sector falls in relation to the MSCI GICS (Morgan Stanley Capital
International, Global Industry Classification Standard), which has four levels, in a
tree structure. The highest level is the sector. The second is the industry group. The
third is the industry, and the fourth is the sub-industry. This sector (see Figure 5
below) falls into the information technology sector, and then under the technology
hardware and equipment industry group. Under this classification there are two
industries – electronic equipment and instruments and office electronics. Under
these two industries, there are actually four sub-industries, but technology
distributors are not evaluated in this sector. All others are manufacturers, so we
wanted to exclude distributors who have a different business model.
Figure 5 Carbon Combined Intensity (2.1) for the electronic equipment and instruments sector
Source: Innovest
In 2007 we evaluated 34 companies in this sector. There were lots of Japanese
companies, 19 out of the 34, along with 9 U.S. companies and 6 companies from other
geographical areas. In our Carbon Beta research framework, we have carbon
management strategy, carbon risk exposure, carbon strategic opportunity, and
carbon performance improvement vectors, as presented by Mario. In this sector, I put
the most weight on the carbon management strategy vector.
For carbon management strategy, I mainly focus on two factors – emission
reduction strategies and goals, and measurement and disclosure. When companies
measure their greenhouse gas emissions, they usually have management structures.
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For carbon risk exposure, I investigate product risks and regulatory risks, with more
of a focus on regulatory risks. For regulatory risks, I basically check where assets are
located. For example, if Company A is operating in Japan and there is a similar
company, company B, operating in the U.S., Company A probably has higher mid-
term regulatory risks because Japan has already ratified the Kyoto Protocol and
thereby must reduce greenhouse gas emissions.
For the third part of the analysis, strategic carbon opportunity, I focus on two
factors: products and services related to carbon issues and carbon credits generated
from CDM or any kind of carbon reduction measures. And, for the carbon
improvement vector, we focus on the carbon emission trend and all of the other
factors we analyze. Ultimately, we rate the performance of companies within a given
industrial sector on a scale from AAA (best in class) to CCC (worst in class), which is
broadly similar to bond ratings.
I don’t think you are interested in companies that aren’t doing anything, so I’ll
focus on leading practices within this sector. In this sector, I appreciate companies
that have lifecycle ideas in their strategy. For example, in the case of Canon, they have
a goal to double net sales through reduced emissions from their product’s lifecycle by
2010 relative to 2000 levels. Other companies like KonicaMinolta, Hitachi, and Ricoh
have similar ideas, and they have tangible data to back up those kinds of goals.
In terms of actual carbon reduction targets, Konica Minolta, Ricoh and Xerox have
targets focused on absolute amounts of greenhouse gas emissions, as opposed to
normalized greenhouse gas emissions such as greenhouse gas emissions per sale.
These three companies are the only companies out of 34 that have greenhouse gas
reduction goals that cover their worldwide operations. Other companies have similar
goals, but state only, for example, that they’re going to reduce greenhouse gas
emissions from Japanese operations by 6 percent, and do not cover their worldwide
operations.
In the category of measurement and disclosure, I have a list of 11 companies. These
11 companies measure and disclose their CO2 emissions, so one third of the 34 actually
have a system to measure their greenhouse gas emissions. The amount of greenhouse
gas emissions is usually six digits, from 100,000 tons to 900,000 tons. But there is an
exception – Hitachi, which is a huge Japanese company, has seven digits, at more than
4 million tons of CO2.
Another interesting initiative is being undertaken by Ricoh. This company has a
goal to reduce its own CO2 emissions, and in addition, it’s also going to require its
suppliers to establish greenhouse gas reduction goals. Usually Japanese companies do
not require suppliers to reduce their greenhouse gas emissions, and that’s something
exceptional.
Canon has a CO2 emissions goal to reduce their emissions from logistics and their
transportation operations, which is also a leading practice in the sector.
I’d like to talk about some interesting business opportunities pursued by these
companies in the carbon area. Kyocera is a company that makes photovoltaic
modules used in solar power generation. They also engage in fuel cell power
generation research. Hitachi is a nuclear power plant manufacturer, which is gaining
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momentum these days because of climate change issues. Hitachi also makes lithium
ion batteries for hybrid vehicles, solar modules, materials for fuel cell power
generation, and equipment to decompose PFC, which is a greenhouse gas. Ibiden is
also an interesting company. They have an electronics division, but they also have a
ceramics division that makes diesel particulate filters. This filter is used to remove
particulate matter from diesel exhaust. Right now diesel passenger vehicles are
gaining momentum, especially in Europe, partly due to climate change issues. This
product is making a profit for this company. Lastly, Ricoh is a company involved in a
Clean Development Mechanism project, and they say they’re going to generate more
than 200,000 tons of CO2 emission credit per year. Ricoh’s greenhouse gas emissions
were approximately 300,000. If they use this emission credit to offset their own
emissions, their carbon footprint will be very low. Ricoh is the only company in this
sector that is engaging in a CDM project.
After I go through all of the publicly available corporate documents and third
party documents, we score these companies to give a final rating. I consider Ricoh,
Kyocera, and Xerox the leading AAA companies in this sector. Xerox is actually the
only U.S. company in this sector that has a midterm carbon reduction goal, which is
to reduce CO2 emissions by 10 percent by 2012 from the 2002 base year.
This is how we analyze companies under the Carbon Beta framework. Now we are
happy to answer your questions.
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Question and Answer Session
QUESTION 1: Investor usage of framework 
I was wondering if you could talk a little bit about the investor response to this product.
I know you mentioned a few institutional investors up front that are using the platform,
but how are they using it? How are they weighting this relative to other fundamental
factors?
Mario López-Alcalá
There are several ways that investors use our data. One is for re-weighting their indices.
Most of the time, investors combine our ratings and information with mainstream
financial assessments for building and developing their investment strategies.
As Hiroshi’s case study points out, we can see the risks and opportunities for the
company from a nice perspective – the traditional accounting perspective and also
the intangible value perspective that is not being currently valued in mainstream
analyst research. In general, investors like J.P. Morgan combine our signal with their
research in order to get their products. Some other investors give us their portfolios
to analyze and audit to see what their specific weaknesses and strengths are.
In the case of re-weighting portfolios or indexes, the main interest is to keep the
sectoral representation of the picks that the client did for purely mainstream reasons.
Within each sector, however, through our research, the rebalanced index overweights
securities of issuers judged to have relatively low climate-change risk, and
underweights securities of issuers with relatively high risks from climate change. The
result is that the new index replicates the return characteristics of the original index,
while reducing investor exposure to the risks arising from climate change.
As I said previously, some other clients use our information by itself for integrating
ESG issues in their mainstream analysis.
QUESTION 2: Biggest industry surprise
At the industry level, what industry gave you the biggest surprise up or down?
Hiroshi Minami
I guess an industry that surprised me was the chemical industry because chemical
companies emit many substances, among them CO2, and it is well recognized that
energy utilization in this sector is very big in relation to their operational costs. The
impact of climate change in this industry is thus significant, but lower than I would
have expected for some of the companies.
I was also surprised that for construction industries there is potentially a huge
impact, and in electrical utilities, emissions levels vary across the sector according to the
different fuel mix of each company and the regulatory frame under which they operate.
QUESTION 3: Data sets that are important but difficult to collect
You obviously collected lots of data and did several different steps of classification,
categorization, ratings and so on. What set of data would you say relative to its
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importance was probably the one you had the most difficulty collecting? For example,
there may have been something where it was really hard to get data for a particular area
or category, but it wasn’t that relevant. And it may have been a situation where it was
easy to get data that was very relevant. Where can you think of where it was really hard
to get data and it really mattered and left you with some uncertainty?
Hiroshi Minami
If possible, I wanted to do more research on products – greenhouse gas emissions
from products – but as that kind of data set is unfortunately nonexistent, I put a
higher weight on carbon management in my sector. However, I wanted to put a
higher weight on the products part or the strategic opportunity part. Given the
unavailability of data, that was not possible. I needed to focus on carbon
management strategy.
Even for the carbon management part, it is not easy to collect greenhouse gas
emission data. For example, last week the Japanese government released carbon
emission data from approximately 14,000 facilities in Japan, which I think is the
largest dataset available right now. These data, however, are not easy to process. Even
after we process it, we don’t know if it’s going to be a very good source for this type
of research. So data shortage is always a problem, but we try to focus on whatever we
can see or we can get and then make good assumptions about what we cannot see.
. . . it is not easy to collect greenhouse gas emission data. For example, last
week the Japanese government released carbon emission data from
approximately 14,000 facilities in Japan, which I think is the largest dataset
available right now. These data, however, are not easy to process. Even after
we process it, we don’t know if it’s going to be a very good source for this
type of research. So data shortage is always a problem, but we try to focus
on whatever we can see or we can get and then make good assumptions
about what we cannot see.
QUESTION 4: Factoring in management responses
Have you ever used a company’s past management of similar problems – maybe in the
energy markets or software permits in the U.S. – to sort of proxy what their management
might be of carbon in the future as opposed to the kind of outputs and other things that
you can put down on paper?
Mario López-Alcalá
Within the U.S., we looked at the potential regulations and how they were going to
affect specific sectors. For example, in the summer of 2007 we looked specifically at
the Feinstein-Carper bill for electric utilities. It was not an economy-wide piece of
legislation. Talking about  management, we do look at the involvement of companies
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regarding different regulations and whether those companies were actively addressing
such regulations. Generally, what we can assume is that the companies that go beyond
their regulatory compliance on one issue are going to keep doing it in different
settings, whether it is with SOX or other substances.
QUESTION 5: Embedded energy of products and accounting for indirect emissions
You don’t include the embedded energy of materials and products into your calculation,
right? You just mentioned that it’s hard for you to include your energy footprint of
products into your calculation. That means your indirect energy consumption or
emission part didn’t include the embedded energy of material use and the product use
into your calculation. Is that correct?
Hiroshi Minami
It’s more no than yes.
My second question is, how do you divide the parameters of energy and emissions
between different sectors? For example, the electricity generators and the utilities – how
do you divide their emissions?
I’m not sure if I understood your question. How do you divide emissions, for
example, that utilities are buying from other generators for resale?
Utilities – apparently they didn’t consume primary energy themselves. They’re just
like traders. How do you solve this problem?
Mario López-Alcalá
The classification that we follow for emissions is the World Resources Institute
industry classification. I believe that the emissions you were talking about go into
Scope 3 emissions in order to avoid double counting. We only actually do an analysis
on the Scope 1 emissions, which are the ones that are most readily available. In that
sense, the Scope 1 emissions are the emissions that are generated through facilities
owned by the company or where the company has the financial control.
Some companies are buying electricity from other companies and then reselling it,
so those emissions are not being counted as direct Scope 1 emissions for the resellers,
but are counted for the ones that are generated. For the company that is reselling
them, they are counted as Scope 3 emissions. That is the way we account for these
emissions in order to not double count.
QUESTION 6: Double-counting and greenwashing
I have two questions for you. First, when you take the aggregate Carbon Combined
Intensity (CCI) rating based on the three categories, use the 0  to 5  scale on each of them,
and then look at the upstream and the downstream effects, how exactly do you de-cou-
ple the model? If you’re looking at the utilities industry, for example, downstream ener-
gy use in the electronics industry is going to give them a higher risk rating, or so I would
assume. And when you look at the electronics industry, you have to look upstream. It
seems like you might be double counting if you don’t de-couple them. I’m wondering how
you deal with that.
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And, secondly, Hiroshi, when you showed some of your research, you talked about how
some specific companies were responding and you gave some quantitative examples of
some camera companies. When you’re looking at these companies, how do you decide?
You started to touch a little bit on one of your answers previously about how you would
like to look at the embedded energy in the products and things like that. But, off the top
of my head, I would imagine that a company that produces film, which is rather an
energy intensive process, would naturally be able to easily publish and achieve targets in
a technology that’s rapidly declining. How do you deal with technological transitions that
are integrated into your model that will allow these companies to publish emissions
reductions that they don’t have to try very hard to achieve?
Mario López-Alcalá
Regarding carbon intensities, one thing that we are always dealing with in this
analysis is two sets of analytical results. One set is quantitative and the other one is
qualitative. For example, when I was talking about the carbon market sensitivity of
the different sectors, this was equivalent to talking about the carbon elasticity for
demand for the specific sector. If I tell you that we could calculate the carbon
elasticity for a whole industrial sector, I don’t think anybody would believe me. It is a
given that most sectors don’t have perfect homogenous products and data for
calculating it, and of course, companies are operating in different countries and in
different regions. Those different regions also have different regulations and are
subject to different preferences and market structures.
The question keeps getting more complicated as some quantitative data is non-
existent. Therefore, we merge these two sets of analysis: qualitative and quantitative.
When we have hard data, we use it. When we do not have it, but we have a good
assumption of what could happen based on our expertise, we go for that. That is the
way we try not to double count. Firstly, some cases we cannot analyze in a
quantitative way because there is no data. And for some other analyses, what we are
trying to do is to separate the effects of these indirect, direct or carbon sensitivity
parameters in a qualitative way.
Hiroshi Minami 
I interpreted your question as how do we evaluate companies who are having easier
targets and accomplishing them versus companies who are having really difficult
targets and not accomplishing them. Is that the right interpretation? That’s a question
that we always face when we analyze companies. One way to tackle that kind of
cheating is to go back to their historical records. In my case, when I checked these
companies’ documents, I went back to data from 1990, the year the Kyoto Protocol
says is the base year. By doing so, we can focus on long-term trend and avoid being
cheated by companies’ claims.
Thank you all for providing us with an opportunity to talk with you today.
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For the Love of Timber: A Different
Look at a Natural Resource
Andrew Aulisi, World Resources Institute
editors’ remarks
“If you’re going to solve climate change, there are three things that have to happen.You have
to have a technology shift in power generation. You have to have a technology shift in
transport. And you have to deal with deforestation.” Andrew Aulisi’s chapter is an obviously
unique and essential addition to our publication. As his above statement indicates, forests are
a critical piece of climate,and more broadly,environmental concerns.They are the roots of the
Yale School of Forestry & Environmental Studies and they are among the drivers of
“charismatic” carbon; almost all of our speakers mentioned the wish to see more forestry
projects, partially because of their importance and partially, as Peter Sweatman expressed,
“There is this thing about forestry that is highly engaging for human beings. We all would
derive a lot of pleasure out of forestry projects.”
It’s not just the topic however,that makes this a worthwhile presentation. In a short time,
Mr. Aulisi embarks on a full value-chain analysis of the forest products sector, from the
forests to the mills to the product markets to the landfills. He goes on to utilize this
framework to explore the potential eventualities for different segments within the sector,
focusing especially on the implications of carbon pricing rather than on the physical impacts
of climate change and often weighing-in considerations of market dynamics, corporate
strategy, and key aspects of policy. Throughout, he effectively illustrates the difficulties in
grappling with the many uncertainties surrounding the climate issue from a full-suite of
perspectives within the sector, carefully elucidating the tentative pros and cons.
The issues surrounding this topic are notoriously complex, but even as the only talk
exclusively devoted to forests, it manages to be comprehensive. A host of relevant topics are
covered including biosequestration, biomass power generation, biofuels, deforestation,
carbon pricing mechanisms, barriers to forest carbon projects such as baseline calculations,
leakage, and permanence, and even payments for ecosystem services. In this chapter, a lot of
questions are raised, some answers are provided, and certainly a lot of indispensable
information is conveyed.* 
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My remarks today are about how I think carbon price signals are going to have a
dramatic effect on the forest products sector. By the forest products sector, I mean a
value chain that starts with timber assets, forests, includes mills, and ends with all
kinds of product markets.
At the World Resources Institute (WRI), where I direct a program called Markets
& Enterprise, we started looking at this about five or six months ago. We thought it
would be a simple assessment to look at that value chain, do an overlay of climate
change in its various facets, and get an understanding of how there are either
reinforcing or potentially contradictory currents across the value chain. In other
words, climate change would in some way spur this industry, and in other ways affect
it negatively. We thought it would be a pretty simple assessment, but in fact, as we got
into it, it became so complex that we had a very difficult time writing the final report
because we couldn’t figure out how to organize it.
We do an external review on all of our research at WRI. This was a study that was
clearly very much through the lens of the industry itself1.
My comments are segmented into three basic categories. I want to make a few
general points about the concept of the forest products sector value chain and how I
think it’s being affected by carbon pricing specifically – not climate change at large,
but carbon pricing. Secondly, I want to talk a little bit about what I think that means
for corporate strategy if you’re a company in this sector, integrated across the sector,
or maybe within one very specific segment of it. The last thing I want to talk about is
three policy-related issues – cap-and-trade, something called REDD (reducing
emissions from deforestation and degradation – an acronym which seems to have
exploded into the nomenclature over the past year), and then payments for
ecosystem services. In so doing, we should recognize that there is a great deal of
uncertainty about what’s going to happen in these policy areas, and that is what the
industry is in effect grappling with.
carbon pricing and the forest products sector value chain
Climate change
One point of background is that carbon pricing or carbon finance is really just one
facet of a much more complex issue. The climate change issue, in my assessment, has
three main dimensions to it. There is the physical dimension, the policy, regulatory
and legal dimension, and then the changes in consumer and public attitudes and
perceptions. Indeed, you can look at perhaps any major environmental issue through
that lens – water scarcity, for example.
The climate change issue, in my assessment, has three main dimensions to it.
There is the physical dimension, the policy, regulatory and legal dimension,
and then the changes in consumer and public attitudes and perceptions.
Climate change will affect many sectors across the economy and has lots of
implications for corporate competitiveness (I will come back to this later). It also has
a lot of implications for investment, and this involves the whole spectrum of
investment actors – whether it’s equity, debt, private equity, what have you.
Somewhere in between these two worlds you get capital formation for technology
deployment. The reason I like to make this point is because WRI is working on
climate change and we are trying to solve it. We are trying to get significant
greenhouse gas emissions reductions globally in a fairly short period of time, and a
very big part of that is technology deployment, particularly in the power sector and
the transport sector.
The third biggest piece that we’ll see is actually deforestation. For any company,
there is now a kind of a risk-based framework through which you can view climate
change, including regulatory, supply chain, and other types of risk. These concepts
will appear in my remarks.
Climate change will affect many sectors across the economy and has lots of
implications for corporate competitiveness. It also has a lot of implications
for investment, and this involves the whole spectrum of investment actors.
Somewhere in between these two worlds you get capital formation for
technology deployment. We are trying to get significant greenhouse gas
emissions reductions globally in a fairly short period of time, and a very big
part of that is technology deployment, particularly in the power sector and
the transport sector.
New value chains
If I could only present one image to you, Figure 1 would be the one. My basic point is
that the old forest products industry, which is located at the bottom in the gray boxes,
is, in my view, going to be turned upside down. It is going to radically change.
Twenty years ago this industry was probably mostly vertically integrated, so you
had companies that owned the forest and also owned the mills. They probably owned
their fleets. They may have been even somewhat involved in the retail end markets.
There were two basic products: paper and lumber – dimensional lumber for things
like furniture and construction.
With the so-called carbon-constrained economy, and in particular the regulatory
drive towards carbon pricing – predominantly cap-and-trade systems (maybe in
some jurisdiction it will be taxation) – we’re seeing three major new value chains
emerging. One is taking the timber and converting it into cellulosic ethanol for
transportation fuels. The other is using the timber for biomass power generation, a
renewable power. The third, of course, is actually not doing anything with the timber,
but leaving it in place. It’s carbon sequestration – binding the CO2 and the cellulose,
and receiving a payment from the carbon markets for sequestration.
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Figure 1 Existing and new value chains in the forest products industry 
Source: WRI
The old forest products industry is, in my view, going to be turned upside
down. It is going to radically change.
As we move forward, I hope to tease out what I think are a few of the key issues in
this reengineering or recasting of this entire sector.
Carbon footprint
Another background point is that this sector, relative to other major industrial
sectors – steel, aluminum, cement, power, among others – is actually a pretty CO2-
friendly sector. You can see that in Figure 2. Beneath the horizontal line that divides
this chart are avoided or sequestered emissions that happen along the value chain.
In managed forests, there’s probably net sequestration that’s taking place. In the
actual manufacturing, the milling of pulp and dimensional lumber, there are
significant emissions, particularly with paper, which is much more energy intensive
than simple sawmilling. Within that more energy intensive category, there is
differentiation between the chemical pulping process and the mechanical pulping
process – the chemical process is a little more energy intensive. But also within this
point of the value chain, there is an enormous amount of biomass power used to
power these mills. In fact, in the United States, about 50 percent of the energy used
in the milling process is biomass power. In Figure 2, that’s represented by the dark
gray sub-stack beneath the horizontal line; it is avoided emissions, in a sense.
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Figure 2 Greenhouse gas emissions, capture, and storage by forest products value chain
Source: Reid Miner, The Greenhouse Gas and Carbon Profile of the Global Forest Products Industry, National
Council for Air and Stream Improvement (NCASI) (Research Triangle Park, NC: NCASI, 2007).
In fact, in the United States, about 50 percent of the energy used in the
milling process is biomass power.
During the course of transporting these products to retail markets, there are
emissions – the tailpipe emissions from trucks. Then there are the products in use. A
point that the industry itself likes to make again and again is that this piece of
furniture, for example, or that handrail over there, or anything made out of wood, is
a kind of permanent storage for CO2 – absorbing it out of the atmosphere and
keeping it locked up. It has a mitigatory effect. It’s a positive climate benefit, assuming
it does stay locked up forever. Of course, many products end up in landfills, and then
you get to the end of this value chain. There are significant methane emissions that
come from landfills, but many of our landfills are essentially tombs the way that they
are kept. In this case, maybe the CO2 never actually decomposes. You can see in Figure
2 that, in this assessment, it’s estimated that a significant amount of the carbon
actually does just stay in landfills.
There is also recycling, of course, which is an avoided emission. It brings the paper
back to the front end of its value chain.
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Carbon price impact on forests, mills, and markets
If we are going to live in an economy where carbon does have a price on it – and that’s
the way it is in the EU right now and it is imminent here in the United States – the
different parts of this sector are going to be affected in very different ways. In some
ways, the effect is direct from carbon pricing, and in other ways it’s indirect. This is
probably the main point of Table 1 .
Table 1 Carbon price impacts on forests, mills, and markets
Value Chain Segment Key Carbon Price Issues
Forests  Land competition with bioenergy crops
 CO2 sequestration credits
Mills  Energy price risk
 Biomass power incentives
 Competition for forest resources
Markets  Demand for biomass power
 Demand for low-carbon biofuels
 Demand for green products (i.e. green buildings)
Source: WRI
If you look at forests, for example, there is a likelihood that the forests are going to
be competing with agricultural crops like corn for corn ethanol or switch grass and
other crops for bioenergy. This is the assumption – that our carbon-constrained
economy with a price on carbon is driving CO2-friendly biofuels into the
marketplace to displace diesel and gasoline. If that were to happen where there’s only
so much land to go around, the forest owners are going to be competing with other
land uses. That could be a negative for that part of the value chain.
On the other hand, forest owners may get a valuable incentive to simply grow and
preserve forest stocks for the CO2 sequestration. This is an issue that people have been
talking about for over a decade, and it’s very problematic. It’s something I will come
back to, and it’s not clear to me that there is going to be a very significant price signal
for biosequestration of CO2.
When you move to the mills, there is an energy price risk. Yes, they do use a lot of
biomass, but a lot of these mills are taking electricity off the grid or maybe using coal
and some kind of on-site cogeneration system. CO2 price signals in the economy are
probably going to drive up the price of fossil fuels. For mill owners, on the one hand,
there’s probably an energy price risk here. On the other hand, they may receive policy
incentives for using the biomass. That’s something they’re already doing anyway, but
a policy, such as a cap-and-trade policy, could emerge and carve off some CO2
allocations for these industrial cogeneration units and give them to the mill owners
as a way of incentivizing greater biomass power in their plants.
These mill owners are also facing competition for forest resources. If you’re
currently a mill owner that’s focusing on dimensional lumber or construction
products, your business and your assets may be tied to some very specific
assumptions about who your suppliers are, the quality and the quantity of your
supply, and the price of that supply. In a carbon-constrained economy, it looks like
we’re moving into a world where timber is going to be in very high demand. Those
mill owners are, I think, facing a major risk for their business models.
When you move to the mills, there is an energy price risk. Yes, they do use a
lot of biomass, but a lot of these mills are taking electricity off the grid or
maybe using coal and some kind of on-site cogeneration system. CO2 price
signals in the economy are probably going to drive up the price of fossil
fuels. For mill owners, on the one hand, there’s probably an energy price risk
here. On the other hand, they may receive policy incentives for using the
biomass.
Lastly, I wanted to talk about the markets because I think this is really what a lot of
it comes down to. With carbon price signals there’s a very good chance that we’re going
to see increased demand for biomass power. That’s kind of a no-brainer, particularly
because the power sector is almost surely going to be the first sector regulated in the
cap-and-trade system. Second, we’re going to see increased demand for low carbon
biofuels, and that could be incorporated into a cap-and-trade system, or it may be just
a function of the price of fossil fuels. Again, this illustrates an indirect effect where the
carbon price signal in the economy is going to drive up the price of oil, which naturally
is going to increase demand for biofuels, assuming they’re less costly.
Third, we could have some carbon price signals that would actually increase what
we’re already seeing, which is demand for green products. In particular I’m thinking
about the green building boom. It’s happening in the United States right now, and
indeed there are some interesting market data coming out that green buildings are
much better investments, and much more productive investments, than the “old
school” brown buildings.
With carbon price signals there’s a very good chance that we’re going to see
increased demand for biomass power. Second, we’re going to see increased
demand for low carbon biofuels, and that could be incorporated into a cap-
and-trade system, or it may be just a function of the price of fossil fuels.
Third, we could have some carbon price signals that would actually increase
what we’re already seeing, which is demand for green products. In
particular I’m thinking about the green building boom.
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Carbon price impact on biomass power and biofuels
Let me make a couple of brief points about biomass power and biofuels. About the
biomass power, I’m actually going to refer to a simple cash flow model that we
developed at WRI that calculates the internal rate of return and payback periods for
various types of clean energy projects. I entered in a hypothetical biomass project at
the start of our talk here. I have no idea if the assumptions are realistic, but it assumes
$5 million of capital costs and that the project is displacing anthracite coal which
costs $7 per MMBtu (million British thermal units).
I wanted to show, for this particular coal-to-biomass fuel switching project, that
the estimate is about 30,000 tons per year of CO2 emissions reductions. If you could
get a $10 price of carbon on those emissions reductions, it improves the internal rate
of return on this project by about 4 percent (from 22 to 26 percent, not too bad). It
also lowers the payback of the project from seven years to six years.
This is the kind of thing that a carbon price signal would do for biomass. It
obviously makes biomass power investments more competitive in the marketplace.
But there is a hitch that I wanted to draw on here, which is that the input fuel cost
in this model – at least in this hypothetical example – is at $1 per MMBtu for the
biomass fuel. I don’t know what biomass fuel costs. In fact, I don’t know if it’s really
a commodity market yet. But let’s consider what happens if this were to go up because
of increased demand for forest products. Maybe, for example, the timber is being sent
to a cellulosic ethanol plant because that’s where the money is or maybe it’s going into
paper if paper is the best value of the timber. Nonetheless, if the value goes up simply
because of supply and demand to, let’s say, $2 per MMBtu, then the internal rate of
return loses 4 or 5 percent.
I’m sure that biomass power is going to get a boost in a cap-and-trade world,
which we’re probably going to be living in here in the United States in, say, five years.
However, this doesn’t necessarily mean, if you’re a biomass power generator, that this
is a no-brainer. You may believe that you’re going to make a lot of money in this
carbon constrained economy, but, in fact, your feedstock might be going somewhere
else.
The point here is probably about the complexity and, as I said at the outset, the
cross currents within this value chain – certain things reinforce one another, and
other things really work against one another.
I’m sure that biomass power is going to get a boost in a cap-and-trade
world, which we’re probably going to be living in here in the United States
in, say, five years. However, this doesn’t necessarily mean, if you’re a
biomass power generator, that this is a no-brainer. You may believe that
you’re going to make a lot of money in this carbon constrained economy,
but, in fact, your feedstock might be going somewhere else.
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Biofuels are a big issue in the world right now. There’s a lot of interest in them. A
couple of years ago people thought they were a real panacea for climate. Biofuels were
going to displace petroleum and diesel, and they were going to be a great thing for
CO2 emissions. But even a few years ago, wiser heads knew that not all biofuels are
created equal, and indeed, some of them probably don’t have a net positive energy
balance, and some of them have a negative CO2 balance. That is, some of them
actually result in more CO2 emissions. Corn ethanol is the biggest offender.
Ironically though, the corn lobby is very strong, and just last year we amped up the
renewable fuel standard here in the United States. It’s now federal policy that fuel
producers use at least 36 billion gallons of ethanol by 2022, with a maximum of 15
billion gallons coming from corn.
A couple of years ago people thought they [biofuels] were a real panacea
for climate. Biofuels were going to displace petroleum and diesel, and they
were going to be a great thing for CO2 emissions. But even a few years ago,
wiser heads knew that not all biofuels are created equal, and indeed, some
of them probably don’t have a net positive energy balance, and some of
them have a negative CO2 balance. That is, some of them actually result in
more CO2 emissions. Corn ethanol is the biggest offender.
That’s a sizeable boost in ethanol. Corn will probably, at least in the near term,
dominate the market as the feed stock even though cellulosic ethanol has a much
better CO2 footprint. One would hope that the carbon price signals in this country
will reward cellulosic ethanol for that benefit, as opposed to allowing there to be, in
effect, a CO2 neutrality between that and corn ethanol which really doesn’t have the
same characteristics.
In this particular analysis that we did at WRI not so long ago, we were looking at
options for the transport sector to reduce CO2 emissions (see Figure 3). Specifically,
we were looking at carbon policy and how it intersects with energy security policy,
which can’t really be divorced from climate change policy. Climate and energy are
nearly the same.
There was a lot of talk, and still is, about coal to liquids in the United States.
Particularly because a barrel of oil is $105 right now, coal to liquids is a fairly attractive
investment as well as other things like tar sands in Canada and oil shale. The problem
with these alternate transport fuels is they have a very bad CO2 lifecycle. Coal to
liquids in particular has twice the CO2 emissions as regular petroleum. We’re a lot
better off just using oil than investing in coal to liquids. But, of course, the coal crowd
is pushing the energy security aspect of it.
With this study, we wanted to try to look at where the United States could get
win/win solutions for climate and for energy security. You can see cellulosic ethanol
right below that huge bubble of increased efficiency, and this is clearly where we
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ought to be investing. Cellulosic ethanol is a great option, at least according to our
analysis. Obviously there are many assumptions that went into this, and you can get
those from our web site2. You can see corn ethanol down along the x-axis (which
represents energy security).
Figure 3 Selected U.S. energy options for the transport sector: climate and energy security impacts
and tradeoffs in 2025
Source: WRI
With this study, we wanted to try to look at where the United States could
get win/win solutions for climate and for energy security. You can see
cellulosic ethanol right below that huge bubble of increased efficiency, and
this is clearly where we ought to be investing.
Maybe you saw some of the recent studies that came out of Princeton University and
other places that try to take into account what happens internationally when you have
a very strong price3. When you have a very strong market demand for biofuels there is
actually a lot of conversion of forest to agriculture, whether it’s for sugar cane or for
corn ethanol production, for example, and there’s so much CO2 released from the soils
that biofuels probably aren’t a good option at all, maybe cellulosic notwithstanding.
A third point about markets is the carbon advantage of forest products, and this is
with respect to the green building sector. Whether it’s plywood, particle board, timber
or hardwood, the sequestration element makes it actually a much friendlier building
product than steel, cement, concrete, etc. (see Figure 4)
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Figure 4 Forest products have a carbon advantage: Net CO2 emission (in tons/m3) of building products
Source: RTS data (1998-2001)
implications for forest products industry strategy
Imagine you’re the CEO of a major forest products company. What do you do with
this framework?
At WRI we’ve been using this framework to look at a variety of sectors. It’s pretty
self explanatory. It’s kind of a risk-based framework that looks at things like
regulatory risk, physical risk, supply chain risk, etc. In looking at a given sector, one
asks a series of questions. What are the potential impacts on the revenues and their
cost structures? How does that factor through to earnings and cash flow and
ultimately, if the company is publicly traded, stock price?
I’ll continue on with this point in a moment, but our assessment in looking at the
forest products sector is that the industry, as a whole, seems to gain. It seems as
though the idea that climate change is an opportunity is sort of contradictory because
obviously climate change is a huge challenge. Climate change is a major problem for
the world today, but for this industry as a solution provider, it’s probably an
opportunity. This comes back to some points already made. I’m referring to, for
example, the low-carbon materials (particularly for buildings), the increased amount
of biomass and biofuels, and also the enhanced forest productivity. This last item is
not something I intended to speak much about because it relates to the physical
impacts of climate change and not so much to carbon pricing. The scientific models
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that predict what is going to happen with temperature, changes in precipitation
patterns, and the like obviously show there could be major impacts, negative impacts,
to forest productivity. On balance, though, it looks like the global forest stock would
probably benefit from increased temperatures and CO2.
Although climate change may be an opportunity for the industry, I actually think
that it’s going to unsettle the industry in a very significant way – in a way that
certainly the company and investors should be thinking about. There are enormous
uncertainties, which makes it very difficult to put together a strategy with great
confidence, but there will certainly be winners and losers.
Figure 5 Major climate change risks and opportunities – financial impacts versus certainty 
Source: WRI
We were grappling with this uncertainty issue a lot as we were trying to put our
manuscript together. We were having a hard time coming to some very crisp conclusions.
Figure 5 is one approach we attempted. The x-axis measures certainty (increasing
uncertainty going out to the right) and the y-axis measures financial impacts for the
forest products industry (increasingly positive financial impacts are in the upward
direction).
Figure 5 isn’t just about carbon pricing. This is about, again, the three major
dimensions of the climate change issue – the physical aspects, the regulatory, legal,
and carbon pricing aspects, and then consumer behavior and attitudes.
Let’s look at new bioenergy markets, for example. We think that this is probably a
great opportunity for a forest owner. But what can you do to plan around it right
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now? If you were going to make a $1 billion investment in growing new forest or new
species, new rotations, new management processes, then what can you say about
where the bioenergy markets are going? I don't know that anybody knows.
Let’s move down the value chain to the mills and look at, for example, energy
prices. If you’re a very efficient mill or you can get more efficient in a carbon-
constrained world, then maybe this is an opportunity for you. On the negative side,
both in terms of increasing uncertainty and increasing negative financial impact,
there is going to be raw materials competition with the bioenergy markets.
Lastly, looking at the end market products, we saw this as being, again on balance,
a positive financial impact. But with climate policy and other things, everybody’s
trying to look into a crystal ball to figure out where both international, U.S. federal,
and U.S. state level climate policies are going to go. I think we’re starting to come out
of the haze on this, at least in the U.S., but it is a little bit of a guessing game.
A diverse industry
Figure 6 is a slightly grainy image, but I did want to speak for a moment about who these
companies are. At the top of Figure 6 are the companies that are really focusing on the
lumber and construction markets, and at the very bottom of the figure are the companies
that are focused on the paper markets; in between are the integrated forest products
companies with their annual revenues (2006 revenues) and country of domicile.
Figure 6 Forest product companies by value chain and markets (in US $billion 2006 revenues) 
Source: WRI
The point here is that the industry is quite diverse. There are different players,
different degrees of diversification and different markets that they’re going after. This
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figure doesn’t even attempt to integrate biomass power, bioenergy, and the CO2
sequestration markets; it just gives some illustrative data points. So, for example, you
have companies like Kimberly Clark which are clearly focused on paper, and the vast
majority of their market is consumer products tissue. At the other end of the
spectrum you might have Masisa, based in Chile, which is very much focused on
wood and lumber while also being vertically integrated from timber through mills.
Figure 7 CO2 emissions profile depends on position in the value chain
Source: Stith T. Gower et al., “Following the Paper Trail: The Impact of Magazine and Dimensional Lumber
Production on Greenhouse Gas Emissions: A Case Study” (Washington DC: Heinz Center, 2006).
Just to accentuate that point, here is a look at the CO2 emissions of this value chain
from two companies that are really in the retail market space (see Figure 7). Time
magazine, one of the world’s largest magazine publishers and one of the largest paper
buyers in the world, has a fairly aggressive program on CO2 (for which I commend
them). They commissioned a lifecycle assessment of the CO2 emissions that go into
their Time magazine product, and you can see that the large majority – I think about
65 percent of the emissions – come from the mills. Some of it is also from transport
and from the landfills where a very high percentage of these magazines go. In fact,
many of them never even make it off the newsstands; they just get collected and go
straight to the landfill without ever being purchased.
Home Depot is a company that’s not involved in manufacturing or pulping, but
they retail a vast amount of wood products. They also looked at their CO2 profile and
came to the conclusion that the vast majority of it was from transport – putting their
product on trucks and shipping it around either to their distribution centers or from
their distribution centers to the point of use.
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Again, there’s a lot of diversity in the industry. Depending on what kind of
company you are, where you reside, and how you’re integrated, this sort of
risk/opportunity profile of climate change is going to be very unique.
Again, there’s a lot of diversity in the industry. Depending on what kind of
company you are, where you reside, and how you’re integrated, this sort of
risk/opportunity profile of climate change is going to be very unique.
Strategic steps and investments in the new forest products sector
I tried to distill from this a few points that I would make if I were a consultant and I
was being hired by this hypothetical CEO to advise her on how to prepare her
business to play in the new forest products sector. Below is what I could come up
with:
 Invest in forest assets;
 Hedge (physical, financial, and diversification);
 Test bio-refinery technologies;
 Get smart on public policy and advocacy;
 Support consumer education; and
 Get out of compliance mindset and think strategically.
I would invest in forests. I would be buying timber, and I think a lot of people are.
I can’t say that I’m the first person to have thought of this, and indeed there’s been a
little bit of a gold rush going on in timber over the past five years, but there’s probably
a long way to go there. Unlike biofuels, where there was a massive rush into biofuels
two or three years ago and now people are starting to pull back a little bit, timber
assets are a great investment right now.
You may be familiar with the TIMO (Timber Investment Management
Organization) concept. It is kind of like a bond, a long term stable investment. If
that’s what you’re looking for, if you’re a long term investor thinking on 20, 30 year
horizons, then the value of those timber assets is probably just going to go up.
The other thing, given the amount of uncertainty that these companies are looking
at, is that you’ve got to have some kind of hedging strategy. That can involve a number
of different things. You can do physical hedging. If you already own forest and you
want to get into forests, you can achieve physical hedging by just diversifying where
you own your forest, the kind of species that you have, etc. This is probably a good way
of dealing with the physical impacts of climate change, which is a major unknown
here. There’s financial hedging. Agricultural hedge products have been around for a
long time to deal with commodity price risk, and you can do that with timber. And
then there’s also diversification – getting into different parts of the industry.
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On that point I’ll mention bio-refinery technologies. There’s a lot of
demonstration work going on right now with cellulosic ethanol, which is really
encouraging. Federal and state governments in the United States are funding
demonstration projects. I don’t personally know if cellulosic technology is on the
verge of some major breakthrough, but people in the industry tell me that it is. It
might be a good time to actually start investing in a couple of those and getting
familiar with what could be tomorrow’s technology. An integrated bio-refinery,
though, doesn’t just have to be about cellulosic ethanol. It could be a state of the art
refinery that’s set up one day to do pulping for the paper markets and, when the price
of paper drops and the price of cellulosic ethanol goes up, it switches production –
you go over to the other side of the refinery and you make ethanol.
The companies in the sector need to get very smart on public policy and advocacy.
The carbon policy, as we’ll talk about in a minute, is a major dimension of climate
change and it’s also probably the major driver here of risk and opportunity. There is
a lot of lobbying going on in Washington right now over things like the Lieberman-
Warner bill (Climate Security Act) which would cap emissions in the U.S. The funny
thing is, I don’t think the forest products industry is actually at the table. I don’t see
them there, even though they have a better story to tell than most sectors.
The companies in the sector need to get very smart on public policy and
advocacy. The carbon policy is a major dimension of climate change and it’s
also probably the major driver here of risk and opportunity.
Consumer education is another thing. This is, for example, the paper versus plastic
issue. That is, what do you get when you’re at the supermarket? I tend to think I
should be using paper for the benefit of the climate.
Lastly, you need to get out of the compliance mind set and think strategically. This
is a broader point about how sustainability and global environment issues are
shaping a new business paradigm. For the past 20 years or so, we’ve been in
compliance. Going forward, if we were to do a survey of global environmental trends
and what’s happening with water scarcity, deforestation, conventional pollution,
nitrogen loading into watersheds, climate change and so on, we’d find that, whether
businesses like it or not and whether we like it or not, environmental constraints are
going to be fundamental business drivers. I think the forest products sector could be
a major solutions provider to climate change, but they need to start thinking
strategically.
Lastly, you need to get out of the compliance mind set and think
strategically. This is a broader point about how sustainability and global
environment issues are shaping a new business paradigm.
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Examples of strategic thinking: automotive and oil and gas 
On that point, I’m going to digress for a moment from forest products and just make
a couple of fleeting points about auto companies and oil companies.
Figure 8 Why is Toyota doing well?
Source: WRI, based on data from Commodity Systems, Inc.
About five or six years ago something really fundamental started happening
between Toyota and General Motors. I’m not going to suggest that environment and
sustainability is the one thing that made Toyota a winning stock because there are so
many things that go into stock price. But Toyota’s mantra is efficiency (if any of you
have ever read about Toyota, for years it was efficiency, efficiency, efficiency, and it still
is) and they also have a very global perspective. They want to compete in all markets
and across vehicle segments, not just focusing on large vehicles but focusing on
sedans and small cars. There’s a culture at Toyota, and there’s a reason why Toyota is
now the largest car company in the world, why they’re a great stock to invest in, why
they have great technologies, why they patented a lot of the hybrid stuff, and why
investors are rewarding them with a premium. And there are reasons why General
Motors is failing – an “old school” company that I just don’t think has been thinking
very strategically on environmental issues. Their recent announcements about their
interest in biofuels are not nearly enough to transform the culture of that company.
British Petroleum (BP) and Exxon Mobil are the two largest oil companies in the
world and two of the biggest corporations in the world. The stock price index in
Figure 9 goes back to May 1997 when then-CEO John Brown, in what was a very
significant speech at Stanford University, broke with industry and came out and said
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that climate change is a big problem – the science is compelling, the issue is real, and
industry has to do something. He committed BP to being a different kind of
company. They came up with an entirely new marketing campaign – Beyond
Petroleum, and the green Helios. That’s what they call it – the Helios – and now we’re
Beyond Petroleum. They set up some very aggressive environmental programs, and I
actually commend the company for investing significantly in reducing the
greenhouse gas emissions within their boundary, inside the fence. But you look at the
stock price comparison and there was virtually no differentiation between these two
companies in the marketplace.
Figure 9 Exxon Mobil and BP
Source: WRI, based on data from Commodity Systems, Inc.
Exxon Mobil is a very different kind of oil company, and Exxon Mobil was the kind
of company that said we’re an oil and gas company, the world needs oil and gas, and
we’re going to be an oil and gas company for a very long time. They had a very
controversial CEO, Lee Raymond, who had very strong views that climate change was
not a serious issue, and was not shy about saying so. He became a magnet for a lot of
criticism.
So you’ve got Exxon Mobil, this dirty brown company, and you’ve got BP, Beyond
Petroleum. What’s going on here? When you look at the way BP has been investing its
money over the past ten years, the vast majority of its capital allocations (it’s well
above 90 percent) are going into upstream oil and gas development.
If you’re making all of your investments on oil and gas, then you’re an oil and gas
company. All of the people who own this stock, large institutional investors and the
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like, are looking at these two companies and they’re saying there is no difference
between them. These are both oil and gas companies. It doesn’t matter if you invent
the Helios and call yourself Beyond Petroleum. Ironically, of all things, about two
years ago BP had a huge explosion at their Texas City refinery, which is one of the
largest oil refineries in the world. They also had some problems with leaky pipelines
up in Alaska which curtailed their production of oil and gas, and you can see that
their stock price was punished.
So, it’s a story about what really differentiates companies. And it’s ultimately about
how you make your investments.
policy and key issues for carbon price signals
Let me conclude with a couple of remarks about policy. There is an explosion of
climate policy development happening right now. Europe is leading, other OECD
(Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development) countries are there,
and the U.S. is about to do something. The U.S. states are doing a lot of work. The
federal government is about to turn a corner, which will change the international
dynamics and hopefully clear the way for the successor to the Kyoto Protocol
agreement in 2013.




EU ETS $7,908 $24,436 $50,097 
New South Wales 59 225 224 
CCX 3 38 72 
Sub-total $7,970 $24,699 $50,393 
Project-Based Transactions
Primary CDM $2,417 $5,804 $7,426 
Secondary CDM 221 445 5,451 
JI 68 141 499 
Other 187 146 265 
Sub-Total $2,893 $6,536 $13,641 
Total $10,863 $31,235 $64,034 
There are many policy levers for tackling climate change. Taxation would be a good
one, but it doesn’t get a lot of consideration. Subsidies get a lot of attention, but
carbon trading is really at the forefront both because it worked in the U.S. for sulfur
dioxide and nitrogen oxides, and because the EU picked it up and now has a pretty
aggressive program with carbon trading. In Table 2 you can see the growth in the
regulated carbon market between 2005 and 2007. This is clearly where the U.S. is
going and – cap-and-trade policy will be the centerpiece of U.S. climate policy for a
very long time.
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4 
State and Trends of the Carbon
Market 2007 (May 2007) and
State and Trends of the Carbon
Market 2008 (May 2008),
World Bank.
There are many policy levers for tackling climate change. Taxation would be
a good one, but it doesn’t get a lot of consideration. Subsidies get a lot of
attention, but carbon trading is really at the forefront both because it
worked in the U.S. for sulfur dioxide and nitrogen oxides, and because the EU
picked it up and now has a pretty aggressive program with carbon trading.
Figure 10 Comparison of legislative climate change targets in the 110th Congress, 1990-2050
(December 7, 2007)
5
There are lots of bills that are moving through Congress. You can see from Figure 10
that “business as usual” emissions would naturally be going up, but the leading bills,
which are all pretty much authored by senators with one exception in the House, are
calling for fairly aggressive and significant emissions reductions. Bingaman (Jeff
Bingaman-New Mexico) has revised his approach, and he’s taking a much more
conservative (meaning aggressive) approach than he was previously. The Lieberman-
Warner bill is the one that gets the most attention because of the bipartisan aspects of it.
This is far from settled. There’s hope that there will be some floor votes this year
before the general election gets into full swing. More likely you might see a window
of opportunity in 2009 with a new administration and a new Congress which is
probably turning more to Democrats. An interesting outcome would be a Democratic
administration with John McCain going back to the Senate, because he is, of course,
a strong advocate for cap-and-trade policy. As a Republican in the Senate, he could
actually be a lynchpin in putting together the necessary political coalition to get over
a 60-vote filibuster. There could be a great window of opportunity next year to get a
serious cap-and-trade bill done.
The carbon price signal that is going to come down on the forest products value
chain is going to create either a push towards cellulosic, a push towards biomass
power, or maybe not very strong pushes at all, keeping the old value chains intact.
That pricing will be determined largely by the answer to these questions. How
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stringent is the cap going to be? In other words, how strict is the supply of the
allowances going to be? That’s probably the primary thing. How are these allowances
going to be allocated out to the various sectors? Will the transport sector be covered? 
The transport sector is interesting and has implications for whether or not there
will be direct or indirect pricing for biofuels. Also, you can have something called “set
asides.” There are all kinds of ways you can actually carve out these very valuable
permits – these carbon commodities – and use them to incentivize technology. You
could have these set asides for biomass power or cellulosic.
Will credits be given for carbon sequestered in products? I think the forest
products industry would like to see this, but I don’t think it will happen. The oil and
gas industry was on the idea, five or ten years ago, that they should get credit for clean
fuel products that they put into the marketplace that displaced their other products
such as petroleum and diesel. It never really went anywhere. There are all kinds of
methodological problems with proving what the displacement is downstream, and
also in proving what’s causing the actual market pull.
If a company’s going to argue that it ought to be rewarded for the embedded carbon
in its product, the corollary to that is that it has to accept the carbon liability in
products that it puts out that are not climate friendly. But, of course, people never want
to talk about that. It’s just probably an unworkable crediting mechanism in the end.
Deforestation
Finally, there is the question about whether credits will be given for carbon
sequestration in forests. Forests and climate are linked. There’s significant deforestation
that’s taking place globally and this is putting a lot of emissions into the atmosphere.
To put that into context, see Figure 11, which isn’t nearly as complex as it seems.
If you just start at the right side with the actual types of greenhouse gas emissions
in the economy from CO2 and methane, and then you work it back (to the left)
through economic activities and then ultimately to the sectors, you come up with a
couple of obvious observations. CO2 is the main emission, and it’s driven largely
through energy consumption of the three fossil fuels – coal, oil, and natural gas. But
then there is land use change, which is a very big source of emissions and it’s all
deforestation. In fact, if you go down the “End Use/Activity” column with road
transport, residential buildings, chemical sector, cement, other industries, oil and gas
refining, extraction, etc, deforestation is the single largest source of emissions globally.
CO2 is the main emission, and it’s driven largely through energy
consumption of the three fossil fuels – coal, oil, and natural gas. But then
there is land use change, which is a very big source of emissions and it’s all
deforestation. In fact, if you go down the “End Use/Activity” column with
road transport, residential buildings, chemical sector, cement, other
industries, oil and gas refining, extraction, etc, deforestation is the single
largest source of emissions globally.
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If you’re going to solve climate change, there are three things that have to happen.
You have to have a technology shift in power generation. You have to have a
technology shift in transport. And you have to deal with deforestation.
The U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change has its annual meeting, the
so-called Conferences of the Parties, which previously gave rise to the Kyoto Protocol.
They meet every year, and the last one was fittingly in Bali, Indonesia, because the
biggest issue at the conference was deforestation, which is a major issue in Indonesia.
If you’re going to solve climate change, there are three things that have to
happen. You have to have a technology shift in power generation. You have
to have a technology shift in transport. And you have to deal with
deforestation.
There’s an extraordinary convergence of interest on the part of countries, NGOs,
and others to do something about so-called REDD, reducing emissions from
deforestation and degradation. There was a lot of talk at the Bali conference about
finding a carbon price mechanism for doing that, and it’s really quite difficult. But it’s
not the only thing. You could set up dedicated funds, payments basically – North-
South payments for stopping deforestation. You could also have the so-called
sustainable development policies and measures, or SDPAMS, which are win-win type
development policies like public transportation. For example, putting in a metro
underground system in a huge urban metropolis like Shanghai would reduce traffic
congestion, reduce traffic pollution, improve local economic activity, and of course
reduce CO2 emissions. So, “sustainable development policies and measures” is UN-
speak for win-win solutions that are good for development and good for climate.
Then there’s the whole supply/demand issue, because you get into this political
fight with countries like Indonesia saying you’re the ones buying the timber. “Why do
you keep telling us that we have a problem with utilizing this valuable natural
resources which is one of the primary sources of income for us? If you’re so serious
about this, why don’t you do something on your side to change demand patterns,
particularly around things like certification and eco-labeling of sustainable forestry?”
There are lots of ways of dealing with reduced emissions from deforestation and
degradation (REDD), but a lot of people would like to get the CO2 credits, the carbon
finance. For 15 years people have been trying to figure out how to do this at a project
level, meaning they’ve got a forest and want to calculate, over time, the CO2 that’s being
sponged out of the atmosphere through sequestration to ultimately come up with a
number that says, “Here’s what I should be credited for in terms of sequestered CO2.”
It’s just very unsettled, and the science on these methods, whether it’s the baselines
or whether it’s the sequestration calculation over time, is very unsettled. That’s just
one barrier that’s hard to get around. The other, of course, is leakage, meaning that
we just protected this forest here, but we own another forest five miles down the road,
and we’re cutting that down twice as fast. Further, there’s the issue of permanence,
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meaning that we’re getting credits for this forest, but then it burns, maybe for natural
reasons, and all that CO2 just goes into the atmosphere.
These three issues have been on the table for ten years, and I don't know that there’s
been any progress in trying to solve them in a satisfactory way. And now the conversation
in Bali isn’t just about doing it at a project level, but doing it at a national level. Indonesia
is saying that they are going to put in a new federal policy for reducing national
deforestation rates, and over time they want to be credited for the reduction of that
deforestation. All of these issues still hold with the quantification methods, leakage, and
permanence. How do you prove that leakage isn’t happening and how do you ensure the
permanence? All of these things still hold, but there’s even added complexity because
now, for example, to prove that leakage isn’t happening, you’d actually have to have some
global monitoring system that would allow you to show that Indonesia’s efforts to reduce
deforestation are not being offset, for example, in Papua, New Guinea.
Figure 12 Indonesia’s deforestation rates need some guarantee of performance
Source: WRI
Just to drive this point home, Figure 12 is a calculation of Indonesia’s deforestation
rates. The first, or lowest, horizontal line, the conservation forest line, is the millions
of hectares of forest in Indonesia that are currently under protection. If you added to
that the concessions that Indonesia is given for managed forests, this is the level
indicated by the higher horizontal line, the working forest line. About 51 million
hectares are protected or managed forest in Indonesia.
They’ve got about 90 million hectares, and their current deforestation rate means
they would have nothing left but their preserved forest in something like 50 years.
Even if they improve their deforestation rate by 30 percent, meaning they reduce the
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deforestation rate by 30 percent, they’d still end up having nothing left but their
preserved forest, but just 34 years later.
If you were going to credit Indonesia for reducing deforestation and give them
tradable carbon commodities, which they would then sell onto the market so that
other countries could use them to increase their stack emissions from power plants,
etc., what are you really gaining? The answer is not much. What you’ve got to get is
some kind of stability – a line like the one in Figure 12 where your deforestation rate
goes to zero and everything is managed. At least if you’re doing that on a national or
ideally a global basis, then you might actually have some confidence in doing some
carbon crediting.
If you were going to credit Indonesia for reducing deforestation and give
them tradable carbon commodities, which they would then sell onto the
market so that other countries could use them to increase their stack
emissions from power plants, etc., what are you really gaining? The answer
is not much. What you’ve got to get is some kind of stability – a line like the
one in Figure 12 where your deforestation rate goes to zero and everything
is managed.
Ecosystem services 
I’ll conclude with a very brief point about ecosystems services. The Millennium
Ecosystem Assessment6 came up with a couple of dozen ecosystem services that are
provided to us for free – various types of services, many of which are being degraded.
The major drivers of change are land conversion, climate change, invasive species,
over-exploitation, and conventional pollution. In the case of forest ecosystems, dry
land ecosystems, aquatic ecosystems, and what you might call exotic ecosystems, most
of the trends are negative, climate change and pollution being probably the most
ubiquitous pressures.
But as we think about these things, we can look at them through a different lens.
A mountain stream becomes a water filtration plant, and one that is preferable
perhaps because it is a lot cheaper than mechanical technology. Or, for example, what
might look like a coastal ecosystem is maybe a storm protection system that protects
against the next hurricane Katrina.
There’s a lot of enthusiasm right now for creating markets that generate these
payments for ecosystem services. I know there are a few anecdotal examples like New
York City paying for some conservation measures in the Catskill Mountains to reduce
pollution loading into the Croton Harmon reservoir system, which feeds into New York
City. That’s a great example. I think there are other, hypothetical, examples like
agricultural companies paying forest owners to keep the forest stands in place because




But the one that seems to be getting the most attention is carbon sequestration. It’s
not really clear to me if there is some new market or some new system that will evolve
in parallel to what’s happening with the Kyoto discussions or with cap-and-trade
systems like the EU ETS (European Union Emission Trading Scheme), but it might.
Maybe there will be some whole new kind of certification system or a whole new
marketplace for these ecosystem services where people would buy carbon
sequestration services from a forest without necessarily looking to trade whatever it
is they received in exchange for their payment into the EU carbon trading system.
Maybe there would be some other compliance or voluntary market into which those
instruments would go.
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Question and Answer Session 
QUESTION 1: CO2 Benefits of biomass power
I have a question about Figure 2, which shows a big (negative) gain in terms of CO2 from
the use of biomass power. What were your assumptions in calculating that gain?
Certainly the biomass used had sequestered a certain amount of carbon, but then you’re
burning that and releasing it back into the atmosphere. Are you counting on that biomass
also being replaced and sequestering more? Also, what about the perturbations to the soil
and such?
Right. Well, obviously when you burn biomass, there’s CO2 going into the
atmosphere. To make the claim that you’ve actually reduced emissions, you’ve got to
start with the idea that a comparable level of sequestration is taking place, so that
whatever CO2 is going into the atmosphere is coming back out in re-growth of the
biomass. That’s basic.
In terms of the actual displacement, there are lots of techniques for doing that. I
believe that this particular analysis just did simple grid displacement, meaning that it
looked at the average grid CO2 emissions for where the plants are located. If you want
to do a really quick calculation, you could just use the U.S. grid average if this is a U.S.
focus (which I believe it is) for power generation as a source of displacement. If you
want to get much more sophisticated, you can use build margins, operating margins,
and hybrid margins in terms of looking at where you’d be getting the power. If you
weren't using biomass power, what would your alternatives be? Different people
argue that you should be looking at what would be built on the margin or what would
be operating on the margin of power generation. I actually find those modeling
exercises to be far too complex for the value of the information that they generate. I
tend to prefer just grid averages, myself.
Some of you may be familiar with this study7. This is the National Council for Air and
Stream Improvement. This came out about a year ago. I think this uses grid averages.
In terms of the actual emissions from soil disturbances and the re-growth of the
CO2, I don’t believe it was taken into consideration in this particular estimate, but it’s
a point that’s well taken.
QUESTION 2: CO2 accounting in biomass power
Not to make too much of this point, but still thinking about Figure 2, wouldn’t you consider
the mills an emissions source? If they’re already burning biomass, which most mills are
because the wood chips are already there, then it’s kind of in their baseline already. If they
increase their burning of biomass instead of fuel oil (or whatever), then that would be an
emission reduction, but otherwise it just seems to be pretty much carbon neutral.
Yes, the atmosphere is seeing emissions. The way this analysis is done is that the
blue stuff on the top is the non-biomass power consumption, and everything below
it is the biomass power consumption. But the point is that there’s CO2 coming out of
the stack when you burn biomass for power. It’s really a policy decision about how
7 
Reid Miner, The Greenhouse
Gas and Carbon Profile of the
Global Forest Products
Industry, National Council for
Air and Stream Improvement
(NCASI) Triangle Park, NC:
NCASI, 2007
you want to reward that. To date, whether it’s in a U.S. state, the U.S. federal
government, or the EU, most policy makers try to take the stance that any biomass
power generation is CO2 neutral. You could even go one step further and actually give
biomass power generators allowances that treat the emissions as neutral, in which
case they would have an asset that they could sell right back onto the market for a
gain. Does that help you with your question?
So, in Figure 2, is the dark gray neutral? Because it seems like it’s being treated as a
sink in this equation. I would agree that it would be carbon neutral but not necessarily
an additional sink.
Treated as neutral, I believe. If I’m reading it correctly, it’s treated as carbon neutral
in this graph, not as a sink per se.
QUESTION 3: Financial hedges for forest investments
What kind of financial hedges are being used that would be appropriate for the longer
term thinking that needs to go into investments in forests as opposed to, say, agriculture,
which is a shorter term investment?
I actually don’t know. I had a chance to ask a CEO of a large forest products
company what kind of financial hedging they were doing, and he said “none,” which
I found surprising.
But hedging is a funny thing. People who hate hedging are the buyers – the
commodity buyers – of these big companies because it devalues their market
knowledge. People who love hedging are lawyers and accountants because they just
want to get rid of the risk. If you are, for example, a pulp buyer for a major paper
manufacturer, then your job is to know what’s happening in the pulp markets and
where you can get the cheapest and highest quality pulp over time. That’s market
knowledge, and that’s how those guys actually earn their keep.
I think there’s a bit of an idea in the forest products sector right now that they
don’t need financial hedging. But I’m guessing and I don’t really know.
QUESTION 4: Forest asset investments
I wanted to explore a little bit further this idea of investing in forest assets because it runs
contrary to what’s actually happening in the marketplace. A lot of the companies that
you showed in Figure 6, such as International Paper, Temple Inland, and MeadWestvaco,
are actually divesting very rapidly of forestland because it’s so tax inefficient for “C”
corporations to own those assets. When you say invest in forest assets, I assume you’re
primarily talking about financial investors investing in those, or are you suggesting that
publicly traded companies should reintegrate? What’s the thinking there?
Well, both investors and some companies are investing in forests, but your point is
absolutely right. In the 1990s and up to the current date, many of the forest majors,
if you will, were divesting their forest assets because of the balance sheet accounting,
but also because the real estate values were much greater than the actual forest stocks –
they were selling their land to developers. Looking back, that might have made perfect
sense ten years ago; I just don’t think that makes sense ten years from now.
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Whether or not it makes sense because of the accounting issue for an International
Paper to go heavily into timber, I don’t know. But ABP Investments, which is one of the
world’s largest pension funds based in the Netherlands, just last year put $60 million, for
example, into a forest investment. And there’s growth in these TIMO investments. I
think that that is probably the front end of a wave of investment into timber assets that
we will see in the next five to ten years and perhaps indefinitely. Maybe it’s a better place
for just financial investors as opposed to the companies themselves, but I think
companies themselves are looking at these so-called timber investment management
organizations, which is a form private equity investing and institutional investing.
QUESTION 5: Carbon returns on forest investments
In regards to the TIMOs, I ran across some data from a conference of people involved in the
financial investment of timberland. It indicated that the forward returns on timberland
were going to be very low because the asset class had been bid up to such high levels due to
so much investor interest. Now you see, for example, CalPERS (California Public Employees’
Retirement System) and the pension fund that you mentioned in the Netherlands are taking
bigger and bigger stakes on this asset class. At what point can investors actually incorporate
into their return models some sort of return from carbon? What do you think it’s going to
take for that to become something that they can actually quantify?
A return from carbon specifically . . . ?
Yes, because right now timber investments don’t really pencil out very attractively.
When you just look at cash flows from timber and even when you incorporate real estate
development opportunities, it still doesn’t really budge above 5 percent. And so, how does
the carbon piece come into that and boost returns to something that investors might be
seriously attracted to?
I would not be betting on carbon returns in terms of sequestration. I don’t think
that biosequestration is going to be a major revenue stream. People have been
working on this for probably 15 years, and I don’t think that the major technical issues
with crediting biosequestration have been resolved in that time.
The different value chains, though, whether it’s biomass power or cellulosic
ethanol, could change the cash flow to which you referred. I would assume that that’s
what people are betting on. The overall production of at least hardwood and some
others has been flat for some time, but I don’t know cyclically why the traditional
values for pulp and paper would be flattening over the past few years. But I would
have to imagine that that’s going to change in the next five or ten years, particularly
with growth in China, India, and other major emerging markets. There’s very
significant demand in Asia right now for paper in particular, and there’s a deficit for
timber supplies in the region. I would be pretty bullish on investing in timber.
QUESTION 6: Carbon credits for biosequestration and avoided deforestation
In Figure 11, how can you say that deforestation accounts for 18.2% of net emissions and
that some aforestation is approximately a negative 1.5%, but then also say that it’s
impossible to credit sequestration from forestation, or even from the avoided
deforestation? Couldn’t you credit it but then maybe discount it for uncertainty?
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That’s certainly one of the ideas that’s been discussed. There’s an idea that if you’re
crediting a forest stand, you’d actually have to have something like a bumper crop
next to it. So if you credit 10 hectares of forest for sequestration, for example, there
has to be 2 hectares on the side; it is something like a physical insurance policy.
I think that the combination of the quantification complexities, the leakage and
monitoring issue, and the permanence issue, at least up to this point in time, have
been a really formidable barrier. People now want to take it to the national level.
There’s a huge political impetus to get it done, and there are a lot of environmental
organizations that would very much like to see a crediting mechanism occur. Yet if
we’re looking into the future and are having a conversation about what we think is
going to happen five or ten years from now, I’m a bit of a skeptic. That’s just my take
on it, not for lack of desire to see a reduction in deforestation and a system of
incentives to help drive that – I’d love to see the incentives in place. I don’t want to
see such incentives put in place in a “shell game,” however, that really doesn’t do
anything for atmosphere concentrations of CO2.
QUESTION 7: Ecosystem markets
We talked about the potential for carbon credits generated from forest preservation/
conservation, and at the end you started talking about other ecosystems services. I know
there’s a lot of talk about such ideas – and for a forest it’s not just about carbon, but also
about biodiversity, water filtration, etc. Have there been any tangible efforts to also put
these other services into some sort of market scheme?
There’s a lot of interest in the water quality benefits of the water quality ecosystem
services – water quality regulation, if you will. But it is very unsettled. The question
is, who’s buying? I mean, where is the demand coming from?  
We talk about markets or payments for ecosystem services, but I think we’re a
pretty long way off from where, for example, you would go to a clearinghouse web
site and tap in an order and buy an ecosystem service the way people buy stocks
online. We’re a long way from that. Right now you’re seeing what basically amounts
to demonstration trades where there are very specific, unique, and local economic
values that are coming from a particular ecosystem. Whether it’s a city like New York
or the hypothetical farmer I mentioned, these demonstration trades have a clear and
strong economic rationale for making a payment to keep an ecosystem intact.
The whole concept of ecosystem services is quite new. The Millennium Ecosystem
Assessment made a very smart decision to frame their analysis through that lens as
opposed to the lens of biodiversity. If the Millennium Ecosystem Assessment had
come out with lots of talk about biodiversity, it might not have stimulated the kind of
conversation that people are having now about how to create these private sector
incentives and payments for ecosystem protection. I haven’t seen a real marketplace
develop. I don’t know where it’s getting traction. I know there’s a lot of technical
analysis being done right now in terms of how one might value specific ecosystem
services. And then, of course, one has to be able to monitor and protect what it's
paying for. If the City of New York made a payment to the Catskills to protect the
water quality, for example, there would have to be some mechanism in place (and I’m
sure many legal contracts) to ensure that the measures were being taken and that the
recipients of those payments didn’t just turn around and then clear cut the forest.
That’s the best answer I can give. It’s a pretty unsettled field.
QUESTION 8: Voluntary carbon offsets
I’m wondering what you think about this upsurge in buying voluntary carbon offsets.
Could you think about that as almost a voluntary market for ecosystem services,
especially where people are paying to have trees planted and so forth?
I used to be a skeptic about the voluntary carbon market and I’ve changed a little
bit. This is not to say that I necessarily think all of the reductions are real. But the
demand for the voluntary carbon credits is real. In fact, the price is going up and there
are lots of people that want to buy them. There are the voluntary corporate targets to
reduce emissions, there are the carbon neutral events, and then there is this whole
idea of carbon neutral products and carbon neutral labeling of products with the
hope that consumers will voluntarily pick the carbon neutral product off the shelf
alongside the one that doesn’t have that label.
This voluntary carbon market is real, and it’s growing. I don't think it’s a solution
to climate change, but it’s an interesting phenomenon, and it does then become an
analog for a voluntary market for payments for ecosystem services. Maybe one day
there will be a Nike shoe that says, for instance, this shoe preserves water quality in
Papua, New Guinea. I don't know, maybe that will be the next label. It seems to be a
real phenomenon. Obviously the media has been paying a lot of attention to
environmental issues and climate in particular, and I think consumer awareness is at
an all-time high. If that continues, then these voluntary markets will have some legs.
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From Understanding to Action:
Advancing Solutions to Climate
Change on Campus, in Our
Community, and Beyond
Bryan Garcia and Eric Roberts, Center for Business and the Environment at Yale
conclusion
Today more than ever, universities have an opportunity – even a responsibility – to
direct their exceptional intellectual capacity and creativity to addressing the greatest
challenge facing our world today: how to foster an environmentally and economically
sustainable way of life. This is important work, and it begins right here, on our
campuses and in each of our communities.
As we conclude Carbon Finance: Environmental Market Solutions to Climate
Change, we believe that we would be remiss if we didn’t propose additional actions
universities could be taking up to advance the field of carbon finance, clean energy,
and climate change. In the spirit of “learning by doing,” we would like to take this
opportunity to present several recommended actions that we believe will advance our
own university’s leadership in these areas while improving upon our current
programs and activities. These actions vary in scale and scope, and are intended to
serve as a catalyst for conversation and subsequently, as a foundation for funding.
The recommendations are from the perspective of what Yale University can do to
advance solutions to climate change on campus and in our community. And while
our aim is to see these, or similar, actions in motion, we also hope that some of the
ideas presented here are useful to other universities in different applications.
on campus 
Here at Yale University, there are a number of course offerings that individually, and
collectively, prepare students for leadership in environmental markets and finance.
Over the course of the speaker series, students would ask the presenters about their
professional careers – “What courses would you recommend that I take to be effective
in an environmental market position like yours?” Based on the speakers’ responses,
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we compiled the following list of courses (see Table 1) that correspond to their views
and educational recommendations from among Yale course offerings, recognizing
that these subjects are available to students in many academic institutions across this
country and throughout the world.
Table 1 Course recommendations for students interested in careers in environmental markets and finance
COURSE # TITLE OF THE COURSE
DECISION-MAKING
MGT 536 Judgment and Negotiation
MGT 562 Behavioral Perspectives on Management
MGT 887 Negotiation
FINANCE
MGT 541 Corporate Finance
MGT 543 Financial Instruments and Contracts
MGT 544 Investment Management
MGT 545 Financial Engineering
MGT 547 Fixed Income Security Analysis
FES 50021 Financial Analysis for Land Management
FES 85030 Private Investment and the Environment
MGT 846 Microfinance & Economic Development
MGT 635 Venture Capital & Private Equity Investments
MGT 946 Venture Capital and the Finance of Innovation
MANAGEMENT, STRATEGY, AND ENTREPRENEURSHIP
FES 96112 Corporate Environmental Management and Strategy
FES 96019 Greening Business Operations
MGT 618 Entrepreneurial Business Planning
ENAS 996a Product Design for Entrepreneurial Teams
CLIMATE CHANGE, ENERGY AND TECHNOLOGY
FES 83072 Climate Change Adaptation and Mitigation in Developing Countries
FES 80105 The Economics of the Climate Issue
FES 86025 Energy Systems Analysis
FES 83064 Energy Issues in Developing Countries
ENAS 495 Seminar on Wind Energy
FES 83026 Technology, Society, and the Environment
ENAS 648 Environmental Aspects of Emerging Technology
ENAS 639 Management of Water Resources and Environmental Systems
FES 96018 Green Engineering and Sustainability
LAW AND POLICY
FES 85033 Environmental Law and Policy
FES 85035 International Environmental Law and Policy
FES 85068 International Environmental Policy and Governance
FES 80029 Local Environmental Law and Land Use Practices
FES 85011 Environmental Policy Analysis for an Unpredictable World
MGT 896 Legal Aspects of Entrepreneurship
ENAS 649 Policy Modeling
MGT 811 Taxes, Business & Strategy
PLANNING AND GOVERNANCE
FES 86048 Introduction to Planning and Development
FES 85023 Markets, Social and Environmental Certification, and Corporate Accountability
FES 86024 Transportation and Urban Land Use Planning:Shaping the Twenty-First Century City
MGT 897 Real Property
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Several of the speakers also strongly recommended having foreign language
proficiency, especially if students were interested in pursuing careers in international
environmental markets.
In addition to these course offerings, there are other programs and activities that
would be complementary and enhance our efforts to prepare leaders for business and
society. The following is a set of recommended actions to consider that involve
measures that can be taken on our own campus that could be appropriate for other
universities as well:
 Recommended Action 1 – Environmental Markets and Finance Seminars
Building on the Carbon Finance Speaker Series, there should be an effort to
delve further into more specific areas of environmental markets and finance,
including forestry and land use, transportation, air, water, waste, energy, and
other environmental sectors. Understanding the interplay between science,
policy, markets and finance will advance our understanding of the role of
government and capital markets in advancing solutions to environmental
problems. We, for example, will be continuing the Carbon Finance Speaker
Series this year, concentrating on the special areas of forestry and land use
within the context of the environmental markets.
 Recommended Action 2 – Case Study Development
There should be increased interest in supporting the research and
development of case studies that are related to carbon finance,
environmental markets, and sustainability to serve core curricula and to
complement current and future research and education programs. Case
studies should serve to not only provide students with an opportunity to
build upon the basic skills they are learning in the core curricula, but they
should also engage students in real world multidisciplinary teams that
analyze complex problems together and identify innovative and achievable
solutions that are scalable and practical.
 Recommended Action 3 – Coursework
There needs to be a continuous effort to evolve and adapt educational
coursework to the ever-changing needs of protecting the environment.
Faculty-led assessments of strengths and weaknesses of course subjects
relevant to environmental markets and finance should be an ongoing
process. And, if necessary, additional courses or advanced seminars should
be developed to meet the needs of the marketplace to support the rapid
advancements in the field of sustainability.
 Recommended Action 4 – Faculty Recruitment
The term “environmental markets” is seemingly an oxymoron. Despite this
paradox there is growing recognition that business can advance solutions to
environmental problems. To that end, there is a growing need for faculty
members who possess the knowledge and understanding of the interplay
between environmental science, policy, markets, and finance. At Yale,
consideration should be given to hire a jointly appointed professor between
the School of Management and the School of Forestry & Environmental
Studies with a research focus on environmental markets and sustainability.
 Recommended Action 5 – Joint Degree Scholarships
Preparing the most promising environmental leaders for business and
society requires that we continue to build upon our success. At Yale, going
into our 27th year of the joint MBA-Environment degree program, we need
to provide our 3-year joint MBA and Environmental Master’s degree
students with additional scholarships.
in our community
There are a number of initiatives that we can undertake to foster the connections
between the university and the communities that we live in to advance solutions to
climate change and a sustainable lifestyle. There is no better learning laboratory for
universities than their surrounding local communities. Our communities provide
students with an opportunity to apply the knowledge they are learning in the
classroom to real world environmental challenges confronting us everyday – from
food and energy, to biodiversity and water. The following is a set of recommended
actions for Yale University to consider that involve measures that can be taken in our
local communities here in New Haven and across the State of Connecticut which may
serve as a model for others:
 Recommended Action 6 – Community Carbon Fund
As a means of supporting a university’s offsite greenhouse gas emission
reduction strategies, there is an opportunity to align its educational mission
with sustainable operations. The creation of a university community carbon
offset fund could support a university’s greenhouse gas emissions strategy by
supporting local carbon offset projects as a major component of its overall
climate change strategy. Involving students alongside members in the
community would provide a meaningful learning experience that leads to
measurable reductions of greenhouse gases.
 Recommended Action 7 – James Gustave Speth Center for Local and Global
Climate Solutions
Yale should support a major fundraising effort to identify a local brownfield
in New Haven that can be the site of a future model sustainable office space
that the university would invest in to house non-profit organizations and
centers working to advance local and global solutions to climate change.
 Recommended Action 8 – Sustainable Campus and Cleantech Cluster
University investment in real estate to expand research and education
facilities for science has been steadily increasing throughout the world. In
fact, several years ago, Yale stepped up its commitment in the sciences by
investing in nearly 140 acres of property and 1.5 million square feet of
building space by acquiring the former science research facilities of a major
carbon finance: environmental market solutions to climate change
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pharmaceutical company. The new “West Campus” of Yale University should
become a model for sustainability that connects the operational
commitment of sustainability with the growing research and science of
sustainability. Perhaps there is an opportunity for the university to partner
with the state to develop a strategy to establish a cleantech cluster to advance
the technologies that will one day offer solutions to tomorrow’s most
pressing environmental challenges.
 Recommended Action 9 – Environmental Venture Prize
In an effort to inspire faculty and students across a university to take an
environmental problem and then identify a financeable solution, a prize
could be created to incite competition and innovation. At Yale, we should
launch an environmental venture prize that engages Yale faculty and
students to develop innovative programs, projects, products and services
that address environmental problems while also educating people about the
challenges of entrepreneurship.
 Recommended Action 10 – Think Globally, Invest Locally: 1% for the State
Campaign
Because of the convincing evidence presented by the various authors within
this publication, we can acknowledge that environmental investing is no
longer only a “do-gooder” strategy. We should encourage major endowment
and pension fund managers in our states to invest one percent of their assets
under management in local climate change solutions.1 In Connecticut, for
example, policies on clean energy, energy efficiency, and climate change
provide over $250 million a year in local investments . . . and growing!
Connecticut could develop a marginal abatement cost curve using the
McKinsey & Company framework that would build in local, state, and
national policies (i.e. a regional price of carbon) and incentives (i.e. clean
energy and energy efficiency) to identify a portfolio strategy with various
risk-return profiles that will both reduce greenhouse gas emissions while
achieving an investment return. We need to “think globally, and invest
locally” to accelerate the diffusion of technology by using the environmental
markets that have been established.
There are many opportunities to accelerate solutions to climate change within our
local communities to reduce greenhouse gas emissions, increase opportunities for
financial profits, and provide important co-benefits like green jobs and a more
efficient and productive economy. Yale’s support of these recommended actions (see
Table 2) will advance sustainability from our campus, out into the community, and
into our homes and neighborhoods.
The potential for universities to effect positive change is great, but it can be realized
only through practical actions, and taking those actions begins with everyone who makes
up the university community. Each of us – faculty, students, administrators, alumni,
donors – has a role to play in enabling our universities to take decisive steps toward even
greater leadership in the climate and energy arena. We need, first, the determination to
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based foundations of
Hartford, New Haven, Fairfield,
Bridgeport, New Britain,
Meriden, and others were to
invest one percent of the
assets under management,
then this would lead to nearly
$500 million of additional
investment in Connecticut
solutions to climate change.
take action. We need to collaborate with one another to organize a plan for going forward
and then carry out that plan. We need the financial resources to marshal the brightest
minds and to support bold initiatives. Perhaps most important, we need to keep before
us a shared vision of the better world we can create by moving forward together.
Table 2 Recommended actions for Yale University
ACTION RECOMMENDED EASE OF COST OF 
# ACTION IMPLEMENTATION IMPLEMENTATION
1 Environmental Markets and Easy Low
Finance Seminars
2 Case Study Development Moderate Low
3 Coursework Easy Moderate
4 Faculty Recruitment Moderate High
5 Joint Degree Scholarships Moderate High
6 Community Carbon Fund Difficult Moderate
7 James Gustave Speth Center for 
Local and Global Climate Solutions Difficult High
8 Sustainable Campus and Cleantech 
Cluster Difficult High
9 Environmental Venture Prize EasyModerate
10 Think Globally, Invest Locally – 
1% for the State Campaign Moderate High
and beyond
Much of the material within this book is national to global in scope, providing a
wealth of advice and insight for advancing environmental finance solutions within
this broader context. Therefore, in this final section, we simply wish to offer a few
more cursory thoughts to close out the publication.
To begin, if significant progress on the climate issue is to be made by internalizing,
to any great extent, the environmental costs of greenhouse gases, the U.S. needs to
adopt meaningful federal legislation. This is not only to facilitate coordination within
our own borders, but also to contribute to the learning and engagement of the
international community. The signatories to the Kyoto Protocol and certain U.S.
states, cities, and municipalities have thus far led the way. But the inefficiency that
would result from a fragmented market, along with legislative uncertainty, is a prime
concern. Further, such a disjointed market seems contrary to both the demands of a
global problem and the trend of markets generally.
Also, while U.S. federal policy is crucial and needs to be adopted quickly, there are
substantial costs to choosing an inferior policy.2 Granted, lively discussions about the
tradeoffs between a carbon tax and a cap-and-trade system are ongoing, but within
this publication, the contributors tend to either advocate a cap-and-trade or simply
take it as a starting point. Concerning a cap-and-trade policy, then, many of the
chapters point to fundamental characteristics that a successful policy would have, and
we hope those recommendations are extracted and heeded.
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See Robert Repetto’s National
Climate Policy: Choosing the
Right Architecture, Yale School
of Forestry & Environmental
Studies, 2007, at: http://www.
climateactionproject.com/
docs/Repetto.pdf
Beyond market-based policy, we are also reminded at several points in this book
that U.S. federal action, and the action of other nations, should not be constrained to
a one-dimensional approach. In Chapter 4, for instance, Abyd Karmali noted that
some simple negative abatement options may be best realized through better
standards, not market instruments. And in Chapter 7, for example, Michael Northrop
made the link between large scale, national action and state or local action: “If you
were serious as president of this country [the U.S.] about climate change, you would
start a city program for climate action. I suspect that the first president that we have
that’s serious about climate change will do that. It’s such a smart thing to do. It’s a
political win, so let’s hope we get to that point.”
At its core, this publication abundantly illustrates the power in keeping government
actions on climate change both friendly and engaging to markets so that capital and
innovation continue to increasingly flow into this space. But despite the financial upside,
the contributors to this book are generally quick to warn that friendly should not, and
cannot, come at the expense of quality. The on-the-ground entrepreneurship that the
carbon markets foster is extremely encouraging, but at the same time, it can push the
proverbial envelope on environmental integrity. Clearly, governments should strive to
maintain this spirit of ingenuity while enforcing sound criteria to prevent the same kind
of uninformed and unchecked development that has landed us in this situation to begin
with. Implicit in this is that governments should not be “picking winners.” This message
is echoed throughout the book, but it is worth repeating because if we are to really learn
how to create value worth having and find climate solutions, the process cannot be
politicized to the extent where we do not learn from our previous successes and failures
in these and other markets. Ideally, we would apply the wisdom of the world’s experts,
of which market experts and participants ought to be included.
At some point during the long process of putting this publication together, Ted Smith
wrote the encouraging message to one of us that the work we were doing was noble. Of
course, we do not carry any illusions of grandeur of our work in this regard. But in
retrospect, this word does describe how we have approached the discourse on the topic
of financial solutions to climate change. We believe that this field can be noble work, and
can be most effective when treated as such. The carbon markets could be one
incremental step in a more transformative shift in how we generate economic
prosperity, and they are an important experiment in a critical time. Can we continue to
be productive as a globe and solve our environmental problems at the same time? We
invite your comment on this question, because it is, indeed, an open question. This book
will not answer that question, but we believe it will provide you, the reader, with a more
sophisticated framework from which to ponder the possibilities. It certainly has for us.
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Robert Repetto (you will be sorely missed!), K. Geert Rouwenhorst, and Dean Gus
Speth for contributing to the dialogue, challenging our understanding, and sharing
your views. Brad, your support, intellect, and genuine concern for each and every
individual that you interact with serves as a framework for the ideal mentor. You truly
lead by example, and your participation and presence during much of this series did
not go unnoticed. Thank you.
To our friends at the Yale Office of Sustainability including Julie Newman, Bob
Ferretti, and Keri Enright-Kato, we look forward to working with you all in the years
to come as we begin to apply some of the lessons we are learning in the lecture halls
to our great university. We are eager to work alongside you to launch a test pilot of
the Yale Community Carbon Fund to provide local solutions to Yale’s greenhouse gas
emissions strategy, while also involving citizens within our local communities and
students in the process of learning how to initiate, develop, and implement successful
carbon offsets in New Haven and throughout the State of Connecticut.
To Jane Coppock, the Editor of the F&ES Publication Series and Assistant Dean,
thank you for being so patient and supportive of this speaker series and publication.
We appreciate the lessons that you have shared with us to put this together in a
professional way. It is our hope that the various chapters presented here in this
publication will serve to educate students, faculty, policy-makers, NGOs, market
markers, entrepreneurs, investors, and business professionals across the board about
the important role the finance sector plays in advancing environmental market
solutions to climate change. Thank you for your support, steadfast guidance, and
leadership.
We also want to thank our partners with the Renewable Energy and International
Law Network (REIL Network). To Leslie Parker, the salonniere of our social network
venture on renewable energy, thank you for your ability to bring us together – your
ability to “connect” leaders in the public and private sectors from throughout the
world is truly amazing. The event in partnership with the British Government,
Climate Change Capital, and the Renewable Energy and Energy Efficiency
Partnership (REEEP) on “Carbon Finance – Clean Energy – Climate Change” at the
Metropolitan Museum of Art was truly magical. Our students, faculty, and alumni
thoroughly enjoyed the opportunity to network with the best and the brightest
practitioners in the carbon markets.
And of course, to the staff across Yale University, the School of Management, and
the School of Forestry and Environmental Studies, thank you for making things
easier for this speaker series to be successful. Many thanks to Cheryl Sharp-D’Esopo,
Kathy Frost, Kimberly Barrow, and Tangela Reed for helping us reserve rooms at the
School of Management, School of Forestry and Environmental Studies, and the
McMillan Center for International and Area Studies. You all made our lives a little
easier by making the necessary facilities available for us to hold these important
events and receptions. To David Defusco, thank you for your support in helping us
design and produce press releases for the events. To our colleagues in the
development offices including Eugenie Gentry, Tim Northrop, and Sarah Shrewsbury
at F&ES, as well as Joel Getz, Kathleen Brown-Dorato, and Elizabeth Costa at SOM,
and David Vogel and Jack Fracasso from central, thank you all for your support of
CBEY. You are the enablers, so thank you.
To Jaan Elias, Allison Mitkowski, and Alexandra Barton-Sweeney, we look forward to
continuing to work with you to turn these stories into business case studies for the
classroom. The intersection of business and the environment is complex and offers some
of the most significant management challenges of our time. We look forward to
continuing our work with you to prepare environmental leaders for business and society.
To our colleagues in the Yale University Office of the Secretary and Media Services
specifically Lucas Swineford, Carl Schumaker, and Arthur Greisner for working with
us to bring these presentations to the world through Yale netcasts – thank you.
Arthur, we especially appreciate your professionalism and reliability in engineering
the technical aspects of almost all of our talks. We look forward to working with you
all in the years ahead to continue to utilize the newest technologies and formats to
disseminate this important educational information to the world. You have helped us
expand our audience outside of the classroom and into the world.
Many thanks to our “last second” proof readers Neda Arabshahi, Geiv Dubash,
Scott Gosselink, Sarah Lowery, Ramon Olivas, Siddarth (Sid) Ratnaswamy, Craig
Roberts, Stella Z. Schons, Mike Sesko, and Jessica Strauss for lending us a pair of fresh
eyes when we needed them the most!
And finally, to the reader, we want to thank you in advance for reading this
publication. It is our belief that the tools of finance have a lot to offer in terms of
advancing solutions to environmental problems and the speakers in this series are
among the world’s leaders in carbon finance. We have only begun to imagine the
positive role of financial innovation, and it is critical that we continue to explore and
experiment with its potential to help all of us solve the problems that matter. Climate
change is obviously one such imperative that is unquestionably worthy of investment
and innovation now and in the many years to come. We hope that this publication
serves to inspire you to think differently about carbon finance and its role in
providing environmental market solutions to climate change.
Bryan Garcia and Eric Roberts, Co-Editors
Center for Business and the Environment at Yale
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Mr. Garcia is the Program Director of the Center for Business and the Environment at 
Yale. He previously served as Director of Energy Market Initiatives at the Connecticut 
Clean Energy Fund, during which he invested resources that made Connecticut a national 
leader in voluntary clean energy markets. He created the EPA and DOE award-winning 
Connecticut Clean Energy Communities Program, which was funded in large part by a 
renewable energy credit trading program he devised. Mr. Garcia served as the Climate 
Change Coordinator for the Governor’s Steering Committee on Climate Change where 





the importance of economic development and climate protection. This plan received 
international recognition and won an EPA Climate Protection Award.






energy technologies. He is currently the Chairman and Co-Founder of the Connecticut 
Green Building Council and a Co-Founder of SmartPower. He also has served on the 
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Environmental Management degree from Yale University.
Bryan Garcia
Program Director,











Environmental Market Solutions to Climate Change
About the Editor
Eric Roberts is a joint-degree, Master of Business Administration and Master of
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about the cover image









We chose images on the cover
to depict greenhouse gas
emission reduction measures
in the energy, transportation,
agriculture and forestry
sectors.
About the Cover Image
The cover image of Carbon Finance: Environmental Market Solutions to Climate
Change was inspired by the McKinsey & Company abatement cost curve.1 This curve
is mentioned extensively throughout the publication, so we felt that it was
appropriate to acknowledge its role in the on-going discussion of climate change
solutions being offered by the finance sector and business communities.2
In an abatement cost curve, there are several kinds of information being conveyed,
including:
 Portfolio – a portfolio of measures (i.e. residential lighting, fuel economy
packages, and active forest management) to reduce greenhouse gas
emissions across societal sectors – this is represented by the various bars
running across the horizontal axis;
 Environment – the estimated environmental benefit in terms of reducing
greenhouse gas emissions (MTCO2) for each of the measures in the portfolio
– this is represented by the width of each of the bars;
 Economics – the estimated economic costs (or benefits) of each of the
emission reduction measures ($/MTCO2 reduced) – this is represented by
the height of the bar and its position above (i.e. marginal cost) or below (i.e.
marginal benefit) the vertical axis; and
 Goal – the societal goal or target that the portfolio of emission reduction
measures is trying to achieve in a specific period of time (i.e. a reduction of
greenhouse gas emissions 20% below 1990 levels by the year 2020) – this is
represented by the endpoint of the collection of measures on the horizonal
axis.
The abatement cost curve represents a powerful communication tool in advancing
the conversation on solutions to climate change from local communities to the
nation, and beyond. The abatement cost curve framework should lead investors,
thought leaders, and policymakers alike to recognize the importance of maintaining
a balanced portfolio of greenhouse gas emission reduction measures. While our cover
image is really a metaphor, such a curve, when carefully constructed, conveys the
feasible set of business and investment solutions available, along with their relative
merits, for reducing greenhouse gas emissions from human activities.

